Ideologies of Arab media and politics: a critical discourse analysis of Al Jazeera debates on the Yemeni revolution

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Abstract and keywords

Abstract:

Critical discourse analysis investigates the ways in which discourse is to abuse power relationships. Political debates constitute discourses that mirror certain aspects of ideologies. This study aimed to uncover the ideological intentions in the formulation and circulation of hegemonic political ideology in TV political debates that occurred in the 2011-2012 Yemen revolution, examining the question of *how ideology was used as a tool of hegemony*. The corpus of the study consisted of fifteen debates (73915 words) from four live debate programmes (The Opposite Direction, In Depth, Behind the News and the Revolution Talk) staged at Al Jazeera Arabic TV channel between 2011 and 2012. Al Jazeera was selected as the focus of this study because of its position as the most popular TV in the Arab world and due to its strong presence during the Arab revolutions. Two debate sides were identified: government, representing the president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his regime, and protesters, who represented the discontent populace gathering squares who demanded the abdication of the president. Data were also obtained from interviews conducted with the Al Jazeera staff who managed the debates. Analysis was conducted on the verbal discourse aspects of four debates, one debate from each programme, using critical discourse analysis: aspects from the van Leeuwen's (2008, 2009) Social Actor Network model, supplemented by additional linguistic features. The results were triangulated using computer-assisted corpus analysis for the entire corpus, the fifteen debates. AntConc (version 3.2.4w) was used to process the keyword lists, word concordances and collocations. The results of the analysis were then compared with the interviews with AJ staff. The main research finding was that although results of the critical discourse analysis correlated with those of the

computer-assisted corpus analysis, they differed to a marked degree from the perceptions of Al Jazeera staff. Also, evident is that Al Jazeera and the protesters had similar ideological intentions, including glorifying the revolution and inciting protests, which was not the case with the government speakers. Overall, the findings show that Al Jazeera displayed evident bias, excluding the government from its debates in a way that runs counter to its mission statement and the tenets of objective journalism. The findings of this study illustrate the powerful role that language plays in shaping ideological media intentions and influencing the media audience.

Keywords:

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Abbreviations[1]

AJ	Al Jazeera TV Network
AJA	The Arabic TV channel of Al Jazeera Network
AJE	The English TV Channel of Al Jazeera Network
CA	Conversation analysis
CDA	Critical discourse analysis
CL	Critical linguistics
DA	Discourse analysis
DN	Director of Al Jazeera net, was interviewed in Qatar
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Imarets)
GI	The Gulf Initiative
HO	Head of Output, was interviewed in Qatar
IE	Interviewee
IR	Interviewer
M1	A female moderator of AJ who was interviewed
M2	A male moderator of AJ who was interviewed
M3	A female moderator of AJ who was interviewed
M4	A male moderator of AJ who was interviewed

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[1] Listed alphabetically

Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide a coherent introduction to the current study. First, an explanation is given on the rationale for conducting the study. This is followed by a comprehensive definition and discussion of the context of the study, followed by the statement of the research problem, the specific aims and questions of the study, the chosen approach to data and corresponding research methods, and the significance of the study within the field as a whole. This chapter concludes by providing an overview of the structure of the dissertation, in an attempt to make its arguments clear and effective.

1.1 Rationale for the study

The concept of ideology refers to a set of held beliefs and attitudes, and is linked to language, power and society. This concept has also been defined as:

> a mechanism of power in modern society, as against the exercise of power through coercive means, and on the other hand has come to see language as a, or indeed the, major locus of ideology, and so of major significance with respect to power (Fairclough, 2001a, p. 10).

This quote means that language is a stage for exercising power through ideology. Besides, manipulation, which is always intentional and covert, and in which the arguer violates the sincerity or responsibility of the speech act of argumentation, and ideology are two focuses on the study of language (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012).

Ideology functions where there are unequal relationships. Showing one's practices as common sense is an ideological power of discourse (Fairclough, 2001a). Therefore, discourse that functions ideologically sustains unequal power relations, which occur between social groupings

of institutions, young versus old people, women versus men, ethnic groups and societal class relations (ibid).

A person's representation of the world around her/him is affected by her/his previous knowledge, attitude and ideology which s/he has about the world. These three factors are presupposed in discourse and are subject to consistent alteration by time, dependent on a range of mitigating factors, including social situations, time, place and literacy. For this reason, the study of ideology within discourse is significant in linguistic research, whereby discourse is linked to power, especially that which exist within many areas such as media and politics. In the current study, this investigation is enabled through the use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which has the goal of seeing beyond texts in the study of diverse topics, such as women, minorities, refugees, politics, or the media. The aim of CDA is to examine how language is used in order to uncover and better understand power relationships, including hidden ideologies.

The focus of the present study is media discourse on the revolution in Yemen and, more specifically, the way in which it was presented by Al Jazeera (AJ). AJ is the most popular and influential TV channel in the Arab region as it is the Arab's main news source. AJ is also the first TV network to challenge the traditions and political restraints in the Arab world by airing programmes that present all opinions and political perspectives, to the extent that the network was accused of having stimulated protests during the Arab revolutions (2010 to date) (Gelvin, 2012). Furthermore, AJ has been accused of being a controversial media giant; it started as an independent free channel, but was later restricted by Qatar politics. AJ has two channels: English (AJE) and Arabic (AJA), the second of which is more popular and widely followed (Al Shroof, 2015). Therefore, AJA is more representative of the discourse of media in the Arab world and is more significant to the Arab events, culture and society. The motto of AJ is 'the opinion and the

other opinion' which means that the channel is neutral as in its programmes; it involves all points of views. So, for any argument, AJ is expected to present all sides of the discussed topic. Despite this motto, the channel might reflect a contradiction in its programmes such as having a mixture of conservativeness and secularism.

The discourse of revolutions is a worthwhile significant area for academic study for a number of reasons, despite revolution discourse not being widely investigated in literature. This is especially true in the Arab context, where no research to date has examined the revolutions of certain Arab countries, such as the Yemeni revolution (Tripp, 2014). However, the Arab revolutions started in 2010 and are still ongoing in some Arab countries, including Yemen and Syria, with results that have become unexpectedly undesirable. It can even be argued that these social movements have had a sufficiently destabilising effect to contribute to the Arab world becoming one of the most unsettled war zones in the world and a dominating topic in global politics. Most significantly, the discourse of Arab revolutions is expected to result in corpus that is rich in ideology, especially given that the history of the Arab world is rich in revolutions, in the state of Yemen in particular (Day, 2011). Finally, studying the revolution discourse of the Arab world may be useful and informative with regards to linguistically detecting the ideological perceptions of countries regarding other countries, such as Saudi Arabia's view towards Yemen.

1.1.1 *Yemen*
Yemen is strategically located in Southwest Asia, at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula between Oman and Saudi Arabia. It is situated at the entrance to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Yemen's area is spread over 527,970 square kilometres, with its capital city, Sana'a, located in the south.

A sizeable proportion of the population of the Arab peninsular originally migrated from Yemen. According to Ingramz (2007), approximately 10,000,000 people migrated to the north east of the peninsula. 'Struggle for patriotic freedom' is a lifelong theory caused by people's colonisation such as the British intervention in Yemen (Officers, 1993). An example of the diversity in Yemen is that the south broadly adheres to Sunnah Islam, whereas the north of the country is Shia (Ingramz, 2007). Muslims of different Islamic branches have strong religious and social perceptions about each other.

A significant characteristic of Yemeni politics is the continued influence of the tribal system. Interviews with a group of Yemeni officers (1993) have shown that every tribe has a male leader, who inherits the position and strongly influences the strength of the tribe through their individual personality and wisdom. Most importantly, the closer the link between the tribe and that of Prophet Mohammed (pbuh), the more respected it will be among the other tribes.

1.1.2 *The Yemeni revolution*

The major surrounding event affecting the vast majority of the Arab world when this research began was the revolutionary wave of demonstrations during which the local people protested against their governments in the demand for political and economic reforms. The revolutions mainly took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, which are listed here in terms of their chronological order, from the oldest revolution to the newest, from 2010 to date. The revolutions started in Tunisia when a Tunisian youth named Muhammed Bouaziz set himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. This sparked protests across the Arab world, with nearly every Arab country experiencing some level of protests since 2010. The unset was caused by many factors. As unemployment was rising due to shifts in the structural growth of resources in the Arab world (Kadri, 2014), it is argued that the revolutions were ignited by a lack of jobs in many

Arab countries. Added to this is the complex set of social, economic and political foundations which brought people to streets including deep oppressive security apparatuses, failed economy, widespread corruption, rampant poverty and social injustice (Zurayk & Gough, 2014). At the time of writing, the revolutions have so far resulted in the 'ousting' of the presidents of four Arab countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

According to Day (2011), months before the street protests took place in Tunisia in 2011, a revolutionary climate was already beginning in Yemen. In fact, the events that transpired in Yemen were far from an echo of events in other Arab countries. In fact, Yemen was melting down due to upsets in the country, such as the Houthis in the south, and Al-Qaeda's presence, so it can be argued that the origins of the revolution could be traced to 1990, with the country's troubled national unification (ibid). The major focus of the Yemeni revolution took place at the Sana'a University campus, leading to the establishment of the permanent site of public protest in Sahat al-Taghyir, the Changing Square of Yemen. The venue choices of the Arab revolutions, the Changing Squares, were not arbitrary, instead representing what citizens felt about institutions and the spaces around them (Tripp, 2014). The revolution in Yemen may also have been inspired by the Tunisian uprising, after which it was initiated by students and unemployed graduates on 15 January 2011.

Following is an alphabetical list of major names in the Yemeni revolution.

Abd al-Rabo Mansour Hadi was the vice president of Yemen from 1994 to 2011, and replaced Saleh as the head of state in November 2011.

Abdullah al-Ahmar was a paramount Sheikh of Hashid tribe, head of the Islamic Islah party and speaker of the Yemeni parliament from 1932 to 2007.

Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh is president Saleh's son and head of Republican Guards since 2000.

Ali Abdullah Saleh was the president of Yemen and founder of the northern ruling party from 1982 to 2011. Saleh's family was from a clan of the Sanhan tribe, part of the larger tribe of Hashid. Soon after becoming the president, Saleh appointed the men of his extended family in top military and security posts (Day, 2011).

Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar was the general, distinct relative of Saleh and defected from Saleh in March 2011.

Sadiq al-Ahmar was the top Hashid Sheikh who detached from Saleh in May 2011.

By the time the revolution began in Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen had already been ruling the country since 1990, making him one of the longest-ruling heads of states in the Arab world. Although Saleh announced that he would not contest the upcoming presidential elections in 2005, he changed his mind and amended the constitution in 2010, thereby making himself the president of Yemen for life. Additionally, the evidence supported the idea that Saleh was grooming his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, the commander of the Republican Guard and Special Forces, to succeed him (Gelvin, 2012). In February 2012, the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh relinquished power to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi, who formed a new government that constituted the opposition. Hadi faced huge challenges in light of a collapsed economy, a humanitarian crisis, political instability, greater US involvement, and most importantly, unresolved conflicts in several parts of the country (vom Bruk, et al., 2014). So, the Yemeni revolution took one year from early 2011 to early 2012.

Yemen is an interesting and valuable subject for study, given its status as the poorest country in the Arab world, with high unemployment and illiteracy rates, as well as having an infrastructure

that is confined to its major cities. Yemen is also unique, because it remains a strongly tribal country, wherein society is linked and profoundly affected by tribal affiliation and violence. Yemen also has 'the most heavily armed population in the Arab world' (Gelvin, 2012, p. 83). Recently in 2015, after many parties took advantage of the situation in Yemen to create conflict or to take revenge, the Yemeni revolution has advanced into a war. The war has continued, with the situation worsening, until mid-2016, when this dissertation was submitted.

Women featured as leading participants in the demonstrations. During the protests, women shared slogans similar to those of men, however cultural reasons meant that these protests were perceived as inappropriate and so they had little strength (Zubaida, 2014). One of Yemen's protesting activists was the journalist Tawakul Karman, who was 'awarded the Nobel Peace Prise in 2011 for her sustained advocacy of human rights and press freedom' (Tripp, 2014, p. 150). The participation of women was used by regimes to adversely affect the image of the revolution, especially to the vast majority of the Muslim population around the Arab world who hold the belief that women should remain in their houses and should not fight. One example of this is the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who publically proclaimed during the revolution in 2011 that demonstrating constituted improper conduct for women, as they should not mix with men in public spaces:

> *I demand the protesting youth to condemn the mixing of women and men at the University Street; Sharia forbids the mixing.*
>   Ali Abdullah Saleh (April 15, 2011)

Touching women's issues is a sensitive matter for Muslim communities as it is generally believed in the Arab world that based on their biological nature, women should not have been among the protesting squares of the Arab revolutions.

To conclude, the Arab revolutions started in 2010 and are still in the process of development, with repercussions that are still evident at the time of submitting this dissertation. However, while the Arab revolutions have been associated with the positive outcome of renewal springtime, thereby earning the uplifting title the 'Arab Spring', the results of the revolutions cannot be truly signified until a new era in Arab politics has been inaugurated. The Yemeni revolution contains a wealth of interesting events, including those that touched on women's participation in the revolution.

1.1.3   Al Jazeera Channel

The word 'Al Jazeera' means 'the Peninsula' in Arabic. It is the name for a large and influential media network that started in 1996. Al Jazeera (AJ) is headquartered in the Arab Gulf country of Qatar. AJ has provided access to modern journalism for the Arab world by breaking the established taboos of media in the region, such as interviewing Israeli officials or dealing with Arab regimes. According to Hammond (2007), the Al Jazeera channel has offended almost all Arab governments. A sizeable proportion of this offence has been attributed to the actions of Al-Itojah al-Mu'akis (lit: The Opposite Direction), which is the leading debate programme on the channel. The presenter of the programme is Dr. Faisal Al Qassem, who was hired by Al Jazeera from the BBC World Service Radio. Al Qassem allows debate guests to express themselves freely and allows the show to degenerate into shouting matches. An example of the strength of the way in which this programme breaks taboos is the argument between the Egyptian feminist Nawal Al Saadawi and the Islamic preacher Yousef Al Badri, who were given a forum to talk face-to-face for the first time.

The following is an extract from El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) which further reveals a perspective on the foundation of AJ as a free media network:

> Officially, Al-Jazeera is an independent network, its only connection to the Qatari government being its funding. This freedom has allowed Al-Jazeera's considerable scope. Political talk shows are now a regular feature of Al-Jazeera's programme listings and viewers are now openly encouraged to call in and voice their opinions. Only Al-Jazeera has dared to challenge Arabic traditions and political restraints by airing programmes open to all opinions and political constraints. Al-Jazeera's staff prioritise stories according to local politics, and much of worthiness, not their acceptability to local politics, and much of Al-Jazeera's material is broadcast live (p. 42).

AJ is the most successful channel and is the leader of the Arab broadcasting (Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007).

Al Jazeera has channels that speak either English (Al Jazeera English- AJE) or Arabic (Al Jazeera Arabic- AJA) languages. According to Sue Philip, the director who was interviewed by Barkho (2011), AJA and AJE have different social and linguistic practices. As they are two different channels, using different languages, the selection of language is highly significant.

1.2 Statement of the problem

When this research commenced, massive demonstrations were developing across the Arab world. Many have argued that Al Jazeera has played an important role in these revolutions, potentially even having escalated the events by broadcasting incidents from the gathering protests and frequently reporting from locations where demonstrations were taking place, in addition to giving updates about specific numbers of demonstrators present. AJ relied on the event details and numbers as reported by the protesters only (Al Shroof, 2015). Commentators

have argued that AJ might appear to be a controversial channel in its policies, future directions, and reporting. An example here is whether or not AJ supports the Islamic movements. According to Zayani and Sahraoui (2007), AJ has a populist orientation that affects and is affected by Arab public opinion by giving people what they want, adding that AJ is somehow lost:

> there is a perception that, in spite of the channel's proclaimed commitment to multiple views; its editorial line is not all that neutral. Even within Al Jazeera, there is a feeling that Al Jazeera has a 'channeling dimension'. Furthermore, there are certain orientations at the levels of news broadcasting which are indicative in and of themselves. Rather than a clear-cut policy that is well thought out, what prevails in Al Jazeera are poles of power which often translate in the work environment into bonding and grouping based on a common school of thought, an ideologically affinity or a religious rapprochement (p. 60).

Zayani and Sahraoui (2007) justify the controversy of AJ by stating that the channel was not allowed to expand naturally, as the media giant was under the scrutiny of its management and leadership. This means that, over time, institutionalisation has become more important than success. By studying its discourse, the standing point including the ideologies of AJ could be determined.

In this study, the discourse and ideologies of the debates held by AJ will be examined using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This approach studies the way in which language is used in abusing power relations, which is particularly evident in the media and political spheres. CDA uses a wide array of linguistic analysis categories and "endeavours to make explicit power relationships which are frequently hidden and thereby to derive results which are of practical relevance" (Meyer, 2007, p. 15).

1.3   Study aims and questions

This section presents the aims and the research questions of this study. By studying the ways in which language was employed by Al Jazeera Channel and by the political sides of the Arab revolution, this research seeks to investigate the ideologies used by media and politicians, exploring the significance of language in social relations. The study answered the following research questions:

Main research questions

1. Was language used to achieve hegemonic ideology in the Al Jazeera's political debates of the 2011-2012 Yemen revolution? If yes, how?

2. How can CDA help identify and unpack ideology in discourse? Does CDA need to be supplemented by another method?

Subsidiary research questions

1. How are social actors represented in the debates by Al Jazeera, government and protesters? What ideologies do these representations serve?

2. Is it possible to detect, *implicitly or explicitly*, the ideologies of the government and protesters? If yes, what objectives do these ideologies serve? Is the language of female protesters characterized by the use of emotional discourse? If yes, how?

3. Is it possible to detect, *implicitly or explicitly*, Al Jazeera ideologies? If yes, what objectives do these ideologies serve and do these objectives correlate with the statements of the selected members of Al Jazeera staff?

1.4 **Data and methods**

This study relies upon two main sources of data. The first of these is a comprehensive overview of the Arabic language debates on the Yemeni revolution, which were held by the Al Jazeera channel in 2011-2012, the transcripts of which were made available online and readily transcribed by the channel online. These debates are important as they provide lexical data of many events throughout the period of the Yemeni revolution, thereby helping to ensure that findings of the study are based on the use of language by many programme moderators and speakers. The other data relied upon in this study were collected from interviews with members of AJ who managed the debates. The methodological basis of this study adheres to Critical Discourse Analysis as its main methodological approach, the main aim of which is to investigate the use of language and its effect on power relationships that are evident in media and political discourses.

1.5 **Limitations of the study**

Although decisions were made due to the limited time and resources available to a PhD study, it would have been preferable to have been able to include more empirical studies done in the Arab revolutions in the literature review and in the critical discourse analysis of the language used during the revolutions. This was also influenced by the fact that the Arab revolutions are an event that is contemporary to the study and are even still affecting some Arab countries. This in fact contributes to the originality and significance of the current study. In Yemen, the result of the revolution has deteriorated into war that is ongoing at the date of this dissertation submission. In addition, there was a limited access to a relatively secretive and high level media organisation such as the number and selection of the interviewed members of AJ. Besides, due to the limited participation of females as political debate guest speakers, study findings on the use of political

language by female politicians were limited to the discourse used by the one featured female speaker.

1.6 **Significance of the study**

There is broad agreement in linguistics that "discourse types and orders of discourse vary across cultures" (Fairclough, 2001a, p. 40). Although aspects of discourse of the English language have been widely investigated in literature, there is a relative paucity of similar studies into the Arabic language. Since the Arab cultural context of discourse varies from the discourse of the English language culture, this study therefore contributes significant findings in addressing the gap in literature of inverstigating Arabic discourse.

In addition, it is of a great significance to embark upon the language used in Arab media as nowadays; Arab news is dominating media, politics and humanitarian crisis across the world. Although previous studies have been conducted in CDA of discourses related to the Arab revolutions, such as those by Alaghbary (2014), Ayasrah (2015) and Kawakib (2016), none have examined the discourse of Al Jazeera and the political aspects of the revolutions. Therefore, this study contributes significantly in investigating the discourse of Arab's leading media giant (AJ).

In addition, it is imperative to specifically study the language of the Yemeni revolution as Yemen suffers from regional divisions among its people and the country has witnessed many revolutions during the course of its history. The regional divisions make linguistic shifts more evident. The time the revolution started in response to the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions; there had already been conflict in Yemen. According to Day (2011), Yemen began to fragment into smaller states as early as 2009. The future of the revolution was unclear, as sides other than ordinary citizens stood to benefit from the revolution. These parties include Al-Qaeda, which is

at its strongest in Yemen, and the Houthis, who are the Zaidi Shia Islamist sect in the South who have a history of seeking separation from Yemen.

From a methodological perspective, the current study has also significance. This study mediates how language was used by and towards women. This is of particular importance as gender has not been widely investigated in the Arabic language, with studies in language and gender being barely known in the Arab Islamic world at large (Sadiqi, 2003). Therefore, this study addresses an observed gap in the extant literature, contributing significantly to the understanding of how discourse is used by and with women. This study also employs aspects of a critical discourse analysis model which was firstly designed for English language corpus and therefore contributes to the field of research by utilising the model in the analysis of the Arabic language.

Most significantly, the results of this study are useful in understanding how ideologies and perceptions of the world inform language and actions. Although this study is in linguistics, its results and recommendations may be useful for further research in fields as diverse as media production, change and policy. To summarize, this study contributed to research in terms of the culture of discourse, genre and mode of the corpus, methodological framework employed in the study and the surrounding context of the study.

1.7 The organisation of this dissertation

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the study, providing the rationale of the study, its context which includes the Arab revolutions and AJ debates, a statement of the problem, the specific study aims and questions, an overview of the data and methods, and a brief discussion of the significance of the study.

Chapter two reviews the literature related to the study. First, it introduces discourse and, critical discourse analysis and its criticism. Then, it provides four well-known CDA theories. Then, it gives the pillars of CDA in this study which are argument, power and ideology. Other theories investigated in the second chapter are corpus analysis and conversation analysis (CA).

Chapter three provides the methodology used in this study. First, the corpus is explained: data collection, debates, data representation and, differences between AJ's transcript and the video recordings of the debates. Second, details on the trip to AJ network in Qatar and the interviews which were conducted with AJ staff are given. The data analysis framework is also elaborated.

Chapters four, five, and six present the data analysis. Chapter four presents the analysis of four debates, one from each of the four debate programmes, using critical discourse analysis. Analysis is provided thematically, based on the notions which have emerged by the analysis. Chapter five presents the triangulation of the CDA. Chapter six presents the analysis of the interviews which were conducted with AJ staff.

Finally, chapter seven offers the conclusions, limitations and recommendations of the current study. It compares the results of this research with empirical studies done in media discourse, political discourse and gender.

Chapter 2: Literature review

2.1 **Introduction**

This chapter reviews the extant literature related to this study in order to provide a coherent theoretical background to the investigation of CDA, situating the empirical research within the broader, established tradition of academic work. This chapter starts by discussing the topic of 'discourse', followed by an overview of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the key criticisms that have been levelled against this approach. CDA is discussed in relation to four main CDA approaches: 'discourse as a social practice' by Norman Fairclough, 'the discourse-historical approach' by Ruth Wodak, 'social cognition' by Teun van Dijk and 'social actor network' by Theo van Leeuwen. Power, ideology and argument are then discussed in more detail, as these constitute the three main pillars of CDA. The other theories used in this study, corpus-based discourse studies and conversation analysis, are then explained in detail. Extensive reference will be provided to important scholars in this field, with particular note of Fairclough and van Leeuwen, who are two of the most influential theorists of CDA and whose CDA frameworks have been widely influential among CDA researchers.

2.2 **Discourse**

There is no straightforward or universally accepted definition of the term 'discourse'. Foucault (1972), one of the major founders and influencers of the field, notes that discourse is continually changing and that definitions should therefore take up the term at its very root. Many academics agree that the term discourse is "wide ranging and slippery" and therefore a precise definition for it should be avoided (Edley, 2001; Taylor, 2001b). Lahlali (2003) adds that the meaning of discourse is multidimensional and intricate, as in addition to expressing ideas and paradigms, discourse plays an active role in human interaction and understandings. Another linguist who discusses the reasons for which it is difficult to discuss discourse is Attar (2012), who claims that

the conflicting and overlapping definitions come from the different disciplinary and theoretical standpoints that discourse has. El-Sharif (2011) agrees with this position, arguing that the notion of discourse is too complex to be encapsulated in a single definition.

Although Attar (2012) distinguishes discourse as referring to spoken and written language, it is argued here that discourse is more than these languages of communication, which is supported by the work of Fairclough who is one of the major theorist of discourse. Fairclough (2001a, p. 20) states that text is only one aspect of discourse, which actually encapsulates "the whole process of social interaction", including all ways that people utilise language to present the world around them, such as the way they feel, believe, and socialise. Fairclough divides this process as follows: the process of production, a text is produced, and the process of interpretation, text is a resource. In this paradigm, discourse therefore includes verbal and visual terms of language, such as shoulder shrugging, head movements, gestures, facial expressions, revolution and posture. Fairclough (2001b) links discourse to social life defining it as the representations of social life that are positioned in different ways, meaning that discourse can also be understood as "social use of language in social contexts" (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 81). There are many components of discourse, which Gee (2005, p. 33) suggests categorising as 'situated identities, characteristic identities, ways of coordinating and getting coordinated by others, things, tools, technologies, symbol systems, places, times, acting, gesturing, thoughts and feelings'. Nevertheless, there may be unequal structure given to the power relations in the society that are shaped by discourse. Fairclough (2001a) justifies the unequal power relationships in the society by showing that the discourse of the non-powerful speakers is controlled by the powerful speakers

Despite the fact that power relations are constrained by discourse, Fairclough (2008) argues that a way in which people identify themselves is the way they use text. Ibid refers to this identification as "the texturing of identities", which figures as a part of social activity within a practice, such as part of doing a job; in representations as with the self and others; and in ways of being, such as the constitution of political versus ordinary identities.

2.3   Critical discourse analysis (CDA)

The critical approach is currently one of the more prominent approaches in the field of linguistics and is closely related to both critical linguistics (CL) and critical discourse analysis (CDA), although the CL and CDA are often used interchangeably. Having been derived from the work of Bednarek and Caple (2012), CL and CDA are interested in uncovering power relations and ideologies behind discourse. Therefore, CDA has the goal of looking beyond texts in studying topics such as women, minorities, refugees, politics and media.

The first academic recognition of the significance of relations between power and discourse occurred in 1970 (Fairclough, 2001a), with the consequence that the study of power within discourse is a comparatively new discipline. Scholars in the early 1990s helped CDA to evolve more formally, for use as a tool to share political concerns about social inequalities in the world (Baxter, 2010). This study dwells on critical linguistics (CL), which investigates the use of language in discourse in an attempt to determine how power relations and ideologies are hidden within discourse.

The purpose of CDA is to enable the examination of the social functions of language, in similar ways to other approaches, which include pragmatics, systemic functional linguistics,

conversation analysis and ethnography (Breeze, 2011). What makes CDA unique is that it emphasises the relationship between language, *text and discourse* and power, *political struggle, inequity and dominance* (ibid). Based on Fairclough (2001b, p. 123), CDA is the "analysis of the dialectical relationships between semiosis (including language) and other elements of social practices". The definition by Fairclough is more suitable for Discourse Analysis (DA) than CDA as it does not link discourse to power. The *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Linguistics* defines CDA as "the study of discourse in relation to the structure of a society as perceived e.g. by Marxists; to ideologies etc. seen as underlying its 'production'; and so on" (Matthews, 2007, p. 87). This definition is elaborated by the *Longman Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics* that defines CDA as:

> a form of DISCOURSE ANALYSIS that takes a critical stance towards how language is used and analyses texts and other discourse types in order to identify the ideology and values underlying them. It seeks to reveal the interests and power relations in any institutional and socio-historical context through analysing the ways that people use language (Richards & Schmidt, 2002, p. 133).

This research is based upon the definition provided by Richards and Schmidt, as this understanding of the term is more inclusive of the meaning of 'critical' in this context, as well as the roles of power, ideology and values in defining CDA.

The relationship between language and power is indicated in the literature. Althusser points out this relationship by claiming that values and beliefs which seem to be normal and common sense are actually constructed by organisations around us, and that these beliefs are created and shared by language (Thomas, et al., 2004). This view shows that language is powerful to the extent that

what seems to be a common sense is actually a production of language. This same view is stressed by Thomas et al. (2004, p. 10) who highlight that language creates power and is a site for performing power; specifically, "language has a key role in transforming power into right and obedience into duty". Since CDA's main concern is power then, it should be interested in studying unequal relationships in society through language.

Given that CDA is the main approach that has been selected for this research, it is important to begin by addressing the most significant critiques that have been levelled at this conceptual framework. In conducting this discussion, the limitations pertaining to CDA will first be presented, after which this chapter will outline the robust methodological techniques and measures that can be adopted in an attempt to ensure the provision of a sufficiently methodologically sound research approach when using CDA.

A core argument levelled by linguists when questioning the validity of CDA research is that this approach increases the risk of the particular backgrounds and ideologies of the discourse analyst being brought to the research. For example, Taylor (2001b) opines that the identity of CDA researchers is often evident in the selection of topic and research area based on the researcher's interests, sympathies and political beliefs. The researcher takes responsibility for a range of data collection variables, including interview, gender, age, confidence, appearance and accent, in addition to the subsequent interpretation and analysis of these data (ibid). Given the close involvement of the researcher and the subjective nature of many of these factors, the previous knowledge and views of the researcher may be more able to affect the outcomes than other approaches.

Six main strategies are commonly cited as valid means of addressing the aforementioned limitations to CDA and to avoid subjectivity in the analysis of data: replicability, researcher position within the project, triangulation of the analysis, use of nonverbal aspects of discourse, use of large data samples (corpus) and, inter-coder and intra-coder reliability (Breeze, 2011; Taylor, 2001b; Wodak, 2007b;). First, Taylor (2001b) introduces 'replicability' to CDA research as criterion for evaluation, where a different researcher should be able to repeat the project and obtain the same or similar results. By ensuring this level of replicability, a researcher can attempt to more effectively avoid the possibility of being biased. It has also been argued that analysts should endeavour to position themselves within the project by self-description and by presenting clear accounts of their own relations to the topic, participants and data (ibid). Breeze (2011) elaborates on this by stressing that the analyst should describe where s/he stands in the project such as stating her/his political views and beliefs. The next strategy is triangulation of analysis through the use of multiple methods or form of data analysis during the investigation of the phenomenon being studied. Triangulation is reinforced by many CDA practitioners, such as Wodak (2007b), who notes that this approach minimises the risk of bias. Besides, Meyer (2007) asserts that triangulation is a methodological design that helps eliminating the beliefs and ideologies caused by the analyst's prejudice and preconceptions. The fourth strategy for ensuring objectivity in data analysis is the use of nonverbal aspects of language, such as images, photographs and body language. To support this, Bednarek and Caple (2012) defends that a photograph never lies and that it contributes to the objectivity of the analysis. The fifth element of objectivity in CDA is the use of a systematic method with large samples of data, often in the form of corpus (Breeze, 2011). The sixth criterion is used by Karimaghaei and Kasmani (2013) who used inter-coder reliability and intra-coder reliability in order to verify their study findings.

Inter-coder reliability describes the approach where a proportion (in this case 20%) of the entire data set is given to people familiar with the study procedures who analyse the data. The results of their findings were in accordance with those of the researchers. In terms of the intra-coder reliability, after data collection, the researchers checked 20% of the whole data within an interval of three weeks so as to avoid any uncertainty.

Lahlali (2003, p. 70) adds to the support of CDA by concluding that this approach "is still developing and evolving. The vast number of publications in this area which have emerged in the recent decade, is a sign of its validity and wide recognition". Although some criticism has been levelled against CDA for not providing a clearly stated method, the fact that it provides a variety in methods is arguably a strength. Furthermore, as a critical approach, CDA accommodates different methods under one umbrella, thereby avoiding the vagueness that typically characterises those methodological approaches that rely on a single methodology (ibid).

2.3.1   *CDA frameworks*

The following section seeks to disentangle the principal strands of the general conceptual framework utilised in the current study. In so doing, it examines the main theories of CDA, as they have been described by their respective theorists. These primary theories are as follows: 'discourse as a social practice' by Norman Fairclough (2007); 'the discourse-historical approach' by Ruth Wodak (2007b); 'social cognition' by Teun van Dijk (2007); and 'social actor network' by Theo van Leeuwen (2008).

The discourse-historical approach of CDA follows a complex concept of social critique, whereby at least three connected discourse aspects related to cognition and action are embraced. This approach aims to 'integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources,

the background of the social and political fields in which discourse is embedded, and the context where analysed discourses take place' (Wodak, 2007b, p. 65). This approach takes into account four levels of context: 'the immediate language or text or internal co-text, the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, the extralinguistic social or sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation', and the broader socio-political and historical context in which the discursive practices are embedded' (ibid, p. 67).

In addition to the above levels of context, Wodak's (2007b) discourse-historical approach has main characteristics: that it is interdisciplinary in the levels of theory and practice; it is an approach that is problem-oriented, rather than being focused on specific linguistic features. Practice is the target of this approach so research results are made available in different fields with the goal of changing discursive and social practices.

The discourse-historical approach has widely influenced CDA studies and has been commonly employed in research undertaken in this area, both as an independent approach and as a part of a multidisciplinary approach (e.g. Badarneh et al., 2010; Buckingham, 2013; Johnson et al., 2010). However, the present study does not employ this approach as its analytical framework because the aim of the present study is to linguistically investigate discourse without solely focusing on social critique or linking the study to other fields.

One of the most prominent scholars of the socio-cognitive approach of CDA is van Dijk (2007). Although interested in the socio-cognitive interface of discourse analysis, the base of 'the socio-cognitive approach is solidly linguistic, and includes grammatical, pragmatic, interactional, stylistic, rhetorical, semiotic, narratives' (ibid, p. 99) and similar forms, as well as the verbal and

para-verbal organisation of communicative events. According to this approach, language users exercise power through discourse by the use of certain properties or functions, which include 'stress, intonation, word order, lexical style, coherence, local semantic moves, topic choice, speech acts, schematic organisation and rhetorical figures' (ibid, p. 112). As with the discourse-historical approach, this method depends on properties of the context such as 'aims, participants, setting, users and their beliefs and interests' (ibid, p. 113). The socio-cognitive approach introduced a number of important terms used in social cognition and CDA, including knowledge, ideology, attitude, action and social structure (ibid). However, it does not implement a clear step-by-step process for discourse analysis.

The third approach is the CDA as a social process which was designed by Fairclough (2007). A social practice or event includes elements that are the 'production activity, means of production, social relations, social identities, cultural values, consciousness and semiosis (discourse)' (ibid, p. 122). In Fairclough's approach, CDA stresses that semiosis is a part of social processes, featuring the analysis of the dialectical relationships between semiosis and the different elements of social practice. Semiosis includes all forms of 'meaning making', including language, visual images and body language, with every social practice having a semiotic element. Fairclough (2007) perceives that social life exists as consistent networks of social practices of different types such as economic, political and cultural. The focus here is on action and interaction that reproduce and transform structures and meaning that semiosis is closely integrated with social life. In this approach, semiosis functions in social practice in three ways: it figures as a part of the social activity within a practice, such as being a teacher assistant as a part of teaching as a job; it figures in representations, with social actors, speakers and writers producing representations of their own and other practices; and it figures in the 'performances' of particular

positions within social practices. Factors such as life experiences, gender, social class and cultural backgrounds influence the production of social practices (Fairclough, 2007).

Fairclough's approach proposes a framework that conducts analysis of the discourse of four areas. The framework begins by focusing upon a social problem that has a semiotic (discursive) aspect. It then analyses the network of practices where the discourse occurs, as well as the relationship between semiosis and other elements of the social practice being examined, and conducts structural, interactional, interdiscursive and linguistic analysis of the discourse itself. It also considers whether the social order (network of practices) 'needs' the problem as whether or not discourse contributes to sustaining relations of power and domination. Finally, the language as a social process approach identifies possible ways to identify the problems of the network of practices (Fairclough, 2007).

The fourth approach to CDA is the social actor network devised by van Leeuwen (2009). As with the preceding approaches, the social actor network views CDA 'as playing a key role in maintaining and legitimizing inequality, injustice and oppression in the society' (ibid, p. 277), providing a critique of dominant discourses and genres which affect these inequalities. The social actor theory extends CDA from specific grammatical processes into broader semantic notions. 'Exclusion', for instance, refers to the marginalisation of social actors from the representation of actions and events in which they took part. 'Role allocation' categorises social actors into activated (agent role) or passivated (patient role). In addition, those individuals performing actions, 'social actors', can be given a generic reference, in which they are either referred to in broad generalised classes of people or noted specifically as identifiable individuals. Generic reference plays a large role in instituting 'us' and 'them'. Other features prescribed by this approach are assimilation, association and disassociation, intermination and differentiation,

nomination and categorisation, functionalisation and identification, personalisation and impersonalisation, and overdetermination (van Leeuwen, 2009). This approach has a socio-semantic basis, meaning that it is valid for application to languages other than English (ibid).

Based on the social actor network approach to CDA, discourses are represented and reconstructed in social practice:

> Discourses are social cognitions, socially specific ways of knowing social practices; they can be and are, used as resources for representing social practices in text. This means that it is possible to reconstruct discourses from texts that draw on them…discourses not only represent what is going on, they also evaluate it, ascribe purposes to it, justify it, and so on, and in many texts these aspects of representation became far more important than the representation of the social practice itself (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 6).

The social actor network approach considers visualisation as the most competent, explicit, and pervasive way of providing explanations, to the extent that these visualisations can be more effective at constructing the world in which we live than texts. It also stresses that images should be the focus in any inquiry of racist discourse and that people are depicted by images in many forms, such as social distance, social relation, and social interaction (van Leeuwen, 2008). The multimodal analysis framework provided by this approach for the analysis of nonverbal aspects of discourse is notionally similar to that of the verbal aspects.

The four main approaches to CDA mentioned above link discourse with power, ideology and argument. These aspects of the discourse are of paramount importance to the current study and are therefore discussed individually in the following section.

2.3.2   *Pillars of CDA*

In this study, there are three pillars to CDA: power, ideology and argument. In the following, these pillars are elaborated.

2.3.2.1 *Power*

Power is a fundamental feature of CDA studies. Being distinguished from other linguistic analysis, CDA seeks to uncover and understand power relationships in the society through an examination of language, which is closely entwined in social power and power is a central condition of social life (Wodak, 2007c).

Power is a general human capacity that seeks to bring about change in reality. Individuals and collectives such as governments usually have this capacity, which can include wealth and military force. In discourse, people exercise power over others, such as TV producers, who tend to decide what is and is not to be included, with the effect that they therefore dominate the way that audiences see and act towards aspects of the world (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). In this research, 'power' refers to political control of Yemen, either by legal capacity or by influence.

This view of power in language has been widely explained in literature. According to Fairclough (2001a), the more powerful participants of communication constrain the contributions of the less powerful, using a wide range of devices, including interruption, enforcing explicitness, controlling the topic, and formulation. Fairclough (2001a) explains these devices below, using examples from classroom interactions, where the teacher is presented as more powerful than the student. The first device is interruption, which is when the more powerful participant stops the less powerful to continue talking or repeating what the less powerful has said. An example of this is when the student asks for e*xamples of the vowels that are not found in Arabic are v and p* and the teacher stops the student and says "*Can I have another answer, students?"*. The next

device is enforcing explicitness*, describing the situation when the more powerful complains that the less powerful is ambiguous and that s/he should make her/his talk unambiguous. This can be seen in the example of a teacher replying to the student "*Explain how v and p are vowels*". Third, controlling the topic is when the more powerful party specifies the topic and nature of interaction. An example is when the teacher replies "*A good question but let us concentrate on today's class objective which is consonants, not vowels*''. Finally, the last device is formulation, which is when the more powerful words what follows, or rewords what has been said. An example is when the teacher replies "*V and p are two sounds which we have in English but which are not found in Arabic*" (Fairclough, 2001a).

