Why the naïve Derivation Recipe model cannot explain how mathematicians’ proofs secure mathematical knowledge

Larvor, Brendan (2016) Why the naïve Derivation Recipe model cannot explain how mathematicians’ proofs secure mathematical knowledge. Philosophia Mathematica, 24 (3). 401–404. ISSN 0031-8019

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The view that a mathematical proof is a sketch of or recipe for a formal derivation requires the proof to function as an argument that there is a suitable derivation. This is a mathematical conclusion, and to avoid a regress we require some other account of how the proof can establish it.

Item Type	Article
Additional information	This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Philosophia Mathematica following peer review. Under embargo. Embargo end date: 7 July 2018 The version of record [Lavor, B., 'Why the Naive Derivation Recipe Model Cannot Explain How Mathematician's Proofs Secure Mathematical Knowledge', Philosophia Mathematica (2016) 24(3): 401-404, is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkw012. © The Author [2016]. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
Keywords	proof , mathematics, derivation, logic, philosophy
Date Deposited	15 May 2025 13:07
Last Modified	04 Jun 2025 17:06