The following discussion examines studies that focused on areas of great relevance to the current research, having investigated the use of discourse in Arabic political tension, the use of irony and presumed knowledge as tools for hegemony, and the ways in which hegemonic practices can be practiced in the classroom. The first of these, research by Atawneh (2009), investigated a similar topic to the current study, examining the use of discourse of political conflict in the Arab world, with an emphasis on how the language of the Israelis and Palestinians mirrored the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. The assumption made by the study was that media search would result in more threats made by Israelis than by Palestinians, given that the Israeli side is more powerful in the Middle East. Data used in the study comprised headlines reported in 428 reports of local and world media (ibid). In order to test the assumption that language reflected power, Atawneh (2009) analysed speech acts reported in media in relation to threats and appeals from both conflict sides. Analysis showed that Israelis used more threats than Palestinians, reflecting their strength, while the comparative weakness of Palestinians was reflected in their use of a larger proportion of appeals. A number of 145 appeals were used by Palestinians compared to 5 appeals

only were used by Israelis. Atawneh claims that these statistics created an irony that the victim was more powerful and the victimizer was less powerful. The study gave a focused, objective analysis that clearly illustrated the link between discourse and power in the Middle East.

Another study which linked political discourse with power by the use of irony was performed by Nuolijarvi and Tittula (2011). Their study sought to analyse the use of irony during the interactions that occurred during TV debates in the 2002 Finnish presidential elections. They studied the construction, use, and response elicited by irony within the sequential context. As with the current study, Nuolijarvi and Tittula (2011) used televised political debates whereby a moderator and opponents were involved in the debates. It also made specific references to aspects of conversation analysis (CA), such as turn-taking, which is significant when there is a moderator who controls the conversation. The data used were collected from four debates between two candidates qualified for the second round of the Finnish presidential election in 2006 (ibid). Each debate lasted for one to two hours and was hosted by two moderators, in the form of a question and answer session, in which the candidates answered the moderators' questions and commented on each others' turns. The methodology employed an analysis of irony as a defence and as an attack, using conversation analysis framework (turn-taking). Instances which ridicule the opponent and shift the serious modality of the setting were analysed. According to Nuolijarvi and Tiittula (2011), irony in public debate was marked by its construction and placement in the sequence of spoken discourse. The meaning of irony was also recognisable in context, although it was sometimes difficult to be sure of the specific intended meaning, particularly as ironic turns occurred in reaction to previous actions, rather than being topic-initiated utterances.

In linking discourse with hegemony, a study was carried out by Flowerdew and Leong (2010) in order to analyse the role of presumed knowledge in Ta Kung Pao's discursive construction of who had the right to participate in Hong Kong's governance under the concept of 'one country-two systems'. It is significant to refer to the study by Flowerdew and Leong (2010), as it is possible that debate opponents of the discourse of this study will attempt to reach their ideologies through the use of their presumed knowledge, such as their specific knowledge about the president or the revolution events. Flowerdew and Leong (2010) raised the main question: what kind of knowledge, why discursive strategies and the extent to which these strategies promoted hegemony in the discourse of Kung Pao. They drew upon a wealth of data, reviewing 250 reports and articles from Ta Kung Pao which had been published between 10 October 2003 and 1 October 2004, which were analysed from an ideological perspective. The study also considered what was explicitly asserted as 'presumed knowledge'. The textual analysis looked into othering, non-naming, and use of metaphor. Findings of the study by Flowerdew and Leong (2010) showed that the identity of 'the patriotic' was highly politically charged and goal specific. The main strategies used by the news reports were othering, non-naming, and metaphors. The definition of patriotism was found to be relative and contextual rather than stable or universal (ibid). It is believed here that although the study linked discourse with hegemony, it did not give a rationale for selecting patriotism as its semantic concept and that patriotism was not specified in the research question or objectives. Additionally, like many other CDA studies, no triangulation was provided for the data analysis.

The previous section discussed power as the basic pillar to CDA. Power is extended by discussing empirical studies that linked discourse and power, to politics, and to gender.

2.3.2.1.1 Discourse, power and politics

CDA research investigates how language is used in political discourse, which can be attributed to the inherent concern that CDA has with power and control, as well as with legitimation and de-legitimation (Mazid, 2007). As this research studies the management and production of political discourse, it is important to briefly outline and explain the link that exists between political discourse and power. Political language is always around us (Thomas, et al., 2004), and while people tend to achieve power in every aspect of their lives, unequal relationships are also present everywhere: family, school, television programmes and parliament (ibid). One forum in which unequal power relationships are particularly evident in debates held in the media, such as on television. This is particularly pronounced with regards to politics, which generally, "includes discourse which represent the varying ways of focusing on political thought, debate, deliberation and action in social life such as different political discourses in economic systems and business activity" (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 83).

The way in which political parties try to achieve power is elaborated by Fairclough (2001a, p. 75), who argues that "in politics, each opposing party or political force tries to win general acceptance for its own discourse type as the preferred and ultimately the 'natural' one for talking and writing about the state, government, forms of political action, and all the aspects of politics-as well for demarcating politics itself from other domains". The use of discourse by politicians is then discussed as follows:

> a skilful politician is able to maximise the positive feedback and support for her/his ideas, plans and actions…the political uses of norms of forms of address help articulate and reinforce ideologically biased views on behalf of groups, institutions and/or political parties in order to influence people's minds and beliefs, to motivate people to act or to obtain increased support for concrete actions (IIie, 2009, p. 9).

Many studies have investigated the use of political discourse as a tool of power. As in the current study, Shenhav (2009) used CDA as the qualitative analysis method to analyse political debates as the discourse source. In this way, Shenhav (2009) investigated whether the structure of narratives created a sense of continuity that is central to the construction of community, which he examined through the context of political debates from the 1960 and 1976 to 2004 campaigns. These data comprised 1100 sentences from 21 presidential debates during nine presidential campaigns. Shenhav used a structural approach to qualitative discourse analysis in order to evaluate the empirical grounding of political discourse. His findings indicated that seven out of nine elections were reported with a strong narrative element in their closing statements. Voters were shown to have the tendency to favour candidates in the narrative content of the closing statements of presidential debates. Although textual analysis gave interesting conclusions, political narratives were not well-defined in the study and neither were political narratives (as a term) widely discussed in the literature review (ibid).

Similar to the type of discourse investigated in the current study, Johansson (2006) used political broadcast TV interview of dialogic nature to examine the discourse from a dialogical perspective. Johansson sought to study what objects of discourse were constructed and how this took place during selected political broadcast interviews, looking at both the dialogical perspective, meaning how the other-orientation emerged in the interview, and the socio-pragmatic perspective. Johansson (2006) hypothesized that the discursive practices were constantly reproduced in various media texts in the political and social media texts. The data used in the study included political interviews recorded between late 1980s and mid 1990s from French TV consisting of four full-length interviews of 40 minutes each and two long fragments

from two interview programmes. This extensive corpus was complemented by a contrastive corpus of nine radio interviews, which had been recorded between the same periods, comprising a total of five hours of recorded material. As in the current study, Johansson analysed the speaking activity of both speakers: the journalist and the politician. Johansson (2006) found that the politicians oriented towards the public in order to gain support and acceptance, attempting to use their answers to persuade and thereby establish specific positions. A range of cognitive-discursive tasks were utilised to appeal to reasons, emotions and knowledge of the public, including description, explications and argumentation. The objects of discourse were mediated and belonged to the public sphere. Additionally, they were repeatedly discussed in different media in a way that formed the main characteristics of media discourse, namely intertextuality and interdiscursivity. The main objects of discourse were the adjacency pairs, questions and answers. The strength of Johansson's (2006) study was that it used TV political interviews as data/corpus, showing how politicians appealed for public support through the use of different linguistic components.

Third, Buckingham (2013) adopted a CDA approach similar to that formulated by Meyer and Wodak (2001), Richardson (2007) and van Dijk (2001, 20115). As in the current study, Buckingham investigated the power of media discourse in shaping beliefs, which she achieved through an examination of newspaper coverage of Turkey's bid for European Union (EU) membership. Specifically, Buckingham (2013) was interested in the way that the media portrayed support for and opposition to this bid, and the extent to which coverage was provided for domestic debate on the issue 'how Turkey was portrayed in the Spanish press of whether it should be part of the EU or not. A thorough examination was performed of the rhetorical and linguistic means used by the leading daily newspaper in Spain over a 12 year period (ibid). This

enabled the proposition to be made that news media did not passively reflect a given reality, but instead were agents, constructing perceptions of reality through the way in which events were covered and selected. Buckingham (2013) examined articles published electronically in *EL Pais* over 12 years, from 1999 to 2010. These sources comprised 387 articles containing news items, editorials, interviews and commentaries, providing a total of 922 topics in relation to Turkey's bid for EU membership. Both 'micro level strategies (topic selection, referential or nomination strategies, attribution to characteristic qualities through prediction, metaphors) and macro level analysis (framing through reporting perspective, 'voice' selection of spokespeople)' (ibid, p. 187-189) were used (ibid). In addition, the study evaluated the extent to which Spanish perspectives were articulated by political elites or other social actors, as well as looking at whether Spanish media coverage of Turkey replicated the views of EU officials and members of states. The data analysis software *Wordsmith Tools 4.0* was employed to locate concurrences from the entire corpus, focussing on metaphors, keywords, and synonyms. In her investigation into the association between discourse with power in the political language of Turkey, Buckingham concluded that editorials and commentaries had made particular and repeated reference to the role played by religion in the categorizing of Turkey as 'the other' in the culture of the EU. Buckingham's conclusions were solid, as in addition to micro screening of the texts, she triangulated her analysis by means of computer software.

Gadavanij (2002) used CDA as the analytical method as part of an exploration of the use of discourse by politicians to achieve their goals. The study relied upon the use of 'no-confidence' debates, which were examined to determine why the discourse of the popular genre with an informal register was employed in parliamentary discourse and the role that this language had in the institutionalised discourse (ibid). The underlying assumption of this research was that social

practices shaped discourse practices, with the text itself containing the evidence of their impact. This hypothesis was tested by limiting the study to text (a transcription of recorded material). A combination of CDA (text) and SCA (context-social context analysis) were employed using five accusatory speeches and two respondent speeches from recent debates of the Thai parliament from 1995 to 1996. In order to make the framework of her study more dynamic, Gadavanij (2002) used two levels of analysis, macrostructure and microstructure, to explore the relationship between discourse and society in a complete way, and enable the effective investigation of social practices, discourse practices, and text. Thai no-confidence debates were shown to 'offer speakers the opportunity to achieve contradictory political and linguistic ends, within the same tightly-crafted speech' (ibid, p. 2), in order to achieve political and social functions. The two levels of data analysis framework employed by Gadavanij were useful in linking political discourse with power.

2.3.2.1.2 Discourse, power and gender

One of the ideologies that can be uncovered by the analysis of political debates is the way in which women represent themselves and are represented in the debates. Gender is recognised as a key characteristic of speakers that contributes to the various features that may influence language use (Shaw, 2000). This means that gender can be relevant in understanding the structure and meaning of a given political interaction. This section is dedicated for discourse, power and gender because women were involved as debate speakers and debate moderators.

The link between discourse and gender as a discourse element is well established in the extant literature. According to Weatherall (2002), language is the result of communities of practice, meaning that social practices should be studied in conjunction with gender as a social element. A logical extension of this position is that context can lead to theoretical and practical insights in

gender and language variation, as social and cultural beliefs permeate every aspect of thought, perception and behaviour and should therefore be central in discussions of discourse. There has been a shift in how language reflects the disadvantages of women into the role that language constitutes to social reality. The relationship between gender, identity, and language is twofold: people have attitudes between women and men's discourse; and speech cues trigger attributes about the gender identity (ibid).

While one point of view states that each gender borrows from a joint stock of specific linguistic devices to exercise power, another view considers women's language different from men's linguistically, showing women to be more cooperative in speaking than men (Thomas et. al., 20014). Yates (2001) and Thomas et al. (2004) claim that men challenge those who are speaking, whereas women help by giving back channel support, such as the verbal and nonverbal feedback to speakers *like mum, yeah, good and I see*. In addition, men use more interrupting tactics than women. . Women more commonly apologize, give explicit justification, question and provide personal orientation whereas men give self-promotion, pre-supposition, rhetorical questions and authoritative orientations. Women also commonly use attenuated assertions, as with the use of hedges and epistemic modals (Thomas et al., 2004), in contrast with men who more typically make stronger assertions. Hedges refer to the use of linguistic forms which dilute assertions, such as *sort of, like, kind of* and *I think*, because they are sometimes not sure about what they say. Epistemic modality is the use of modals showing less confidence such as *maybe*, *should* and *might*. Overall, these examples suggest that women tend to value cooperation and that their language use supports this position, whereas men are uncomfortable with intimacy (Yates, 2001; Thomas et al., 2004).

The link between political debates and gender representations has been indicated by empirical CDA research. In the following section, reference is made to three studies that investigated the representation of women in political discourse. As with the current study, Shaw (2000) studied gender as a political discourse-variation element and employed elements of conversation analysis to investigate the hypothesis that "political debates were speech events which foregrounded issues of power and 'the floor', and allowed the opportunity of assessing the ways in which the gender of participants affect their construction as more or less powerful participants in debates" (p. 406). In so doing, this study established the extent to which the gender of participants can be related to the control that a speaker is able to exert over the debate. This was managed through a qualitative investigation that combined ethnographic approach with conversation analysis. Five political debates of the British House of Commons were used that took place between July 1998 and March 1999, during which 25% of participants were females. From these data, Shaw analysed, identified and categorized debate turns, interventions and interruptions. Her analysis uncovered that there was a single flow in political debates, which had two turn-taking systems: legal systems and illegal ones, meaning those that deviated from the usual norms of the debate in some way. Violations of the turn-taking rules were common and legal turns were interrupted, most frequently by male debate members (90% in Shaw's study). Shaw concluded her finding with the following:

> The findings that masculine discourse styles are treated as the interactional norm in debates relates to the fact that traditionally women have not been represented in this institution, and continue to be underrepresented…there is a strong male culture in debates in which is likely to prevent female Members of the Parliament (MPs) from participating in these rule-breaking activities (p. 416).

So, the discourse of women is influenced by the institutional culture in which the discourse takes place.

While Shaw studied turn-taking in political debates, Hess-Luttich (2007) investigated the use of interruption in arguments in TV debates. It is especially significant to discuss this research, as it examined political TV debates and utilised CDA as the analysis framework, in common with the current study. Hess-Luttich (2007) sought to describe the genre and to chronologically trace the structural changes of discourse. Genre referred to context, situations, settings and frames which determined the pragmatics of language use. The data used in the study were extracted from political talk shows, one broadcast in Germany in the late eighties and one in Switzerland 15 years later. These data comprised the discursive practices of the host, which were studied in terms of empirical criteria such as turn-taking and speaking time, (ibid). The relationship between interjections and back channel behaviour was found to be interesting. More than three times as many reactions were used by women than men. However, more interjections were used by men. The males were shown to interrupt women four times more often than women did, while women failed to interrupt twice as often as men. This study by Hess-Luttich (2007) is relevant to the current research in looking at political TV argumentation, studying moderator and speaker's discourse, and performing gender-based analysis.

The third study that explicitly referred to the gender-based differences in discourse was conducted by Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013). Their research appraised gender representation in the 1999 Nigerian constitution using insights from CDA, feminism and Systemic Functional Linguistics. The study particularly emphasized on a close examination of grammar cohesion through the use of lexical and grammatical expressions that encoded gender in the constitution

and ideological positions, in addition to their impact on gender parity and socio-political equity. 'Male-as-norm' ideology was the subject matter of the paper, with an assumption that since language was the means of constructing systematic inequality between genders, language could equally be used to deconstruct this inequity (ibid). Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013) used functional and socio-linguistic perspectives on the analysis of discourse, drawing insights from two approaches to language analysis: CDA and feminism. Their analysis perspectives were tied to issues of power and ideology, so the choice of certain words and expressions was analysed to grant an insight into the view of language as being intricately tied to power and ideology. Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013, p. 687) concluded that 'generic masculine noun and pronoun references, which referred to social and political positions, open to eligible individuals in Nigeria while the single feminine referent was a marked case'. A total of 480 masculine pronoun references were found, in comparison to only 40 various antecedents referring to persons, clearly illustrating profound under-representation of female gendered language. As in the current research, Ezeifeka and Osakwe focused on a study of connected language with respect to power and ideology through an examination of gender-based differences in discourse. Their work also provided suggestions on language features for future constitution reviewers such as the replacement of 'chairman' by 'chairperson', as well as discussing the representation of women in political discourse and the official document of constitution. Likewise, the representation of women in Arab media and political discourse is equally important.

2.3.2.2 Ideology
This section is allotted to ideology because it is a main pillar of CDA and is the centre of this research. Ideology is defined in the literature of linguistics and is shared widely by many theoretical approaches to CDA. Ideology can be defined as being everything we think and know (Thomas, et al., 2004). Therefore, people who ask questions on the domination of ideology tend

to sound ideological because ideologies become common sense assumptions within any group or society. One definition that closely links ideology to the language as a social process approach followed by the present study is provided by Fairclough (2008, p. 18) who argues that ideologies can be best understood as "representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation". Therefore, ideology refers to the beliefs that a person or an institution has on any aspect of life, including views about groups of people, such as women, or surrounding events, such as the revolution, which is the specific context of this research. From a similar perspective to Fairclough's perceptions regarding the power of discourse in enforcing ideological assumptions, van Dijk (2007, p. 103) explains that ideologies are basic social representations of social groups:

> CDA research is often interested in the study of ideologically biased discourse, and the ways these polarise the representation of us and them. These representations are 'particularized' in mental models then expressed in text and talk. This theory suggests that an analysis of the semantic macrostructures and microstructures will result on 'positive self-representation' and 'negative other representation'.

So, it is significant to analyse the text holistically as well as analyse certain linguistic aspects of discourse. The other is negatively represented through the use of discursive tools.

In his approach to ideology, van Dijk (2007) constructs two significant linguistic terms useful in the study of ideology within CDA. These terms are attitudes, culturally shared opinions and knowledge, which are the information shared by certain communities such as doctors, academics and social revolutions. In this study, ideology represents the shared knowledge and attitudes of media and politics of the Arab world.

Having provided an overarching discussion of the broad themes occurring within CDA, a discussion will now be provided on three empirical studies that specifically addressed the ideology of the Al Jazeera channel (AJ). As well as being the focus of the current study, AJ is likely to have been the focus of research because it is the most influential channel in the Arab region and has played a significant role in the events of the Arab revolution. Fahmy and Al Emad (2011) investigated whether it was possible to validate the claim that Al Jazeera Arabic was biased while Al Jazeera English was cleansed by changes and omissions. They hypothesized that Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English differed in their coverage of the US/Al Qaeda conflict, with the Arabic coverage relying upon fewer American sources and taking a stance that was more negative towards the US. The data used for the research was in a total of 1760 Al Jazeera English and Al Jazeera Arabic news stories, although only 238 (139 Arabic and 99 English) were content analysed. Content analysis included the analysis of prominence of online stories which covered the conflict. Findings of the study by Fahmy and Al Emad (2011) indicated no significant difference between the news stories in the English versus Arabic websites. The results indicated that Al Jazeera websites negatively framed the fighters especially Al Qaeda agents. Despite this study only considering the use of Al Jazeera Arabic, since it is the most appealing to the Arab audience with a direct connection to the Arab revolutions, it presented the conclusion that Al Jazeera did not produce different news coverage to Arabic and English-speaking online consumers (ibid).

The second research that studied AJ was carried out by Leudar et al. (2004). They investigated public representations of the participants in violence and of the violence itself, based upon the assumption that the presentation of events offered moral accounts of past actions and therefore prepared the ground for the future violence, meaning that the depiction and occurrence of events

were closely related. This assumption by Leudar et al. is applicable in the case of the present study, arguing that investigation of the discourse of AJ enables detection of the ideological assumptions of the channel, which represent its foregrounded accounts of the Arab revolutions as the actions. The data used in the research consisted of public addresses made soon after the attacks: two addresses by the US president, George Bush, to the nation; a statement by British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the British House of Commons along with their ensuing parliamentary debate on the events; and two statements by Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, that were broadcast on Al Jazeera TV in Qatar. Membership categorisation analysis (MCA) was used in order to establish how the key figures involved in the conflict represented the September 2001 events and the participants in them. According to Leudar et al. (2004), this methodology was originally formulated by Sacks in 1960s and then developed by other researchers in order to better understand the actions and utterances of people. It was found that any participant in the conflict had a double contrastive identity (ibid). Bin Laden presented himself as the defender of Islam while Bush was among the crusaders who attacked Islam. Similarly, Bush represented himself as among the defenders of freedom and democracy whereas Bin Laden was a terrorist. Although the study by Leudar et al. (2004) used a useful data analysis framework which identified the representations of 'us' and 'them' in a systematic way, there was a failure to explicitly link these representations to ideology.

In the third study, Barkho (2011) used corpus from AJ to test how the channel sustained its ideology. This involved a study of the role played by internal guidelines in shaping the news narratives of AJE and BBC with regards to the Middle East, by highlighting the role of the these guidelines in structuring and patterning news discourse. The outcomes of the study cast doubts on the openness, transparency and visibility of the editorial process of both channels. Barkho

(2011) was able to utilise excerpts from the internal guidelines of the AJE and BBC which were strictly confidential and hidden from the public. Textual analysis of the guidelines was used, with a reliance on lexicon analysis of terms and phrases that described the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians. Power and social relations were implied by lexical and word-choice aspects (ibid). Personalisation was also detected. Barkho (2011) moved beyond textual analysis to interview editors at both channels, in order to investigate their internal guidelines and better understand the relations of the channel with power, dominations and legitimacy. As their guidelines were written in the form of orders, rather than advice or suggestions, the study found that the two news giants, AJE and BBC, used their organisational power to dissimilate and inculcate their ideology and viewpoints in the Middle East conflict (ibid). Most interestingly, the editors claimed neutrality despite the discourse analysis of the study showing that these channels were actually ideological. Even if this study does not analyse AJ's guidelines, a reference to the guidelines is made when interviewing members of AJ staff (see sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7).

The ideology of other TV genres and channels had also been covered by literature. Johnson et al. (2010) studied the television news discourse on the coverage of Hurricane Katrina. From the context of the current study, this is valuable because they used CDA in analysing the ideologies hidden in the discourse of media. Their study specifically focused on an examination of the ways in which on-air conversation between journalists indicated how racial ideology could be reflected in the US television coverage of race-related crises. Interjournalistic discourse regarding African Americans in national network and cable news programmes that aired after hurricane Katrina was used as the corpus of the study (Johnson et al., 2010). Source of the data was organisations such as CBS, CNN and MSNBC, with 65 news programmes in which reporters mentioned keywords of racial ideology during the interjournalistic discourse. The methodology used in the

study was one instigated by van Dijk (1995). The transcripts of four news programmes were sorted for three types of semantic items: lexicalisation, word choice-propositional framing and, us and them. The results of the analysis indicated that the majority of the journalists were white, with 17 (77%) out of 22 being Caucasian, while only 4 (18%) were black and 1 (5%) was Hispanic non-white. The study concluded that because this cohort of reporters was predominantly white and worked for white-owned news organisations, the discursive elements reflected the perspectives of the dominant culture in these channels. It also suggested implications for reporters to avoid ideological reporting as with black and white. Overall, the study by Johnson et al. (2010) therefore suggests that media mirrors aspects of ideological discourse, positioning it in a biased stance.

Another investigative study that examined the ideologies of debates as a tool of exercising power was conducted by Attar (2012), who also relied upon CDA as the chosen analytical framework to examine public national debates on Genetic Modification (GM). Attar (2012) sought to investigate which discursive strategies were adopted by participants of UK public debates on technologies and whether those debates attempted to achieve consensus on such issues, rather than being polemic. Uncovering the ideologies of the investigated texts enabled the examination of the issues of power exercised by dominant groups in public debates on controversial technologies, with particular focus on GM foods. The data contained emails and comments posted online as general debate, augmented by transcripts of the six tier public meetings, which took place in 2003 as part of the UK government's consultation programme on the commercialisation of GM crops. The study used the Fairclough's approach (2003), relying on Nvivo and word-by-word textual analysis. Through use of intertextual analysis, the study concluded that debates were argumentative in nature, although most of the debates were

summaries more than discussions. Although Attar (2012) used debates, they were public and therefore differed from the debate structure of political interviews on television that are employed for this study.

2.3.2.2.1 Linguistic indicators of ideology

The representations of the world within discourse can be traced by coding the text's ideological linguistic features. Fairclough (2001b) describes the vocabulary that carries ideological assumptions as the ideological struggle under the 'veil of semantics'. This section therefore discusses the various linguistic devices that indicate ideology, as these have emerged from the extensive body of empirical literature on political ideologies.

2.3.2.2.1.1 Semantic derogation and Euphemism

Among the highly indicative elements of political ideology are semantic derogation and euphemism. Semantic derogation refers to the use of negative words in representing people or things in order to show them as inferior. An example of semantic derogation is the use of 'family' or 'children' to refer to the wife in urban areas in Oman. By such reference, the wife is linguistically hidden and is instead given the attribution of her own children. In contrast, euphemism is "a figure of speech which uses mild inoffensive or vague words as a means of making something seem more positive than it might otherwise appear" (Thomas, et al., 2004, p. 48). An example of euphemism is the use of 'moderate' rather than 'liberal' or 'secularist' when discussing opinions in countries that hold strong religious beliefs and practices. The term 'moderate' does not imply anything about the religious background of an individual, whereas 'liberal' and 'secularist' often imply a non-religious position, which might be considered taboos in societies with religious domination. Ideologically, euphemism therefore functions as a way to hide reality.

A study which demonstrated the strength of semantics in enforcing political ideology was conducted by Waterton and Wilson (2009). They sought to examine the rhetorical resources drawn upon in policy, media and public discourses by analysing the socio-political conditions of the text. The analysis helped them to chronologically examine the exploitation of African people. The study used formal institutional talk, parliamentary debates and political speeches, media reporting and everyday talk, observed through a range of computer-mediated communication forums. As in the current study, Waterton and Wilson (2009) focused on detecting semantic aspects that indicates ideologies of the discourse of media and politics. Data was dated between 2006 and 2007. The study concluded that the abolition discourse represented the past in a limited way of what was considered as damaging for British self-image (ibid). The study by Waterton and Wilson (2009) is significant in the study of political discourse as it explicitly showed the extent to which politicians deviate from reality, the distressing or damaging past, and their use of mild language. Nevertheless, the study did not clearly list the linguistic tools used by the political speakers so these tools could be compared with the ones used by Arab politicians.

2.3.2.2.1.2 Otherness

Otherness is the reference to others with egocentricity, always with a negative connotation, such as 'I am successful but he is a failure', or 'we are clever but they are stupid'. This study utilises the concept of otherness to denote the way in which speakers refer to 'the other' and the way or ways that they distinguish themselves from others, or one side from other sides. It is important to note that there are numerous ways in which 'the other', as a social actor, can be referred to in text, the most important of which can be seen in the following list, adapted from Fairclough (2008):

Variable	*Explanation/example*

Inclusion/exclusion	Suppression: to be inferred as not in the text at all
	Back-grounding: mentioned somewhere in the text but has to be inferred in one or more places
Pronoun/noun	Noun or pronoun (he, she, it, I, you, we, they)
Grammatical role	A participant in a clause (actor, affected), a circumstance (prepositional phrase)
Active versus passive	Is the social actor the actor of the process (the one who does things) or the affected or beneficiary (the one affected by the process)?
Personal/impersonal	Personal: the police (referring to the police in their own name)
	Impersonal: the filth (referring to the police as filth, not their name)
Named/classified	Named: Tom Smith
	Classified: the doctor or the doctors
Specific/generic	Specific: teachers are the ones who work in the schools (schools of a specific area)
	Generic: teachers tend to be unfair with marks (general to all teachers)

In the following section, a discussion is provided of seven key empirical studies conducted on the subject of 'otherness' as an ideological element in political discourse. The first of these, Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010), used a CDA framework to examine the justifications and persuasive techniques employed by three republicans and three democratic candidates in the US presidential election. They relied upon analysis of debates between republicans and democrats over the Iraqi constitution of war (the bylaws of war indicated in the Iraqi constitution), with the aim of understanding the underlying ideology of both US political parties with respect to the

issue of the constitution of war. Through analysis using van Dijk's (2004) framework, they also investigated the ways in which the candidates attempted to justify themselves and persuade their audience in order to win their consensus over the nation. The study used transcripts of the six candidate speeches in presidential primaries of the USA for the 2008 war in Iraq. All transcripts were taken from the internet. The study used van Dijk's framework (2004) in politics, ideology and discourse. In order to analyse the data by means of this framework, Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010) selected twenty seven ideological elements such as actor description, authority, categorisation, consensus, disclaimer, evidentially, hyperbole, implication, irony, lexicalisation, national self-glorification, number game, polarisation, presupposition, vagueness and victimisation. As with other studies on 'otherness', Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010) discovered that speakers mainly used negative other-representation and positive self-representation in order to utilise subtle ideological discourse structures. Other strategies used were lexicalisation, pluralisation and rhetoric for persuasion and justification. Although data analysis framework was clear and systematic, the study did not triangulate its data analysis means of a different method, such as corpus analysis. Nevertheless, it is a useful source for the current study, which also uses political debates as the data and studies the ideology of debates, with a focus on investigating 'us' and 'them'.

Another discursive element that indicated 'otherness' in political debates is forms of address, a subject that was investigated by Jaworski and Galasinski (2000). As in the current study, they examined vocative address forms and ideological legitimisation in political debates to investigate the use of 'otherness' as an ideological tool in televised political debates (ibid). The objective of their study was to examine the way in which vocative forms of address shape the political public ideological discourse of political debate speakers. The study used formal 90 minute debates that

took place between 1988 and 1995. The debates took place between two Polish politicians from the independent and communist parties, and Lech Walesa, former president of Poland and trade union leader of Solidarity. Transcripts of four debates were analysed, mainly the exchanges between the main participants in each debate. Jaworski and Galasinski (2000) concluded that speakers defined interpersonal space between the opponents by the use of vocatives. However, these vocatives were not used to gain the addressees' attention. Walesa achieved his ideology by the use of negative contrast, where one party distanced himself from the other in order to achieve his ideology. The choice of vocative forms of address was also shown to be built by politicians through positive self-image. The conclusion was that politicians achieved their ideologies by using positive self-representation and negative other-representation. This ideological legitimisation served their debate aims.

As with this study, Tileaga (2008) examined the use of 'framing' as the linguistic tool in the production and management of an ideological representation of revolution discourse, with specific reference to the Romanian revolution of 1989. The study used the commemoration in the Romanian parliament in order to analyse the hegemonic attempts, with a focus on two specific addresses made by the head of state, (now former) President Ion Iliescu on 21 Dec 2000 and 18 Dec 2003. Tileaga (2008) undertook a critical psychological approach to the analysis of political discourse in order to explore issues of agency, examining a range of topics that included entitlement and working, patterns of reoccurring shifts, the management of the authenticity of the true nature of an event. Findings indicated that the occasional ideological and political significance of political events lied in the category of features and consequently of the social and ideological context in which it was invoked. The use of political commemorative addresses allowed for the fulfilment of the ideological; function of framing.

Iiie (2009) offered a fresh look at the strategic uses of parliamentary language patterns in the UK, through an in-depth examination of the interplay between these characteristic forms of address and institutional discursive practices. Both the study by Iiie (2009) and the investigation in the present study seek to understand the ideological implications in the forms of address used by political factions, which makes the parliamentary study useful in the current context. The data of Iiie's study comprised the official transcripts of proceedings of the House of Commons (11 sessions from 2001 to 2004), and the reflex records of the official transcripts in the Swedish Riksdag (11 sessions that were held in 2005). Four categories of parliamentary address were examined in terms of three parameters: (in)directness, (non)reciprocity and (in)consistency. The data analysis focused on the various ways in which members of parliament (MPs) in the two parliaments utilised particular addressing and referring strategies in order for them to pursue their own agendas and undermine political opponents and to challenge institutional role distribution and hierarchical authority. Iiie (2009) discovered that the MPs in both parliaments tended to address one each other by means of relatively restricted and well-defined forms of address that were specific to the parliamentary context, but which could nevertheless be grouped into gender-specific titles, gender neutral titles, institutional titles, and personal names. The political uses of forms of address were shown to be particularly important, because they helped articulate and reinforce the ideologically biased views of groups, institutions and political parties. This, in turn, helped those groups to influence the beliefs and minds of audiences, to motivate people to act, and to gain support for the actions of their group (ibid).

In addition to political debates, the topic of 'otherness' has also been studied in political speeches, such as the study by Mazid (2007) who used a CDA framework to investigate the presuppositions and strategic functions in the speech delivered by George W. Bush, nine days

after the attacks on the World Trade Centre, Pentagon, and other US targets that took place on 11th September 2001. Mazid (2007)'s study is similar to the current research, in the sense that both explore the ideological notion of 'us and them' in political discourse through the use of CDA. However, Mazid (2007) focused on an exploration of idealism and pragmatism, the conflict between 'us' and 'them', and other aspects of ideologies and power relations that were found in the speech. The study relied upon data a speech by Bush, nine days after the attacks of September 11 2011 (ibid), using CDA and political discourse analysis to identify presuppositions in the speech, which were then thematically grouped in order to facilitate examination (into tragedy, immediate response, fear, US/Utopia, terrorism, Islam was not bad, US authority, world-wide-support and retaliation) (ibid). Mazid (2007) concluded that Bush's speech revealed many strategic functions which characterized political speeches such as delegitimisation, resistance, protest and opposition. In the speeches, 'us' was portrayed as free, developed and just while 'them' was doctorial, illegitimate and uncivilized.

Another study which investigated political speeches in terms of otherness was by Oddo (2011) who studied war legitimisation discourse through the representation of 'Us' and 'Them' in two 'call-to-arms' style addresses given by the US President F.D. Roosevelt in 1941 and another two by George. Bush in 2002. As with the present study, the theme of 'us and them' functioned as a tool of ideology in political discourse. Intertextual analysis was conducted to identify the specific legitimation strategies and thematic formations that underlie the rhetoric of both speakers. The speeches were also situated within their wider social and historical context in an attempt to study the various ways in which both presidents may have influenced or manipulated the public. Data analysis comprised an examination of the polarisation of lexical resources to constitute 'Us' and 'Them', analysis of representations of past and future function to legitimise violence in the four

speeches and examination of how presidents demarcated group membership in order to discredit opponents of war at home. Oddo's (2011) analysis illustrated that both presidents had drawn upon similar thematic formations and rhetorical strategies during their attempts to lead the US public into war. In their speeches, the concept of 'US' was presented through the use of positive and neutral nouns, like defend and protect, whereas 'them' was represented by the use of negatively valued nouns and processes, such as attack and kill. The study gave a clear methodology comprising three levels of analysis that were used to understand and compare the speeches of two presidents (ibid). However, although the numbers and frequencies of words were given, no corpus software package was used to triangulate the analysis.

Media was another genre in which otherness was the vehicle of demonstrating political ideology. As with the current study, Pasha (2011) examined the concept of 'otherness' as a tool of ideology in the discourse of media in the Arab world. The study focused on front page news and headlines reports published in al-Ahram during 2000 and 2005, as well as by reference to the online index of the newspaper. The textual analysis focused on transitivity, sourcing, lexical choice and presupposition (ibid). This enabled an investigation of how 'Islamists were socially, discursively and linguistically represented in the Egyptian newspaper al-Ahram, and so how Islamists were represented in the mainstream Egyptian official media, and the factors that influenced this representation' (ibid, p. 5). The assumption made by Pasha (2011) was that the western newspaper and the Egyptian elite's al-Ahram held similar representation of Islam and Muslims; a representation based on the ideology of exclusion and othering. The study concluded that the Egyptian regimes have been practicing a systematic way of excluding the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Pasha (2011), the Egyptian government was trying to instil fear of Islamists among the population in order to gain the support of the west. The study highlighted

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the process of news making, the 'role of ideology, the history of Islamism, and the type of relationships between Islamists and the regimes linguistically through ideology, media and othering' (ibid, p. 4). However, there seemed to be selection bias with regards to the data and methodology, as in many areas was in favour of the Islamists. Additionally, no triangulation was performed of the analysis, so its neutrality could not be confirmed.

2.3.2.2.1.3 Metaphor
Metaphor is an expression where something is described by stating another word or concept with which it can be compared. For example, in the case of 'her words stabbed at his heart', the words referred to did not actually stab a person in the heart, but their effect was painful or harmful to the individual and so can be compared to the feeling of being stabbed by a knife (Richards & Schmidt, 2002). Every language has its own metaphors and, for this reason, metaphors can be attributed to ideology, as they represent cultural connotations and backgrounds that help to shape the beliefs and attitudes of people.

The power of the use of metaphors in political discourse is acknowledged in literature. Billig and MacMillan (2005) emphasise that the use of metaphors in political discourse generate new meanings and challenge beliefs, as well as serving as routine idioms to deaden political awareness. Similarly, Archakis and Tsakona (2010) explain that metaphors are words used in political speeches in order to activate specific positive or negative emotional connotations among the audience. Overall, the functions of metaphor and presupposition are to 'stigmatize, stereotype, exclude, silence opposition, distract, call names, background certain issues, preclude argument, establish territories and draw ideological boundaries' (Mazid, 2007, p. 360).

It is essential to refer to studies that investigated metaphor as the linguistic tool to achieve the speakers' ideological stances by employing CDA. This is because the speakers of the debates in this study can be expected to use metaphors extensively, in order to achieve their ideological intentions. This is especially likely in the context of Arabic discourse, where cultural aspects are evident in language including the use of metaphors in debates. Four studies are quoted below and organised according to their data analysis methodology. The first two studies were by Shenhav (2007) and Archakis and Tsakona (2010), who both used a comparative analysis. Shenhav (2007) presented seven types of confidential discussions through the analysis of the discourse of Israeli government members and prime ministers. He made the assumption that there is a need to 'regard some of these traces as an inevitable part of the process of constructing political discourse' (ibid, p. 77), because politicians typically fail to provide the general public with all of the information that they have at their disposal. Shenhav (2007) used 'a comparative analysis of in-camera and public political discourse in Israel, suggesting techniques for identifying unintentional disclosure of information' (ibid, p. 179). Israeli politicians were shown to employ seven types of traces of ideological stands: 'evading answering the question, presentation of a standpoint, appraisals and thoughts, general statements and vague concepts, vague communications and incoherence, fragmentation of narratives, and metaphorical and metonymic displacement' (ibid, p. 195).

Another important study to adopt a comparative analysis approach was conducted by Archakis and Tsakona (2010), who sought to better understand how journalists created ideological networks in parliamentary discourse and newspaper articles, by analysing the speeches of the members of parliament (MPs). Their study employed data from parliamentary debates that took place on 9th February 9, 2005, regarding a new bill in Greece. These official written proceedings

of the debates were supplemented by newspaper articles referring to the particular parliamentary session, which were published on the next day (10th February, 2005) (ibid). The comparative analysis included parliamentary proceedings and related newspaper articles with an emphasis on metaphor. So, the study by Archakis and Tsakona (201) is similar to this study in that it investigates the metaphors in political and media discourses. They found that reported facts were selected on the basis of their unusual consequences, rather than by virtue of their legal or political significances, adding that newspaper reports were not an imperial reflection of reality but rather value-laden reality-representations (ibid).

Other methodologies that were used in the detection of metaphors as a linguistic tool of ideology were the historical approach and inter-disciplinary approach. Billig and MacMillan (2005) examined the idiom 'smoking gun', which was extensively used in the controversy regarding the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Through the use of their historical approach, they were able to obtain a better understanding of the ways in which metaphors can enter the political lexicon and the change in their usage and meaning over time, with metaphors gradually evolving into idioms (ibid). They discovered that, 'red-handed' was used more often than 'smoking gun' in 14 of the 20 years, 'smoking gun' became markedly more common in 4 years (1987, 1988, 2002 and 2003) (ibid). Billig and MacMillan (2005) found that idioms were used rhetorically to achieve different purposes, with the context of 'smoking gun' being clearly ideological as it was used in controversies about political leaders. With the constant repetition of the idiom, the metaphorical meaning of smoking gun was blunted, leading to a dull literal meaning and therefore, ideological concealment. In this way, Billig and MacMillan provided convincing evidence that suitable linguistic strategies could result in a phrase shifting from a 'simile' to 'metaphor' to 'idiom' over time. They also demonstrated the importance of considering metaphors

and related linguistic tools such as similes and idioms in investigating ideology of political discourse (ibid), and for this reason due consideration is given to these subjects in the current study.

El-Sharif (2011) utilised an inter-disciplinary approach to analyse metaphorical language in order to investigate the significance of metaphoric language in strengthening Islamic religious beliefs. He made the assumption that religion could be instrumental in supporting ideological beliefs which aimed to lead and control the souls of mankind. In addition, prophetic tradition constituted a planned discourse that mirrored aspects of Islamic religious doctrine and ideology (ibid, p. 26). This assumption is significant in the context of the present study, as the Arabic discourse used in this discourse is permeated by reference to religion, including metaphors of religious origins. As a powerful linguistic tool in reaching intended ideological assumptions, this can be expected to dominate political discourse. El-Sharif (2011) used an Arabic version of *the Niche of Lamps*, a well-known collection of Prophet Mohammed's sayings, comprising a large corpus of 320,000 words. As El-Sharif was unable to use corpus based software with the large Arabic corpus, concordances were done manually. Instances of explicit metaphor markers followed, mainly lexical connotations from context. The metaphors were then classified into three categories: 'highly conventional (appearing more than nine times), conventional metaphors (appearing four to eight times), and novel metaphors (appearing three times or less)' (ibid, p. 100). The inter-disciplinary approach he used was based on three stages: compilation of corpus, identification of instances of metaphors, and contextual and critical analysis of the identified metaphors. El-Sharif (2011) identified that prophetic metaphors conform to the conventional systems of belief of the early Arabs who lived at the times of the prophet. The prophetic metaphors varied considerably in terms of the target of their domains, such as message of unity,

solidarity, brotherhood in Islam, and relationship between believers. El-Sharif (2011) used a neutral analysis framework, which was important when using religious language. However, although the study analysed discourse qualitatively and quantitatively, no software was used in counting the concordances of Arabic data despite the availability of such software.

2.3.2.2.1.4 Style
According to Fairclough (2008, p. 159), styles are "the discourse aspect of ways of being, identities", how we define ourselves in the way we speak, write and move, as well as the ways that people identify themselves and are identified by others. Styles are commonly identified by the interplay between 'language' and 'body language', such as gestures, stance and facial expressions (Thomas, et al., 2004). As an illustration of this, metaphor can be realised in a range of linguistic styles, including phonological pronunciation, stress, intonation and rhythm; vocabulary; metaphor intensifying adverbials, such as dreadfully and awfully; and swear words, such as bloody (Fairclough, 2008). In this study, style mainly refers to the use of religious discourse and, the shift between the standard and nonstandard variety of the discourse used for analysis.

Various studies draw attention on the richness of the reference to religion as a discursive style in Arabic. Badarneh et al. (2010) examined the intertextual borrowings of ideological nature in political discourse related to the Middle East. This is significant in the context of the current study, which seeks to link Arabic political discourse to ideology through the use of religious discourse. Badarneh et al. (2010) relied upon a range of English and Arabic texts related to a small number of key political social actors in the Middle East: Bin Laden, Bush, and the Pope of the Catholic Church. In order to examine their purpose, code of behaviour, and audience, the study employed a multi-disciplinary framework of CDA, specifically that proposed by van Dijk

(2003). In so doing, an attempt was made to understand why the actors were saying what they were saying, their intended objectives, their unique characteristics, and anything that they did not do which others commonly did. Questions relating to the code of behaviour gathered information about: the speaker, his actions, expected behaviour, and societal rank. Finally, audience related questions examined the intended target of speech, information on the discourse community, and identifying his friends and enemies. Religious discourse representations in the speeches were analysed in terms of intertextuality: mixing genres and voices. Badarneh et al. used intertextuality by mixing genres, orders of discourse and social change, where values were integrated with the text, with 'hidden discourses involving the reformation of existing social, cultural and ideological values and moulding them in order to reach the speaker's goals' (ibid, p. 2). Badarneh et al. justified the methodology they used by stating that 'direct representation, *quoting others-people with religious history,* had linguistic functions such as making the text producer seem neutral and objective, giving the impression that the producer was talking about things as facts, conveying ideological messages, and saving the producer's face through alienating from the proposition by the original speaker' (ibid, p. 14). Badarneh et al. (2010) showed that opposing parties attempted to legitimise the war in the name of God: Bin Laden combined religion with politics, stating that his religion commanded him to fight or occupy in order for him to perform holy war 'jihad'; and Bush claimed to fight in the name of God, exercising hegemony over the Middle East. Momani et al. (2010) support the assertion that political discourses often use religious style in order to achieve hegemony. Badarneh et al. (2010, p. 1) summarised their key findings that the events after 9/11 caused the presence of religion in the Middle East discourse to increase.

Another study in this area, by Albirini (2011) studied the social functions of code switching between the standard and dialectical Arabic employed by educated speakers of Egyptian, Gulf, and Levantine Arabic domains in order to better understand spoken shifts between standard and nonstandard Arabic. In order to detect systematic patterns (pragmatic and sociolinguistic functions), Albirini (2011) used 35 audio and video recordings in the domains of religious lectures, political debates and soccer commentaries. The participating speakers were found to switch to standard Arabic in order to introduce 'formulaic expressions, highlight important segments of discourse, mark emphasis, introduce direct quotations, signal a shift to a comic or serious tone, produce rhythmic stretches of discourse, take a pedantic stand and indicate pan-Arab or Muslim identity' (ibid, p. 125). This shift from dialectical to standard Arabic creates a sense of importance, high prestige, identity, seriousness, eloquence and sophistication (ibid). Overall, Albirini's (2011) study demonstrated that Arabic discourse is rich in shifts from non-standard to standard Arabic in using direct religious quotations, which leads to ideological assumptions (ibid).

2.3.2.2.1.5 Visual inputs

As with texts, visual inputs function in social control and power. Visual inputs include voice pitch, voice volume, gesture, posture, physical distance (kinetic), eye contact, and face work like losing and saving face (Bloor & Bloor, 2007). In this study, the visual aspects of discourse are the video recordings of the debates, which included aspects such as the images, movements, camera angles, and voices in the recordings. The significance of visual inputs is demonstrated in literature. According to Fairclough (2001a, p. 172), "the combination of verbal and visual elements to constitute texts is becoming increasingly important in our society…the salience of the image has been taken to be one of the main characteristics of contemporary society postmodern culture". This section provides a background on visual inputs, which is important in

the context of this study, given that the application of visual analysis of TV political debates constitutes a significant aspect of the methodology. However, as the source material led to linguistic analysis of text only, the decision was made to control the scope of this research by not including visual analysis.

This section will begin with a discussion of the works by Bednarek and Caple (2012), contemporary linguists who have written extensively about their empirical studies on the analysis of visual language. In their discursive approach in the construction of news values, Bednarek and Caple (2012) explain that debate images are not selected randomly, as a 'concern for composition and balance in the image frame is central to the work of any televised photographer' (p. 163). There are numerous considerations regarding the use of images in the construction of news values, including 'the contextualisation of the image participants, which refers to where and with whom the participants are photographed and how much or how little of this is included in the image frame (the denotative aspects). The second major consideration is the technical considerations: shutter speed (how fast), aperture (how much light), focal length (how much in focus), lens (how distorted, natural and condensed the shot) and angle (how high or low the angle is- connotative aspects)' (ibid, 58).

In addition to the above image consideration elements, Bednarek and Caple (2012) produced key photographic devices or values that are determined from images, with one image potentially having one or more of these devices. The first device is the evaluative elements which constitute the way participants are photographed and show their importance and status. 'It also portrays the prominence of participants whether photographed in the middle of a media scrum with microphones and cameras pointed at them or surrounded by body guards, negative or prominence: uniforms and official regalia and negative value: low camera angle (below) or high

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camera angle (high) of the participant although the image should concentrate on the participant or speaker' (ibid, p. 39). The second element is intensification which refers to images which repeat information. Comparison is the third device and represents the different sizes of images which construct comparisons leading to superlativeness and novelty. The fourth device is the references to emotion that is 'showing social actors' emotional responses in an image which construe a variety of values such as negativity (negative emotions), personalisation (an emotional response especially when combined with close-up shot), and novelty (depictions of surprise or shock in facial expressions and gestures, impact (with casual emotions) and superlativeness (strong emotional responses)' (ibid, p. 54). Reference to time and place is another device that refers to time, which is difficult to depict in images, and place, which can easily be shown, such as to show proximity. Timeliness can also be constructed through images, as in the case of showing of weather conditions (snow is equal to winter) or flora/fauna (Jacaranda blossom is equal to spring). Role labels is the sixth device, such as photographing bookshelves to show the person is an academic and a police station to show the photographed subject is a member of the police, referencing to individuals and personalizing of what individuals do. The seventh device is aesthetic elements which shows how the participants who are arranged in the image impact the balance and aesthetic quality of the image making the event positive because of its 'beauty'. Finally, moving images are about camera share causes images to blur. Excessive revolution of images can convey negativity and superlativeness. Impact can be constructed by capturing image sequences showing cause and effect (ibid).

The ideology of news values through the examination of visual inputs was investigated by Bednarek and Caple (2013), who sought to 'bring news values to the attention of critical linguists, encourage a constructive approach to news values and introduce a new framework to

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the analysis of news values' (ibid, p. 2). A corpus of 70000 words of news stories from national UK newspapers in 2003 was analysed by a combination of corpus assisted multimodal discourse analysis (CAMDA-word frequency by word forms, clemmas and clusters) where all corpus was used, and microanalysis of selected data. Findings revealed that systematic linguistic analysis showed the discursive devices used in British press in order to construct news values or ideology. The study by Bednarek and Caple (2013) reinforced corpus assisted CDA studies in the study of ideology through news worthiness and supported the analysis of semiotic text aspects like images, layout and typography.

Visual inputs of texts have been investigated by other researchers. For example, Carvalho (2011) did CDA of Time magazine articles written in Arabic language on the war on Iraq prior to the 2003 occupation. Her study attempted to determine the major themes used by Time magazine to report the case of war and whether the themes were influenced by the themes present in Bush's speeches. Carvalho used corpus of Time magazine articles from February to March 2003, and the speeches by President Bush during the same period. Both text and images were both considered as data, a total of 25 articles of eight issues and four presidential addresses. Carvalho performed a qualitative analysis in search of patterns of discourse such as how opposition, president, Iraq and Saddam were characterized. Major themes presented were polarisation of us and them, patriotism and the 'if' discourse. However, it should be noted that this study would have been more objective and reliable if more than one analysis method were used and if triangulation of analysis was carried out by another researcher.

Despite the relative paucity of research in this area, another study dealing with the visual inputs of discourse was conducted by Norton and Gieve (2010), who explored the creation of native and non-native speaker identity in the discourse of television lifestyle, travel and documentary

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genres, where an English native speaker audience was assumed. The study was conducted with the assumption that foreigners are ideologically represented on television. A corpus of travel based programmes was used, including lifestyle shows, celebrity travelogues and living abroad documentaries that were filmed between 2003 and 2005 (ibid). The study relied upon critical language awareness and CDA to uncover 'otherness', with data analysis involving coding categories based on mediation degree, unseen/unheard and not reported, unseen but reported, seen/unheard, seen/heard in English and seen/heard unmediated. Verbal as well as visual and aural representations of actors were analysed (ibid). Findings indicated that dominant voices represented in the programmes were those of presenters and producers, than of the local people. Norton and Gieve's (2010) focused on social relations, identities and power relations, which was supplemented by a corpus that focused on two debates. The study was also critical and honest about what could be analysed about camera/visual aspects of the corpus especially with mediation levels.

2.3.2.3 Argument
Arguments feature prominently in political debates. The general structure of a typical debate is that a debate starts with hearing of statement, such as proposals and declarations, and followed by reactions of different debate members or short speeches (Guillem, 2009). A similar debate organisation is suggested by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, p. 36), who explain that an argument is "a set of statements (explicit or implicit), one of which is the conclusion (claim) while the others are the premises". Premises explain the conclusion which follows the premises. From this definition, we can trace three elements of an argument: statements, conclusion, and premises. Edley (2001) better specifies the argument components which are grounds (premises),

warrants (justifications) and claim. The following is an example on the argument structure, adapted from Edley (2001):

Globalisation delivers goods in the South (grounds)*; globalisation will deliver goods if changes are made in national and global power* (warrant)*; changes should be made in global and national power* (claim).

In TV argument, there are at least two sides of guest speakers and the arrangement is designed to maximise the number of arguments and warrants in an attempt to influence the opinion of the public. Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) identify four categories of responding to the argument. These categories are cognitive responses (judgments), intentional responses (drawing intentions), decisional responses (decisions) and behavioural responses (actions).

Next, two empirical studies done on argumentation are elaborated. Similar to this study, Simon-Vandenbergen (2008) studied arguments in political discourse of television debates in an attempt to determine the extent and way in which 'the party abandoned views which led to the verdict?' To address this line of enquiry, the study examined a newspaper and a 2004 television debate between Dewinter and Vermeersch, two politicians of the extreme right-wing party of the Flemish anti-immigration Bloc in Flanders (Belgium). Dewinter had 30 turns (1762 words) and Vermeersch had 31 turns (1456 words). The English translations were from Dutch, the official language in Flanders. Simon-Vandenbergen (2008) concluded that direct replies were given 20% of the cases. In addition, they were always embedded in equivocal contexts and contained hedges. Remarks on the private lives of opponents were tools to win the debate, by lowering the credibility of opponents. This may be useful or insightful given the potentially combative nature of the subject of debates in the current study.

Another study which used argumentative discourse was by Macagno and Walton (2010) who sought to examine the argumentative use of emotive words that were studied in the recent literature on persuasive definitions. They showed how words, reality and common knowledge were linked. This study is significant to be mentioned here because it is expected that this study concludes in gender-based differences in the use of discourse especially with words that express emotions. An investigation was conducted into the semantic and the argumentative structure of certain emotive words, after which the study looked at why the emotive words were so powerful when used as argumentative instruments and the conditions under which the persuasive definitions were legitimate. Macagno and Walton (2010) employed a methodology of a pragmatic perspective by presenting an analysis of persuasive definition based on argumentative scheme and the concept of presupposition. Three levels of data analysis were employed: the semantic, the argumentative and the pragmatic level. Findings indicated that emotive words were sometimes utilized in alteration way that changed the interlocutor's values. The justified and unjustified use of emotive words could be evaluated on a case-by-case using the reasonableness conditions of persuasive definitions. In critiquing the study by Macagno and Walton (2010), their study focused on argument as the discourse genre but CDA was not employed in the methodology. In addition, the framework they employed did not make use of well-known linguistic theorists.

2.4   Corpus-based CDA

The use of computer software to perform corpus analysis is an accepted triangulation method for use with CDA. In fact, the majority of studies that are published in discourse analysis and ideology are based on corpora (McEnery & Xiano, 2006).

The term corpus (the singular of corpora or corpuses) refers to the "collection of linguistic data, nowadays stored in computers, which is seen to be representative of a certain type of a text, interaction or discourse" (Yates, 2001, p. 103). Corpus is used to describe discourse data, particularly with reference to large collections stored on computers from which patterns can be electronically accessed, recognised, and manipulated (Taylor, 2001a; Baker, 2007). In this research, the term 'corpus' denotes the political debates that comprise the discourse of the study.

Richards and Schmidt (2002) distinguish four types of corpora: the general corpus, or reference corpus, is a large collection of many different types of texts, such as dictionaries; the specialized corpus, which is a collection of similar texts, such as PhD theses; the comparable corpus, which refers to more than one corpus of different languages or varieties of one language; and the learner corpus, which describes a collection of texts produced by students. This research is based upon a specialized corpus that is comprised solely of televised political debates.

There are many benefits of employing corpus analysis studies. Corpus analysis, or corpus linguistics, is the most appropriate method to show how discourses change between texts, providing an effective tool for the investigation of variation in node word selection (Edwards, 2012). Corpus work is primarily quantitative, as it involves statistics such as the counting and measuring of linguistic features. This makes corpus studies especially useful for studying the relationship between language practices and other variables, such as context or culture (Yates, 2001). As corpus studies utilise computers for most of their core operations, data can be gathered and processed with speed, accountability, accuracy, reliability and sorting linguistic items (Baker, 2010; Kennedy, 1998). Specifically, corpus linguistic approaches enable researchers to quantify linguistic patterns, providing solid conclusions (Baker, 2010). There are a number of advantages offered by corpus-based approaches that are especially significant to discourse

analysis (Baker, 2007). For example, they enable the reduction of research bias, such as self-awareness, objectivity, and restrictions to cognitive biases. Corpus analysis studies the incremental effect of discourse as word or grammatical construction may suggest the existence of a discourse rather than relying on our intuition or existing bias (ibid). Studies using corpus can also be effective in dealing with resistant and changing discourses, as they can highlight discourses that may not be easily visible in other types of analysis. Finally, corpus analysis is an extremely productive means of triangulation. For this reason, the current study uses corpus analysis as a means of triangulating the findings of the CDA.

Corpus works can generally raise many questions for researchers, such as whether the corpus resembles any other forms of communication or records of that communication; whether the corpus is written by a man or woman; where and when it was written; whether the corpus employs happy, sad, ironic, factual, friendly or aggressive language; the number of conversations that the corpus includes; or whether the turn-taking makes sense (Yates, 2001). The term KWIC (Key Words In Context) is particularly useful, as it denotes the frequency of word occurrences. Examples of word concordance software that enable the analysis of corpora are WordSmith, AntConc, Wmatrix and Nvival (ibid).

Despite their abundant strengths, corpus-based approaches have been criticized for being too broad, not allowing for close readings of texts, and for being limited to the verbal domain of discourse although discourses are communicated through means other than words (Baker, 2007). As analysis is being employed as a supplementary approach to CDA in the current study, it is hoped that this weakness is mitigated or avoided.

Many of the empirical studies that were discussed in this chapter used computer assisted corpus linguistics as a supplementary methodology to CDA, almost exclusively in order to triangulate the CDA analysis. However, Edwards (2012) conducted corpus analysis as the main data analysis method to investigate the ideological strands of political texts. CDA and corpus analysis were employed to examine the 2005 and 2010 manifestos of the British National Party, with the Wordsmith programme being used to perform a contrastive qualitative analysis (concordance contexts and relevance) (ibid). Edwards analysed a range of features that included genre, pronouns, speech acts, agency, presupposition, and intertextuality. One significant finding by Edwards was that the first person pronoun was used 197 times, constituting less than 1% of both the 2005 and 2010 corpus. The study by Edwards concluded that the distribution of 'our' in the 2005 and 2010 manifesto was even because it referred to British nation in both years. However, while the word 'white' signified identity in 2005, it was used to refer to 'skilled employees' in 2010. The meaning of 'human' was also found to differ between 2005 and 2010. Edward's study was interesting as he used 'time' as a variable. However, time was not considered as a variable in this study due to issues of space and because it was not judged to be salient to the research questions at hand.

2.5   Conversation analysis

Elements of conversation analysis were used in this study for the in-depth examination of discourse, with particular reference to the differences that occurred between female and male speakers. The process by which two or more participants take turns in communication, conversations can be formal, such as parliamentary debates, or informal, like friends chatting in a coffee shop. The *Longman Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics* defines

conversation analysis (CA) as a research tradition that studies the social organisation of natural conversation of a detailed inspection of recordings and transcriptions by investigating meanings and pragmatic functions of conversations. Conversation analysts study the sequential organisation of talk, turn-taking and the way people identify and repair communication (Richards & Schmidt, 2002). Wooffitt (2001, p. 49) describes CA as "a method for the analysis of naturally occurring interaction. CA's key assumption is that language use is a site for social interaction. People do things to each other when they talk".

Conversation analysis is a CDA strand that is developed by ethno methodologists and, for this reason, can be used as an effective tool in CDA research for answering questions that are formulated in order to analyse language. Fairclough (2001a, p. 9) adds the following in the link between CA and CDA:

> Conversation analysis is one prominent approach within discourse analysis that has been developed by a group of sociologists known as 'ethnomethodologists'. Ethnomethodologists investigate the production and interpretation of everyday action as skilled accomplishments of social actors, and they are interested in conversation as one particularly pervasive instance of skilled social action.

One important concept of CA is the maxims of conversation developed by Grice (1975). An explanation of the four maxims of conversation is provided below, having been adapted from Fairclough (2008). In the following, the maxims are listed and examples are provided for how each maxim could be violated.

Maxim	*Maxim violation example*
Maxim of quantity	Speaker A: *Why do you like your friend Sara best?*

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(Give as much required information, and no more than the required in the context)	Speaker B: *Because I like her best.* Comment: Maxim is not satisfied as concrete reasons on why Sara is liked best are not given.
Maxim of quality (Speak the truth)	Speaker A: *Who is your best friend?* Speaker B: *Nora* Comment: As speaker B does not reply with the truth that her best friend is Sara, the conversation is not of quality.
Maxim of relevance (Speak relevant information)	Speaker A: *Is Sara your best friend?* Speaker B: *Let's go shopping!* Comment: Reply of speaker B does not answer the question raised by speaker A, so the response is irrelevant.
Maxim of manner (Be clear)	Speaker A: *I heard your best friend is Sara.* Speaker B: *Well, Sara speaks good English and enjoys outings.* Comment: Maxim of manner is violated as speaker B's reply is ambiguous and does not clearly state whether her/his best friend is Sara.

Despite the relevance of these maxims in conversation, CA has been criticized in some aspects. Bloor and Bloor (2007) criticise the maxims by stating that people do not always observe the

guidelines in practice, instead often lying, waffling and disagreeing. People may also refuse to speak or simply provide a sign of disagreement. It is also dependent on the receiver to make assumptions about what the speaker produces, rather than to rely only upon what is said. Maxims can also be violated by a number of face threatening activities, such as starting an unsolicited conversation, challenging an opinion or assertion made by the addressee, interrupting another person's turn, raising a topic that is unknown by or unwelcome to the addressee, changing the topic, raising taboo topics or words, or ending an interaction (ibid).

Aspects of conversation analysis are evident in the examination of TV political debates. These include shouting, gesturing, interruption hesitations, turn-taking, holding the floor, and violations of the conversation maxims. For this reason, CA is a valuable methodology to be deployed within this study. However, because power is investigated within discourse, CA is insufficiently holistic and robust to capture the complexity of the research questions and so must be used in conjunction with the other chosen methodologies.

2.6   Conclusion

This study is a corpus assisted critical discourse analysis research that studies the ways in which discourse is employed in media political debates as a tool for exercising power. This research has specifically focused on ideologies by media and political parties of the Arab world. This chapter has provided a focused examination of the existing literature in media and political discourse in order to situate the current study within the wider field of critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics. The review has demonstrated a broad consensus regarding the importance of ideology in media and political discourse however, some degree of contention exists with respect to the area of interest to this study, namely the linguistic components which imply ideological

strands and the importance of combining two or more research methods in the analysis of data. As this research seeks to investigate the use of language in the mass media and the impact of these choices on audience bias, the review in this chapter suggests there is currently limited understanding with the use of ideology within Arabic texts. Therefore, in the next chapter of this study, an outline of the choice of methodology will be provided. As will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, this study has been informed by the literature to utilise a combination of research strategies to achieve its aims, with critical discourse analysis, computer assisted corpus analysis, and conversation analysis all playing an important role in answering the research questions.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The review of literature in the previous chapter clearly illustrates that CDA is an approach to methodology rather than the methodology itself, and no specific techniques or conditions are accepted as standard for data collection or data analysis in CDA (Al-Ali, 2006; Badarneh, et al., 2010; Buckingham, 2013; Hardman, 2008; Hess-Luttich, 2007; Mazid, 2007; Meyer, 2007;). Additionally, computer assisted corpus analysis was shown to be a functional and commonly utilised triangulation method to ensure the objectivity of the results generated by CDA.

The chosen methodology of this study is outlined as follows: the corpus of the study is described, with information being given on the composition of the data collection debates and data representation. After this, information is provided on the chosen approach for the interviews that were conducted with AJ staff, which is followed by a definition of the data analysis framework in this study and the rationale for its selection. It is important to point here that in the analysis, the Arabic corpus utilised is the text as transcribed by AJ, which has been translated into English for the sake of clarity and readability in this dissertation. The translation was done by the researcher's research assistant and was checked by a professional translation company.

3.2 The corpus

The corpus used for analysis in this thesis comprises the AJ debates. This section is divided into sections that discuss the following: data collection of the corpus, information on the debates themselves, data representation, and the key differences that exist between the actual recordings of the debates and the corpus as a transcript (obtained from AJ website).

3.2.1 *Data collection*

The success and viability of research using CDA is highly influenced by the quantity and quality of data available. In covering the revolution in Yemen, AJ broadcast a wide range of media,

including news, live documentaries, documentaries, talk shows, discussions, and conversation programmes. Debates were selected as the study genre because they are a concise representation of media and political discourse, which is central to this study. So, in this research, debates refer to the conversations staged by the Arabic channel of the Al Jazeera network, which involved participants arguing their thoughts about the 2011 Yemen revolution. These participants are sometimes geographically separated, speaking remotely from other locations and countries, and are sometimes interviewed in the Al Jazeera studio in Qatar. Since all the debates were broadcast live, they represented the actual language of politics and media in the Arab region.

Table 1 Number of debates

Debate program	Total number of debates
Revolution talk	3
Behind the news	6
In depth	3
The opposite direction	3

All the debates were broadcast in four live programs: the Opposite Direction, In Depth, Behind the News, and The Revolution Talk. Fourteen of the debates took place at the studios of the AJ channel in Doha, Qatar. Only one debate took place in an open air studio in Yemen. The debates were staged over a year from 22 May 2011 to 21 May 2012. The corpus contains fifteen debates, with three to five episodes from each of the four programmes. Each debate lasted for 23:31 to 49 minutes and contained 27430 to 7064 words. The debates dealt with important and emerging events related to the Yemen revolution, such as the breaking news, the chronological progress of the revolution, and what guest speakers thought about events or likely developments within the

revolution. Each debate contained a main discussion theme, depending on the progress of the revolution at the time of recording, each of which was divided into subthemes within the same debate. Questions addressed to guest speakers were on the same subthemes so all questions fell under one theme. For further information on the debates, including date, programme name, titles and subtitles, moderator name, guest speakers and their relation to the revolution, revolution stage, duration in minutes, and number of words, please refer to Appendix 1. The Al Jazeera channel has made these debates available online, in both written and video recorded formats. Audio recordings and transcription (written record) of each of the debates are archived at: *http://www.aljazeera.net/portal.*

It should be noted that the only female guest speaker participating in the debates was Tawakul Karman, a Nobel Peace Prize-winning journalist who actively participated in the revolution. It is assumed that male debate participants outnumbered females due to a similar ration of males to females in Yemeni political life, as women place a much smaller role in Yemeni politics than men.

The debates are only available in the Arabic language, standard Arabic. All readily transcribed debates of the Yemen revolution of Al Jazeera were used for the study. These debates were an important source of language data, given the many events throughout the period in which the Yemeni revolution occurred, as well as to ensure that findings of the study were based on the use of language by as many programme moderators and speakers.

Recent developments in the Arab world have clearly illustrated the power of media discourse in shaping political protests and social resistance (Chiluwa, 2012). An example here is the way in

which the revolution events were covered by media. The selection of political debates staged on Al Jazeera television, one genre, as the corpus is significant. First, debates represented the formalized attempts by the revolution sides of either with or against in order to gain public support for a pre-emptive war against one another. Secondly, debates pointed out significant statements on the parties' plans for the future of the war of Yemen. These formalized debates were readily comparable across a spectrum of factors, such as genre, word-count and participants.

The online transcriptions of the chosen debates are organised in the following format on the AJ website:

Programme name
Debate title
Webpage and video link

Moderator name
Guest speakers (speaker name and relation to the revolution)
Debate date

Debate subtitles

Pictures of moderators and guest speakers

Name of speaker: discussion

Figure 1 Debate structure

This clearly shows that the transcription of every debate was organised and included the elements of the debate. Examples of these elements were the programme name, debate title, debate subtitles, moderator, guest speakers and the discussion.

Each debate involved at least three people (the moderator and two speakers) and was broken into three main segments (the introduction, the discussion, and a conclusion). The introduction includes a summary and report produced by Al Jazeera about the coinciding revolution event, which is supported with videos, images and people speaking about the event. In the debate, the discussion phase takes the form of a question and answer session, during which the moderator poses questions to each of the invited speakers and gives them an opportunity to respond. Each debate is based around one main theme, which is further divided into subthemes, meaning that the discussion covers questions related to subthemes of the same theme. A conclusion is given by the moderator, finishing the debate by expressing gratitude to the speakers for their contribution and thanking the viewers for their attention. Sometimes this final statement also involves both speakers being asked to give a short concluding remark about their predictions for the future of the discussed topic.

Although turn-taking is primarily controlled by the moderator and signalled by means of questions explicitly directed to the guest speakers, turns are also occasionally taken by statements directed by the moderators. In rare cases, speakers question the moderator. Some turns are either as short as a single word or as long as sentences. The following table illustrates that less turns are given to speakers who are not present in the studio in Qatar whose live contribution is aired by technology.

Table 2 Turn-taking by 'in studio speakers' versus 'aired speakers'

	Government	Protesters	Total	AJ moderator
Number of speakers at studio	4 (50%)	12 (42.9%)	16	15
Turn-taking	165 (83.3%)	339 (89.4%)	504 (42.7%) of total turns	677 (57.3%) of total turns
Number of aired speakers	4 (50%)	16 (57.1%)	20	
Turn-taking	33 (16.7%)	40 (10.6%)	73	
Total speakers/turns	8 (22.2%) 198 (34.3%)	28 (77.8%) 379 (65.7%)		

Although it is evident that the protestors take a greater number of turns than the government speakers, however this is almost certainly because more protesters speakers are involved in the debates, meaning that they have more to say and get more turns. The fact that the AJ moderators account for almost half of the total turns taken is also readily explainable, as all of the turning is primarily facilitated by the moderator's questions addressed to the guest speakers.

The number of government face-to-face (in the studio) speakers in this data sample is equal to that of the government aired speakers (via skype), however there are more aired protesters speakers than face-to-face protesters speakers. One justification for this is that the only female participant is on the side of the protesters and will have not travelled to the channel. An additional justification is that many of the protester speakers may have been too busy to travel, due to their obligations or roles in the revolution.

3.2.2 *Debate participants*

Debate participants are the guest speakers who are invited to the debates as well as the debate moderators. The majority of those involved in the debates were government representatives and protesters, although neutral speakers were present in some debates and did not favour either sideParticipants not only included the number of the speakers but also their roles in the debates, their relation with the revolution, their intended aims, their shared backgrounds, and the social actors (the doers of the actions mentioned in the debates). Every debate was overseen by one AJ moderator. In addition to the aforementioned participants, between two and six guest speakers were also involved in the debates, representing government, protester, or neutral positions. Government speakers refer to the invited guests who supported Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime, such as ministers and spokespersons, and for this reason they supported the government and opposed the revolution. The protesters were representatives from the youth who were gathering at the demonstrating squares, and so they were usually the young people who supported the revolution for regime change. Neutral speakers neither supported the government nor the protesters, including delegates from the United Nations or Gulf Initiative. Almost all of the speakers from both the government and protester factions were Yemenis, whereas many neutral speakers were not. Despite the range of available participants, not all of the debates included speakers of different political standpoints, with some sessions only including protestors, despite the aims of the events being to present both perspectives of the revolution. It is expected that since all speakers are from the Arab world then, they share similar facts about the revolution, cultural knowledge, behaviour and institutional practices.

The relation between the guest speakers and the revolution, with speakers from a diverse range of backgrounds, included university professors, researchers, journalists, spokespersons, lawyers, activists, leaders in government, revolution and parties and, delegates from the United Nations,

and the Gulf Initiative. The role of AJ moderators was to introduce the debate by giving a summary of the debate theme and the coinciding revolution events. The moderator was in charge of controlling the debate, which was principally managed by the distribution of turns to guest speakers. These turns were given by asking questions, interrupting, asking speakers to address their actual points, or to limit the amount of time they spend on a given topic or argument. The overall mode of the debates was formal and the debates were principally in standard Arabic, although some of the speakers, including AJ moderators, occasionally chose to use nonstandard Arabic in short phrases or sentences.

The role of guest speakers was to answer the questions raised by the moderator. Their language mainly aimed to convince the Arab audience of their political views. This is evident in their language choice, although Arabic language is linguistically rich in discourses that signal ideological perspectives, and this is particularly true in political Arabic discourse:

> Political discourse in the Middle East has witnessed an unprecedented dynamism. With the acceleration and escalation of events in the Middle East after the events of September 11, 2001; different political parties have been involved in a linguistic war not less vicious than military war. …combination of different genres and discourses makes off social practices and ideologies (Badarneh et al., 2010, p.1).

AJ moderators addressed guest speakers and the guest speakers addressed them in return. Guest speakers also spoke to each other, especially where interruptions occurred. However, the guest speakers generally spoke to the large Arab TV audience.

Although discussions got heated and expressive vocabulary was selected, no insults were explicitly traded between speakers at a personal level, such as references to their private lives. Additionally, those topics that are generally considered to be taboos in the Arab world, such as sex and secularism, were not discussed in the debates.

3.2.3   *Data Representation*
In this study, only one TV channel was used as the debate source: Al Jazeera Arabic (AJA). The use of corpus from Al Jazeera is representative and sufficient for answering the research questions for many reasons, as explained below.

Al Jazeera is the most popular news channel in the Arab world. People enjoy watching AJ because it is a trusted source and broadcasts news items in a way that matches public preferences with regards to delivery or content. It is also generally recognised that AJ has played an active role in the Arab revolutions (Al Shroof, 2015). For example, AJ was shown on wide screens in the gathering squares by protesters during the revolutions. An important sub-channel of AJ is Al Jazeera Mubasher (Al Jazeera live), which enabled the recording of demonstrations in gathering squares to be broadcast live. Many of AJ staff were either killed or taken hostage by the regimes people were demonstrating against. The corpus used in this study comprises all 15 debates, from four debate programmes, held during the period of the Yemen revolution, with online transcript staged at AJA. A total of 40 people participated in the debates (moderators, twenty four protesters, four government speakers and five neutral speakers), with the resulting corpus totalling 73,915 words.

Although Al Jazeera has an English channel as well as the Arabic one, only the Arabic channel is considered in the present study, for a number of reasons. First, the Arabic channel is the most popular in the region with a large number of viewers of 60 to 80 million views at a time at peak time (between 8.00 p.m. and 12.00 am) (Al Shroof, 2015). Second, most of the participating speakers of the debates are Arabs who live in the region, therefore only speak Arabic fluently. This means that the corpus of the Arabic channel is authentic. Third, the English Al Jazeera channel has a western style of broadcasting and coverage, meaning that it has certain important

differences from its Arabic counterpart with regards to the way of presenting and debating. AJA is directed at the Arab audience, the central focus of this study, and therefore comprises the most logical source of language for analysis.

Although some aspects of conversation analysis are used in this study, such as turn-taking and interruptions, common transcription conventions are not used. This study deals with strategies used by speakers to maintain their roles in debates and therefore transcription of the said words is not applicable. Transcription conventions are not necessary in the study of language ideologies.

3.2.4   *Differences between AL Jazeera transcription and video recording*

This section highlights the discrepancies between the video recordings of the debates and the scripts available on the AJ website online. The 15 videos were compared against the script and the differences were identified (for more information, see Appendix 2, which lists the differences between the debates' video recordings and online transcript).

A few considerations are highlighted here. First, the repetition of letters and sounds is not considered, meaning that only completed words were studied. Additionally, the decision was made not to study certain grammatical forms that were deemed irrelevant to the substance of the study, such as the use of articles (specifically, the word 'the' attached to words) or critical marks or music breaks, as these are neither indicated in the script nor in the recording so they were not considered. Pauses and interruptions are not acknowledged in the text and are therefore not examined.

3.2.4.1 *Arabic and English grammar*

While Arabic grammar shares some characteristics with English grammar, it differs in many important aspects, the most important of which are discussed in this section. First of all, while English sentences tend to be verbal comprising of at least one verb, an Arabic sentence can also

be nominal comprising no verb. In Arabic, pronouns can be separate words or affixes attached to verbs, meaning that these pronouns become the subjects of the verbs to which they are attached. In English, a noun is identified as singular (one) or plural (more than one), whereas in Arabic a noun can be singular (one), dual (two), or plural (more than two). All pronouns in Arabic can be identified by either feminine or masculine; additionally, all Arabic nouns and verbs can be distinguished as feminine or belonging to females by adding a case ending at the end of the word. With regards to articles, Arabic does not contain indefinite articles (a, an), and so no replacement is written for the indefinite articles in Arabic.

3.2.4.2 General remarks

The total number of discrepancy cases between what AJ has written in the transcript and what was actually said in videos is 935 occurrences. A detailed description and analysis of the occurrences is provided below. The occurrences comprise a total of 68 omissions of the filler 'I mean', 230 omissions of immediately repeated words (one after another), and 637 cases of other discrepancies.

3.2.4.2.1 The filler 'I mean'

Although the use of 'I mean' by the speakers is generally indicated in the script, 68 other recurrences of 'I mean' are not indicated in the transcript. Throughout the corpus, the lexical chunk 'I mean' is employed as a filler in order to achieve the following purposes:

1. To signal a pause that the user of 'I mean' has not finished speaking and is still thinking. 'I mean' is mostly used by one of the female AJA moderators;

2. To get the speaker engaged until she/he comes up with the next point, while thinking instead of pausing completely as the other speaker (opponent) might seize the opportunity to fight back and therefore attack;

3. As a bridge to move a conversation onto the next word/idea, which is an accepted speaking style in Arabic.

3.2.4.2.2 Repetitions

Although repetitions are generally indicated in the scripts, the unindicated repetition of words, phrases and sentences by all debate speakers is 230 recurrences. Every recurrence happens one to three consecutive times. Speakers attempted repetitions for the following rhetorical purposes:

1. To make the opponent tentative of what is being said;

2. To silence the other speaker;

3. To stress or emphasise a point.

3.2.4.2.3 Other discrepancies

In addition to the unindicated repetitions and filler 'I mean' elaborated above, 637 discrepancies occurrences emerged from the transcripts, as summarised in the table below.

Table 3 Discrepancy types

Discrepancy type	Number of occurrences
Omission (AJ omits words that are said in the video)	364
Substitution (AJ replaces a certain word by another word)	182
Addition (AJ adds words that are not said in the video)	63
Spelling mistake (AJ spells certain words wrongly)	17
Reorder (AJ changes the order of the said words)	11
Total	637

This table illustrates that the AJ channel made another 637 discrepancies in its transcripts. These deviations from the source can be categorised into 364 omissions, 182 substitutions, 63 additions, 17 spelling mistakes and 11 reorders. An example for each of these discrepancy types is presented below, in one of five tables. The first of these is an illustration of omission.

Table 4 Omission

Category	Actual video example	AJ transcript
Omission	***She he** says yesterday.*	***He** says yesterday.*

This example shows that the pronoun 'she' that is said in the corpus is omitted by AJ transcript, showing a missing 'she' in the write up of AJ.

Table 5 Substitution

Category	Actual video	AJ transcript
Substitution	*that signing will be **in** three places*	*that signing will be **at** three places*

In this example, the transcript AJ substitutes pronoun 'in' with 'at'. In Arabic, pronoun 'in' stands as a separate word while 'at' is attached as an affix to the noun 'three', which causes differences in the spelling and number of words involved in the pronoun.

Table 6 Addition

Category	Actual video	AJ transcript
Addition	*that it be **a conflict** between parties(nunation absent from 'conflict')*	*that it be **a conflict** between parties (nunation present in 'conflict')*

AJ added nunation to the word 'conflict' as a critical mark added as a particle to the noun.

Table 7 Reorder

Category	Actual video	AJ transcript
Reorder	*I am **speaking today** in the name of*	*I am **today speaking**, speaking in the name of*

In this example, AJ revered the verb 'speaking' with the time phrase 'today' giving more importance to time than action.

Table 8 Spelling mistakes

Category	Actual video	AJ transcript
Spelling mistake	*Does he want **to wear it** for picnic; he wants to be proud of it?*	*Does he want **to wear** for picnic for it; he wants to be proud of it?*

A spelling mistake has been made here, by splitting the verb from the object and adding a letter at the beginning of the object. These changes in the spelling create a total different meaning from 'makes something wear' into 'wears for something'.

Table 9 lists the sociolinguistic functions associated with the types of discrepancies that can be seen between the recordings and transcripts of the debates.

Table 9 Functions of discrepancies

Grammatical description	Adjective, pronouns (demonstrative, prefix, indicative, subject, relative, possessive), object (complete, incomplete, conjunction, address form), noun (common, proper, reference, plural verses singular), verb (passive verses active, verb ending, verb form, case ending), prefix, suffix (possession, verb, preposition), repetition, extra information, tense indicator, negation, article(definite, subject), hedge, subject, phrase (prepositional, conditional), yes (intensifier), number, sentence (verbal, nominal), feminine marker (verb, noun), genitive, filler, phrase (standard, colloquial), question (standard, colloquial), modifier, meaningless words/slips of the tongue, discourse marker, determiner, introductory okay, explanatory paragraph, sarcastic metaphor, video, speech
Sociolinguistic functions	Euphemism, dysphemism, semantic derogation, intensifier
Other functions	Meaningless language variation, correction of slips of the tongue, spelling errors

AJ can be seen to have perpetrated omission, substitution, addition, or reorder of various grammatical categories shown on the table. These discrepancies serve the sociolinguistic functions of euphemism (making negative meanings less strong), dysphemism (making meanings negative), semantic derogation (making the referred to inferior) and intensifier (stressing or exaggerating the meaning). Other functions of the discrepancies that do not carry sociolinguistic purposes are meaningless language variations, including corrections of spelling errors and unintended speech errors (misspeaking). Table 10 presents four significant occurrences regarding the omission discrepancies, each of which occurred only once.

Table 10 Omission examples

No	Grammatical description	Source	Data
1	Omission of metaphor	Video	***Oh you're so eloquent!*** *I don't know who Humaid is.*
		Transcript	*I don't know who Humaid is.*
2	Omission of an explanatory paragraph	Video	***For the revolutionary youth in Sanaa. In order to correct the description and not make any mistake that could be misunderstood. So, Mr. Qurashi is a member of the Organisation Committee*** *of the Revolution youth in Sanaa. Mr. Qurashi, what role*
		Transcript	*of the revolutionary youth in Sanaa. Mr. Qurashi, what role*
3	Omission of speech	Video	***Saleh, 'we neither want nor need power, but we need to transfer power to safe hands'.***
		Transcript	-
4	Trim in video	Video	*How would you expect a country, a country to withstand it, in your opinion?*
		Transcript	*How would you expect a country, a country to withstand **when it is 24-hour drunk,** in your opinion?*

The first example reveals the deletion of 'Oh you're so eloquent!' which is a metaphor in Arabic. This metaphor is in the form of a vocative, which denotes the other side as being the son of the earth/desert, indicating wisdom or that the person is knowledgeable. Deleting the metaphor cools down the conversation.

The second example, a full explanatory paragraph on the background of the speaker is omitted in the transcript, suggesting less importance and creating vagueness regarding his identity. In other words, AJ semantically derogates the speaker by deleting the section of text that offers basic necessary information and which was actually said by the moderator in the actual debate.

An exclusion of Saleh's speech is shown in the third omission example, causing a euphemism case, because the speech by Saleh provides an evidence of what was said and therefore heats up the discussion by indicating that the speaker/s disagree with Saleh.

The most interesting example is the fourth example, in which a section of the dialogue of the moderator was omitted, although the same part remains in the transcript. This suggests that AJ may have chosen to deduct it from the video, because the utterance 'it is 24-hour drunk' is inappropriate to the Arab and Muslim culture. Speaking and writing about alcohol/drinking is a taboo in the Arab society. The moderator referred to the whole people of Yemen as drunken 24 hours a day, exhibiting an extreme absence of mind and thinking.

3.3   The interviews

The following section provides salient details about the trip to AJ network in Doha, Qatar, to interview selected members of AJ staff who work on the debates: moderators, director of AJ online, and head of output. This section is divided into a discussion on ethical approval, which was obtained from The University of Hertfordshire prior to the commencement of the study; the interview questions; issues of consent; interviewees; the first interview; pre-visit arrangements; the visit to the AJ network in Qatar; the Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards of AJ; and an overview of the AJ code of Ethics.

3.3.1   *Ethical approval*

It was necessary to obtain ethical approval from the University of Hertfordshire in order to ensure that the research complies with general standards of good practice, as well as those of the University of Hertfordshire.

Explicit ethical approval was granted by the University of Hertfordshire's Ethics Committee in order to conduct the interviews. The letter of approval to visit Al Jazeera for data collection was obtained on September 16, 2014 from AJ Chief Bureau in Muscat, Oman (to see the AJ approval letter, please refer to Appendix 4. The ethics approval certificate from the University of Hertfordshire is available in Appendix 5).

3.3.2   *Obtaining participants' consent*

Outside the academic community, obtaining participation consent through the use of a consent sheet can be difficult in the Arab world as people are sometimes cooperative and thus welcome research without formalities. However, the ethical procedure for data collection was followed strictly with the first interviewee, as per the guidelines stipulated by Hertfordshire University. This procedure includes stating the aim of the study and asking the participant to sign the consent form (Appendix 7) and Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 8). In the Arab context, asking non academics to sign forms can result in the withdrawal of participants, even if they are willing to participate. Therefore, it was not possible to get participants to sign the consent form. Answering interview questions was therefore interpreted as being sufficient to show the approval of the participants to participate in the interviews.

Although the questions were drafted in Arabic and English (Appendix 9), participants felt more comfortable speaking in Arabic since they worked for AJA. Six of Al Jazeera staff were interviewed: the director of AJ net (AJ online); the head of output (chief editor); and four

moderators. Two of the moderators were female, but all other interviewees were male. The majority of interviews took place face-to-face; however for reasons of scheduling, it was necessary to interview the director of AJ net over the phone. Each face-to-face interview took approximately 25 to 35 minutes. One of the female moderators was interviewed in Muscat (Oman); all other interviews took place at the AJ network in Doha (Qatar). All face-to-face interviews were voice recorded, with the explicit consent of the interviewees. Each interview took a structured format of questions raised by the researcher and answers were given by the interviewees. During the first interview, which took place in Oman, the interviewee was given a hard copy of the questions so she could read and answer each in turn since her schedule was busy, which helped in saving time and ensuring all questions were answered.

3.3.3 *The interview questions*

The questions were drafted and edited over a period of approximately six months. The questions were grouped into sections based on areas related to the context of AJ debates. They were designed to obtain information about the background of the participants, including their time working for the channel, the place where the staff worked prior to joining AJ, and any critical incident that they had encountered while working on debates. General questions involve questions on the channel policies, training programmes and editorial standards such as the particular selection of vocabulary by moderators. The speakers section involves questions related to selecting speakers and whether or not these speakers are aware of the questions before the debate. The moderator section comprises questions related to the full process of selecting AJ moderators for the debate programmes, such as the language used, supervision during the debate, flexibility with the questions, and neutrality of the moderator. Finally, the transcription section

involves questions on the full process of preparing the debates for the AJ website and the discrepancies that exist between the actual debates and the transcripts.

3.3.4 *Pre-visit arrangements*
After the cancellation of the first trip by the AJ moderator, the trip was re-arranged by another well-known moderator who was conducting training in Muscat during the period of June 10-11, 2015. The moderator was interviewed in Muscat and helped in arranging for the trip to the AJ networks. It was agreed that the best time to conduct the interviews in Qatar was the second week of September, as this is the end of the holiday period and so staff would be present.

The trip went as scheduled, although the second moderator who had arranged the visit was unable to attend due to work commitments in 'occupied Palestine'. The trip arrangements were therefore transferred to the staff in charge of the visit (Senior Producer, Output Department, AJA). Both the moderator and senior producer said that AJ specifically welcomes students from Western universities, however they refused the request to interview 15 members of AJ staff, explaining that the staff are busy and that it is unnecessary to interview more than five individuals, as the same answers would be elicited. Selection of the interviewed staff and order of interviews was controlled by the senior producer.

3.3.5 *Visit to AJ Network*
An entry permit for one week was obtained on September 16, 2015. AJ was visited for two days, over two shifts each day, which were principally spent in the AJA newsroom. Overall, the researcher was treated with courtesy, generosity, and a high degree of respect. The senior producer arranged the entry permit, met first with the researcher, and arranged the interviewees, with the time of each interview selected in accordance with the availability and preference of each interviewee. Three interviews (50% of total) took place inside the newsroom, in the small

office of the senior producer of AJA. It should be noted that he was present at the beginning of each interview and occasionally returned to his office during each interview.

Feedback from all interviewees was almost identical, except for the fourth moderator (M4) who was interviewed in a meeting room without the presence of the senior producer throughout the interview. It was realised too that the Head of Output (HO) was suspicious and tense immediately prior to the interview with M4, perhaps because of a suspicion that M4 would offer different feedback than that which was expected. It is important to mention here that although other moderators were present in the newsroom during the time of the visit, it was not possible to interview them without the approval of the senior producer and these individuals were not selected.

It was planned that interviews be structured in order as drafted and grouped. However, interviews were semi-structured as most of the questions were asked but not necessarily in the same order and sometimes follow up questions were added, all based on the duration of the interview, feedback received from each participant, and their role at AJA.

3.3.6   *QUALITY ASSURANCE and EDITORIAL STANDARDS*
The Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards (QAES) document was obtained during this trip to AJ, however the code of ethics was only sent to the researcher on October 25, 2015, more than a month after the visit. During the trip to AJ and upon the request of the researcher, a copy of the Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards document was received by the HO. The QAES document is written in Arabic, as it targets the practices of AJA, and includes code of ethics; general principles, such as accuracy and neutrality; partial productions, like reports and news; and general productions, such as repeated material and recorded programmes. The following are

the highlights from the quality standards document that are explicitly related to the linguistic aspects of conversation programmes:

1. In case of any mistake, as with the pronunciation of names, the mistake is corrected when the material is republished (page 19).

2. If there is an affected party then this party leads the correction of the mistake or the decision for it to remain unchanged, so long as it is so, s/he does not affect the reputation of AJ (page 19).

3. The mistake is to be published and corrected on AJ net online (page 20).

4. It is forbidden for the network's policies to be involved unless requested by the general director (page 33).

5. Accuracy must be ensured with respect to the connotation and denotation of the vocabulary used such as 'killing' and 'execution' (page 41).

6. Vague vocabulary should be avoided as with 'recently' and 'a couple of months ago'. Instead, accurate years and months are required (page 41).

7. Vocabulary should not express opinion or judgements (page 43).

8. AJ does not use colloquial words or vocabulary that is off general principles or which is impolite (page 44).

9. Publishing news must always be neutral and free from judgment such as 'an explosion of this size' or 'collapse of negotiations has opened to violence' (page 48).

10. Statistical accuracy be ensured, such as 'the number of injured' as inaccurate numbers can worsen the situation and create complications among the concerned parties (page 50).

11. No name shortcuts may be used, such as 'Najad' instead of 'Ahmedi Najad' for Iran's president (page 51).

12. In the case of news that can invoke debate or fear, AJ should invite experts to provide clarification and explanation (page 52).

13. Impartiality must be maintained so information is offered without inciting any party even if the journalist is convinced by the arguments of one party. Inviting one side of any issue is against 'impartiality' (page 57).

14. All guests must be treated with equal respect. For example, one guest should not be addressed as 'Abu D' (father of X) while the other is 'your highness the president' (page 62).

15. News from witnesses should be dealt with care and suspicion, in the sense that additional witnesses should be found to corroborate or disprove the testimony of initial witnesses (page 69).

16. The moderator should be strict yet not aggressive (page 195).

17. The moderator should be funny where needed but without being excessive (page 195).

18. The moderator should be dynamic but not rigid (page 195).

19. The moderator should control her/his voice tone while interviewing guests (page 195).

20. The moderator should avoid the use of prolapsed idioms that need representation by facial expression, which serve to mock guests (page 196).

21. The moderator's slogan should be 'the fixed variable is to seek knowledge' and every attempt should be made to extend this slogan to the viewer (page 202).

22. Invitations should be extended to as many guests who hold the opposing ideas to those of the moderator, programme or channel in order to test reliability and not exclude 'the other' (page 203).

23. With regard to the control of programmes, the moderator has the responsibility for controlling time, covering all questions and controlling the behaviour and disagreements between guests (page 204).

24. The moderator should be able to control her/himself and not be high tempered, being able to absorb crisis and give the guest time to revise her/himself and apologise where appropriate (page 205).

25. The moderator should read and research each topic, and address it from all angles and perspectives (page 208).

26. A topic should be addressed deeply but in a simple way because the audience varies in educational level, from university professors to individuals with more limited education and views (page 209).

27. Interruptions during conversation programmes should be logical and only occurs when there is a good reason such when a guest has spoken for too long, when clarification is required, or when rejecting an answer (page 231).

28. Interruption should be equally applied to all guests in cases where more than one guest is in a conversation (page 213).

3.3.7 *Al Jazeera Code of Ethics*

An electronic copy of AJ code of ethics was received from the senior producer (Output Department, News Directorate, AJA), who claimed that it was obtained from the official internal site of the network (TAWASUL). The code of ethics comes in English and Arabic; however they differ in length and content. The English version is shorter and includes international standard regulations, such as standing by colleagues in the profession and ensuring continued cooperation with journalistic unions (item 10 of AJ Code of Ethics-English). The Arabic version of the Code

of Ethics includes a short introduction stressing that the code is based on Press Charter, after the aims of the code's regulations are listed. Sixteen items are then included as the validity and reliability regulations. The four regulations presented below are those that relate to conversation programmes in some way.

1. To not distort stories, realities and information under any circumstances (regulation 2)

2. To not make judgements and to avoid descriptive analysis that is not based on data/evidences or upon information that can be certified for authenticity (regulation 3)

3. To avoid words and phrases that can be vague or cause doubts, as with the use of 'recently' instead of 'finally' in order to avoid important dates being checked (regulation 4)

4. To respect the privacy and uniqueness of the cultures and traditions of nations as well as to refrain from offering generalized attributions such as the description of a certain cloth as being 'national' or a young man with a tattoo as being 'delinquent' (regulation 8)

3.4 Data analysis framework

CDA approaches are problem-oriented, rather than being focused on specific linguistic items. As CDA theory and methodology are integrated, this approach can be helpful in understanding social problems (Meyer, 2007). Having comprehensively reviewed CDA literature with respect to political discourse, CDA functions as a method, model, and a multidisciplinary structure, as well as a theoretical and analytical framework. In this study, CDA serves as the main theoretical approach and analytical framework.

Many data analysis frameworks have been utilised in CDA studies. The first example of these is the 'membership categorisation analysis' (Leudar et al., 2004), which is employed to study the alternative representations of events, specifically how they justify past events or prepare bases for future events. The membership categorisation analysis was not used because this study relies upon TV debates belonging to a single genre. The setting of the study is the 2011 to 2012 Yemen revolution. The discourse is studied as it occurred and is not compared with other discourses over different periods of time.

Another CDA data analysis framework is the procedure adapted by Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010) from van Dijk's 2004 framework. Their approach requires the selection of ideological strategies, such as irony or lexicalisation, which enables politics, ideology and discourse to be linked. This framework is not followed in this study, because CDA has been criticized for being too qualitative with regards to textual analysis, meaning that a framework that combines both qualitative and quantitative analysis is important for analysis triangulation. Maingueneau (2006) emphasises this importance by advising that CDA analysts should be critical and choose the strong path by analysing the production and management of texts. This study analyses the production of discourse through a study of its verbal aspects, as well as examining the management of discourse through the behaviour and production of the moderators. The elements of the analysis of the production and management of discourse, as well as the discourse itself comprise both quantitative and qualitative analysis, which helps to ensure the neutrality of data analysis.

As mentioned before, based on the findings and recommendations of previous studies done in CDA, the decision was made to integrate more than one method into the data analysis approach. For their data analysis, recent studies in CDA integrate CDA approaches with corpus analysis

(Attar, 2012; Bednarek and Caple, 2013; Buckingham, 2013; Edwards, 2012; Hardman, 2008; Lahlali, 2003; Norman, 2012; Shenhav, 2004). An important aim of using corpus analysis is to avoid any analysis bias that might occur as a result of the background or interests of the researcher. Corpus analysis enables objectivity, as it provides a wealth of statistical data and offers a holistic view into the corpus. In addition to the corpus based CDA analysis, interviews were conducted with a group of individuals working on the debates at the AJ channel. The interviews provide an additional perspective to the debates, enabling comparisons to be drawn between the ideological practices of AJ that have emerged from the CDA analysis and the official or unofficial stance of the channel. The research methodology designed and followed by the current study is outlined below, in table 11.

Table 11 Data analysis: theory and framework

Method	Critical Discourse Analysis	Computer-assisted corpus analysis	Interviews
Frame-work	Elements of van Leeuwen's Social actor network (2008, 2009) and further linguistic aspects	Computer software (AntConc version 3.2.4w)	Members of AJ staff who work with debates
Data	Four debates, one from each programme (17,350 words) • AJ (7,600 words) • Government speakers (1,150	Fifteen debates of Al Jazeera, (73,915 words) • AJ (27,186 words) • Government speakers (7,659 words) • Protesters speakers	

	words)	(30,512 words) [3]	
	• Protesters speakers (8,500 words) [2]		

As illustrated by table 11, the methods of data analysis included CDA as the main approach, triangulated by computer-assisted corpus analysis and compared with the results of the interviews with AJ staff. Whereas the corpus analysis examined the entire set of linguistic data, CDA focused on textual analysis of four debates (one from each of the debate programmes). The textual analysis applies elements of the van Leeuwen's (2008, 2009) social actor network and other linguistic components. Once collected, data for both the CDA analysis and the corpus analysis was categorised as belonging to Al Jazeera, the government, or the Yemeni protesters.

3.4.1 *Social Actor Network*

The social actor network model employed for analysis in this study is based on the works of van Leeuwen (2008, 2009). This theory maintains the basic aspects of CDA, in which ideas, texts and talks are deemed to play a significant role in maintaining or legitimizing inequality, injustice and oppression in contemporary society. It is also a valuable tool for the examination of the discourses of powerful agencies, without restricting the investigation to a single analytical method. The social actor network theory extends CDA's study of the specific grammatical discursive processes such as 'passive agent deletion' and 'nominalisation' into broader

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[2] The remaining words were excluded from the study as they were records of neutral speakers, such as United Nations and Gulf Initiative representatives.

[3] The remaining were excluded from the study as they were said by neutral speakers, such as United Nations and Gulf Initiative representatives.

discourse-semantic concepts like 'exclusion' of social actors (discourse doers) from the representation of the actions or events which they do or participate. Based on the social actor network, social actors are doers of actions. They can be referred to generically as classes of people or specifically as identifiable individuals. As this approach has a socio-semantic basis, it can be applied to languages other than English (van Leeuwen, 2009). A careful review of the literature of CDA with respect to the Arabic language revealed an absence of studies using the social actor network, meaning that this study appears to contribute to knowledge in this field by being the first to use the social actor network for the Arabic language.

The social actor network theory views discourses as social cognitions of knowing social practices, meaning that they can be used as resources for the presentation of social practices within texts. This, in turn, means that conclusions can be drawn from texts, since 'discourses are reconstructed in social practices and so discourses are reconstructed from texts that draw on them. Discourses not only represent what is going on, they also evaluate it, ascribe purposes to it and justify it' (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 6). Aspects of the social actor network are therefore expected to support the findings of this study in being representative of Arab media and politics.

It is significant to state here that in addition to analysing social actions, the social actor network approach is also a valid framework to examine social actors, which can be represented using textual and visual aspects of discourse. However, social actions can be analysed by a variety of different components from the van Leeuwen model (van Leeuwen, 2008), although the current study limits this analysis to text. The following is a short explanation of the linguistic categories analysed in this study as per the social actor model.

Exclusion

Although social actors are represented in discourse, they may be included or excluded to suit the interests and purposes of speakers in relation to their audience. Exclusions are either 'innocent' leaving no negative traces on the social actors, or have close ties to the propaganda strategies. The two main ways of excluding social actors are backgrounding (actors are not mentioned in relation to a given context but mentioned elsewhere in the text) and suppression (no actors mentioned anywhere in the text, "The police…the killing of demonstrators") (ibid, p. 28). Of these, suppression can take a further two forms: deletion of passive agent "the car was damaged" and nominalisation "The level of support for stopping…". As for suppression, deletion of the passive agent and nominalisation were considered as these two are evident in the data.

Role allocation (activated agent role and passivated patient role: subjection and beneficialisation)

Role allocations are the functions that social actors fulfil in representations, with activation occurring when actors are shown as being dynamic forces within an activity (e.g. "People seek aspects of commercial television…"). In contrast, passivation occurs when actors are represented as undergoing the activity or receiving the end of the action. Passivated social actors are categorized into either *subjected* (treated as objects of the representation, "*Australia was bringing about 70,000 migrants a year*") or *beneficialised* (treated as third party which positively or negatively benefit from the action, "*22000 Hong Kong Chinese arrived last year, bringing bulging wallets to cities*") (ibid, p. 32).

Due to space constraints, the analysis is limited to two actors, which appear in top keyword list, shared by all data groups of the corpus analysis: 'Saleh' and 'the people of Yemen'.

Generalisation and specification

Generalisation refers to the representation of actors as generalized groups or classes ("*Non-European immigrants make up 6.5 per cent of the population*") whereas specification refers to specific identifiable individuals ("Staff in both play groups and nurseries expressed willingness") (ibid, p. 35). Specification is used with elites which dominate while generalisation is used with groups of ordinary people. Most of the specification cases are for singular actors only.

Assimilation: aggregation (definite quantifiers) and plurality

Assimilation involves the grouping of actors, either in the form of aggregation, which quantifies people in numbers and is realised by definite and indefinite quantifiers (although only definite quantifiers are analysed), or plurality, which refers to social actors as groups by using mass nouns like thousands and hundreds. Aggregation makes the representation of actors strong as numbers usually carry surveys and research statistics ("A number of critics want to see our intake halved to 70,000") (ibid, p. 38).

Indetermination and differentiation

Indetermination is used for social actors who are represented as unspecified, as with anonymous individuals or groups. This is realised by means of indefinite pronouns like '*somebody', 'someone', 'some' and 'some people*' (e.g. "*They won't let you go to school until you're five years old.*"). Differentiation explicitly differentiates an individual social actor or a group of actors from a similar actor or actors, creating a distinction between 'self' and 'the other', or between 'us' and 'them' ("…'uptown' people in American terminology-others are 'downtown' people from places like Vietnam…") (ibid, p. 40).

Personalisation and impersonalisation

Personalisation describes the representation of social actors as human beings through personal, possessive or proper nouns/names, including the features of human beings ("Australia is generous to a fault."). Similarly, impersonalisation is the use of attributions of nonhumans in order to describe human beings ("Australia is in danger of saddling itself up with a lot of unwanted problems") (ibid, p. 46).

Overdetermination

Overdetermination has been explained by van Leeuwen (2008) as occurring when social actors are represented as simultaneously participating in more than one social practice, such as when a story in a distant past or future, even though it deals with contemporary issues in order to avoid political or other censorship.

The linguistic features that were added to the social actor network model appeal to religion; style (marked by the use of colloquial Arabic); repetition; use of hedges; euphemism and dysphemism; and proverbs and idioms, based on empirical studies written in media and political discourse.

To conclude, the decision was made to follow selected aspects of the van Leeuwen's social actor network for the analysis of texts. This approach provides a systematic analysis model that is appropriate for use with Arabic data. It also provides an analysis of broader linguistic aspects. The corpus used in this study constitutes discourses that are mainly related to the doers of the action (social actors), such as president 'Saleh' or 'the people of Yemen', making these data perfectly suitable for analysis with this model.

3.4.2 *Computer based corpus analysis*

The following table presents a list of the terms used in the corpus analysis. The list is given in

alphabetical order.

Table 12 Corpus analysis: key terms, adapted from McEnery and Xiano (2006)

Term	Definition
Collocations	particular words or sets of words which associate with other words
Concordance	an alphabetical index of a search pattern in a corpus showing every contextual occurrence of the search pattern
Corpus	a collection of sampled texts, written or spoken, in machine readable form which may be annotated with various forms of linguistic information
Frequency	the actual account of a linguistic feature in a corpus
Keywords	content words in a corpus whose frequency in unusually high (positive keywords) or low (negative keywords)
Unicode	a character-encoding system designed to support the interchange, processing and display of all the written texts of the diverse languages of the world

The sample of corpus that has been chosen in the current study is representative of the type of

language used here: TV political discussions for mediated political debates. The debates are

focused on the conflict of views between the two opposing sides of the Yemen revolution,

namely the government and the protesters. Therefore, the speakers should be selected to provide

a balanced perspective that grants an insight into the beliefs held by both political sides regarding

the Yemen revolution, and for this reason the debates included speakers from a range of different

political beliefs, which provided a representation of the corpus on politics in the Arab world. In

addition, the language used by AJ broadly represents the media of the Arab world, as AJ is the

most popular media network in the region. AJ is the most successful channel and is the leader of the Arab broadcasting (Al Shroof, 2015; Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007). For more information on data representation, see section 3.2.3.

3.4.2.1 *AntConc version 3.2.4w*

Studies in corpus linguistics use various computer analysis software, such as AntConc, WMatrix, Word Smith, NVival, micro Concord, Oxford Concordance program OCP, TACT, and Word Cruncher. The software used for this study is AntConc, version 3.2.4w. This software is the only computer program able to deal with Arabic and for this reason it was chosen for use in the current study. In addition, it is highly functional, providing all of the statistics required in the current analysis, including variables like keywords, concordances, and collocations. This comprehensive nature makes AntConc suitable for achieving the intended aims of the corpus analysis in the current study, namely triangulating the critical discourse analysis. The interface of AntConc version 3.2.4w is presented in the image below (see image 1).

Image 1 AntConc version 3.2.4w Interface

In order to use this software, technical steps were followed. First, the required data groups were saved in separate plain text files, as the software is only capable of reading pure text files. The data groups were organised in accordance with the responses by the three groups (AJ, the government, and the protesters), and then the file of the corpus required for analysis was loaded from the file on the toolbar of the software. In order to enable Arabic language to be processed, Unicode (UTF-8) from the Character Encoding was selected, which is located in the Global Settings toolbar. The three linguistic features for statistical analysis in this research are wordlists, concordances, and collocations. After inserting the file required for analysis and Unicode

characters, the wordlist was created by clicking on the wordlist button below the toolbar, followed by the search button on the bottom of the software. The wordlist is provided, in conjunction with word ranks and frequencies. The top thirty words of this list were copied, after which the content words were chosen for analysis, as function words are generally deemed to be insignificant in the study of ideological discourse. Image 2 below displays the AntConc Wordlist interface.

Image 2 AntConc Wordlist Interface

The next stage involved a keyword being selected from the wordlist, which automatically directed the screen to the occurrence of the word in the list of concordances. The number of words to display on the left and right of the selected word was chosen from the settings on the

bottom of the view screen. This produces a screen similar to the one presented below (see image 3):

Image 3 AntConc Concordances Interface

Finally, the start button below the collocations provides the rank and list of the word occurrences. The options at the bottom of the screen enable the selection of variables such as cluster size, or the number of right and left aligned collocates (see image 4).

Image 4 AntConc Collocations Interface

Additional statistics that can be provided by the software are keyword lists, clusters, concordance plots, and file view. However, the current research has declined the use of these options, as the options mentioned initially are adequate to comprehensively answer the research questions and therefore fulfil the aim and objectives of the research. The additional options also provide similar results, allowing the required statistics to be accessed by counting wordlists, concordances, and collocations only.

3.4.3 _Translation_

This study conducts an analysis of Arabic text. Arabic as well as translation from Arabic into English are offered only for the extracts used for the CDA of this dissertation. The aim of this translation is to ease readability of this dissertation. Therefore, a reference to literature is provided on any ideological practices that are subjected to translation. One of the most prominent scholars of translation positioning in discourse is Baker (1992, 2007 a, 2007 b, 2010 a, 2010 b), who later collaborated with another important scholar (Baker & Maier, 2011). Baker (1992) confirms that translating all levels of discourse from isolated words to sentences is complicated by cultural issues, the collocational environment that surrounds discourse, and the grammatical variation of languages. The data in this study were not filtered as Arabic was used in the CDA and computer analysis, however precaution measures were utilised in the translation of the excerpts. Baker (1992) confirms that these measures are significant because the work of translators plays a vital role in the formation of political reality. Therefore, since this study seeks to uncover ideological strands depicted in discourse, the methodology should not imply any ideological methods. As quality standards and ideology are all woven around the text and the use of discourse, it has been suggested that translators are commonly influenced by political and socio-cultural constraints (Oktar and Kansu-Yetkiner, 2012).

To investigate ideology within translation further and suggest ways to avoid subjectivity in translation, the following section discusses two studies that link translation to ideology. The first of these was conducted by Ayyad (2012) and is arguably the most relevant to this research, given its focus upon the translation of Arabic discourse into English. Ayyad's study examined the ideological factors that informed translational choices as well as the interpretation of translated texts by readers. Ayyad used five different Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives and their 31 Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of 2001 to 2003 (ibid). Ayyad (2012) analysed

names, origins, meaning and typology, with data analysis including the production, creative ambiguity in the road map as a metaphor, the roadmap and its translation, textual function and principles of audience design, the Arabic translations of the roadmap, and the Hebrew translations of the roadmap. These considerations combined to establish the ideological and political affiliation of the institutions and new media for translated versions of the roadmap. Overall, the translation process was shown to reinforce ideologies and political agendas (ibid). Inspired by Ayyad's study, this research seeks to provide useful insights into the ways in which objectivity can be achieved by CDA studies, bringing into sharp relief the political implications of lexical choices, in both the original and translated texts.

The conclusion of Ayyad's study was supported by Oktar and Kansu-Yetkiner (2012), who provide valuable insights into translation and ideology. Their research examined two translations of a novel published in 1942 and 1981, having been translated by two different people, in order to examine the ideological reasoning of translators in the structure of discourse that is associated with political and social life. The assumption made was that the translator prefaces offered concrete directions in the construction and contestation of authority, in a way that was ultimately likely to influence the perception of readers. In other words, translation brought the ideology to the surface. Oktar and Kansu-Yetkiner (2012) used Halliday's systemic-functional grammar (1994) by focusing on theme-rheme structures developed in the prefaces. The key findings of their study were: the occurrence of similarity in translation; specific choices of semantic configurations, such as references to emotions, and differences; and choices of frame references in construction representations in relation to literacy values. Consequently, the study hypothesis was validated, concluding that the construction of discourses were influenced by the socio-political contexts (ibid). It is therefore significant for this study to endeavour to avoid any

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ideological choices of semantic configurations. One way to ensure objective translation is for the translation to be triangulated by another translator, as was achieved in this study.

To conclude, in order to avoid any inconvenience caused by translation, Baker (1992) argues that translation ethics should be incorporated within translator training programmes, with trainees being prepared with techniques that enable any 'reframing' in the translated texts to be more effectively avoided. Training should consider the translation of the 'function' not just the structure (ibid). For this reason, the translation of the excerpts of this study was conducted by a translator who holds her degree in translation of Arabic into English and vice versa. Additionally, in order to provide maximum benefit of translation ethics, the translation was triangulated by a certified translation company (triangulation certificate attached in Appendix 3). Therefore, every effort has been undertaken to ensure that the translation has been completed professionally, with the avoidance of ideological influences and increased objectivity.

3.5 Conclusion

Chapter 3 detailed the methodology used in this study in order to situate the current study within the wider field of critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics. The chapter defined the target data, data collection techniques, and data representation, after which it outlined the discrepancies between the AJ transcript of the debates and the actual video recordings of the same. An overview was given of the data collection trip in Qatar and the chosen framework for data analysis.

The detailed methodology has demonstrated a broad consensus regarding the importance of combining CDA with corpus analysis in the analysis of the debates, as well as interviews with

AJ staff in order to compare the linguistic analysis with the perceptions of the staff. However, the methodology in this chapter suggests there is currently limited number of female speakers who participated in the debates as well as a limited number of the interviewed staff of AJ.

The following three chapters present the analysis of the data: chapter four analyses the selected debates through critical discourse analysis; chapter five uses computer-assisted corpus analysis to triangulate these findings and chapter six analyses the interviews with AJ staff.

Chapter 4: Critical Discourse Analysis

4.1 Introduction

In chapter 3, the details on the methodology employed in the study were presented. This chapter provides the qualitative analysis of the four debates (listed on table 11) using critical discourse analysis. The analysis was performed in several stages. The data was divided into three groups (AJ, government, and protesters), which was then coded using selected aspects of van Leeuwen's social actor network model (2008, 2009), in addition to further linguistic components. The number of occurrences was then counted under each linguistic component, after which the coded examples were divided in accordance with their ideological functions. This chapter presents that notions and other ideological strands that emerged from the analysis are 'us' and 'them', AJ's reference to the Arab leaders, and the discourse of women. These ideological intentions (intended aims of the utterance) and linguistic tools have been organised from general into specific and explicated, with commentary supported by excerpts from the data.

4.2 The analysed debates

For the sake of the CDA analysis, one debate from each of the four programmes was selected. All of the four debates were staged in 2011 when the Yemeni revolution was ongoing, before Ali Abdullah Saleh was 'ousted'. The only female guest speaker who participated in the debates was Tawakul Karman who spoke in two debates only: *Behind the News* and *In depth* programmes. The two debates she participated in were selected. Analysis was performed with regards to the debate on *The Opposite Direction* which took place in 2011. The guest speakers on this programme did not speak in the other debates of the same programme. The earliest episode of *The Revolution Talk* debate was selected, which took place on May 22, 2011, during the peak of the Yemen revolution. The analysed debates are 17350 words. Data is divided into 7600 words by AJ comprising 43.8%, 1150 words by the government comprising 6.6% and 8600 words

constituting 49.6% by the protesters. In a similar way to the entire corpus, the four debates that

were selected for the CDA analysis in the present study demonstrate that the government

speakers were excluded from the debates, as can be seen by the relative scarcity of government

representatives invited to participate as guest speakers. Therefore, the number of words they

contributed to the debates was less. Table 12 offers background information of the four debates

that were used for the CDA analysis.

Table 13 Debates used for Critical Discourse Analysis

No	Date[4] Programme	Debate title and subtitles	AJ Moderator	Speakers
1	22/5/2011 Revolution Talk	Yemen revolution's progress and the gulf initiative 1) The protesters and the failure of the Saudi initiative 2) Yemen and civil war's possibilities 3) Yemen's revolutionists between the peaceful and armed paths 4) Expectations of the next stage	Mohammed Kreshan (Male)	1) Jamal al-Milaiki (male: researcher and a Yemeni activist) 2) Abdulmalik al-Mikhlafi (male: leader in the joint Congress) 3) Ali al-Maamari (male: formal spokesperson of the Parliamentary bloc for liberated independent) 4) Abbas al-Masawi (male: Yemen's extension media in Beirut) 5) Sarhan al-Otaibi (male: head of the Saudi Society for Political Sciences) 6) And others
2	19/09/2011 In Depth	Yemen…at the edge of the revolution 1) Massacres continue and uprising rise 2) Gulf initiative and the regime's behaviour 3) Implementation mechanism in a timely manner 4) Revolutionary escalation Friday and	Ali al-Dufairi (Male)	1) Humood al-Hattar (male: former Yemen minister of Endowments) 2) Tawakul Karman (female: a leader in National Youth Revolution of Yemen)

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[4] Listed chronologically

		army's role		
		5) Extent of political parties' influence in society's sectors		
3	8/10/2011 Behind the News	Last explicit connotations of Yemen's president 1) Tawakul withdraws lights from Saleh 2) Sceneries of the delivery of authority 3) Saleh and the security council's decision 4) Youth and problems of the delivery of power	Fairouz Zayyati (Female)	1) Tawakul Karman (female: a leader in the National Youth Revolution) 2) Yasir al-Yamani (male: a leader in Yemen's ruling party)
4	13/12/2011 The opposite Direction	Yemen to the first square 1) Army security file 2) Continuation of sit-ins in the Change Square 3) Youth of the revolution and their persistence in Saleh's trial 4) Upcoming struggle for undertaking Yemen's power	Faisal al-Qasem (Male)	1) Jamal al-Milaiki (male: researcher and a Yemeni activist) 2) Abbas al-Masawi (male: a Yemeni journalist)

Table 13 presents the notions and the ideological intentions that emerged from the CDA analysis,

namely revolution, the people of Yemen, protesters, president/Saleh, regime, army, fighting and

Gulf Initiative, 'us' and 'them', AJ's reference to the Arab leaders, and the discourse of women.

The CDA model for analysis relied upon the van Leeuwen's (2008, 2009) social actor network

model, augmented by further linguistic components (for more discussion of this framework, see

Chapter 3, section 3.4).

Table 14 Emerged notions and their ideological intentions for CDA analysis

Notion	Ideological intentions
Revolution	• To glorify the revolution (AJ + protesters) • To empower the revolution (AJ + protesters) • To distort the revolution's image (government)
The people of Yemen[5]	• To show the people of Yemen as victims (AJ + government + protesters) • To praise and empower the people of Yemen (protesters)
Protesters	• To show the protesters as victims (AJ + government + protesters) • To empower the protesters (AJ + protesters) • To praise and inspire the protesters (AJ + protesters) • To incite the protesters (AJ) • To disperse the protesters' image (government)
Saleh	• To derogate Saleh (AJ + protesters) • To weaken Saleh (AJ + protesters) • To incite revenge against Saleh (AJ) • To announce war against Saleh (protesters) • To criminalise Saleh (protesters) • To doubt Saleh (protesters) • To threaten Saleh (protesters) • To glorify Saleh (government) • To empower Saleh (government)
Regime[6]	• To distort the regime's image (AJ + protesters) • To derogate the regime (AJ + protesters) • To weaken the regime (protesters) • To threaten the regime (protesters) • To order the regime (protesters) • To express power (government)
Army	• To empower the army (AJ) • To incite the army in joining protests (protesters)
Fighting	• To describe massive killing (AJ + protesters) • To describe fighting intensity (AJ)
Gulf Initiative	• To distort the GI's image (AJ + protesters)
Us and them	• To identify the government as 'the other' • To differentiate 'Saleh' and 'regime' from 'people' and 'army' • To provide a negative generalisation to Saleh's circle • To identify Saleh as 'the other'
AJ's reference to Arab leaders	• To derogate the Arab leaders • To distort the Arab leader's image

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[5] الشعب

[6] النظام

The discourse of female speakers	• Emotional discourse • Interruption

In the following sections, the analysis is organised thematically, in terms of the notions that emerged from the CDA analysis. The ideological intentions supported by coded examples with the linguistic aspects used by the speakers are explained, after which the key similarities and differences between the data groups are highlighted. Due to space limitations, selected examples are presented as data excerpts, along with their English translation. The number of the examples utilised is dependent on the number of the linguistic aspects that were used by the speakers in attaining their ideological purposes.

4.2.1   *Revolution*

The three groups examined in this study, those representing Al Jazeera, the government, and protesters, all utilised the topic of the revolution in order to reach their ideological intentions. Revolution was one of the first 30 words in the list of lexis produced by the computer assisted corpus analysis of the debates, illustrating that the results shown here coincide with those of the statistical analysis. In this section, the ideological intentions of the three data groups are explained. The most notable finding here is that both AJ and the protesters share ideological intentions that portray the revolution as a positive event, glorifying and empowering the revolution, whereas the revolution was only accorded a negative intention by the government, in an attempt to distort the revolution's image.

First, both AJ and the protesters glorified the revolution in a way which made the revolution's image look like a sign of victory in the history of Yemen. In order to portray the revolution as a glory, AJ and the protesters shared euphemism and appeal to religion as the linguistic aspects:

*giving the lives of 180 people as **offerings** for the anticipated democratic change.*

مقدمة حياة 180 شخصاً **قرباناً** للتغيير الديموقراطي المرتقب

(AJ: euphemism)

*Let me, dear brother, greet whom you called in your report **the noblest, the purest and the strongest** national youth revolution in history.*

دعني أخي العزيز في البداية أوجه التحية لما أطلقت عليهم في تقريرك **لأنبل وأطهر وأقوى ثورة** شبابية شعبية ربما شهدها التاريخ يعني على مر التاريخ الإنساني

(Protesters: euphemism)

In this extract, AJ praised the exposure of protesting youth to killing that protester's death is given a positive connotation of 'sacrifices' or 'offerings'. In the culture of the Arabic language, when 'death' is described as 'sacrifices', then the aim of the death is perceived as being noble and glorious. Similarly, the protesters used euphemisms to exalt the image of the revolution. The protesters praised the people that were being killed for the sake of a revolution, claiming that it was 'the noblest, purest and strongest', praising the revolution in strong terms:

*and the wounded people **offered** 26 Yemenis as **sacrifices***

وكان أن **قدم** الشعب الجريح **قرابينه** 26 يمنياً

*Quranic source: "And recite to them the story of Adam's two sons, in truth, when they both **offered a sacrifice** [to Allah], and it was accepted from one of them but was not accepted from the other. Said [the latter], "I will surely kill you." Said [the former], "Indeed, Allah only accepts from the righteous [who fear Him]" Qur'an (Suratt Al Ma'idah (5), verse 27)*

(AJ: appeal to religion)

*The youth today **won their battle**, which means they have taken a first step*

الشباب اليوم هم **ينتصرون في معركتهم** التي عبرها يعني هي خطوة أولية

*Quranic source: ("And when they went forth to [face] Goliath and his soldiers, they said, "Our Lord, pour upon us patience and plant firmly our feet and **give us victory** over the disbelieving people") Quran (Suratt Al Baqarah (2), verse 250)*

(Protesters: appeal to religion)

Here, AJ employed an extract from a verse of the holy Quran which mentions the phrase 'offered a sacrifice', in order to show that the protesters were fighting for an aim of glory and victory.

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Appeal to religion as a linguistic component typically has a strong impact on Arab audiences, since religious sources such as the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet (pbuh) are widely believed and followed by the people. Appeal to religion was a tactic that was extensively used by the debate speakers: 28 cases by AJ and 58 cases by the protesters. In addition, the protesters used qur'anic expressions like 'won', 'battle' and 'victory' in order to represent the revolution as a glory. This contributed to reaching the protesters' intended ideological aim which was to create a positive image about the revolution.

Additional linguistic strategies used by AJ in the glorification of the revolution are indetermination and overdetermination. The protestors instead tended to rely upon appeal to religion, repetition, metaphors, idioms and personalisation in representing the revolution as glorious:

> but there are **those** of the regime who defy and provoke this peace and kill people
> لكن **ثمة من يتحدى ويستفز** هذه السلمية من قبل النظام ويقتل الناس

(AJ: indetermination)

> With respect to you and to the revolution's youth, everyone **made** the Yemeni revolution.
> مع إحترامي لك، ولشباب الثورة، وثورة اليمن **صنعها** الجميع

(AJ: overdetermination)

The use of indetermination here contributes to AJ's glorification of the revolution, as while 'those' refers to unknown parties who attempted to change the tone of the revolution towards a more aggressive tone, claiming that the revolution retained its peaceful character, despite these negative intentions.

Likewise, AJ selected the use of the past tense here although the present tense was possible for the sake of emphasizing the completed action of the making of the revolution. This is important because using the present tense here would have meant that the revolution was still incomplete

and therefore accorded less status. Additionally, attributing the instigation of the revolution to 'everyone' grants it additional strength because it shows that everybody supports them:

> *I am amazed that the ousted president, on the day **his people, his great people**, are awarded, and who the world describes now as the people of peace.*
>
> أنا متعجبة بأن يصل بالرئيس المخلوع في اليوم الذي يكرم فيه **أبناء شعبه أبناء شعبه** العظيم والذي يصفه العالم الآن بأنه شعب السلام

(Protesters: repetition)

> *while the second reason is that the protesters and the opposition will continue with the peaceful revolution no matter **how much blood is shed***
>
> أما السبب الثاني الذاتي فهو أن الثوار والمعارضة سيستمروا في الثورة السلمية مهما كان **الدم الذي يدفع**

(Protesters: metaphor)

In the first excerpt, the protesters repeat the glory of the Yemeni people who have won a Nobel Prize due to the revolution. Describing the people as 'great' in this context praises them for their involvement in the revolution.

In the second excerpt, the protesters identified the blood as being the price paid in exchange for the glory of freedom. By the use of this metaphoric expression, the importance of the revolution is underlined, portraying people as giving their ultimate possession, their 'blood', to ensure its glory and success:

> *We cannot go backwards, we cannot even stop in the middle of the road. Since yesterday, we **forged a great path** towards the attainment of victory.*
>
> لا يمكن أن نرجع إلى الوراء, ولا يمكن حتى أن نقف في منتصف الطريق, نحن منذ أمس **شققنا طريقا رائعا** نحو إكمال النصر

(Protesters: idioms)

> *Let me, dear brother, greet those who you called in your report the **noblest**, **purest** and **strongest national youth revolution**' in the history of human kind.*
>
> دعني أخي العزيز في البداية أوجه التحية لما أطلقت عليهم في تقريرك **لأنبل وأطهر وأقوى ثورة شبابية** شعبية ربما شهدها التاريخ يعني على مر التاريخ الإنساني

(Protesters: personalisation)

In this extract, the protesters described the path in which protesters have moved in as 'a great path' which implies glorification in the culture of the Arabic language. Revolution is referred to

as 'victory'. 'Great path' and 'victory' give a positive image about the revolution and attract more followers since the way to the glory has become shorter.

In the second excerpt, the protesters use personalisation in order to identify the revolution as the same as a 'noble', 'pure' and 'strong' human being, with is a positive way to strengthen its image. The use of the superlative in describing the human being also accords the highest quality to the revolution and, by extension, to the people involved in it.

Second, both AJ and the protesters seemed to seek to empower the revolution, relying on metaphors to representing the revolution as being powerful:

> *Combined, they did not succeed in stopping **the torrential rains of freedom** in the streets of the country*
>
> <div dir="rtl">لم تنجح مجتمعة في إيقاف سيل الحريات الجارفة في شوارع البلاد</div>

> *where the youth protesters, **the fuel for the explosion of the revolution***
>
> <div dir="rtl">حيث الشباب الثائرون المعتصمون مفجرو الثوره ووقودها</div>

(AJ: metaphor)

> *The second reason is the fear of the **revolutionary tide** coming from Yemen. This is the first point regarding external factors.*
>
> <div dir="rtl">والسبب الثاني، خوفا من المد الثوري الآتي من اليمن، هذه النقطة الأولى بالنسبة للعامل الخارجي</div>

> *This thing is that revolutions always start with a **spark**. Just as the regime shakes, the revolutionary institutions must be formed.*
>
> <div dir="rtl">هذا الشيئ الثورات دائما تبدأ بشرارة, الثوار بالفعل مجرد أن يهتز النظام يجب على مؤسسات الثورة أن تتشكل، فما زال إذا سقط النظام</div>

(Protesters: metaphor)

In AJ's examples, metaphors were used in a way that suggested that the revolution was strong and powerful. The event was identified in the same manner as 'torrential rain and wadis[7]' and 'a volcano which erupts', both of which are incredibly potent natural forces that cannot be stopped. Just like AJ, the protesters used metaphors in signifying the revolution as powerful. In this first example, the protesters identify the revolution as being the same as a wadi or river that flows from Saudi Arabia to Yemen. This attribution is similar to the natural, powerful association made by AJ. In the second example, the protesters identify the revolutions as fire-like, starting with a spark and having immense destructive power, which is once again similar to the metaphor used by AJ. Both water and fire signify the revolution as powerful in Arabic language.

On the other hand, the government sought to distort the image of the revolution. Government speakers only utilised one linguistic indicator, dysphemism, to negatively shift the image of the revolution:

> *He did not reach (power) through **coups**, **conspiring** or **treachery***.
> لم يصل عبر **الانقلابات** لم يصل عبر **التآمر** لم يصل عبر **الخيانة**

(Government: dysphemism)

In this way, the government refers to the revolution as 'coups, conspiring or treachery'**.** The government could have used 'illegally' in reference to the way in which Saleh did not seize power. The different names the government gave to the revolution here depict a negative image about the revolution.

In summary, CDA indicated that the revolution was a notion that emerged from all data groups. The ideology that both AJ and the protesters had about the revolution was positive, as they used language to glorify and empower the civil events. Both AJ and the protesters utilised

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[7] Wadis are water channels

euphemisms and appealed to religion and metaphor as linguistic tools to achieve their intended purposes. In contrast, the government held a negative ideology about the revolution, indicating that the AJ had adopted a bias in favour of the protesters in the Yemen revolution.

4.2.2 *The people of Yemen*
The second notion which has emerged by the critical discourse analysis was the social actor 'the people of Yemen' which was among the 30 top keyword list of the statistical analysis. However, the reference to 'the people' by the protesters and government was different. While the protesters included themselves as the 'people', the government used 'people' to denote those Yemeni who supported Saleh and the regime, thereby excluding the protesters from 'people'.

The most significant finding in this area is that all data groups used the people of Yemen as 'victims', most probably in an attempt to elicit sympathy from their audience. None of the data groups gave the people of Yemen an active role as the action doers, however. While AJ and the protesters showed the people of Yemen as victims through the use of subjection, the government used the tools of beneficialisation and impersonalisation:

> *but they also say that through the use of military aircraft, Saleh's forces have killed, slaughtered and bombed these **unarmed people**?*
> لكنهم يقولون أيضاً بأن القوات الموالية للرئيس صالح قتلت وذبحت وقصفت بالطائرات أيضاً هذا **الشعب الأعزل؟**

(AJ: subjection)

> *The opposition has conspired and is conspiring against the country and against **the Yemeni people.***
> المعارضة تآمرت على الوطن وتتآمر على الوطن وتتآمر على **أبناء الشعب اليمني**

(Protesters: subjection)

> *not through coups, assassinations and creating crises for **the people***
> ليس عبر الانقلابات والاغتيالات وخلق الأزمات **للشعب**

(Government: benificialisation)

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*the innocent Yemeni people which (the opposition) has offered as victims and **fuel for the sedition that it is trying to ignite** in Yemen*

الشعب اليمني الأبرياء الذين قدمتهم ضحايا **ووقود للفتنة التي يحاولوا إشعالها** في اليمن

(Government: impersonalisation)

AJ shows the people of Yemen as victims by describing them as 'unarmed' civilians who were killed, slaughtered and bombed by Saleh's forces. The active role that is given to Saleh's forces is negative because it harms the object that is the Yemeni people. Similarly, the protesters passivate the Yemeni people by making them the objects of opposition's conspiracy. This means that the Yemeni people are portrayed as the victims of the opposition's negative action and are also given an equal role to 'the country', in that both 'people' and 'the country' are phrased as being victims. According to the government, 'the people' are victims of 'coups', 'assassinations' and 'crises'. People are given a passive role by being treated as a third party that benefited from the end of the action of creating the crises. In addition, the government speakers use language that explicitly describes the Yemeni people as 'the innocent' which implies that it views the people as victims. Furthermore, the government uses impersonalisation for the Yemeni people as it identifies them as the same as fuel that is used to start war in Yemen. Making use of the Yemeni people in initiating portrays them as victims of the political interest in Yemen.

Interestingly, only the protesters attempted to ideologically ensure the praising and empowering the people of Yemen. For these two socio-linguistic functions, the protesters used deletion of the passive agent, subjection and indetermination:

*on the day his people **are awarded***

في اليوم الذي **يكرم** فيه أبناء شعبه

(Protesters: deletion of the passive agent)

The protesters praised the people of Yemen by expressing pride in the people. The awarding body is deleted because the stress is on the act of achieving than the agent who awarded the people. Praising the people of Yemen also fulfils a propaganda aim, as the protesters are including themselves when referring to the people of Yemen. Therefore, praising the people of Yemen also praises the protesters and, by extension, the entire revolution:

> *and everyone must respect **the people's will***
> ويجب على الجميع أن يحترموا إرادة **الشعب**.
> *We will remain in power, and the brother president will remain and is ready to hand over power tomorrow but only into **the people's hands (people's hands - repeated 5 times)***
> نحن سنظل في هذه السلطة والأخ الرئيس سيظل وعنده استعداد من يوم غد يسلم السلطة ولكن عبر **أيادي الشعب**
> **(أيادي الشعب ـ مكررة 5 مرات)**

(Protesters: subjection)

> *I want to say that I am confident in the Yemeni people who are capable of moving Yemen into the future with or without the GI, and to take away all of **these (regime)**, I repeat that I didn't say the General People's Congress.*
> أريد أن أقول أن ثقتي بالشعب اليمني أنه قادر على أن ينتقل باليمن نحو المستقبل بالمبادرة الخليجية أو بغير المبادرة الخليجية
> وأن يذهب بكل **هؤلاء** وأنا مرة أخرى لم أقل حزب المؤتمر الشعبي العام

(Protesters: indetermination)

In the two examples above, the role of the object given to the people of Yemen denotes power as the genitive construction associates 'will' and 'hands' with the people. 'Will' and 'hands' show power as people have the right as well as the strength to choose their president. In addition, the expression 'people's hands' is repeated five times in the same occurrence by the protesters, clearly emphasising how powerful the people of Yemen in the perspective of the protesters. In addition, this increases the investment by the audience, making them feel like part of the revolution and the protestors; therefore turning people against the regime

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In the second extract, the protesters empower the people of Yemen by showing that they are able to 'moving Yemen into the future' and 'take away all of these'. The unidentified 'these' refers to any power that could stand against the revolution, especially the regime which involves individuals as well as groups. Additionally, mentioning 'the Gulf Initiative' as the way to move Yemen into the future is a way to increase the empowerment of the Yemeni people, suggesting to them that they are strong enough to move on, with or without the initiative.

In summary, all data groups attempted to portray the people of Yemen as victims. AJ and the protesters share the linguistic component of subjection; the government used other components to make the people of Yemen seem like victims. Protesters added the ideological intention of praising and empowering the people so as to encourage them to join the protesting crowds.

4.2.3 *Protesters*
Protesters were important social actors to emerge from the critical discourse analysis. Analysis showed that they aimed to employ five ideological intentions. These intentions varied such as making use of the protesters as victims, positivizing their role and dispersing their image. The most striking finding is that similar to the people of Yemen, protesters were presented as victims by all data groups. AJ and the protesters share similar linguistic components in the showing the protesters as victims:

> *and the wounded people offered **26 Yemenis** as sacrifices, whose blood was shed yesterday*
>
> وكان أن قدم الشعب الجريح قرابينه **26 يمنياً** سالت دماؤهم البارحة

(AJ: assimilation)

> *A killer is a killer, whether s/he killed **ten or a thousand**.*
>
> القاتل هو قاتل قتل **عشرة** أم قتل **ألفا**

(Protesters: assimilation)

In the first extract, AJ presented the protesters as victims, because a specific number of them was reported as being killed during the fights. The way in which these victims were killed was described as blood 'shed', indicating massive killing. Similarly, the protesters specified that the victims included all those killed, whether a small or large number, in so doing illegalising the regime and distorting its image.

Unlike AJ and the protesters, the government presented the protesters as victims by describing them as the 'victims' of 'crimes, treachery and disloyalty', which are derogatory terms when compared to more neutral phrasing like 'the opposition that wants to overthrow the president'. The following excerpt demonstrates how the government used dysphemism in order to ideologically portray the protesters as the victims:

> *those youth who fell victims to **crimes, treachery and disloyalty***
> هؤلاء الشباب الذين راحوا ضحايا **الإجرام والخيانة والعمالة**

(Government: dysphemism)

Then, AJ and the protesters therefore shared two ideological intentions: empowering protesters and praising or inspiring them. In order to empower the protesters, AJ used nominalisation and active role allocation, in contrast to the protesters who employed indetermination:

> *The Last Chance Friday: **confirmation** of the demand of "the peaceful national revolution", and a new GI*
> جمعة الفرصة الأخيرة: **تأكيد** مطلب "الثورة الشعبية السلمية"، مبادرة خليجية جديدة

(AJ: nominalisation)

> *where the youth protesters, the revolution's catalysts and fuel, and these in fact reject the GI and every other initiative that doesn't remove **Saleh** from his palace immediately and prosecute him*
> حيث الشباب الثائرون المعتصمون مفجرو الثوره ووقودها، وهؤلاء في الأصل يرفضون المبادرة الخليجية وكل مبادرةٍ أخرى
> لا تحمل **صالح** خارج قصره فوراً وتذهب به إلى المحاكمة

(AJ: active role allocation)

Portraying the demands of protests to enforce a 'peaceful national revolution' shows the protesters as being strong, with conviction for their demands despite external pressure. AJ empowers the protests here, without explicitly stating that the demand for a peaceful revolution is by AJ itself. Saleh is given a passivated role that derogates him from power in such a way that protesters will be empowered to protest against him. In this same example, at the same time as Saleh is passivated, the protesters are given an active role of strength and power:

> *The Transitional Presidency Council, and I address an invitation here through the AJ channel, has to hold a meeting soon and appoint a **representative**. If that's not possible, the youth will appoint a **representative** for the Transitional Council or an official **spokesperson** on their behalf.*
>
> وعلى مجلس الرئاسة الانتقالي وأنا أوجه هنا دعوه عبر قناة الجزيرة عليه أن يعقد اجتماعه سريعاً وعليهم أن يعينوا **ممثلاً** لهم فإن تعذر ذلك فسيقوم الشباب بتعيين **ممثل** للمجلس الانتقالي أو **ناطق** رسمي عنهم

(Protesters: indetermination)

Similarly, the protesters used unknown people, 'a representative' and 'spokesperson', to show the system followed by protesters, indicating that members will play an important role in the organisation of the protest, regardless of their specific names. By anonymising these roles, it also invites the audience to imagine their own participation which is a subtle way of drawing support for a cause.

Furthermore, AJ and the protesters represented the protesters positively by praising and inspiring them. AJ used personalisation whereas the protesters deleted the passive agent and used metaphor in order to praise and inspire protesters respectively:

> *and perhaps the world agrees that Ms. Tawakul Karman is one of those youths who **gave a bright face to the Yemeni revolution**.*
>
> ولعل العالم أجمع على أن السيدة توكل كرمان واحدة من هؤلاء الشباب الذين **أعطوا وجهاً مشرقاً** للثورة اليمنية

(AJ: personalisation)

In this example, AJ personalises the revolution as being the same as a bright face, as form of human attribution to the revolution. This positive active role given to the protesters praises them and inspirers them to continue and pay more efforts into the revolution:

*and without the revolutionary youth, this initiative would not have **been signed***
ولولا شباب الثورة لم تكن **لتوقع** هذه المبادرة.

*This blood which **are spilt** today in the victorious battles, and not the critical battle*
هذه الدماء التي **تسكب** اليوم في معارك النصر وليست معارك الحسم

(Protesters: deletion of passive agent)

The future is bright, and you will soon hear of a great victory.
المستقبل مشرق ومستقبل الانتصار العظيم ستسمعونه قريبا جدا

*and we all have to give the opportunity for our youth to **steer the march of the revolution**, and to take it forward*
وعلينا جميعا أن نتيح الفرصة لشبابنا كي **يقودوا مسيرة الثورة** وينطلقوا بها الى الأمام

(Protesters: metaphor)

Similarly, the protesters displayed pride in the protesting crowds. As the focus is on the protesters themselves as high achievers, the doers of the actions here are insignificant and therefore not stated. The actions related to the protesters here are the signing of the GI and the sacrifices that individuals made in being killed for the sake of victory. The protesters also utilised metaphors to praise and inspire protests, painting the future as being the same as a bright sun in the first extract, while the second identifies the revolution as the same as a car that is driven towards a goal. In this way, the protesters are encouraging the youth to win victory and lead the revolution.

In addition to this, AJ seemed to wish to incite protesters in numerous linguistic ways, such as assimilation, dysphemism, proverbs and idioms:

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*The Algerians revolted and provided more than **200 thousand martyrs***.

الجزائريون ثاروا قدموا أكثر من **200 ألف شهيد**

(AJ: assimilation)

*Shouldn't the Yemeni people continue their honourable revolution until they **sweep away the figures of the hateful past***?

أليس حريا بالشعب اليمني أن يواصل ثورته المجيدة حتى **يكنس رموز الماضي البغيض**

(AJ: dysphemism)

*We'll repeat the proverb a hundred times: **one can't make an omelette without breaking an egg***.

بنعيد المثل مية مرة **ليس بإمكانك أن تصنع العجة دون أن تكسر البيض**

(AJ: proverbs)

*It is best for the Yemeni people, if they aim to achieve a real revolution, to **eradicate this regime entirely.***

من الأفضل للشعب اليمني إذا أراد أن ينجز ثورة حقيقية عليه أن **يجتث هذا النظام عن بكرة أبيه**

(AJ: idioms)

In order to incite more protests, AJ showed Algeria as a role model, using assimilation by explicitly stating that 200,000 protesting Algerians were killed in the conflict. AJ even identified the killed as 'martyrs', thereby implying that they were killed for noble reasons that would benefit all Algerians. Meanwhile, in the second example, rather than saying 'remove Saleh's assistants', the AJ speakers elected to say 'sweep away the figures of the hateful past'. This would have the ideological intention of distorting regime's image, because this implies the removal of something negative by the protesting Yemeni people, also implying that the protesters are heroic.

AJ used a proverb in the third example in order to incite protesters to continue with the revolution until Saleh has been removed. In the fourth excerpt, AJ used the idiom 'eradicate this

regime entirely' in order to incite protesters to continue with the revolution until the entire regime is gone.

Interestingly, only the government sought to associate the protesters with negative connotations by dispersing their image. In doing so, the government used repetition:

> *There are noble people in this opposition but they **became controlled, became controlled**.*
> هناك شرفاء في هذه المعارضة ولكن **أصبحوا مسيرون، أصبحوا مسيرون**

(Government: repetition)

According to the government, the good people among protests are being 'controlled'. Repeated is the action of being 'controlled' which implies a negative connotation of the small number such as not being able to make decisions or even think.

To conclude, although all data groups portrayed some protesters as victims, the government used indirect means that referred to them as the victims of 'crimes, treachery and disloyalty'. Similarly, the way in which the government tried to disperse the image of the protesters was also indirect, referring to the good members of the opposition as being 'controlled', instead of attributing active roles that would make their image negative. This section showed attempts of less power by the government speakers.

4.2.4   *Saleh*

Saleh was another social actor who emerged from the analysis. Saleh appeared in the top keyword list of the computer analysis at a high frequency and was used by all three data groups in order to achieve their diverse ideological intentions. Both AJ and protesters shared negative intentions in this usage, whereas the government's intentions were evidently positive towards Saleh.

Together AJ and the protesters shared the aims of derogating and weakening Saleh, relying on dysphemism to derogate and subjection to weaken him:

> until they prosecute **the tyrant** and all of his followers
> حتى تتم محاكمة **الطاغية** وكل من والاه

(AJ: Dysphemism)

> I am amazed that the **ousted** president, on the day his people, his great people, are awarded
> حقيقة أنا متعجبة بأن يصل بالرئيس **المخلوع** في اليوم الذي يكرم فيه أبناء شعبه

(Protesters: Dysphemism)

In order to derogate Saleh's status, AJ referred to him as 'the tyrant'. In this reference, AJ used dysphemism, despite other possible neutral references, such as 'president'. In the same way, the protesters used dysphemism to derogate Saleh from power. They selected 'the ousted president' although other neutral options, like 'the president who misused power' being viable:

> and Saudi Arabia greatly influences **the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh's** decisions, by virtue of their existing relations
> والسعودية تؤثر بشكل كبير على مواقف **الرئيس اليمني علي عبد الله صالح** بحكم طبعاً العلاقات القائمة بينهما

(AJ: Subjection)

> The revolution's youth were able to persuade **Ali Abdullah Saleh** that they are capable of overthrowing him.
> استطاع شباب الثورة أن يقنعوا **علي عبد الله صالح** أنهم قادرون على إسقاطه

(Protesters: Subjection)

Saleh is passivated here, being presented with no power. For example, he is unable to stand by his own since he is 'influenced by Saudi Arabia'. AJ too argues that Saleh is so weak that AJ claimed that his actions are being influenced by Saudi Arabia and that he was unable to stop the Yemeni youth from claiming to be able to overthrow him, thereby implying that the young protesters were stronger than Saleh.

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In derogating Saleh, AJ further employed metaphors, impersonalisation and activate role allocation and the protesters used nominalisation and subjection:

> *Many of the Yemeni writers say that the final expected end will be by removing the pillars* ***of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime***, *the remnants of the regime, represented by **his sons, brothers and assistants***.
>
> الكثير من الكتاب اليمنيين يقولون إن النهاية الأخيرة المتوقعة ستكون بإزاحة **أركان حكم** علي عبد الله صالح من بقايا النظام المتمثلة في **أبنائه وإخوانه وأعوانه**

(AJ: Metaphors)

> *Haven't the protesters accomplished a great achievement by **sweeping the president** from his presidency?*
>
> ألم يحقق الثوار انجازا عظيما **بكنس الرئيس** عن سدة الحكم

(AJ: Impersonalisation)

> *while **Ali Abdullah Saleh** grasps into the chair until his last trick*
>
> أما **علي عبدالله صالح** فمتشبثٌ بالكرسي حتى آخر حيلة

> *Nothing is more evident of the tricks and manoeuvres than **Saleh**'s way of dealing with the GI.*
>
> ولا شئ أدل على المراوغة والمناورة مثل تعاطي **صالح** مع مبادرة مجلس التعاون الخليجي

(AJ: Active role allocation)

In the first extract, AJ identifies Saleh's regime (including his sons, brothers, and assistants) as the same as the pillars of a house, but one which is broken, with only 'remnants' that remain. Here, the poor condition of the house infers that Saleh has a weak status. The next approach that AJ used was impersonalisation, by identifying the president in the same manner as rubbish that is swept up and discarded. Finally, Saleh is also derogated in the above examples, with phrases like 'grasps to the chair until his last trick' and 'tricks and manoeuvres' being used to give him a negative role. AJ does not deny responsibility for this negative role:

*There has been **disrespect** for the Yemeni people and the constitutional legitimacy, which he (Saleh) used to sing the praises of*

تم **استهتار** بالشعب اليمني وبالشرعية الدستورية التي كان يتغنى بها

*The revolution which has endured this **ousted** regime all this time*

الثورة التي صبرت طيلة هذه الفترة على هذا النظام **المخلوع**

*in order to resolve their revolution, without **controlling**, but by partnering with them*

لحسم ثورتهم، دون **التحكم** بل أن يكون شريكاً معهم

(Protesters: Nominalisation)

*We say to the ousted **Ali Saleh** that if he has a real intention to step aside or, excuse me, to hand over the power*

نقول للمخلوع **علي صالح** إن كان لديه رغبة حقيقية في أن يتنحى أو عفوا في أن يسلم السلطة

(Protesters: Subjection)

Here, Saleh was degraded by the protesters, with the actions and legitimacy of the regime being called into question, suggesting that Saleh shows no respect to Yemeni people and legitimacy. The regime is degraded because it is considered overthrown and weakened despite the revolution being incomplete. Nominalizing the actions in the given examples shows that Saleh lacks responsibility for dealing with his people's demands. In addition, the protesters gave Saleh the role of the object of an action done by the protesters, with the subjection showing that he is powerless because he passively receives actions from them.

Among the negative ideological intentions that AJ used for Saleh were inciting revenge against Saleh and forcing him to resign. AJ used indetermination and assimilation to fulfil these intentions:

guaranteeing immunity approved by the government for the president Ali Abdullah Saleh **and those who worked with him** *from all judicial prosecution*

ضمان حصانة يقرها البرلمان للرئيس علي عبدالله صالح **ومن عمل معه** من كل التتبعات القضائية

(AJ: Indetermination)

A large number of factories were shut down and **tens of thousands of workers** *were dismissed.*

تم إغلاق عدد كبير من المصانع وتسريح **عشرات الآلاف من العمال**

(AJ: Assimilation)

In this extract, AJ incites the protesters to take revenge upon Saleh and upon the unidentified group of 'those who worked with him'. 'Immunity' from 'all judicial persecution' implies many cases against Saleh. Therefore, in order to force his resignation, AJ used assimilation to specify the number of workers who are shown as victim as 'tens of thousands', giving a reason for his abdication, by showing that he has caused Yemeni factories to shut down and corresponding hardship for the people.

Furthermore, announcing war against Saleh, criminalizing Saleh, doubting Saleh, and threatening him were specific to the protesters. The protesters used various linguistic tools in order to fulfil these intentions:

and I say our battle is now only with **Ali Abdullah Saleh** *and his sons*

وأنا أقول نحن الآن معركتنا مع **علي عبد الله صالح** وأولاده فقط

(Protesters: Subjection)

Saleh and his sons are the object of the protesters' 'battle'. Meaning that, in this context, the protesters effectively announce a war against Saleh:

*The national youth revolution has prepared a complete file on the crimes of **Ali Saleh**
and his regime, and it will submit it to the International Criminal Court.*

علي عبدالله صالح طردته الثورة الشبابية الشعبية

(Protesters: Beneficialisation)

*The brothers in the European Union, United States and human right organisations, have
to prosecute **Saleh**.*

الأخوة في الإتحاد الأوروبي في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية كذلك المنظمات الحقوقية عليها أن تقدم **صالح** للمحاكمة.

(Protesters: Subjection)

In the first incident, the protesters benefits from Saleh's crimes, as it they will file them as

examples of corruption to the International Criminal Court. In beneficialising Saleh, the

protesters portray the president as a criminal. Meanwhile, in the second example, Saleh is also

portrayed as a criminal, with the speakers asking the world, EU, US and human right

organisations to 'prosecute Saleh'.

*People might talk about the humanitarian aspects that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has
provided to the president **Ali Abdullah Saleh**, like providing health care*

قد يتحدث الناس عن الجوانب الإنسانية التي تقدمت بها المملكة العربية السعودية من خلال تقديم الخدمات الصحية للرئيس **على
عبد الله صالح**

(Protesters: Beneficialisation)

In this extract, Saleh benefits from the Saudi health services in order to manipulate and delay. By

stating this, the protesters demonstrate that they doubt his intentions after he flew to Saudi

Arabia:

*We will pursue the assets, **this looted money by which the Yemeni people** are now being
persecuted.*

نلاحقه سنلاحق الأرصدة، **الأموال المنهوبة** هذه التي الآن يقمع فيها الشعب اليمني

(Protesters: Personalisation)

The protesters linked the concept of 'looted money' with the idea of a human being who is being chased. By the use of personalisation here, the protesters threaten Saleh, who is implied to have 'looted' the 'money'.

In contrast, only the government employed positive ideological functions with relation to the president, aiming to meet their intentions of glorifying and empowering Saleh. For both of these aims, the government used subjection:

> *I speak to sister Tawakul Karman, I am sorry that she refers to **the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh** as an ousted president*
> أتحدث للأخت توكل كرمان يؤسفني أن تتحدث عن **الأخ الرئيس علي عبد الله صالح** أنه رئيس مخلوع

(Government: Subjection)

In this extract, the government glorifies Saleh. Despite him being passivated by the government, he is glorified by the context, which shows disagreement with the opinions that the protesters have expressed about Saleh. In addition, Saleh is referred to as 'the brother president' which shows respect and solidarity. So, the government hold on power by supporting Saleh:

> *The majority of the people still cling to **the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh.***
> السواد الأعظم من أبناء هذا الشعب ما زالوا يتمسكون **بالأخ الرئيس علي عبد الله صالح**

> *while they don't acknowledge the millions who have come out from all over Yemen, in support of **the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh***
> بينما هم لا يعترفوا بالملايين الذين تخرج من كل أنحاء اليمن مؤكدة ومتمسكة **بالأخ الرئيس علي عبد الله صالح**

(Government: Subjection)

Additionally, the speech of the government representative seeks to empower the president by claiming that the majority of the people of Yemen want to keep him as the president. Saleh is referred to as 'the brother president' and, although he is given the object role, he is portrayed as being admired by his people.

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The ideological aims intended by the data groups with regards to Saleh show their stance and whether they are with him or against him. The intentions by AJ and the protesters strongly support the idea that they both oppose the president, while the intentions by the government speakers showed their struggle to maintain the powerful status of Saleh as the president.

4.2.5 *Regime*

In a similar way to the use of 'Saleh', 'regime' was used to achieve the ideological intentions of negative connotations by AJ and the protesters, and the positive connotations by the government. Both AJ and protesters used language that derogated the regime and distorted its image. Interestingly, both of them appealed to religion in order to distort the image of the regime:

> *Isn't it a hideous mistake to accept the president's stepping aside while leaving his entourage in the army, security institutions and the media to **wreak havoc and desolation in the country**?*
>
> أليس من الخطأ الشنيع القبول بتنحي الرئيس وترك أذنابه في الجيش وأجهزة الأمن والإعلام **يعيثون خرابا وفسادا** في البلاد
>
> *Religious source: "Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger **and strive upon earth [to cause] corruption** is none but that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land". Quran (5: 33)*

(AJ: Appeal to religion)

> *It goes like a wolf **in preacher's** clothing; we hear who spent many years defending this regime and those who were hired to defend the regime*
>
> يوم أن يرتدي الثعلب ثياب **الواعظين** نسمع من كان طيلة السنوات يدافع عن هذا النظام وما كان أجيرا يدافع عن هذا النظام
>
> *Religious source: "God commands justice, and goodness, and generosity towards relatives. And He forbids immorality, and injustice, and oppression. He **advises** you, so that you may take heed." Quran (Suratt Al Nahl (16),verse 90)*

(Protesters: Appeal to religion)

In its reference to the regime's practices in this extract, AJ quoted 'wreak havoc and desolation in the country', derogatory references stated in the holy Quran. This reference implies a bad regime image that caused corruption and therefore deserves the punishment stated in the Quran,

namely to 'be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land'. The protesters also distorted the regime's image, describing it as hypotactic that covers its intentions in the form of a religious 'preacher'. In the holy Quran, preacher is in charge of 'advising' others.

Additionally, both AJ and the protesters derogated the regime. While AJ used dysphemism for this purpose, the protesters used repetitions:

> *The Yemeni people are still afraid. This is **a treacherous government, a treacherous regime, the security institutions are treacherous**. The army has no other choice than to take **revenge** against the Yemeni people, revenge.*

الشعب اليمني مازال متخوفا هذه **حكومة غدر هذا نظام غدر أجهزة الأمن أجهزة غدر** الجيش ليس أمامه إلا **الانتقام** من الشعب اليمني **الانتقام**

(AJ: Dysphemism)

AJ used dysphemism in derogating the status of the Yemeni regime. AJ used references of negative connotations, such as 'a treacherous government, a treacherous regime, the Security institutions are treacherous'. In addition to these derogatory terms, AJ claimed that the army is on the side of the protesters and used 'revenge' as a derogatory term regarding the expected actions of the army against the regime:

> ***These*** *are who squandered public money, **these** are who misused power, **these** are that the international community now praises*

هؤلاء الذين أهدروا المال العام **هؤلاء** الذين أساؤوا استغلال السلطة **هؤلاء** الذين يمدحهم الآن المجتمع الدولي

(Protesters: Repetition)

Similarly, the protesters repeated the derogatory reference 'these' to show the regime as lower in status and weaker in power. The demonstrative pronoun here is followed by derogatory facts about the regime, from the perspectives of the protesters, regarding the misuse of public funds and power, and who has deceived the international community.

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Added to this, the protesters had the ideological intentions to weaken, threaten and order the regime:

> *The Friday of Dignity was on March 18. On March 31, the army joined (the revolution), and **all of the pillars of the Yemeni regime collapsed**. We heard of the resignations of the whole diplomatic corps, most of whom are in the diplomatic corps.*

جمعة الكرامة كانت في 18 مارس, في 21 مارس انضم الجيش, **وتهاوى النظام اليمني بكامل أركانه**, سمعنا باستقالات السلك الدبلوماسي بشكله يعني أغلب من في السلك الدبلوماسي

(Protesters: Metaphors)

> *which it feeds on, after the international community started **closing in on it***

والتي يقتات منها بعد أن المجتمع الدولي بدأ **يضيق عليه الخناق**

(Protesters: Idioms)

The protesters used metaphors and idioms to portray the regime as weak. In the first extract, the protesters identify the regime as being similar to a house with damaged foundations or structure, in the form of its pillars. Meanwhile, the 'resignations of the whole diplomatic corps' is a specific example of the regime's downfall, with the metaphor implying a weak regime coming to an end. In the second extract, the protesters employ the idiom 'closing in on it', which also implies collapse and weakness, like prey being hunted by the 'the international community.

The protesters specifically threatened the government by the use of backgrounding and idioms:

> *Nothing remains except revenge; **they should all go** to the dumping ground of history.*

لن يبقى إلا الانتقام، عليهم أن **يذهبوا** جميعا إلى مزبلة التاريخ

(Protesters: Backgrounding)

> *Nothing will remain except revenge. They should all go to **the dumping ground of history**.*

لن يبقى إلا الانتقام، عليهم أن يذهبوا جميعا إلى **مزبلة التاريخ**

(Protesters: Idioms)

The backgrounding example by the protesters shows an absence of the subject, although it is intended that the subject is Saleh, his family and his regime. The use of backgrounding by the protesters is innocent, as the audience are generally likely to have clearly understood who the intended social actors were, given the remit of the programmes and the context of the discussions.

The protesters threatened that it would take revenge upon the regime and ensure that Saleh was remembered poorly, using the expression 'the dumping ground of history' to denote the destiny of the regime. To this end, the protesters aimed to order the regime by employing dysphemism:

> They **have to acknowledge** the goals of the national youth revolution now. Whoever wants to hand over power **has to acknowledge** what is required from Ali, anyone who wants to hand over the raped power

عليهم أن **يعترفوا** الآن بأهداف الثورة الشبابية الشعبية من يريد أن يسلم السلطة عليه أن **يعترف** المطلوب من علي المطلوب من كل من يريد أن يسلم السلطة المغتصبة

(Protesters: Dysphemism)

In order to meet the aim of calling for their demands to be met, the protesters used the strong modal 'has to' associated with the verb 'acknowledge', although these lexical choices were softened by mild references such as acknowlege what is required. Dysphemism here is used to instruct the regime to follow the collective demands of the protests.

Again, only the government achieved a positive sociolinguistic intention in their use of regime, which was expressing power:

> Government: **We are a country**, we don't need to turn into a jungle (
> AJ: *Are these the duties of the country?*
> Government: **We are a country**, we cannot act like these gangs, who are blocking roads, terrorising peaceful people, and killing the innocent in the camps.
> AJ: *What about the thugs?*
> Governemnt: **We are a country**, it hurts me to hear the word thugs being used to refer to the Yemeni people.

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الحكومة: **نحن دولة** لا نحتاج أن نتحول إلى غابات.

الجزيرة: هل هذه مهام الدولة؟

الحكومة: **نحن دولة** لا يمكن أن نمارس ما تمارسه هذه العصابات من قطع الطرقات من ترويع الآمنين من قتل الأبرياء في المعسكرات.

الجزيرة: ماذا عن البلاطجة ؟

الحكومة:**نحن دولة** أنا أأسف أن أسمع كلمة بلاطجة عن أبناء الشعب اليمني

(Government: Repetition)

The government repeated its self-reference 'we are a country' in order to express power over what it so called 'jungle', 'gangs' and 'thugs'. This self-reference as 'a country' implies power in many respects, including space, fighting, and decision making.

In summary, only the government used the regime to achieve positive goals, namely to express power and control. This is almost certainly because the government considers itself part of the regime and so has a vested interest in ensuring that its power is maintained. In contrast, the intentions attributed to AJ and the protesters were powerful in nature, as they sought to threaten, weaken, and issue commands to the regime.

4.2.6   *Army*

AJ and the protesters share the use of the army as a notion in order to achieve their specific aims of ideological intentions. In the case of AJ, these intentions seem to be empowering the army, while the protesters used language that aimed to incite the army to join the protests:

> *The Yemeni army is the second largest military force in the Arabian Peninsula after Saudi Arabia, with nearly **90 thousand** professional soldiers.*
>
> الجيش اليمني ثاني أكبر قوة عسكرية في الجزيرة العربية بعد السعودية منسوبوه المحترفون قرابة **90 ألف عسكري**

(AJ: Assimilation)

The AJ speakers used assimilation tactics in order to empower the army, giving the specific number of the army soldiers in Yemen, '90 thousand', to stress that it is the second biggest army in the Arabian Peninsula and therefore possesses significant military influence. By the use of

assimilation here, AJ portrays how powerful the Yemeni army is; in a way that winning party is whichever the army stands by.

The protesters tried to incite the army to join the protesters so as to empower the revolution and ensure victory against Saleh:

> *We address the brothers in the Republican Guard and in the Central Security telling them that they have a chance. They are the country's army, **not killers and not a gang.***
> نحن نخاطب كذلك الإخوة في الحرس الجمهوري وفي الأمن المركزي بأن أمامهم فرصة هؤلاء، هؤلاء جيش البلد هؤلاء جيش الوطن وليسوا **قتلة** وليسوا **عصابة**

> *Religious source: "Because of that, We decreed upon the Children of Israel that **whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely"***
> *Quran (Suratt Al Ma'idah (5),verse 32)*

(Protesters: Appeal to religion)

By negating 'killers' and 'gangs' from the descriptions associated with the army, the protesters are reinforcing the idea that it defends the army and that the army should therefore be on the side of the protesters. The quote from the holy Quran 'whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely' conveys strong emotions to the army that siding with the protestors and the uprising citizens would be in accordance with the teaching of their religion.

To summarize, both AJ and protesters endeavoured to positively use the army in order to reach their ideological aims related to the revolution. AJ portrayed the army as being powerful in order to encourage them to protect the protesters, while the protesters themselves pushed the army to join in the fight against Saleh.

4.2.7 _Fighting_

As with the aforementioned use of the army, AJ and the protesters both attempted to use the conflict occurring in Yemen to maintain their ideological stance about the revolution. They both described the high death count and AJ also described the intensity of the fighting. In order to describe the massive killing (high death count), both AJ and the protesters used assimilation:

> before and during the protests, about **800 were killed and 20 thousand were wounded** in different Yemeni cities and provinces
>
> سقط قبلها وخلالها نحو **800 قتيل** وحوالي **20 ألف جريح** في مدن ومحافظات اليمن المختلفة.

(AJ: Assimilation)

> This regime killed the youth in the square;, **800 youths** were killed.
>
> هذا النظام قتل الشباب داخل الساحات **800 شاب** قتل.

(Protesters: Assimilation)

Using specific numbers in reference to the killed and injured in Yemen glorifies the events of the revolution. These numbers are followed by the location of the killing and injuring which is 'in different Yemeni cities and provinces' and in the squares. By providing information on the numbers and locations illustrates AJ's intention to glorify the revolution and make the protesters seem like victims. Likewise, the protesters used the same number as AJ, '800' in reference to the number killed in Yemen, meaning that both groups used exactly the same discourse in achieving the same intention.

Only AJ described the fighting intensity. By doing so, AJ attempted to glorify and exaggerate the revolution that it was a major event in Yemen and that protesters were achieving:

> A total of 26 Yemenis were killed by weapons, some of which are **said** to be heavy weapons.
>
> 26 يمني قضوا بأسلحة **قيل** أنها أسلحة في بعضها أسلحة ثقيلة

(AJ: Deletion of the passive agent)

By deleting the actor of the report, who described the weapons as 'heavy', AJ evades responsibility for the provision of the facts about the fighting in Yemen, although these include numbers and are generally harmful and degrading to the government. The intensity of the fighting is another aspect of the war that AJ do not engage with, as they delete the passive agent, without stating the source of the information.

Finally, only AJ and the protesters used the fighting in Yemen in order to achieve their intentions. Both groups referred to the number of people injured and slain, in an attempt to prove that the regime was killing large numbers of Yemeni people.

4.2.8   *Gulf Initiative*

Only AJ and the protesters used the GI in achieving their ideological intentions. Overall, the intentions here show a negative representation of the GI by both AJ and the protesters, both of whom represented the GI negatively, in a way that they distorted the image of the GI**.** AJ used deletion of the passive agent, subjection, assimilation, appeal to religion, dysphemism, indetermination, and metaphors. In contrast, the protesters relied upon personalisation:

> the Gulf Initiative which **was amended** three times because of his change of mind
> مبادرة مجلس التعاون الخليجي التي **عدلت** بسبب تقلب موقفه ثلاث مرات

(AJ: Deletion of the passive agent)

> but the initiative grants **Ali Abdullah Saleh** an escape from prosecution
> لكن المبادرة تمنح **علي عبد الله صالح** الهروب، أن لا يخضع للمحاكمة

(AJ: Subjection)

> *This initiative excluded the revolution's youth who stood under the sun for months, and months, **in their millions, and millions**.*
> هذه المبادرة استبعدت شباب الثورة الذي وقف تحت الشمس لأشهر، لأشهر **بالملايين، بالملايين**

(AJ: Assimilation)

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*and the protesters' leaders stay in Yemen's squares believing that signing the initiative is a **betrayal to the martyrs' blood***

وعلى مسافة من الطرفين تقف قيادات المعتصمين في الساحات اليمنية معتبرةً أن توقيع الإتفاقية **خيانةً لدماء الشهداء**

(AJ: Appeal to religion)

*Did the Yemenis pay all of those sacrifices in exchange for a **meagre settlement**?*

هل دفع اليمنيون كل تلك التضحيات مقابل **تسوية هزيلة**

(AJ: Dysphemism)

*that the GI which **many** have praised (using musical instruments)*

أن المبادرة الخليجية التي طبل وزمر لها **الكثيرون**

(AJ: Indetermination)

*to fit **the president's size** as his opponents say, and to respond to his concerns which have not stopped, it seems.*

كي تواءم **مقاس الرئيس** كما يقول معارضوه وتستجيب لهواجسه التي لم ينقطع سيلها على ما يبدو

(AJ: Metaphor)

In the first example, AJ accused Saleh of making numerous modifications to the GI. Although the actor of the modification is not stated in the extract, this is implicit knowledge as it is well known that Saleh amended the initiative. By deleting the passive agent, the image of the GI is distorted in order to stress the action of the amendment, rather than the doer of the action, who is unimportant because the GI is negative in all cases.

Additionally, AJ distorts the image of the GI in order to portray Saleh as a coward, with the GI actively granting him 'an escape'. The passive role given to Saleh here is of a coward and is illegal, so the GI does not sound like a viable solution to the Yemeni crisis.

Once again, AJ shows the GI with a negative picture since the people of Yemen protested under the sun for months and in large numbers 'in millions', which is stressed by repetition. 'Martyr' is a religious adjective given to those who die or are killed in the pursuit of religious aims, which

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can be seen in numerous sources in Islam, such as the Prophet (pbuh) stating that, 'whoever dies or is killed in the cause of Allah is a martyr'. In this extract, AJ tries to distort the GI's image by stating that signing the initiative is a 'betrayal to the martyrs' blood', showing that the items are not only unacceptable but even constitute a betrayal against those who have died. In the fifth example, AJ used the words 'a meagre settlement' as a negative semantic reference to the initiative, which is more negative than other possible phrasing, such as 'an unfair settlement'. This negative choice distorts the initiative's image, indicating that the Yemeni people and the wider world all disagree with the initiative.

Among the many ways AJ uses in distorting the GI's image is indetermination. The verb 'have praised' is used with musical instruments in Arabic, which implies negative connotations, suggesting that the initiative is given a larger image than it actually deserves. Therefore, in distorting the GI's image here, AJ decreases the size or importance of the initiative's image.

In the last extract, AJ compares the initiative with a garment that has had its size fixed, implying that Saleh modifies the items of the initiative according to his will and intentions. This metaphoric expression is an indication of the attempts made by AJ to distort the image of the revolution:

> *because this **initiative wanted to twist the arm of the Yemeni people** by giving these criminal guarantees*
>
> لأن هذه **المبادرة كانت** أرادت أن تلوي **ذراع الشعب اليمني** باعطاء هذا المجرم ضمانات

(Protesters: Personalisation)

In contrast, the protesters only used personalisation to distort the image of the GI, identifying the GI as a person who twists an arm and the Yemeni as a person whose arm is twisted. The 'guarantees' offered by the initiative to Saleh derive from the initiative itself and, since Saleh is

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referred to as 'the criminal', it is therefore implied that the initiative grants him rewards that he did not deserve.

This analysis suggests that AJ was dissatisfied with the GI, and more so than the other two factions, because it sought to distort the status of the initiative using a wide range of linguistic tools.

4.2.9   *'Us' and 'Them'*

'Us' and 'them' is a further notion that has emerged from the micro-analysis by which speakers convey their political ideological stands. In the following, these strands are analysed by AJ's identification of the government as 'the other', AJ's differentiation of 'Saleh' and 'regime' from 'people' and 'army', the negative generalisation to Saleh's circle and the identification of Saleh as 'the other'.

As in the previous sections of this chapter, the findings show that AJ identified the government as 'the other'. In the following, a reference is made to 'differentiation' and 'generalisation and specification' as the two main linguistic components used in conveying the ideological stand of 'us' and 'them'. This differentiation between sides, whether 'us' and 'them' or 'self' and 'the other', was made by all data groups. There are a total of 17 occurrences by AJ, 25 occurrences by the government, and 96 occurrences by the protesters.

AJ differentiates 'Saleh' from opposition, competitors, and people. In its differentiation, AJ refers to Saleh as 'the president', 'the man', 'Ali Abdullah Saleh', 'Saleh' and 'The Yemeni president'. Perhaps more significantly, it also excludes him as an actor when differentiating him from the opposition. Instead, Saleh is attached as a genitive pronoun when mentioning 'the competitors' and 'the opposition', as Saleh's other such as 'his opponents' and 'his rivals'. Attaching Saleh's pronoun rather than his name derogates him from power and importance. It is

also interesting to highlight that AJ differentiates the regime from the army, potentially encouraging the army to support the revolution and thereby oppose Saleh and his regime. The ranges of differentiation references employed by AJ are attached to appendix 9 (table 63).

The opposition is made different from the regime, revolution, and tribes. For example, when the regime is made solid 'the regime', the opposition is made strong by attaching the regime as a genitive pronoun to it. Additionally, an interesting linguistic phenomenon here is that AJ does not specify a clear stance with regards to the opposition as being with or against the revolution. The evidence suggests that AJ differentiates the opposition from the revolution or the tribes, meaning that the opposition is either with or against the revolution. The most significant finding here is that AJ differentiates 'Saleh and regime' from 'people and army', showing a clear bias with regards to who it perceives to be against Saleh.

The government attributes itself to Saleh, people, regime or debate speaker's first name. On the other hand, it attributes 'the other' to the opposition or Tawakul Karman. While's Saleh's attributions are positive such as 'the president Ali Abdullah Saleh', the opposition is referred to Saleh's other as negatively generalized groups 'the killers', 'the criminals', and 'the gangs'. The opposition is differentiated through the use of pronouns, like 'these' and 'they', derogating the opposition from its power at the same time as empowering the president. The differentiation references by the government are attached to appendix 9 (table 64).

The most significant finding here is that unlike AJ, the protesters do not differentiate themselves from the opposition, instead considering themselves to be the opposition to the regime. Furthermore, the Gulf is differentiated from the regime when referring to the leaders of Gulf countries, but from the youth demonstrators and Yemeni people when referring to the gulf

initiative. Similar to the government, protesters refer to their opponent 'the regime' using pronouns like 'they' and 'this regime'. The protesters' differentiation references are attached to appendix 9 (table 65).

Secondly, data groups' distinction of 'the other' is evident in their generalisation and specification of the social actors. All groups use generalisation extensively: 207 occurrences by AJ, 93 by the government and 497 by the protesters. Depending on their occurrence in the corpus, the generalized social actors are categorized into four connotations: negative, victim, faithful and strong.

AJ generalises social actors with a mostly negative ideological connotation. Most of the negatively connotated actors are related to Saleh's circle such as 'the regime', 'the dictator' and 'the regime officials'. Meanwhile, other Arab presidents are generalized as 'Arab leaders' and 'the tyrants'. The reference 'Arab leaders' is given without articles, which shows less importance and status to the presidents, as if AJ refers to 'any presidents'. The people of Yemen are generalized as victims and are indicated as the whole Yemeni people or a sect of the people, such as young people or protesters. AJ portrays the faithful groups in Yemen, the protesters, using language like 'opposition parties', 'the protesters' leaders', as well as the officials who joined the revolution in ways that include 'the sheiks of Hashid tribes', military leaders', and 'ambassadors'. The Yemeni people as a whole are portrayed as being victims by AJ, but are nevertheless given a connotation of strength and power and are referred to as 'the unarmed people', 'the protesters', and 'the opposition'. The occurrences of generalized social actors in the discourse of AJ can be seen in appendix 9 (table 66).

In contrast with AJ, the government generalises the opposition with negative connotations such as 'the killers', 'the criminals' and 'the gangs'. Similar to AJ, the government shows the Yemeni people as victims such as 'the Yemeni people', 'the innocent youth', 'the revolutionary Yemeni people' and 'the safe people'. It also generalises the regime and army as faithful such as 'military leaders' and 'the ruling party'. The positively connoted actors of faith and strength by the government express power and support to the regime, mainly the Yemeni people and army. The occurrences of the generalized social actors made by the government are attached to appendix 9 (table 67).

As with AJ, the protesters represents Saleh's circle negatively. Saleh's circle includes the regime, Saleh's family, the security forces, al Qaeda, and all who work with the circle. This circle is represented as being responsible for the killing that has taken place during the revolution in Yemen. The regime is attributed by 'thugs' and 'the ones who misused the power', which shows a semantic derogation of Saleh's regime as a group. As with AJ and the government, the protesters generalized people and protesters as being the victims of the regime's response to the revolution. Overall, all these groups are in support to the revolution and the overthrow of Saleh, meaning the Yemeni people, protesters, and army, are all portrayed as being faithful and strong. Table 68 in Appendix 9 lists the occurrences of the generalized social actors by the protesters.

All data groups reveal the 'us' and 'them' notion through their use of the specification of certain individuals related to the revolution. Additionally, all data groups specify social actors extensively: 149 occurrences by AJ, 34 times by the government, and 148 occurrences by the protesters. Most of the specification occurrences are references to Saleh, however, and for this reason discussion was limited to those specified references of Saleh made by all data groups.

Table 15 References to Saleh

Group	Reference to Saleh
AJ	The Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Saleh, the Yemeni president, the president, the man, the president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the tyrant, the dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh, this man, this executioner, the president Saleh الرئيس اليمني علي عبدالله صالح، صالح، الرئيس اليمني، الرئيس، الرجل، الرئيس علي عبدالله صالح، الطاغية، الديكتاتور، علي عبدالله صالح، هذا الرجل، هذا الجلاد، الرئيس صالح
Government	The brother president, the brother president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the president, the leader and symbol Ali Abdullah Saleh الأخ الرئيس، الأخ الرئيس علي عبدالله صالح، علي عبدالله صالح، الرئيس، القائد الرمز علي عبدالله صالح
Protesters	The ousted president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, this man, the ousted, the ousted Ali Abdullah Saleh, Ali Abdullah Saleh and his sons, Ali, he, Saleh, dictator, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the entourage and the family, the snake's head, the killer, the brother president, president Saleh, the ruler, person, gang leader الرئيس المخلوع، علي عبدالله صالح، هذا الرجل، المخلوع، المخلوع علي عبدالله صالح، علي عبدالله صالح وأولاده، علي، هو، صالح، ديكتاتور، علي عبدالله صالح والحاشية والعائلة، رأس الأفعى، القاتل، الأخ الرئيس، الرئيس صالح، الحاكم، شخص، زعيم عصابة

Table 14 shows clearly that Saleh is generally specified in a similar way by AJ and protesters. In addition, the full address name of Saleh is shared by all groups, 'Ali Abdullah Saleh', as the use of the full name implies a neutral connotation. One specific reference of Saleh that is shared by AJ and the government is 'the president', whereas by the protesters and government share the reference 'the brother president'. The most interesting linguistic pattern from the table is that most of the specific references about Saleh are shared by AJ and the protesters. Whereas 'president Saleh' portrays the leader in a way that suggests power and domination, 'dictator', 'this man' and 'Saleh' derogate him from his power as Yemen's president. In this respect, AJ is demonstrating bias in the references it offers with reference to the president, suggesting that AJ considered Saleh as 'the other' in the same way as the protesters.

Ultimately, the data show that AJ's 'the other' was similar to that of the protesters. It considered the government its other. It also considered the government 'the other' of the protesters, as if it

spoke on the protesters' behalf. This conclusion was drawn from AJ's use of the differentiation and, generalisation and specification as the linguistic devices. This conclusion supports the findings of the previous notions discussed in this chapter, which showed that AJ shared the same ideologies as the protesters.

4.2.10 *AJ's reference to Arab leaders*

Overall, AJ displayed negative connotations in references to the Arab presidents. First, AJ referred to the Arab presidents as generalized groups, such as 'Arab leaders' and 'the tyrants'. Using the reference 'Arab leaders' without the article 'the' indicates less importance and status to the presidents, as if AJ refers to 'any presidents'. The title 'tyrants' has particularly negative connotations, as it implies slavery and dominance over populations.

Second, AJ aimed to distort the image of the Arab leaders, as can be seen in the two extracts below:

> *You're talking about **these Arab rulers** as if they are patriots of the first class, **Ok** give me one minute **OK** Jamal, I want to ask you*
> يعني عم تحكي لي عن هالحكام العرب ولا كأنهم وطنيين من الطراز الأول **بس** دقيقة **بس** أنا جمال بدي أسألك

> ***The tyrants*** *have caused the Arab countries to lose billions and billions, they looted the country, cursed and slaughtered people. **Do several billions make much a difference? How much difference do several billions make?** Let them lose several billions.*
> الطواغيت يعني خسروا البلدان العربية مليارات المليارات ونهبوا البلاد ولعنوا العباد وذبحوا الدنيا يعني **فارقة على كم مليار هلأ فارقة على كم مليار** ما تخسر كم مليار

(AJ: Repetition)

In the first extract, repeated 'ok' in a way that the moderator was trying to emphasise his reference to the Arab leaders as 'these Arab leaders'. As noted earlier, use of the demonstrative pronoun 'these' demeans the status of the leaders, as the moderator was referring to all Arab presidents. In the second example, the moderator repeats the question that encourages a negative perception of the huge quantities of money wasted by the leaders of Arab countries. Presidents

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are referred to as 'tyrants' who have 'looted the country' and 'slaughtered people'. Both repetition and the examples above emphasise the attempts by AJ to distort the images of the Arab presidents, thereby inciting protests against them.

To conclude, AJ represented the Arab leaders using derogatory generalized references, such as 'the tyrants' and 'these', which distorted the image of these rulers and their regimes.

4.2.11 *The discourse of female speakers*
In this section, the significances of the way in which women used discourse and how others used discourse with them are analysed. The discourse of the female moderators is equal to their male counterparts and does not signify any emotional state which shows how experienced AJ moderators are. However, the discourse of Tawakul Karman, the only female speaker, is characterized by her emotional response to the revolution, which distracted from the debates. Linguistically, Tawakul appealed to religion and used idioms in stressing her emotions. Additionally, the discourse directed to women demonstrates more interruptions by men directed to women, than women to men. These factors are discussed in greater detail below.

As noted above, the only female debate guest speaker was characterized as being emotional. Tawakul made 35 of the total 54 appeals to religion, suggesting that she preferred to convince the Yemeni people and the wider Arab audience by appealing to their emotions and piety, through the use of religious terms, rather than by logical reasoning supported by evidences. She also seemed to be emotional in the selection of idioms, as illustrated by the examples below:

*We cannot go backwards; we cannot even stop in the middle of the road. Since yesterday, we **forged a great path** towards victory.*

لا يمكن أن نرجع إلى الوراء, ولا يمكن حتى أن نقف في منتصف الطريق, نحن منذ أمس **شققنا طريقا رائعا** نحو إكمال النصر

*but there is a planned president, there is a planned president who they want to place in power. There are **no elections or whatsoever (watermelon)**; there is a planned president who will be placed within 3 months.*

إلا أن هناك رئيسا مطبوخا هناك رئيس مطبوخ يراد أن يوضع هكذا هناك رئيس **لا انتخابات ولا بطيخ** هو رئيس مطبوخ يراد أن يوضع خلال 3 أشهر

(Tawakul Karman: Idioms)

The use of 'great' does not employ ideological view or convincing strategies, nor add or emphasise any practical actions or achievements. Likewise, the use of 'whatsoever-watermelon' is arbitrary and inappropriate for a politician in Arabic, because it is colloquial and adds no ideological power to the meaning.

Moreover, Ali Al-Dhofairi (moderator of the *In Depth* debate) asked Tawakul to list the challenges that could be encountered on the completion of the revolution. Instead of focusing on the challenges, Tawakul elaborated on describing the completion of the revolution. Ali realised that she was attempting an emotional use of discourse, so he stopped her by saying:

*I don't want to go back, please Ms. Tawakul if you don't mind. I mean, with my full respect to all you said, **this is not an emotional subject**.*

يعني لا أريد أن أعود للوراء كثيرا أستاذة توكل إن سمحت لي, يعني **المسألة ليست مسألة عاطفية**, مع التقدير الكامل لكل ما تم الآن

(AJ: Interruption)

Ali was strict with asking her to stop being emotional by stating 'this is not an emotional subject'.

The discourse of men addressed to women was also characterized by interruption as a discourse strategy. The table below details the number of interruption occurrences in the *Behind the News* debate, which was coded for micro-analysis. This debate was selected because it has male and female speakers. Speakers are Fairoz (moderator/female), Yasir (government/male) and Tawakul (protesters/female).

Table 16 Interruptions: *Behind the News*

Debate: Behind the News	
Interruption	Number
Fairouz interrupts Yasir	17
Yasir interrupts Fairouz	26
Fairouz interrupts Tawakul	6
Tawakul interrupts Fairoz	2
Tawakul interrupts Yasir	0
Yasir interrupts Tawakul	2

The major finding here is that Tawakul interrupted least. Yasir's interruptions took the form of laughing, hemming, answering questions, commenting, and thanking. Tawakul never interrupted Yasir and the only two cases she interrupted Fairouz were by saying 'okay', thereby showing cooperation with the moderator. While Fairouz and Yasir spoke in the studio, Tawakul participated remotely, meaning that she may not have been able to interrupt others due to communication or technological difficulties.

All in all, Tawakul was the only female guest speaker in the debates. Her emotional state was evident in her common use of religious terms and idioms. Her emotional discourse was also clear to the moderator, Ali Al-Dhofairi, who once asked her to focus on the topic, which was not emotional. Tawakul made the least number of interruptions, yet was interrupted by the moderator and the male guest speaker on multiple occasions.

4.3 **Discussion**

This section provides a discussion of the findings of the CDA analysis that are presented in this chapter. First, AJ and the protesters share many ideological intentions, along with a large number of the same linguistic strategies. For example, AJ and the protesters both glorified the revolution, portrayed the people of Yemen and the protesters as victims, incited protesters, derogated and weakened Saleh, and distorted the regime's image. Furthermore, AJ and the protesters were almost identical in their ideological strands, with AJ almost speaking on the behalf of the anti-regime faction. In stark contrast, the government speakers held very different ideological intentions from either AJ or the protesters, and used different linguistic components even when the held similar ideology. As an example, AJ and the protesters employed subjection with reference to the Yemeni people, while the government used beneficialisation. When portraying protesters as victims, AJ and the protesters themselves used assimilation, whereas the government used dysphemism.

Second, by excluding the government speakers from some of the debates, AJ seemed to violate its motto 'the opinion and the other opinion'. In the four debates, only one government speaker, 'Yasser Al Yamani', was invited as a guest and only to a single debate. In contrast, many protesters and neutral speakers participated in the debates. Consequently, the government was excluded from speaking extensively on the subject, defending its cases, or meeting its intentions.

As its social actors are excluded, this means that the government leaves no traces of its activities. According to the van Leeuwen's framework, excluding social actors or social actions are 'radical exclusions', because the actors are not heard which did not allow the government to explain and justify its position in regard to the revolution. In addition, AJ also excluded social actors when responding to the claims made by either the government or the protesters. Furthermore, as with the protesters, AJ gave the impression of considering Saleh and his government, and many other Arab leaders, as 'the other'. These others were derogated and referred to as 'the tyrants' and 'these'. Finally, the discourse of women in these debates was characterized by the female guest speaker Tawakul Karman as being emotional with less interruptions than male moderators and male guest speakers.

A number of interesting additional findings emerged from the analysis, supporting the evidence of the ideologies investigated in this research. Perhaps most importantly, AJ's reports in the debates are strongly in favour of the revolution. For instance, the 'In Depth' debate includes a very long introduction and report about the Yemeni army and the situation of the economy, which was not related to the substance of the debate and could therefore be argued as being unnecessary. This report derogated the status of the Yemeni government, as it caused the army and economy's degrading. Additionally, it was evident that the AJ moderators interrupted the government speakers much more commonly than the protesters. Fairouz, the moderator of 'Behind the News', continuously and obviously interrupted Yasser al Yamani, the government speaker. Regarding the use of hedges, AJ mostly used these linguistic phrases to show uncertainty and avoid responsibility, rather than as a sign of hesitation or weakness.

The moderators were shown to have strong moderation skills, demonstrating good control of the debates. In addition to his role in managing the conversation, Faisal Al Qasim, moderator of 'The

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Opposite Direction', tended to ask questions and demand answers, even asking 'Why don't you answer?' in order to avoid deviation from the agenda or themes of the debate. In the 'Revolution Talk', Mohammed Kreshan also shows good control over the debate, asking his guest 'We don't want your opinion about the Initiative but we want you to answer who is responsible for its failure'.

Finally, the protesters generally showed confidence in speaking. Jamal Al-Maliki, the speaker advocating for the protestors on the 'Opposite Direction' debate, used words that denoted emphasis several times, demonstrating confidence and fluency. The protester speakers used no or fewer exclusions, indetermination, and hedges which emphasised their certainty of their claims. They frequently used modality for the actions that they wanted Saleh and other parties to perform or cease, such as to stop killing or to sign the Gulf Initiative. This indicated confidence about their goals and a commitment to their cause, even suggesting bravery in the face of death, by issuing orders to the regime.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the CDA analysis of four debates taken from four different debate programmes held by AJ in order to situate the current study within the wider filed of CDA. The data was coded using aspects from van Leeuwen's (2008, 2009) social actor network model and supplemented by further linguistic tools. The analysis was presented based on the emergent notions: revolution, people of Yemen, protesters, Saleh, regime, army, fighting, Gulf Initiative, 'us and them', AJ's reference to the Arab leaders, and the discourse of women. The main conclusion drawn in this chapter is that all the notions or themes derived from the analysis were shared by AJ and the protesters, both of which differ from the notions and themes championed by the government.

As this research seeks to investigate the use of language within media discourse, the data and outcomes of the critical discourse analysis are triangulated using computer assisted corpus analysis in the following chapter.

Chapter 5: Corpus analysis

5.1 **Introduction**

The previous chapter presented the critical discourse analysis of the four debates, which was conducted using aspects from the van Leuween framework (2008, 2009) and a selection of specifically selected linguistic elements. The purpose of chapter five is to triangulate the critical discourse analysis using computer assisted corpus analysis. This chapter therefore lists the selected corpus analysis terms and then outlines the computer software used for the analysis. This is followed by the background of the corpus, after which the results of the statistical analysis are presented, including concordances and collocations of the keywords of the notions that had emerged from the corpus analysis. In the analysis, the Arabic data was used in the same form as transcribed by AJ. The excerpts used here are translated for increased readability and transparency of analysis. Main keywords are given in Arabic as footnotes.

5.2 **The analysed debates**

When using AntConc, each group of the corpus is entered into the software, *AJ (27,186 words), government (7,659 words) and protesters (30,512 words)*, and is analysed separately. Initially, the first thirty words, most commonly employed in each data group, are listed, as given by the software. After this, the keywords that are specific to data groups and those keywords shared by two or three of the groups were identified. The first twenty collocations with frequencies of one right and one left were provided, in addition to the first 20 concordances listed by the software. These concordances and collocations show ideologies underlying the way in which the speakers used these words.

Table 17 incorporates the top thirty keywords of each of the data groups (AJ, government, and protesters), along with the frequency with which each of the keywords occurs. The content words

used for the analysis in this chapter are in bold. Attention is drawn to content key words only, as these are the most significant data with regards to the study.

Table 17 Wordlists with frequencies

Data group	AJ 27,186 words 36.8% of total corpus	Government 7,659 words 10.4% of total corpus	Protesters 30,512 words 41.3% of total corpus
Wordlist First 30 words with frequency	821 in 608 from 391 at 351 Ali 348 that 281 not 261 **Saleh** 235 this 230 al Qasem 230 Faisal 206 **Yemen** 200 to 200 Abd 182 this 169 about 166 Allah 161 al Dufairi 153 **the president** 142 **the revolution** 141 no 141 means 127 is(question tool) 125 Yemeni 122 sir 121 now 115 that 106 Owais 106 Ghada 104 or 102 okay	201 in 201 from 187 that 149 al Yamani 149 Yasser 120 **the people[8]** 103 **the president** 102 **the Yemeni** 102 this 99 **the brother** 94 to 84 no 83 at 77 **Yemen** 69 people 68 Abd 68 Ali 68 **we** 54 about 52 today 51 all 49 Allah 46 **power[9]** 46 **Saleh** 42 I 40 did not 37 this 36 that 32 **South** 32 he	834 in 745 that 710 from 403 at 304 this 294 no 268 Ali 247 this 233 **Saleh** 227 to 221 he 215 Abdul 194 not 186 now 179 Allah 176 that 170 **revolution** 164 **I** 163 **regime** 152 or 151 that 151 about 142 **Yemen** 136 there 124 **we** 119 was 119 she 118 **initiative** 113 did not 111 **people**

Table 18 Shared keywords

Data groups	Shared content keyword
AJ, government and protesters	Saleh, Yemen
AJ and government	President
AJ and protesters	Revolution
Government and protesters	People of Yemen, We, I

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[8] الشعب
[9] السلطة

Table 19 Specific keywords

Data group	Specific content keywords
Government	the South, power
Protesters	initiative, regime

Table 17 indicates that the total number of words found in the protesters discourse (30,512 words) is nearly four times the number of words in the government discourse (7,659 words). This strongly suggests that AJ excluded the government from expressing its side of the argument and meeting its goals by not ensuring that as many government speakers attended as the protesters. Another figure displayed on table 17 is the number of words found in the AJ discourse (27,186 words), which is similar to the number of words found in the protesters discourse. That means that the discourse of AJ is three times larger than that of the government speakers.

Tables 18 and 19 show the content keywords which are shared by and specific to corpus groups as identified by the software: 'Saleh' and 'Yemen' are shared by all the groups; 'president' is shared by AJ and the government; 'Revolution' is shared by AJ and the protesters; 'People of Yemen', 'We' and 'I' are shared by the government and the protesters. Some words can also be seen to be specific to certain groups: 'the South' and 'power', are highly utilised by the government, whereas 'initiative' and 'regime' were extremely popular among the protesters. No specific content words are specific to AJ.

Table 20 Notions and ideological intentions

Notion	Data group	Ideological intentions
Saleh	AJ	• Reference to Saleh, his family and circle • Derogating Saleh
	Government	• Solidarity to Saleh • Defend Saleh

	Protesters	• Negative representation of Saleh
		• Weakening Saleh
Yemen	AJ	• Avoid responsibility in Yemen
	Government	• Positive future in Yemen
	Protesters	• Avoid censorship of the events in Yemen
President	AJ	• Derogatory references to Saleh
	Government	• Solidarity with Saleh
		• Used in positive context
		• Representation of power and censorship
Revolution	AJ	• Used in neutral context
		• Used to ask questions
		• Associated with young people
	Protesters	• Used in positive context
		• In the revolution's side
People of Yemen	Government	• Pretend being supported by the people
		• Used as a synonym to Yemen
		• Given a patriotic role
	Protesters	• Victims and sacrifice
		• Speak on behalf of the people
We	Government	• Reference to the Yemeni government/regime
		• To defend the government's case
		• To respond to the protesters' claims
		• To convince the world of the government's case
	Protesters	• Reference to the parties that the protesters belong to
		• Present verb tense to show the revolution's demands
		• Past verb tense to indicate a completed action
I	Government	• Reference to the speaker only
		• As a conversation strategy: to interrupt and hold the floor
	Protesters	• Refers to the speaker only
		• To justify the revolution
		• To express censorship and control
Power	Government	• Synonym to regime
		• As a destination that power is exclusive to the government
South	Government	• To show the South as a victim
		• To express solidarity and care
Regime	Protesters	• Reference to Saleh and his family
		• Used in negative context
		• Demand entire circle's resignation
Initiative	Protesters	• Uncertainty of the initiative

The examination of the corpus is organised in accordance with the notions and sociolinguistic functions of the emergent keywords that have emerged from the analysis. Table 20 shows the notions, keywords from the wordlist on Table 17, in addition to their particular ideological intentions, as determined by the analysis. The majority of the notions derived from the computer analysis are the same as those identified by the CDA.

5.2.1   *Saleh*

It is particularly notable that the computer analysis shows the aims of AJ and the protesters were similar, with both groups using Saleh for ideologically negative intentions. The concordances of the use of Saleh by AJ demonstrate that Saleh was used to refer to the man, his family, and his wider circle of influence. Importantly, the reference was used in a way that derogated Saleh from his power as the president. Tables 21 and 22 show the first 20 concordances and collocations of 'Saleh' by AJ.

Table 21 Concordances of 'Saleh' by AJ (261 hits: 0.96%)

Concordances
1. Isn't it enough that Ali Abdullah **Saleh** stepped down without doing what al Qadhafi did?
2. Al Qassem: Who is that Ahmed Ali Abdullah **Saleh**? Faisal Al Qassem: entirely.
3. that Ali Abdullah **Saleh**'s son and his relatives still hold a strong grip on? What do you say about (the security) apparatuses
4. you. This party will disappear when **Saleh** leaves. There are many people, for example,
5. removing the pillars of Ali Abdullah **Saleh**'s regime that are represented by
6. the army and security… It is also believed that **Saleh**'s departure will not keep any legitimacy for his sons
7. What are you afraid of? **Saleh** will leave in two months or less. Why
8. Faisal al Qassem: Who knows Ali Abdullah **Saleh**? Faisal al Qassem: Abbas al Musawa
9. the Gulf (Initiative) states that Saleh's family, relatives and assistants can remain in power.
10. responsibilities, Ali Abdullah **Saleh** said some time ago to the protesters or to the
11. al Qassem: That belongs to Ali Abdullah **Saleh**. Faisal al Qassem: Abbas al Musawa
12. that Ali Abdullah **Saleh**'s family, sons, relatives
13. Abdullah **Saleh**'s (family), sons, and relatives to
14. Abdullah **Saleh**'s (relatives) to stay in their positions. It didn't state that
15. But the Initiative grants Ali Abdullah **Saleh** an escape, stipulating that he is not to be prosecuted and
16. the revolution youth and their insistence to prosecute **Saleh**. Faisal al Qassem: Very well, I ask you
17. the revolution youths are very concerned that **Saleh** will leave without being prosecuted and that he will have
18. Don't you think that the immunity Ali Abdullah **Saleh** has
19. entirely, at least Ali Abdullah **Saleh** has killed(innocents), at least killing people is better than (destroying the country)
20. Ali Abdullah **Saleh**'s record in breaking promises and conventions is full

Table 22 Collocations of 'Saleh' by AJ

Collocations	
Word	**Frequency**
and family	2
they sign	1
he demands	1
removes	1
and hints	1
and his regime	1
and we see it	1
and his opposition[10]	1
but they	1
and for a number	1
and a decision	1
and changed	1
and immunity[11]	1
and a third	1
and the stepping down[12]	1
and preventing	1
and remains	1
and inciting[13]	1
and the close (Saleh's entourage[14])	1
The Joint[15] (The Joint Meeting Parties)	1

Table 21 illustrates that the concordances of Saleh appear in contexts of his family, relatives, political party, and the Gulf Initiative. In some of the concordance sentences, a nonstandard variety of Arabic is used, such as 'meaning' or 'who knows'. The use of a nonstandard variety of Arabic only appears in sentences produced by AJ discourse, showing that the channel accords less status or importance to Saleh. The overall concordances of Saleh show a negative context in which Saleh is stated as with the phrases 'grants Ali Abdullah Saleh an escape' and 'Ali Abdullah Saleh's record is full of breaking promises and conventions'.

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[10] المعارضة
[11] الحصانة
[12] التخلي
[13] والتحريض
[14] حاشية صالح
[15] اللقاء المشترك

Saleh mostly collocates with his circle and family. Collocations generally portray Saleh with passive roles, including 'changed', 'remains', 'preventing' and 'inciting'. This result coincides with the passive role allocation of the critical discourse analysis, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter.

Similarly, the protesters used a negative representation to depict Saleh, in an attempt to weaken his status as the president of Yemen. Tables 23 and 24 present the concordances and collocations of 'Saleh' that were produced by the software.

Table 23 Concordances of 'Saleh' by protesters (233 hits: 0.76%)

Concordances
1. The departure of **Saleh** alone is not enough. The regime must also leave.
2. persuade me that if Ahmed Ali Abdullah **Saleh** remains, for example, he will remain for
3. Al Maliki: Ahmed Ali Abdullah **Saleh** is the one who killed the Yemenis. Ahmed Ali
4. the Yemenis, Ahmed Ali Abdullah **Saleh** and his father are the ones who committed those massacres
5. Yemen to be a democratic country, **Saleh**'s departure is not enough; the whole family has to leave as well.
6. Jamal al Maliki: Of course Ali Abdullah **Saleh** (knows) that everything is controlled from the palace.
7. I will give you an example of Ali Abdullah **Saleh**; when…
8. the regime, the regime is nothing but **Saleh**'s family, his entourage, and the national security
9. the national security that **Saleh**'s family controls, and the journalists which he is one of.
10. (Who) killed the Yemenis are Ali Abdullah **Saleh**, his entourage, and the family for whom brother
11. until now he is not convinced that Ali Abdullah **Saleh** is the one who killed those (people). Jamal al Maliki
12. to assure you that if Ali Abdullah **Saleh** could do like (al Qadhafi) did
13. Jamal al Maliki: Ali Abdullah **Saleh** was unable to do like (al Qadhafi) did.
14. They foiled Ali Abdullah **Saleh**'s plans to wage a civil war, and Ali Abdullah
15. to wage a civil war, and today Ali Abdullah **Saleh** is incapable of waging any wars
16. (they are ready) for whatever Ali Abdullah **Saleh** might do. I don't want to say
17. proud of Ali Abdullah **Saleh**, but there are more than 20 million Yemenis and
18. (not) at all proud of him, Ali Abdullah **Saleh** led Yemen to… I will give you some
19. in what way we are proud of him? Ali Abdullah **Saleh** … Waseem al Qurashi: This is not true at all.
20. This is not true at all. Ali Abdullah **Saleh**… There is only one positive thing …

Table 24 Collocations of 'Saleh' by protesters

Collocations	
Word	**Frequency**
and his regime	3
and an era	2
he states	1
and we found	1
and for other than	1
and for Saleh	1
and as	1
and senior	1
and requesting	1
and they will prosecute him	1
and he will be prosecuted	1
and it will blackmail	1
and his clique[16]	1
and about	1
and it goes out	1
and the donors	1
and the party	1
and the entourage	1
and giving	1
he puts it	1

Table 23 reveals that the concordances of 'Saleh' by the protesters are characterized by a negative context in reference to Saleh and his family, such as listing evidence of the unsatisfactory conditions of Yemen during the era of his rule, for example 'who killed the Yemenis is Ali Abdullah Saleh, his circle and the family'. In addition, the results from the concordances show that the protestors challenge Saleh through phrases like 'Saleh is unable to start a war today', in a way that weakens his status. It should be noted that the protesters primarily referred to Saleh using his complete name 'Ali Abdullah Saleh', without including the title of 'president' or even 'Mr'. When referring to his family, only Saleh's first name is commonly used which is derogatory in Arabic.

Saleh's most frequent collocation is with the words 'and his regime', which indicates that the protesters are unhappy with Saleh and his circle. This can even suggest that they desire the

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[16] تمسكه

resignation of the entire regime. The second highest frequency is 'and an era', which also suggests the distress or disapproval of the protesters with regards to anything associated to Saleh. Other collocations relating to Saleh's circle are 'and the party' and 'and the entourage'.

On the other hand, the government demonstrated solidarity with Saleh and defended his position as the president who should continue to maintain power. Tables 25 and 26 disclose the concordances and collocations of 'Saleh' by the government speakers.

Table 25 Concordances of 'Saleh' by government (46 hits: 0.60%)

Concordances
1. all the people of Yemen. Ali Abdullah **Saleh** has made great achievements in this country
2. the steps brother President Ali Abdullah **Saleh** took to establish democracy for journalists in
3. only… and that Ali Abdullah **Saleh**'s regime, at the Arab region level, is the one that
4. the one raised by brother Ali Abdullah **Saleh** does not hang around the doors of embassies
5. the doors of his masters. Ahmed Ali Abdullah **Saleh** leads a national institution and defends the homeland,
6. Sabotage, through terrorism. Ali Abdullah **Saleh** will not hand over power except to (safe) hands
7. nobody will be spared. Ali Abdullah **Saleh** didn't stretch his hand to… I challenge you…
8. one document that Ali Abdullah **Saleh** and his sons have plundered a land in Aden, and you
9. initiative. Yasir al Yamani: Ali Abdullah **Saleh** will stay as long as the Yemeni people want him to
10. year 2013. Yasir al Yamani: Ali Abdullah **Saleh** will stay as long as the Yemeni people
11. nonsense. Brother President Ali Abdullah **Saleh** is a father to all the people. Brother Ali
12. people. If brother Ali Abdullah **Saleh** wants to take revenge, he will take his revenge on
13. the country's leaders. Brother Ali Abdullah **Saleh** bandaged the country's wounds and his own wounds, and returned
14. Taiz. Brother Ahmed Ali Abdullah **Saleh** will never be a gangster. Yasir al Yamani
15. national … Yasir al Yamani: Ali Abdullah **Saleh** still enjoys a broad popularity in
16. from Sa'ada to al Mahrah. Ali Abdullah **Saleh** is a symbol for all Yemen's people. These members
17. the president. The history of President Ali Abdullah **Saleh** since he took over power in
18. How would he hand over power to them? Ali Abdullah **Saleh** came to power by the hands of the people.
19. about the brother president Ali Abdullah **Saleh** as an ousted president. I think that
20. from the sea water. Ali Abdullah **Saleh** will remain (in power) until 2013, whether they like it or not.

Table 26 Collocations of 'Saleh' by the government

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
Allah	41
will stay	3
they hold	1
he calls	1
and those	1
as if	1
and his sons	1
model	1
Muhsin	1
bandages	1
his guarantees	1
symbol	1
stop (usually stop bloodshed)	1
achieved	1
made	1
pillars	1
Aba (a father, a part of a word)	1
when	1
will remain	1
we will remain	1

The concordances of 'Saleh' in the discourse of the government speakers show solidarity with him, as seen in the use of the term 'brother', which is commonly used to address associates in Arabic. The government language also portrays the achievements of Saleh in a positive light, such as 'leads a national institution' and 'made great achievements'. These incidences generally indicate that the government speakers responded to the protesters by attempting to defend the president. Meanwhile, collocations show that the government associates Saleh with future certainty, as seen in utterances like 'will stay' and 'and will remain'. The use of present simple verbs of action with regards to the regime are also evident, such as 'he calls' and 'they hold'. The subject of these action verbs is almost always 'Saleh', except for the verb 'we will remain'.

In conclusion, the percentage of the concordance hits of Saleh by the three data groups is more or less the same (average percentage between 0.60% and 0.96%) indicating that 'Saleh' is applied relatively equally in the discourse of all three groups, despite being used in different ways, for

different purposes. While AJ and the protesters both derogated Saleh from power and seemed to intend to weaken his status, the government demonstrated solidarity with Saleh and defended him.

5.2.2 *Yemen*

Yemen was the second keyword that was frequently used by all three of the data groups. In a similar way to the use of 'Saleh', AJ and protesters seemed to share the intention of opposing the government. The most significant finding here is that together AJ and the protesters both used language that suggested that they did not accept responsibility in Yemen. Tables 27 and 28 demonstrate the first 20 concordances and 20 top collocations of 'Yemen' by AJ as analysed by AntConc.

Table 27 Concordances of 'Yemen' by AJ (205 hits: 0.75%)

Concordances
1. hold the regime accountable for all **Yemen**'s tribal, political and social sins?
2. that it will free **Yemen** of all its problems. This
3. remains, not only in **Yemen** but also in other places.
4. which is the intelligence and security in **Yemen**? Faisal al Qassem: Very well.
5. He told them you destroyed **Yemen**, you destroyed all
6. into war between the two halves of **Yemen**, which ended with his forces winning over
7. the progress of the political process in **Yemen**. Which political process? Even
8. Next power (struggle) in **Yemen**. Faisal al Qassem: Very well.
9. entirely. It will not help **Yemen** in any way because the problem is in
10. Ali Abdullah Saleh over **Yemen**. That means
11. in Libya, Syria and **Yemen** are youths and (the elderly) will inherit it
12. Dear (followers), was the of **Yemen**'s sergeant Ali Abdullah Saleh
13. with Ahmer. Doesn't the **Yemen**'s political and tribal nature require
14. Dr. Waseem al Qurashi, the Organizing (Committee) of the Youth Revolution in **Yemen**, and
15. you, as opposition, in Yemen and outside **Yemen**, gather
16. in Yemen and outside **Yemen**, you gather thousands (of people) to vote
17. international (statistics) indicate that **Yemen** is in the lowest ranking in the world? Faisal
18. Ali Abdullah Saleh would have never come back to **Yemen**, unless he had
19. (what) change can it bring about in **Yemen**? What? Is there
20. elections or reforms in **Yemen** whereas the intelligence institution

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Table 28 Collocations of 'Yemen' by AJ

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
and other	4
they suffer	1
and deputy	1
and structure	1
and power	1
and future	1
and old	1
will help	1
and outside it	1
and Hussain	1
and revolution	1
and its retrograde	1
and specifically	1
and challenges	1
and restrain	1
and its influence	1
and he rules	1
and the Yemenis	1
and the pregnant	1
probabilities	1

Table 27 demonstrates that AJ assigned a passivated role for Yemen: direct objects include 'will free Yemen', 'destroyed Yemen', and 'help Yemen'; genitives are 'Yemen's sins', 'Yemeni nature', 'outside Yemen', 'Yemen's sergeant', and 'two halves of Yemen'; and prepositional phrases, such as 'over Yemen' and 'in Yemen'. No collocations show an active role by AJ associated with Yemen, as these are given to other parties, indicating that the channel takes no responsibility in escalating the events of the revolution. Examples of such, include 'will help', 'they suffer' and 'and he rules'. Interestingly, Yemen collocates with 'and outside' once again showing sides or parties other than those of Yemen. Tables 29 and 30 show the top 20 concordances and collocations of 'Yemen' that AntConc produced for the discourse of the protesters.

Table 29 Concordances of 'Yemen' by the Protesters (142 hits: 0.47%)

Concordances

1. Intellectual (transformation) that will enable the existence of a real education which will create a productive society in **Yemen**. So, Saleh's departure is not enough
2. leave. By the way, the ruling party was not actually ruling **Yemen**. Who was ruling Yemen was a family
3. (the) ruling party was not actually ruling in **Yemen**. Who was ruling Yemen was a family and its entourage. Moreover, they hired some
4. for this family. The only guarantee, brother Faisal, for **Yemen** to be transformed into a democratic country is not Saleh's departure
5. Brother, part of the Gulf Initiative aimed to solve the world's problem in **Yemen**, and not Yemen's problem, and I am
6. to solve the world's problem in Yemen, and not **Yemen**'s problem, and I am not totally against the Initiative
7. solution without (including) these dictators will undoubtedly be good for **Yemen**. We don't want to say that the only solution
8. represented by the state of the national security and the military security that run **Yemen**. Perhaps everybody wondered, when (the whole state) moved
9. to Saudi Arabia, why did the regime remain? That is because what runs **Yemen** is not institutions, dear brother. According
10. and not in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Do you know how shameful it is that the oil minister in **Yemen** doesn't know how much
11. is not…We don't claim that the Gulf Initiative is the historical document that will solve all **Yemen**'s problems. Firstly, I can't
12. … simply is that the existence of protesters who were able to lead **Yemen** to this critical historical stage
13. …that we are in now. Those (protesters) are the only guarantee for the transformation of **Yemen** into a democratic country. I can't say
14. the public squares. Without the public squares, we will never be reassured about **Yemen**. Jamal al Maliki: Do you know how many
15. to worry because we lost many lives. For the sake of those lives, **Yemen** deserve to lead a decent life, away from depending on foreign powers.
16. (This country is) more civilized than its tribal sheikhs. Jamal al Maliki: The tribes in **Yemen** proved that they are more civilized than
17. the regime that misrepresented **Yemen** as a group of fighting tribes. But those tribes proved
18. more mature…They (tribes) did not carry weapons but to defend themselves. **Yemen** youths were able to prove…That's why we talk
19. (I lived) faithfully with those sacrificing youths without deceiving them. Dear brother, the youths and the tribes of **Yemen** are more civilized than this regime.
20. without deceiving them. Dear brother, the youths and the tribes of **Yemen** are more civilized than this regime. It shouldn't be…

Table 30 Collocations of 'Yemen' by the Protesters

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
and outside	2
alone	2
and tribes	2
they lead	1
they accuse	1
and for more	1
and perhaps	1
and she will give birth	1
and they ruled	1
and it seeks	1
and the Kingdom	1
and allowing	1
and the coronation	1
and we cut short	1
his departure	1
salary	1
in need	1
for a Yemen	1
for the observer	1
for transferring	1

According to table 29, Yemen is mostly allocated to a passivated role, which are: direct object 'will solve all Yemen's problems', and 'that runs Yemen'; prepositional phrases, like 'in Yemen' and 'to Yemen'; and genitive 'Yemen tribes', 'Yemen's youth', 'transition of Yemen' and 'the Yemeni youth'. However, two indications of activated roles appear with the concordances: 'for Yemen to transform' and 'Yemen deserves to live'. Through the allocation of a passivated role, the protesters effectively avoid censorship of the actions and reactions occurring in Yemen. The three top collocations in the analysis of Yemen are 'and tribes', 'alone' and 'and outside', in order to describe political sides in Yemen.

In contrast, the government employed the word Yemen by associating itself with a promising future for the country. Tables 31 and 32 show the computer analysis of the word 'Yemen' with respect to the government's language.

Table 31 Concordances of 'Yemen' by the Government (77 hits: 1.01%)

Concordances
1. and a Yemeni symbol that all the people of **Yemen** are proud of. Ali Abdullah Saleh made achievements
2. in establishing democracy for journalists in **Yemen**? Dear brother, we don't need to
3. The brother President whom the people of **Yemen** from all over the country praise… We don't
4. (after it committed all these) crimes, allowed the blood of the people of **Yemen** to be shed, it allowed… Yasir al Yamani
5. We don't act hypocritically, it shed the blood of the people of **Yemen**, allowed attacking the camps and
6. (I tell) you, not only me, but also all the people of **Yemen**, that the brother President actually still enjoys
7. still enjoys a broad popularity and he will lead **Yemen** to a safe side. He is the only man
8. Yasir al Yamani: Dear brother, we are in **Yemen**, You should know very well that the country…
9. (he) ordered the protection of the protestors in **Yemen**. Yasir al Yamani: But who is
10. in this country not only **Yemen** is accused of terrorism.. And the people of Yemen are greater than to be
11. not only Yemen is accused of terrorism. And the people of **Yemen** are greater than to be called beggars. The people
12. greater than to be called beggars. The people of **Yemen** are great despite all the poverty they are enduring
13. (we feel proud) of being Yemenis. Today in **Yemen** and for 9 months they have been blocking roads
14. for Al Jazeera channel..Yasir al Yamani: The people of Yemen… Yasir al Yamani: The people of **Yemen**. Excuse me,
15. al Yamani: The people of **Yemen**. Yasir al Yamani: The people of Yemen… Excuse me, I want to add something… brother Waseem
16. We want youths who seek change in **Yemen**, who seek reform in Yemen, we want youths…
17. …change in Yemen, who seek reform in **Yemen**, we want youths… When you talk about the revolution,
18. the country's reforms. The revolution happening today in **Yemen** has destroyed everything, destroyed everything…
19. everything, destroyed everything in **Yemen**. When will they build Yemen? Don't you see what
20. everything in Yemen. When will they build **Yemen**? Don't you see what is happening in Libya? Is

Table 32 Collocations of 'Yemen' by the Government

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
and for transferring	2
by its economy	2
great people	2
he rules	1
they make	1
and he will lead	1
unite	1
and Yemen	1
and the chaos	1
and stability	1
is guaranteed	1
is confirmed	1
for a factor	1
in favour of	1
as a bomb	1
its length	1
evils	1
will go	1
they will build	1
will support	1

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Table 31 shows that the government concordances of Yemen give the country a passivated role: including the genitive 'people of Yemen'; prepositional phrase 'in Yemen'; and object, 'and he will lead' and 'they will build'. In addition, the table shows that Yemen is used in the sense of referring both to the country or people who geographically reside in Yemen. With regards to collocations, Yemen connects with positive future verbs like 'and he will lead', 'they will build', 'will support' and 'will go', all of which are used to create the implication that the government intends to lead the whole country into a better future. The collocated verb 'united' indicates that not following the government may break Yemen into pieces, in mental, emotional, and geographical senses.

In summary, the concordance percentage for Yemen is high among the government speakers, but low among the protesters which is of rhetorical tactics. One interpretation of this is that the government seeks to convince the people of Yemen, as well as their Gulf neighbours, that official leaders of the country are able to bring stability for the country and wider region. In contrast, both AJ and the protesters used Yemen in a way that showed they sought to avoid censorship of events in Yemen.

5.2.3 *President*
President was the notion shared by AJ and the government. As might be expected, the overall intended aims of using the president were similar to those related to the use of Saleh. AJ particularly relied upon the notion of 'president' to derogate Saleh from his power. The following tables show the concordances and collocations of 'president' by AJ.

Table 33 Concordances of 'president' by AJ (153 hits: 0.56%)

Concordances

1. accepting the **president**'s stepping aside while leaving his entourage in the army, a hideous mistake?
2. the protesters achieved something great by barring the **president** from seizing power? Isn't...
3. (They tricked) them. They ousted the president and let them think that by ousting the **president**, they should have solved the problem, but
4. agreement and revolt against the legitimacy of the UN appointed **president**, even
5. crumbs. Faisal al Qassem: The vice **president** … Faisal al Qassem: Nice.
6. to you the same story. This **president**, this leader or
7. to my question about the popularity of the **president**; about this president
8. the president, about this **president.** Faisal al Qassem: Go ahead.
9. that you say that Mr. **President** still enjoys a broad popularity
10. says brother, this **president** became physically deformed and no
11. The public squares fight and reject the **president**. Those people are agents of foreign parties and they are
12. during the bombing of **president** Ali Abdullah Saleh' troops
13. the protesters, while the vice **president**, in charge of running the state, sought
14. to lift the immunity of **President** Saleh and those close to him, … were lost
15. Vice **President** Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi directed them this time
16. Al Yamani: So, does **President** Ali Abdullah Saleh seek
17. opposition and the Yemeni authorities led by the **President.** Ali Abdullah Saleh
18. putting the initiative into effect, so the Yemeni **president** Ali Abdullah Saleh
19. The Gulf Initiative and if **president** Saleh's stepping aside and authorizing (somebody else to assume)
20. No way, the Yemeni **president** Ali Abdullah returns

Table 34 Collocations of 'president' by AJ

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
he gives	1
it fortifies	1
it precedes it	1
and he runs it	1
and we want	1
and his assistants	1
and his forces	1
and leaving	1
and that	1
and those around	1
and the way	1
size	1
for seeing	1
for holding responsible	1
for possibility	1
for removing	1
for younger	1
sibling	1
motivations	1
opponents[17]	1

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[17] معارضين

This analysis demonstrates that AJ used 'president' to refer to Saleh, addressing the 'president' by the title 'Mr', 'this', or nothing. These styles of address semantically derogate Saleh from his power and status. In a few concordances, 'president' is followed by Saleh's full name 'Ali Abdullah Saleh' which shows respect in Arabic.

Collocations of 'president' denote actors other than Saleh, including 'and his assistants', 'and his forces', 'and that', 'and those around', 'for younger', 'sibling', and 'opponents'. The active roles of the president are indicated in a few collocations, as with 'he gives', 'it fortifies ', 'it precedes it', and 'and he runs it'. The collocation 'for removing' indicates a negative connotation, suggesting a lack of neutrality with regards to the way in which AJ addresses Saleh, as more neutral nominal nouns could have been used in Arabic, like 'replacing' or 'replacing him with another president'.

From the opposite perspective, the government used 'president' in a positive context, demonstrating solidarity with Saleh and representing him as with power and control. Tables 35 and 36 present the computer analysis of 'president' by the government speakers.

Table 35 Concordances of 'president' by the government (103 hits: 1.34%)

Concordances
1. I tell you, not as you labelled the **president**. The brother president is not a such sergeant, you know
2. as you labelled the brother **president**. The brother president is not such sergeant, you know who are
3. who are the sergeants in this area. The brother **president** is a leader and a Yemeni symbol about whom all (the people of Yemen) are proud
4. the Syrian regime didn't follow the steps of the brother **president** Ali Abdullah Saleh in providing
5. to an acknowledgment from Al Jazeera channel to the brother **president**. The brother president, whom the people (of Yemen) acknowledge
6. from Al Jazeera channel to the brother president. The brother **president** whom the people of Yemen acknowledge
7. I am only… All the people of Yemen… The brother **president** actually still enjoys a broad popularity
8. the millions who still support the brother **president** and who will continue to support him
9. president and who will continue to support the brother **president** and the constitutional legitimacy. We are with
10. today one million citizens are demanding the departure of the brother **president**. However, the Yemeni people are 25 million Yemenis

11. Yemeni people consist of 25 million Yemenis who support the brother **president.** We don't overlook the other party. There
12. more than 5 million demonstrators reiterate their support for the brother **president** every Friday. Yasir al Yamani: You
13. kill you… Yasir al Yamani: The brother **president** acknowledged the role of the youth. Yasir al Yamani:
14. nobody is allowed to protest. The brother **president** ordered the protection of the protestors and the demonstrators
15. We are with the youth, with the change. The brother **president** called on the youth to form a political bloc
16. the people and they are confident of themselves. The brother **president** deputized vice-president, gave him an authority
17. of themselves. The brother **president** deputized the vice-president, giving him the authority
18. please. Yasir al Yamani: Without insulting the brother **president**; we don't allow dwarfs to insult his person
19. (we) don't allow dwarfs to insult his person. The brother **president** is a national symbol. Rather, we should criticise each other
20. The Yemeni people still support the brother **president**. Brother Waseem speaks on behalf of the people and insults

Table 36 Collocations of 'president' by the government

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
deputy	2
fortified	2
he leaves	1
he takes them out	1
he abandons	1
and he accuses	1
and he threatened	1
and about	1
and he will work	1
and he will continue	1
and legitimacy[18]	1
and he gave him	1
symbol	1
situation	1
alone	1
for lieutenant general	1
authorized	1
sovereignty	1
leader	1
talk	1

Concordances of 'president' in the language used by the government demonstrate that 'president' refers to Saleh and is preceded by 'brother', which expresses respect and solidarity with him. In addition, concordances indicate an active role for the president, with terms that include 'the

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[18] الشرعية

brother president ordered the protection of the protestors', 'the brother president is a leader', 'the brother president actually still enjoys', and 'the brother president acknowledged the role of the youth'. In fact, the data show that Saleh is mentioned in positive contexts, even when he is accorded a grammatically passive role, as with 'support the brother president' or 'the brother president whom the people of Yemen acknowledge'. Concordances also show defence of Saleh, with comments to accusers like 'without insulting the brother president' and 'the brother president is not such a sergeant'.

One of the two top collocations of Saleh is 'fortified', indicating a degree of support and confidence that he is the best choice for Yemen and that he should remain in power for a longer period, without trial. Collocations are either active verbs carried out by Saleh, like 'he leaves', 'it takes them out', 'he abandons', 'and he accuses', 'and he will work', and 'and he will continue'; or adjectives that claim he is a great president, such as 'alone (the only)', 'fortified', 'for lieutenant general', 'authorized', 'sovereignty', and 'leader'. These collocations emphasise the government's position that Saleh is best for Yemen and that he should continue as leader.

Overall, the incidents in which the word 'president' was used by the government (103 hits, 1.34%) is three times higher than its usage by AJ (153 hits: 0.56%), providing power and control by the government to Saleh. While AJ derogated Saleh from the presidency, the government associated him with a positive context, suggesting that he is the best option as Yemen's president.

5.2.4 *Revolution*

Revolution was a notion shared by AJ and the protesters. It was expected that the use of this notion among the protestors would be positive. The most notable finding here is that while AJ used the revolution with neutral connotations, it associated the revolution with the young people

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in Yemen which showed AJ's support to the young people protesting in Yemen. Tables 37 and 38 present the concordances and collocations for the notion of 'revolution', with their frequency of use by AJ.

Table 37 Concordances of 'revolution' by AJ (142 hits: 0.52%)

Concordances
1. Don't the **revolution**'s youth have the right to stay in the squares?   2. Isn't it wrong to end the Yemeni **revolution** in the … way   3. Why don't the **revolution**'s youth follow the wise proverb saying, "what   4. social and economic al deterioration because of the **revolution**. Shouldn't they now   5. the Gulf (Initiative) is an attempt to get around the Yemeni **revolution**? 86.6 yes, 13.4   6. we see and call for a continuation of the **revolution** and staying in the streets   7. everyone is now a winner in the Yemeni **revolution**. Accept this initiative. Faisal: 8. his speech to the protesters or to the **revolution**'s youth, he told them you destroyed   9. deviated from the topic. The **revolution**'s youth and their insistence on prosecuting Saleh   10. You say that the **revolution**'s youth, especially you, are [upset]   11. the revolution, especially you as the **revolution**'s youth, are very upset   12. This initiative excluded the **revolution**'s youth who stood in the sun   13. Praised too much this **revolution**, that should continue   14. it means that you as the **revolution**'s youth are …, do you deny it?   15. to expire after the blessed Yemeni **revolution**, why   16. What can the Yemeni **revolution** change except replacing   17. I ask you, let me speak about us, the Yemeni **revolution**… as long as... OK   18. ceven if the Yemeni **revolution** succeeded and removed this regime   19. can this **revolution** achieves? What can it change?   20. Who are you deceiving? The **revolution** and the family army… Faisal al Qasem

Table 38 Collocations of 'revolution' by AJ

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
for youth	6
and it came	2
and it directed	1
and continuing	1
and future	1
and its supporters[19]	1
and for youth	1
and it did	1
and insults	1
and peacefulness	1
and revolution	1
and the movement[20]	1
and staying	1
and their insistence	1

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[19] مؤيديها
[20] والحراك

it succeeded	1
curvy	1
upset	1
it granted[21]	1
disavowals	1
for success	1

AJ accords more passivated than activated roles to 'the revolution'. The three activated roles given are 'what can it (the revolution) change?', '(what) can this revolution achieves?', and 'praised too much this revolution, that should continue'. Meanwhile, examples of the passivated role of 'the revolution' include 'as the revolution's youth', 'after the blessed Yemeni revolution', 'the revolution's youth', 'get around the Yemeni revolution' and 'end the Yemeni revolution'. The overall context in which AJ discusses 'the revolution' is neutral and is sometimes used in asking questions. As with the concordances, collocations of 'the revolution' are mainly passive, using 'the revolution' in genitive clauses. The most frequent collocation is 'for youth', in a way that AJ associates 'the revolution' very closely with young people. There are other collocations that connect 'the revolution' to young people, such as 'upset' or 'their insistence'. Interestingly, 'the movement', which is a more neutral synonym of 'the revolution', also collocates with the revolution.

The protesters used the revolution in a positive context, demonstrating their support and demand for the movement. Tables 39 and 40 present the computer analysis of the 'revolution' in the discourse of the protesters.

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[21] اعطت ضمانات

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Table 39 Concordances of 'revolution' by the protesters (170 hits: 0.56%)

Concordances

1. regime. Jamal al Maliki: Who… The Yemeni **revolution** didn't lead Yemenis to
2. that 50% are below poverty line. The **revolution** only exposed the snake and made it come out
3. of its hole. The **revolution** was absolutely not the reason behind poverty that
4. We are in front of the one who will guarantee … for Yemen. The **revolution** will establish a sound education system,
5. The revolution will establish sound education system. The **revolution**, in its depth, is a social transformation
6. departure of all who incited oppression during the **revolution**. It is not a personal issue
7. The only guarantee to achieve the **revolution** goals and to transform Yemen into
8. into a democratic Yemen is the **revolution** youths and their protests in the public squares. This
9. the journalists who appeared during the **revolution** inciting the regime to kill those youths are part
10. that to be controlled by anyone. The Yemeni **revolution** is, in fact
11. intellectual, social… Jamal al Maliki: The **revolution** is a continuous action and this is an account
12. and this is a superficial account of what happened. In fact, the **revolution** has already achieved something
13. As for me, I took to the streets with the **revolution** youths because I, as a Yemeni a youth,
14. Arab. The army that supports the **revolution** was the one that fights al Qaeda
15. now all the South Yemen's leaders are with the **revolution** against Ali Abdullah Saleh.
16. It is the national army that supports the **revolution** now, whereas those who took his side
17. Yemeni … I say on behalf of the **revolution** youths that we took to the streets revolting, first
18. I took to the streets with the **revolution**'s youth because, as a Yemeni a youth, I saw that my country we being destroyed, I saw
19. First, in the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate, the national Yemeni youth **revolution**
20. Taiz's massacre and holocaust, the **revolution** field's massacre and Asr's massacre. All these

Table 40 Collocations of 'revolution' by the protesters

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
and youth	2
supports	2
and against	2
it hinders	1
they are unfair to	1
and they set off	1
and an event	1
and mountain	1
and its conspiracy with the regime	1
and it is considered	1
And our leaving	1
and their staying	1
and with peaceful	1
and	1
and the issue	1
and policy	1
and the Republic	1
and the transition	1
and the goals	1
and completing	1

The overall context in which 'the revolution' is used by the protesters is positive, demonstrating that they are with the revolution. The protesters gave both active and passive roles to 'the revolution'. Examples of the activated role are 'the Yemeni revolution didn't lead Yemenis to', 'the revolution only exposed the snake and made it come out', 'the revolution will establish a sound education system', 'the revolution, in its depth, is a social transformation', and 'the revolution has already achieved something'. In contrast, the passivated roles involve: the use of 'the revolution' as the object, as in 'the army that supports the revolution': as genitive, such as 'the revolution youths', 'the revolution goals', and 'the revolution fields'; and prepositional phrases, as with 'during the revolution' and 'with the revolution'. Both of the roles given to 'the revolution' illustrate that the protesters support and even encourage this social and political uprising. 'The revolution' collocates with words that relate to the social actors, although these are mainly young people and the protesters themselves. These social actors support the revolution as 'and youths' and 'supports' are the top frequent collocations here.

In summary, AJ and protesters shared a high frequency usage of the word 'revolution'. The overall use of this notion among the protestors was with a positive connotation, unlike AJ, which primarily used the revolution as a point with which to ask questions. Nevertheless, AJ also associated the revolution with young people in Yemen, demonstrating a perception of optimism and power with regards to the revolution.

5.2.5 *People of Yemen*
The government and protesters used the 'people of Yemen' in order to achieve their ideological intentions related to the revolution. The results of the statistical analysis coincide with those of CDA in this area. A key finding in this particular area is that the protesters considered the people of Yemen as part of their group, seeming to speak on their behalf. In addition, the protesters

portrayed the Yemeni people as victims and sacrifices. Tables 41 and 42 show the concordances

and collocations of the 'people of Yemen' by the protesters.

Table 41 Concordances of 'people of Yemen' by the Protesters (111 hits: 0.36%)

Concordances
1. Yemenis to poverty. What brought **the Yemeni people** into such state of poverty is this
2. Faisal: This regime caused 50% of **the Yemeni people** to live under the poverty line.
3. is the Gulf Initiative only. **The Yemeni people** are patient and
4. other (things), that we have to address **the Yemeni people**. The idea of frightening them
5. that the real power should be in the hands of **the people of Yemen** and not a certain family
6. from these faces that **the Yemeni people** are bored of. Jamal al Maliki
7. to do what al Qathafi did. **The Yemeni people** stood against him, part of (the army) stood
8. a civil war may start as they frighten us. **The Yemeni people** are ready for all likely scenario
9. .. Jamal al Maliki: Haven't **the Yemeni people** proven that they are more
10. now that the community and **the people** have become the real strategic actor
11. no one of those killers. **The Yemeni people**, with their dignity, will not accept that
12. Certainly. Yasir al Yamani says that **the Yemeni people** are proud of Ali Abdullah
13. you can't talk about **the Yemeni people**. Waseem al Qarashi: He
14. My country is being destroyed. I stress that **the Yemeni people** are truly great and noble.
15. after him, if he does not submit to **the people**'s ambitions. Waseem al Qarashi: Notice that
16. it (does not) mean youths only because the interest of **the people** is shared by all their categories and all
17. honest in implementing this agreement. **The Yemeni people** are known for their tolerance
18. Yemeni (people) are known for their tolerance. Yet **the Yemeni people** pay the price for what they
19. **the Yemeni people** (pay) the price for what they have done, namely to get its freedom
20. you say you will step aside from power. **The Yemeni people** know that this man

Table 42 Collocations of 'people of Yemen' by the Protesters

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
and he despairs	3
seeks it	3
and its types	3
got	3
gets bored	2
he breaks	2
he decides	2
he surprises	2
they provoke	2
he is satisfied	2
they bribe	2
the scare us	2
and they bear	2
and he will bear	2
he got bored	1
interests	1
confrontation	1
to be led	1
for ambitions	1
to get rid	1

The role given to the people by the protesters is mostly active, as can be seen in 'the Yemeni people are patient', 'these faces that the whole Yemeni people are bored of', 'The Yemeni people stood', 'the Yemeni people are proud', 'The Yemeni people are ready', 'The Yemeni people will not accept', 'The Yemeni people are known for their tolerance', 'the Yemeni people pay', and 'The Yemeni people know'. There are a number of different connotations for these active roles, such as implying that the people are sacrifices and victims. Among the three top collocations in the analysis are the action verbs conducted by the people: 'and he despairs' , 'seeks it' and 'and they bear', which creates the implication that the protesters are supported by the people and that the people undertake the responsibility for their actions, effectively making it seem as though the protesters speak on behalf of the people. Interestingly, the verb 'and they bear' collocates in the present and future tenses, in reference to the idea that the people are strong and will not back down.

Unlike the protesters, the government used the people of Yemen as a synonym for the country, although the officials also claimed the support of the population. Tables 43 and 44 provide the software analysis of the usage of the notion of 'people of Yemen' by the government.

Table 43 Concordances of 'people of Yemen' by the government (120 hits: 1.57%)

Concordances
1.   power peacefully within the limits of the constitution and within the hands of **the people**. They speak on behalf of the people of the people, if they want
2.   within the hands of the people. They speak on behalf of **the people**, if they want while speaking on behalf of the people
3.   the people, if they want while speaking on behalf of **the people**. If they wanted to rise to power, why they shouldn't come to it?
4.   Polling as long as they trust **the people**, speak on behalf of them. Who gave them the right to speak on behalf of the people?
5.   on behalf of the people. Who gave them the right to speak on behalf of **the people**? The people of the Yemeni people are not a million as (Al Jazeera channel) mentions
6.   Who gave them the right to speak on behalf of the people? **The Yemeni people** are not a million as (Al Jazeera) channel mentions
7.   a million today are demanding the departure of the brother president. 25 million of **the Yemeni people** support the president.

8. (let them) make it reach the street, if they speak on behalf of **the people** and they are confident. The brother president
9. Let me tell you, we want a voting by the hands of **the Yemeni people** and not through Al Jazeera channel.
10. Even zakkat which they give to the citizens is looted without **the Yemeni people** benefiting from it. The great Yemeni people don't need it
11. which they give to the citizens is looted without the Yemeni people benefiting from it. The great **Yemeni people** don't need someone to
12. The great Yemeni people don't need someone to beg in their name. **The Yemeni people** are greater than you bet on. If you
13. than you bet on. If you bet on **the Yemeni people**, come to the elections, come.
14. I feel sorry that brother Waseem talks of **the Yemeni people**, saying that they go out because they are paid. The people
15. the Yemeni people, saying that they go out because they are paid. **The Yemeni people** are greater than to be belittled by
16. Yemeni (people) are greater than to be insulted by one of **the Yemeni people**. The vast majority of the Yemeni people
17. one of the Yemeni people. The vast majority of **the Yemeni people** still support the brother president. Brother,
18. support the brother president. Brother Waseem speaks on behalf of **the people** and at the same time insults them by saying that they are hired
19. the brother president. Brother Waseem speaks on behalf of the people and insults **the people** of being hired and that they go out because they are paid.
20. that they are hired and that they go out because they are paid. How can he speak on behalf of **the people**, go away! Go away! The people want you to

Table 44 Collocations of 'people of Yemen' by the government

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
and he insults	2
they fought	2
he accepts it	1
it means	1
ask/consult	1
he wants you	1
and he specifies	1
and we respect	1
and across	1
and we remained	1
(part of word)	1
and they wanted	1
suffering	1
for the country	1
abilities	1
it suffered	1
resistance	1
it will make them reach	1
they will hold	1
made	1

The table above shows that the government accords a passivated role to the people of Yemen. They also suggest that the people are being used by different factions for various purposes, using language like 'speaks on behalf of the people', 'bet on the Yemeni people', and 'they speak on behalf of the people'. Additionally, people are given a patriotic role showing them as supporting and being with the regime, such as with the phrases like 'the Yemeni people are not a million', 'speaks on behalf of the people', 'bet on the Yemeni people', and 'they speak on behalf of the people'. The government uses words to suggest that it represents and supports the people, such as 'how can he speak on behalf of the people, go away! Go away! The people want you to'. The most frequent collocations 'and he insults' and 'they fought' indicate that the government uses the populace in fighting and creating doubt about the protesters.

Overall, both political groups used the people as a broad synonym to Yemen, although this was low among the protesters (.36%), but very high with the government (1.57%). This indicates that the government has a greater intention to use the people of Yemen for the pursuit of its intended aims related to the revolution. These uses include showing the media that the people support the government and are therefore against the revolution, perhaps increase local or international support for the government, or diverting it away from the protests.

5.2.6   *We*

Among the top keywords of the government and protesters was 'we'. Analysis of its use gives a better understanding of the concept of 'us' and 'them' as an ideological linguistic notion. Data show that the government used 'we' in reference to the Yemeni government or the regime, when responding to the claims of the protesters, when defending its case, and when attempting to convince the world of its case. Tables 45 and 46 provide the computer analysis of 'we' by the government.

Table 45 Concordances of 'we' by the government (68 hits: 0.89%)

Concordances
1. democracy for journalists in Yemen. Dear brother, **we** don't need an testimony from a channel
2. the people of Yemen, from east to west. **We** don't deny that there is a revolution, but
3. to the brother president and the constitutional legitimacy. **We** are with the peaceful transition of power, with transferring
4. 25 million Yemenis who support the brother president. **We** don't overlook the other party. There are some
5. who killed them. Yasir al Yamani: Dear brother, **we** are in Yemen, you should know very well
6. the country, listen to me. Yasir al Yamani: **We** don't kill them, we have still been protecting the protestors for 8 month
7. listen to me. We don't kill them, **we** have been protecting the protestors for 8 to 9 months
8. bloods of those innocent, deceived youth. **We** are with the youth and change, but
9. but who will benefit from this bloodshed? **We**, in power, are not benefiting. Who benefits?
10. to power through these innocent bloods. **We** are with the youths and the change. The brother president
11. upon implementing the Initiative. Yasir al Yamani: **We**… don't interrupt me, brother Waseem. I
12. brother Waseem. I didn't interrupt you. **We** don't need, despite our confidence in the voting
13. the voting that was in our favour and the regime's as well. **We** don't need… Yasir al Yamani: one moment,
14. He is the one who votes. Let me tell you, **we** want voting through the hands of the Yemeni people
15. and not through Al Jazeera channel. Yasir al Yamani: **We** want to go to the polling, we are ready
16. Yasir Al Yamani: **We** want to hold a ballot; we are ready to hand the Supreme Committee
17. a homeland which you want to divide. Yasir al Yamani: **We** don't beg. You know better who begs
18. what they suffer, but they are great people. **We** are proud of Yemen and we are proud of being Yemenis.
19. We are proud of Yemen and **we** are proud of being Yemenis.
20. to the elections, as the brother president called for. **We** are ready to join …from the first

Table 46 Collocations of 'we' by the government

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
we say	6
we want	5
we are not	4
Yemenis	1
he manipulates[22]	1
clear	1
we kill them	1
we are proud of	1
we see	1
we realise	1
for the boxes	1
two minutes	1
it leads us	1
with our will	1
the battles	1
exploiters	1
the neighbours	1
Al Anfi (name)	1
its farthest	1
we acknowledge	1

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[22] هو يراوغ

Table 45 demonstrates that the government's concordances with 'we', referring to the Yemeni government or regime, exhibit the use of action verbs, but at a lower frequency than the protesters. The government states that it is not against the demands of young people in Yemen, in an attempt to provide a response to the claims of the protesters. It also focuses on giving justifications for retaining power. The action verb 'we say' collocates most with 'we', differentiating the government (us) from the protesters (them), while showing confidence in what they think or declare. The second top collocation is 'we want', which seems to be enable convincing arguments to be proposed to the world about the importance of the officials continuing to hold power in Yemen.

The protesters used 'we' differently, instead applying it in reference to the parties to which they belong. They used the present verb tense to present the demands of the revolution and the past verb tense to discuss their fulfilled actions. Tables 47 and 48 show the computer analysis of 'we' by the protesters.

Table 47 Concordances of we by the protesters (124 hits: 0.41%)

Concordances
1.   can't he prove… thus, **we** are in front of the one who will guarantee the revolution for Yemen
2.   to enable for an active society in Yemen. So **we**… Ali Abdullah's departure is not enough
3.   repeatedly defending this regime. Thus, **we** are in front of a dictatorial regime that must be
4.   Jamal al Maliki: I will tell you why **we** are scared; first, we are frightened of the remnants
5.   about it while it was officially approved by the ministry, so **we** live in a country that has been run by a gang inside
6.   a gang inside the Republican Palace. **We** fear this gang that still
7.   Should be ended and disappear forever. **We**'ll keep searching… It is true that there is a price. The price
8.   for the critical historical period in which **we** live. Those (people) are the only guarantee
9.   basis. This is all what we understand, so **we** want the coming government to face
10. The Gulf Initiative. What kind of security are **we** talking about? We have to worry because we sacrificed
11. now it has free and noble (people). Now, **we** demand a family to be specific
12. Waseem al Qarash: In what way can **we** recruit … We don't have money to spend on recruiting (fighters)
13. them. This happens every time. **We** take to the streets peacefully for every rally and we will always be
14. the losers run the country. That is why **we** took to the streets. We… when… now
15. the country. That is why we took to the streets. **We**… when… Now what are our demands?

16. when… now what are our demands? **We** demand the departure of a regime that has been arguing, and
17. Abdullah Saleh... Waseem al Qarashi: **We**, as youth, went out to the public squares and we wanted
18. the country. One of our demands is prosecuting… **we** demand prosecuting Ali Abdullah Saleh
19. prosecution, with no exceptions. **We** demanded prosecution with no exceptions
20. about their project. And what is their project? **We** talk about youth… Waseem al Qarash

Table 48 Collocations of 'we' by the protesters

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
we demand	3
we search	2
and completed	1
and we were committed	1
and we announced it	1
we strive	1
we call	1
we pass	1
we appreciate	1
we fight	1
we take control of	1
we free	1
we are afraid	1
we greet	1
we try	1
we recruit (people)	1
we communicate	1
together	1
continuing	1
used to	1

Based on Table 47, 'we' concordances used by the protesters indicate an active agent role to the speaker, with the majority of instances of 'we' being followed by an active verb, like 'fear', 'keep search', 'want', 'took to the streets', 'demand', 'demanded', and 'talk'. Use of these active verbs in the past denotes an action achieved by the speaker, while those in the present refer to the continuous, ongoing demands of the revolution. In all cases, although 'we' is used by a single speaker, it refers to the group or party to which that speaker belongs. As with the concordances, collocations present an active agent role of the protesters, using the pronoun 'we' with action verbs. Most frequent verbs in this context are 'we demand' and 'we search', both of which are in the present tense to display the requests of the revolution.

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To conclude, both the government and protesters employed 'we' as a linguistic vehicle with the aim of achieving their intended ideological purposes. When using 'we', the government responded to the protesters, defended its case, and sought to convince the world regarding its case and intentions. In contrast, the protesters used 'we' to list the demands of their revolution and to refer to completed past actions of their movement.

5.2.7   *I*

As in the use of 'we', 'I' was employed by the government and protesters to achieve their ideological aims. The most interesting finding in this analysis is that while the government used 'I' as a conversation strategy, the protesters used it to justify the revolution and even to show control. In tables 49 and 50, the computer analysis of 'I' by the government is provided.

Table 49 Concordances of 'I' by the government (42 hits: 0.55%)

Concordances
1.   the opposition is suitable for replacing the regime. **I** tell you, not only me, but also all
2.   replacing the regime**. I** tell you, not only me, but also all the people of Yemen. The brother president
3.   don't want any good for Yemen. Yasiral Yamani: **I** am not talking about brother Waseem. Yasir
4.   : We… don't interrupt me, brother Waseem. **I** didn't interrupt you. We don't need, despite
5.   : Al Jazeera, if it was in another regime, **I** am sure that Ahmed al Shalby would provide a daily coverage.
6.   international media are there. Yasir al Yamani: **I** am proud to be from this regime
7.   they protect you. Yasir al Yamani: Brother Faisal, **I** don't allow you, with respect to (Al Jazeera) changed
8.   (they) get their monthly salaries while they are demonstrating. But **I** feel sorry that brother Waseem talks
9.   the south. Yasir al Yamani: No, please let me finish, **I** haven't finished my turn to talk. Yasir al Yamani: You
10.   Abdullah Saleh did not extend a hand to…, **I** challenge you to bring one document that
11.   they will continue to support the brother president. Yasir al Yamani: **I** gave you an example, brother Faisal, I
12.   : I gave you an example, brother Faisal, **I** told you, if the international community respects
13.   there is no objection. These are symbolic leaders. **I** didn't interrupt you, listen. They are symbolic units
14.   not as he depicts it. Yasir al Yamani: **I** will give you an example, did you see at the level
15.   Yemen. When will things be fixed up inYemen? Yasir al Yamani: **I** hope, as you criticise the brother president, that
16.   Dear (sister), stop putting words in my mouth. **I** said these members, these leaders and these
17.   Abdullah Saleh as an ousted president. **I** think sister Tawakul knows
18.   traditionally speaking it is known for whom, but **I** insist that the president doesn't manipulate,
19.   reaching through the Yemeni people. Yasir al Yamani: First, **I** thank you, sister Fairouz, for exposing
20.   finish Ms. Fairouz. Yasir al Yamani: Yes, **I** tell you, after that, … was formed

Table 50 Collocations of 'I' by the government

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
I say	7
I would like	3
one	3
I said	2
I wish	2
ousted	1
sure of	1
for the regime	1
I was	1
escaped narrowly	1
I wonder	1
I own	1
I said	1
I am proud of	1
I give you	1
I gave you	1
I am sorry	1
I challenge you	1
I am sorry	1
dirty	1

In Arabic, 'I' is used as a subject pronoun for a singular speaker of either gender. Based on the above concordances, the use of 'I' by the one government speaker refers to himself only and is employed for a range of purposes, including: interruption, as in 'I am not talking about brother Waseem'; holding the floor 'please let me finish, I haven't finished my turn to talk'; attacking the other speaker, as in 'I don't allow you'; illustrating, as in 'I gave you an example'; and stating wishes, as can be seen in 'I hope'. Collocations indicate the government use of 'I say' with 'I' in order to control the level of information that they reveal. Among the top collocations are 'one', which indicates that the government distinguishes itself as unique.

Having seen the government usage of this word, tables 51 and 52 present the concordances and collocations of 'I' by the protesters.

Table 51 Concordances of 'I' by protesters (164 hits: 0.54%)

Concordances
1. a dictatorial regime that must be restrained. **I** am not… Jamal al Maliki: About
2. the revolution. It is not a personal issue. **I** want to say that
3. the show and from (appearing on TV with) that brother. **I** want to say that the issue
4. there (isn't) a real guarantee for his departure. **I** am talking about a real guarantee until
5. to solve Yemen's dilemma, even if **I** am totally not against the Gulf Initiative
6. was once against … **I** can't accept the idea that
7. dear brother, do you know… **I** will give you an example of why we want
8. (I don't) say that the snake's head has gone, **I** simply say that (the rebel's) staying
9. departure of all… Jamal al Maliki: First, **I** am convinced that no force can
10. Ali Abdullah Saleh does... **I** don't want to say only
11. Dear brother… Jamal al Maliki: **I** speak in this bitterness because
12. Yemen into, I will tell you some statistics, **I** don't know in what way
13. positive from your speech, that you said **I** acknowledge the revolution, and I thank you
14. Al Qarashi: What youth? Waeem al Qarashi: **I** know to what it refers to, day 18
15. electoral (process) because everyone knows. First, **I** want to point to
16. now, the world, brother Yasir… In fact, **I** feel sorry for your situation because you are defending
17. defend a regime like this (one). Honestly, **I** feel sorry for … and certainly this is
18. Al Qarashi: He is a thief. Waseem al Qarashi: **I** say, brother Yasir might be disturbed
19. now only some of the mercenaries are around him. **I** want also to clarify a point
20. also to clarify a point here. When I speak about who are around him, **I**

Table 52 Collocations of 'I' by the protesters

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
is restrained	1
is destroyed	1
is committed	1
I am amazed	1
spokesperson	1
believer	1
by itself	1
I said it	1
my heart	1
therefore	1
Franc	1
I will speak	1
boring	1
let me	1
I was created	1
I spoke	1
excuse me	1
with a result	1
I say	1
bas (part of the name Abbas)	1

The above tables demonstrate that the protesters use 'I' to refer to the speaker only and is accompanied by action verbs such as 'I want to say',' I am talking', and 'I speak in this bitterness', which provide strong justifications to the revolution and serious responses to the government statements. 'I' is also employed to show control of what is being said. The frequency of collocations is equal throughout, with a mix of action verbs and adjectives. These verbs serve roles such as helping the speaker to hold the floor, like 'I will speak' and 'let me'.

Overall, the government and protesters employed 'I' among their first 30 keywords, and both groups used the pronoun to refer to the individual speaker only. However, while 'I' was used as a conversation strategy by the government, helping them to interrupt or hold the floor, the protesters used this reference for ideological purposes, such as justifying the revolution and expressing power.

5.2.8   *Power*

Among the 30 top keywords, two notions were exclusive to the government: power and south. Power was used by the government as a synonym to the regime and to designate that authority should be exclusive to the government. Tables 53 and 54 present the software analysis of 'power' as used by the government.

Table 53 Concordances of 'power' by the government (46 hits: 0.60%)

Concordances
1.   with the peaceful transmission of the **power**, with peaceful transfer of power, within the limits of the constitution, within the limits
2.   on behalf of the people of Yemen, and they wanted to reach **power**, why don't they reach through
3.   reach power, why don't they reach **power** through elections, as long as they
4.   benefit from these bloods? We, in **power**, are not benefiting, who benefits? who benefits from
5.   the parties that seek reaching **power** through these innocent bloods. We are with
6.   dear..., unfortunately, the brothers want to reach **power** through chaos, through bloods, through sabotage
7.   Ali Abdullah Saleh will not hand over the **power** except to safe hands through the people
8.   The president will not cling to **power**, and doesn't want power, but he has to hand it over
9.   anyone, if they want to reach **power** as brother Waseem say that they have to
10.   cannot and cannot hand over **power** to the killers, the criminals and the gangs. Yasir
11.   these parties. The brother president will not hand over **power** to those gangs. There are national leaders

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12. The brother president talks about the people, and he will hand over **power** to safe hands. He will not hand over power
13. power to safe hands. He will not hand over **power** to the extremists who attacked camps
14. the provinces, they killed the Yemeni people. How does he hand over **power** to them? Ali Abdullah Saleh reached
15. Ali Abdullah Saleh reached **power** through the hands of the Yemeni people. He did not reach
16. manoeuvre. We can't hand over **power** to the innocent killing gangs. Yasir
17. Before that, the president wants to transfer **power** within the limits of the constitution, within the legitimacy
18. They speak on behalf of the Yemeni people. How does the brother president hand over **power**? There are elections, Is
19. sensible that the brother president abandons **power** and hand over these gangs the control of
20. dialogue to reach a joint agreement for transferring **power** through the hands of the Yemeni people, not through a military coup

Table 54 Collocations of power by government

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
behind	2
peacefully	2
he handed over	2
they reach	1
he transfers	1
he hands over to them	1
and he hands over	1
and it is not	1
and they stayed	1
and he will hand over	1
and the opposition	1
and he/it became	1
he transferred	1
in order to reach	1
for transferring	1
for the killers	1
for gangs[23]	1
for these	1
let them come	1
with his will	1

As noted above, according to table 53, the government used 'power' to denote the regime. 'Power' is given a passive role: object, 'reach power' and 'We can't hand over power'; genitive, including 'hand over the power' and 'for transferring power'; and prepositional phrases, like 'reach power', 'in power', and 'abandons power'. Additionally, in the case of 'how does he hand over power to them?', 'power' was employed as a beneficiary. The passive role given to power

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[23] للبلطجية

suggests that it was used as a tool. Furthermore, in not passing power to those who killed Yemenis, the government supported Saleh without clearly stating that the protesters were the killers. Collocations indicate that the government used 'power' as a destination that should not be reached by its opponents. Its belief in its sole eligibility in maintaining power is evident with the use of 'peacefully', 'for the killers', and 'for gangs'. Among the collocations are verbs that denote transfer of 'power' like 'they reach', 'he transfers', 'and he handed over', 'and it is not', 'and they stayed', 'and he will hand over', and 'he hands over to them',

To summarize, compared to the total words spoken, the government made most references to power. It used power as a synonym for the regime and showed that it considered to be its ultimate exclusive right.

5.2.9 *South*[24]

'South' is the second high frequency notion that was exclusive to the government. The most significant finding here is that the government presented the south as victims, as well as expressing solidarity and the need for care to be shown to the south. The concordances and collocations of the use of the South by the government are shown in tables 55 and 56.

Table 55 Concordances of South by government (32 hits: 0.42 %)

Concordances
1. Don't interrupt me. Brother Waseem talked about **South** Yemen. He knows who transformed South Yemen and the people
2. about the south. He knows who transformed **South** Yemen and the people of the south, into an advantage and booty in
3. He knows who transformed the south, and the people of **South** Yemen into an advantage and booty in the provinces
4. southern …He knows who killed the people of **South** Yemen in 1993 in the socialist … leaders
5. Yemeni… for reform. He knows who looted the **South** and he knows who looted Ali's house
6. These extremist members looted the south and transformed the **south** and the people of the South Yemen
7. extremist (members) looted the South and transformed the **south** and the people of the South into war booty, and he
8. who looted **South** Yemen and transformed the south and the people of the South into war booty, and he

جنوب اليمن [24]

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knows who
9. and he knows who issued fatwa allowing shedding the bloods of the people of the **south**. Do you deny who are
10. knows who issued fatwa allowing shedding the blood of the people of **South** Yemen. Do you deny who are
11. who issued fatwa allowing shedding the bloods of the people of the **south**, the Yemeni Congregation for reform in 1994
12. this talk, and you know that. They looted the **south**, they transformed the south… Yasir Al Yamani: No,
13. and you know that. They looted the south, they transformed the **south**… Yasir Al Yamani: No, excuse me, I
14. Yasir Al Yamani: You know how they looted **South** Yemen. You know who started the war in
15. today, you know how they transformed **South** Yemen's people into small groups and fighting factions.
16. into small fighting factions. They looted **South** Yemen. They looted the sea, no one escaped them.
17. to go back to Al Zandani and Humaid Al Ahmer, the people of the **south** are literate, they (will not accept) that Al Zandani rules them
18. They will not accept that these … rule them. The people of **South** Yemen rejected you completely when you formed
19. the land, the honour, the blood and everything in the **south**. They were supposed to reach them as partners
20. all the country leaders of the people of the **south**. Why this blood? Is this blood

Table 56 Collocations of South by the government

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
and it transferred	15
literate	4
looting[25]	3
and relatives	2
and people	2
entirely	2
they were oppressed	2
they suffered	1
martyrs	1
they transferred	1
they violated	1
looted	1
they rejected you	1
they looted	1
people	1
they come	1
upon them	1
about	1
and you	1
moment	1

As with 'power', the government used 'the south' to persuade the audience that the southern region would be better under Saleh's regime and that it had suffered in the past when factions attempted to separate it from the official regime. As they did with 'the people of Yemen', the

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[25] سرقة

government uses 'south' to indicate solidarity and concern for the Yemenis geographically situated in the South of Yemen. Furthermore, the concordances coincide with the collocations, as the top frequencies with respect to the government view of the south are 'and it transferred', 'and relatives', 'they transferred', 'they looted', and 'looted', in reference to the hardships that the south historically experienced when external parties tried to separate it from the other regions.

Overall, the south was used with high frequency by the government, as a way to show solidarity and persuade an area of the country to side against the revolution.

5.2.10 *Regime*

The two keywords that were exclusive to the protesters were 'regime' and 'initiative', the first of which was used to refer to Saleh and his family. The overall context in which the regime was used by the protesters was negative, as the protesters demanded the resignation of the official rulers. Tables 57 and 58 present the computer analysis of the 'regime' by the protesters.

Table 57 Concordances of regime by the protesters (163 hits: 0.53%)

Concordances
1. against the **regime**. Jamal Al Maliki: Who first
2. Yemeni to poverty is this **regime** during 33 years. Do you know, brother
3. that 15 figures of this **regime**, according to an official report are
4. know, brother Faisal, that this **regime** led the Yemeni people to
5. Saleh without the **regime**'s leaving… a part of it staying, it will not stay…
6. he continued defending this **regime** repeatedly, so we are talking about a regime
7. remaining in this **regime**. Jamal Al Maliki: First, who
8. afraid first of the remnants of this **regime**, until this moment there is not
9. all of it to Saudi Arabia. Why did the **regime** (officials) stay? It stayed because of who runs Yemen
10. Al Maliki: I will tell you who is the **regime**? Jamal Al Maliki: First, let
11. all (those) years he has been defending this **regime**, and who was paid to defend
12. was paid to defend this **regime**, and everything is recorded, and the brother defends
13. recorded, and the brother defends this **regime** day after day. Then he comes
14. for it. He made the world laugh at us. This **regime** abused the national sovereignty. How many
15. September 26. So, I will answer him. What is nature of the **regime**? The regime consists of a family
16. So, I will answer him. What is nature of the regime? The **regime** consists of Saleh's family and
17. Jamal Al Maliki: The remnants of this **regime**. Jamal Al Maliki: They still
18. that exploded on the hands of this **regime**, because we saw the blood that
19. more civilized than this **regime** that misrepresented it. Dear brother
20. misrepresent it. Dear brother, this **regime** misrepresented Yemen as...

Table 58 Collocations of 'regime' by the protesters

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
remnants[26]	12
for overthrowing[27]	5
and overthrowing	2
it falls	2
and as if	2
they defeat	1
it shakes	1
he plots	1
it triggers	1
it enjoys	1
it collapses[28]	1
he understands	1
they follow	1
and he falls	1
and he stays	1
and in favour of	1
he signed it	1
and its comprehensiveness	1
and his partners brutality	1

Table 57 shows that the overall context in which 'regime' was used by the protesters was negative. For example, the regime has caused financial hardships, as in 'Yemeni to poverty is this regime', and made Yemen an internationally dependent state, as in 'this regime abused the national sovereignty'. The government views the regime as Saleh and his family, with many of the high ranking posts in Yemen being occupied by the relatives of the president. The most frequent words that collocate with regime are 'remnants' (12 times) and 'for overthrowing' (5 times), implying that the regime is perceived as being more than just Saleh and that the protesters demand the resignation of his entire circle in the government.

Overall, the regime was commonly used by the protesters to refer to Saleh and his family, with a negative connotation that implied the need for their removal.

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[26] بقايا

[27] للإطاحة

[28] ينهار

5.2.11 *Initiative*[29]

The notion of 'initiative' (the Gulf Initiative to help find a solution in Yemen) is among the first 30 frequent keywords that the protesters used. In support of the findings of the critical discourse analysis, the corpus analysis shows that the protesters were uncertain about the initiative and especially about its feasibility in fulfilling their revolutionary intentions. Tables 59 and 60 outline the concordances and collocations of 'initiative' by the protesters.

Table 59 Concordances of 'initiative (GI)' by the protesters (118 hits: 0.39%)

Concordances
1. until it happens. Jamal Al Maliki: The **GI**, brother, is a part
2. I am not totally against the **GI** or against what happened
3. say that the only solution is the **GI**. The people
4. the street, without them, **the initiative** would not have been signed, and the world would not have cared about us
5. their… except for … remaining. Jamal al Maliki: The **GI** and its all merits
6. the street if we agreed that the **GI** is the solution,
7. Jamal Al Maliki: Dear brother, the **GI** is not… we don't
8. (Do you) know how many (people) have died after signing the **GI** until today?
9. the army's bullets. Jamal Al Maliki: After **the initiative** and after signing the initiative
10. Al Maliki: After the initiative and after signing **the initiative**, so what security
11. what I avoid to say is that the **GI** is the only solution
12. but with the GI or without the **GI**, and that it takes away all
13. Al Qurashi: Before we reach **the initiative**, he talks… Waseem Al Qurashi
14. about the General People's Congress. The **GI** transfers power
15. when he killed the youth. Waseem Al Qurashi: **The initiative** was supposed to transfer power
16. Taiz after he signed the **GI**. It was supposed
17. Secondly, he wants to retreat from signing the **GI** because he
18. Of guarantees. Ali al Sarari: **The initiative** is only granted from
19. And he did not state… he stated that **the initiative**… but he didn't state that
20. the situation. When we accepted **this initiative**, we accepted it because we saw

Table 60 Collocations of 'initiative' by the protesters

Collocations	
Word	Frequency
it applies	1
it withdraws	1
it allows	1
and he deals with	1
and he tries	1
and he abandons	1
and we refuse	1
and its stance	1

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[29] المبادؤة الخليجية

and it granted him	1
and when	1
and for signing	1
he signed	1
and before it	1
and it fell	1
and invitation	1
and the initiative	1
and commitment	1
and the procedure	1
we agreed	1
and his readiness	1

According to the concordances in table 59, the protesters seem to express doubt about 'the initiative' in terms of concept and procedure, using language like 'what I avoid to say is that the GI is the only solution' and '(do you) know how many (people) died after signing the GI until today?'. A number of words to denote uncertainty are associated with 'the initiative', like 'the initiative was supposed' and 'it was supposed'.

Overall, the initiative was among the top first 30 words of the computer analysis of the protesters' discourse. Corpus analysis demonstrates that the protesters did not trust the initiative and were uncertain about whether it would be able to fulfil their aims.

5.3 Discussion

The computer-assisted corpus analysis was conducted in order to triangulate the coding of the critical discourse analysis. AntConc version 3.2.4w (corpus analysis software) was utilised in order to count the word lists of the entire corpus, which had been divided into three groups: AJ, the government, and the protesters. The top 30 keywords were then selected from the word lists for each of these groups. Some keywords were found to be shared, by two or all three of the groups, while others are specific to single groups. With the use of AntCont, the first 20 concordances and first 20 collocations with frequencies were specified for each content word.

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The notions that emerged are Saleh, Yemen, president, revolution, people of Yemen, we, I, power, South, regime, and initiative, matching the notion identified in the CDA.

The most significant finding from this analysis is that AJ seems to have excluded the government from full participation in the debates, as fewer government representatives took part and only had the opportunity to speak 7659 words, compared to the 30512 words spoken by the protesters. The government speakers showed solidarity with Saleh, addressing him as brother, defending him, showing that they value Saleh's family, and collocating him with future certainty, such as 'will remain' and 'will stay'. In contrast to the government position, AJ and protesters referred to Saleh in negative connotations. For instance, AJ gave Saleh passive roles, like 'avoidance' and 'breaking covenant', while the protesters accused Saleh of causing Yemen's unsatisfactory condition. The protesters also challenged Saleh by saying 'Saleh is weaker than to start a war' and declining to address him as the president. Among the protesters, Saleh was used to denote his family and circle, all of whom were targeted for resignation.

Compared to that of AJ and protesters, the percentage of the concordance hits of 'Yemen' by the government is highest, meaning that the official speakers used this word most. In this way, the government attempted to give Yemen a patriotic image, showing how the country supported its president and arguing that Yemen's good future are owed to national unity and Saleh's endurance in power. While the government assigned a patriotic role to the 'people' that support the regime, the protesters used language that also suggested that they represented the 'people', arguing as if all Yemenis oppose Saleh. Additionally, the government represented people as being victims who are being misused, although the parties misusing them were not specified, which correlates with the critical discourse analysis. Instead, victimisation tactics were ascribed to generalized actors, like 'thugs', and anonymous actors, like 'some members'. The protesters

also portrayed the populace as victims, as in 'the people tolerates', associating them with noble sacrifice through language like 'the Yemeni people have provided'.

Both AJ and protesters depict the 'revolution' with activated and passivated roles. The connotation that AJ uses for the revolution is neutral, enabling effective debate moderation, the protesters employ a positive connotation which explicitly supports the revolution. The top word that collocates with revolution is the same with AJ and protesters, which is 'youth'.

Although AJ and government share the content word 'the president', these two groups use this reference in markedly different ways. While the government refers to President Saleh with respect, solidarity and support, AJ derogates him from power with language like 'exchange' and 'placing another president'. To support this further, AJ's percentage of concordance hits for president is three times less than the level of usage by the government.

It is valuable to point out here that similar to the CDA analysis, the differentiation of 'us' and 'them' is evident with the corpus analysis into the sociolinguistic functions shared by the political parties (namely, the government and the protesters). The government uses the reference 'we' to describe the ruling regime, while protester speakers used it to refer to either themselves or to their parties. The pronoun 'I' was used by the government and protesters for a range of debating functions, like interruption, holding floor, stating wishes, and expression of censorship.

'Power' is the ultimate goal of the government, which it will not pass to the protesters. In order to convince its audience that Yemen's future is best with Saleh, the government speakers used the 'south' to create a feeling of solidarity between this region and the entirety of Yemen, as well as with Saleh's regime. The use that the protesters made of 'regime' associates the ruling body with negative connotation implies that the regime is the cause of poverty of Yemen and its

dependence on foreign nations. The word regime refers to Saleh and, his circle and family. Top collocations of the regime are 'remnants' and 'for overthrowing' denoting that the aim of the revolution is to overthrow the president and the entire circle associated with him. The final notion pertains to the 'Gulf Initiative' and specifically the uncertainty of the protesters about its efficacy, with the concordances showing that their speakers are sometimes totally against the initiative and sometimes showing partial support.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter sought to achieve the aim of triangulating the results of the critical discourse analysis. Computer assisted corpus analysis, AntConc version 3.2.4w was utilised as the triangulation method. In order for this to be done, the corpus analysis terms were listed and a brief introduction was provided of the computer software for analysis. Once this was done, the background of the corpus was provided, followed by the detailed results of the statistical analysis, including the concordances and collocations of the keywords, which are the notions that emerged from the corpus analysis. The Arabic corpus of AJ was used in the analysis, which was translation into English in order to present it in this research.

The main result of this chapter was that the corpus analysis supported the results obtained from the CDA, supporting the hypothesis that AJ had partially excluded the government from its debates and thereby supported the ideologies of the protesters.

The following chapter provides the analysis of the interviews that were conducted with AJ staff, which offer rich data to better understand the context of the debates and the ideological stance of Al Jazeera and its staff. These data are presented for the purpose of comparison with the varied analysis conducted of the debates.

Chapter 6: Interviews with Al Jazeera staff

6.1 Introduction

The main aim of the interviews which were conducted with AJ staff was to compare their perceptions and that of the channel itself with the CDA analysis which had been conducted of the debates, gaining a better insig ht into the data provided. In this chapter, a brief analysis of the interviews is provided. This begins with a background of the interviewees, after which the answers provided by AJ staff is presented in seven themes that emerged from their responses: the experience of the interviewees themselves, AJ policies, debate preparation, debate guest speakers, debate moderator, the discourse of AJ, and the debate transcription process. Each of these themes also involves sub-themes, the most important findings for each of which are highlighted and supported by excerpts from the interviews.

6.2 Interviews

In order to gather information on the ideologies of AJ channel and for the sake of comparison with the results of the textual analysis of the debates, a total of six interviews were conducted with AJ staff: four of the interviewees (two male and two female) were moderators of debate programmes, one was the head of the Output and one was the director of Al Jazeera net online. The first interview took place in Oman and the rest were held at the AJ network, in the Arabic News Room, in Qatar. All discussions were conducted face-to-face, except for the director of Al Jazeera net who was only available to be interviewed by phone due to his excessively busy work schedule. The ethnographic information of the interviewees can be seen in the following table (61).

Table 61 Ethnographic information of interviewees

Interviewee designation(interview chronological order)	Interviewee gender	Initial given for the purpose of this study	Interview means and location	Length of the Interview
Moderator	Female	M1	Face-to-face; Hotel, Muscat	33 minutes
Head of Output	Male	HO	Face-to-face; His office AJA newsroom	35 minutes
Director of AJ net	Male	DN	Phone; Senior producer's office AJA newsroom	5 minutes
Moderator	Male	M2	Face-to-face; Senior producer's office AJA newsroom	25 minutes
Moderator	Female	M3	Face-to-face; Senior producer's office	30 minutes

			AJA newsroom	
Moderator	Male	M4	Meeting room; AJA newsroom	29 minutes

The interviews were semi-structured, enabling the researcher to drive the discussion forward in response to the answers given by the participants. The results are presented thematically, according to the principal themes that emerged from the analysis of the interviewee responses. The recordings were transcribed then answers were grouped and coded. Table 62 shows the major themes and their sub-themes.

Table 62 Themes for analysis from AJ staff interviews

Major themes for analysis	Sub-themes
Interviewees' experience	• Duration of experience at AJ • Experience before joining AJ • A critical incident encountered while working with AJ
AJ policies	• AJ policies of how debate programmes are generally conducted • AJ's neutrality • AJ as a proactive tool for the Arab nation • AJ's decreased popularity in the Arab world • Influence of Qatar policies on AJ
Debate preparation	• The process of debate topic selection • Writing the debate questions

	• Preparation of the debate reports
Debate guest speakers	• Selection of guest speakers • Availability of all sides of the argument • Selection of real time versus virtual speakers • Guest speakers' awareness of the questions before the programs
Debate moderators	• Control of debate moderation • Adherence to debate questions • Standing points to be won at debate
Discourse of AJ	• AJ's policies on the selection of certain vocabulary • Exaggeration of the revolution events by AJ • Use of 'thugs' and 'ousted president' by AJ • Use of nonstandard Arabic by AJ • Language used with and about women
AJ debate transcription	• Reasons for transcribing the debates • Who transcribes the debates • Discrepancies between the debates and transcription

6.2.1 *Interviewees experience*

AJ staff were asked about three subthemes related to their experience: the duration of their experience at AJ, their experience before joining AJ, and a critical incident they had witnessed or been involved in during their tenure at the news channel. All interviewees are senior AJ staff who joined the channel at its inception. Consequently, they had served other Arabic media

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networks before joining AJ. M1 joined AJ with the first batch in 1997, five months after AJ was launched. Before that, she worked in the Arabic department on Swiss radio, as well as on Algerian television and radio. HO joined AJ in 2001, before which time he had worked as a journalist at a Jordanian newspaper. M2 joined AJ in January 2001, after leaving Algerian TV and radio. M3 joined AJ in 2000, but had also worked on Algerian TV prior to moving to AJ. M4 joined AJ three months after it was launched, but before that time he had worked for BBC Arabic and had been a journalist for several TVs and radio stations in Tunisia. This demonstrates that all the interviewees have extensive experience in journalism and with AJ in particular, with M1 and M4 having 19 years of experience at the channel and HO, M2 and M3 all having 15 years.

The interviewees M1, M2 and HO were then asked about a critical incident that they had encountered during their time with AJ. Through learning of the incidents, AJ's ideologies could be elicited. Both M1 and HO gave answers that were related to human feelings while the feedback elicited from M2 related to the practice of Arab versus Western channels. M1 stated that during the coverage of the Israeli war on Gaza 2009-2008, she had started to cry live on air and that her voice was hoarse after listening to a Gaza woman screaming for help from her house as it was being bombed. M1 explained that journalists are forbidden from crying on air, according to the AJ Code of Ethics, in order to avoid influencing the audience with their emotional state, indicating that the channel attempts to avoid influencing the ideologies of its viewers.

As with M1, HO's response was related to the human emotions carried by journalists. He cited two incidents, the first of which occurred when he was the news director for one night and Mohammed al Qadhafi (son of Libya's previous president) was talking to AJ over the phone. Suddenly, Mohammed's house was shot severely to the extent that the call was lost. HO said that

he became very nervous that the phone call could have murdered Mohammed al Qadhafi's family. However, Mohammed al Qadhafi answered the call from AJ half an hour later and reassured them that nobody had been hurt. The second incident took place when AJ's journalist Tariq Ayoub was killed in 2003; HO was the one who wrote the news about his colleague's death. The first incident stated by HO indicated the widespread of AJ and significant role AJ played in the region.

When asked the same question, M2 described a critical situation that occurred when moving from two different schools in media, from the Algerian TV to Al Jazeera. According to M2, the Algerian TV was similar to the French media which was not the case with AJ. This suggests that media giants follow different schools in media, which could influence the ideologies of these channels.

In conclusion, all interviewees are senior members of AJ so are familiar with the practices and policies of the channel. However, since the interviewees were selected by the channel, it seems possible that they have been selected for their loyalty to the channel and so would endeavour to present it in a positive light.

6.2.2   *AJ policies*
The policies of AJ which were elicited from the interviewees were on how debate programmes are generally conducted, AJ's neutrality, AJ as a proactive tool for the Arab nation, possibility of AJ's decreased popularity in the Arab world and influence of Qatar policies on AJ.

M1, M3 and HO were asked about the channel policies in terms of the procedures for the debate programmes. Although all interviewees gave the same responses that policies govern programme content and style, they gave different names for the documents controlling the editorial policies.

M1 stated that AJ is committed to neutrality linguistically, including with respect to facial expressions. A standard vocabulary and pronunciation guide is circulated by the news management on correct editorial style, giving information about the proper way to say such as China capital *Bekin* or *Beijing* and *Kofi Anan*. The Editorial Style guide also unifies vocabulary, indicating whether *revolution* should be used or *uprising*, or whether it should be *Houthis* or *Ansar Allah*. M1 added that every employee knows about the dictionary by internal email, and that linguistic editors and producers check and correct any linguistic, editorial, or political mistakes. Deviation from policy results in a verbal warning from by the news director, the news supervisor, or news producer.

According to HO, unlike other Arab news channels, AJ has systematic policies:

> *In the past five years, AJ has created a Professional Behaviour List in line with the common rules of the news sector. The list is improved every year whereby AJ adds international updates in news, technology and ethics while considering the special characteristics of AJ and the Arab audience.*

(HO)

The claim here is that AJ tries to balance common professional behaviour against educating the Arab audience. M3 referred to the AJ's quality document that all AJ staff must follow as the Professional Behaviour Guide.

With regards to investigating the neutrality of AJ, M1 was asked if she thinks that AJ is a neutral channel and HO was asked if he thinks that AJ focuses on its policies in its training programmes. Interestingly, M1 argued that no news channel is truly neutral and, while AJ strives to remain neutral, there will always be a degree of deviation. She elaborated that the Arab world has never seen such a media revolution like the coverage that AJ provided of the Arab Spring, in terms of its density, synchronisation, and power. She added that the strategic and national interests, as well as the ties between countries and diplomatic crises, means that AJ cannot please everyone.

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For example, Al-Sisi the Egyptian President came to power as a result of a coup, however a large proportion of the Egyptians resent him being called *the president who came as a result of a coup*. Audiences have also taken sides on topics or individuals like Bashar, Sisi, the Arab Spring, and Islamists. HO said that AJ does not impose its policies on trainees, simply providing instruction on the general standards like neutrality, objectivity, and the professionalism. Nonetheless, AJ trainers might tell trainees about their experiences at AJ, which might influence their behaviour in some ways.

M2, M3, M4 and HO were questioned on their perceptions about the accusations of some critics that AJ played a provocative role in Arab nations, promoting ideas like the Muslim Brotherhoods, or freedom and dignity. All of the participants indirectly agreed, but elaborated using different vocabulary and examples. HO said that if the Arab Spring succeeded and established democracy, freedom and the rights it fought for, AJ would have been thanked. People loved AJ when it fought for these values, but the deterioration of the Arab Spring resulted in AJ being hated by some of the populace. He claimed that many who criticise AJ for this position actually switched their position from support of the Arab Spring, once it became clear that the movement had lost popular appeal. Therefore, he stated that AJ did not maximise nor minimise the revolutions, instead simply providing the news. He added that AJ interacted spiritually only with the Arab Spring.

M2 was linguistically clearer in his responses, stating that AJ had incited protesters:

> *We positively incited protest. We incited people to make their own decisions and to get rid of fear. People shouldn't be afraid and shouldn't be controlled.*
(M2)

He said AJ had contributed to helping Arab people to overcome their fear of their rulers, arguing that Arab people are not naive so they were not being controlled, only inspired. He argued that if

AJ was broadcast in Switzerland, with the intention of making the Swiss people revolt against their government, they would not have succeeded because Switzerland is a democratic society. Therefore, M2 said that AJ told people that they had the right to be heard and to establish democracy, but that it did not incite negatively.

However, M3 was linguistically conservative as she gave her agreement indirectly:

> *A tool for inciting Arab people to demonstrate, let us analyse this beautiful phrase you have just said.*

(M3)

M3 said there was no shame in demonstrating and that it should not be restricted to open societies, meaning that it would be great if AJ had incited a justified public outcry. M3 then stated that AJ had not incited anyone and that she was happy with the performance of the channel with respect to the Arab Spring. AJ helped the Arab people to slowly overcome their fears of criticizing their leaders and raised their awareness about the power of speaking freely about their opinions, as well as their ability to demand their rights.

M4 gave a balanced response to this question, stating that whether or not AJ incited protesters is dependent of the view of each person regarding the issue. He gave Islamists as an example of a minority in the Arab world whose voice is not being heard by the governments, and who AJ therefore gives a chance to speak and share their opinion. In response to this decision of inviting Islamists to speak, some might think that AJ is being biased, while others might think that the channel is overly concerned with events in the community. M4 supported this statement, thus:

> *One of AJ's slogans says that it strives to give 'a voice to the voiceless'.*

(M4)

This interviewee argued that AJ generally talks about the suppressed and oppositions in the Arab world, seeking to provide a platform for those who are normally unheard. It is significant to investigate whether these accusations were valid.

M4 was the only interviewee who described that the way that AJ covered the Arab revolutions as being extremely sympathetic and perhaps overly so:

> *AJ covered the Arab revolutions sympathetically. If we said that AJ covered these movements without sympathy then we are hiding reality. We covered the revolutions with a great deal of sympathy and sometimes even with exaggerated sympathy.*

(M4)

M2 and M4 were asked for their perceptions regarding AJ's decrease in popularity in the Arab world, in an attempt to elicit whether they believed that this could be attributed to the results of the Arab Spring. While M2 cared about how AJ was judged, but did not answer the question, M4 agreed that AJ was losing its credibility. M2 said it was still early to judge the Arab Spring's success or failure, and that more time is needed to test its success. M2 did not answer the part about AJ's decreasing popularity.

M4 agreed that AJ was losing credibility, although he argued that before the Arab revolutions, the situation was different and that a general agreement had between Arabs over issues like the Israeli occupation of Palestine and the American invasion of Iraq. While there were disagreements between political parties, they tended to be relatively weak and superficial. Even at the start of the Arab revolutions there had been general agreement on change and democracy. Although M4 thinks that blaming AJ is a shallow way of thinking, he generally agrees that the revolutions resulted in a deterioration of the political situation in the Arab world.

M2, M3 and M4 were questioned about the influence of Qatar policies and agendas in the practices of AJ. There were fluctuations in the answers given by the participants. M2 redirected the question, asking the researcher for her opinion on the same issue, adding that AJ does covers issues in Qatar but there is comparatively to report. Given that AJ is an international channel, it therefore covers the most important news across the entire Arab world. He also added that AJ

once invited the Qatari prime minister, who challenged the interviewer to find an event that was not being covered by the channel, stating that if the event was found then too many events were being covered by AJ at the same time.

The responses from M3 were that AJ was the recipient of numerous accusations and commendations, as all people are free to have an opinion. She therefore argued that it was a good thing that people could be free to criticise the channel for those policies that they did not like. On the subject of Qatari funding, M3 expressed amusement and pondered about how others could think that AJ served Qatar.

Interestingly, M4 replied that definitely AJ follows Qatar's policies and agenda. The news director and the channel's director refer to the Chairman of Board of Directors, who is a Qatari royal family member, in order to decide over issues related to the channel. M4 said that AJ neglects to cover issues regarding the Gulf countries, at least covering them with the same daring and braveness as it reports other issues. He added that there are two reasons for not covering issues about Qatar, the first is because there are no political parties, revolutions, demonstrations, or stories of interest to the mass media. The other reason is that,

> *There is no country in the world that funds a satellite TV channel with the huge amounts of money involved and simply turns it into a platform against itself.*
(M4)

In other words, M4 thinks that AJ is like other Arab media networks in not covering events of the countries that sponsor their operations.

In summary, AJ staff were asked about the AJ policies that are relevant to debates. The data show that there are written documents which specify the code of conduct and quality assurance of the programmes. The participants had a range of different views about AJ's neutrality,

however. In general, they believed that AJ holds human principles, such as democracy, which it wishes to add to the Arab nation and that it remains the preferred media network for Arab audiences. However, the interviewees do not generally seem to think that AJ incited protest in the Arab world. Only one moderator thought that since Qatar has an influence on AJ's practices and directions, arguing that this is a logical consequence of the funding that it receives from the Qatari government.

6.2.3 *Debate preparation*

Three sub-themes emerged from the questions and discussion of the procedure for the preparation of debate programmes: the process of the topic selection, writing the debate questions, and the preparation of the debate reports. M1, M2, M3 and HO were asked to provide a brief synopsis of the selection process for the debate topics. All of the participants agreed that the debate topics are selected in daily meetings by a group of staff, however there was disagreement regarding the parties who are involved. M1 and M3 agreed on producers, journalists and editors. M1 added news supervisor and M3 added the editing and news directors. HO said that questions are selected according to the importance of the topic, the ramifications or consequences of the topic, and what is judged to be important for the day.

M1, M2 and HO were questioned about who drafts the debate questions. The most notable finding here is that all participants agreed that the moderator drafts the questions, after discussing the topic with the team who decided on the actual debate topic. HO best elaborated the process by stating:

> *that when the topic is decided by the editing team, it is then given to the programme team, which includes the programme producer, the interview producer, the journalist who writes the report and the moderator. The programme team discusses the topic, and decides over the sub themes and the guest speakers. They then talk to the moderator*.

(HO)

So, AJ abides by a step by step process in the preparation of its debate programmes. Only M1 added that the news producer is also involved in preparation of the questions.

M3 and HO were questioned about who is in charge of preparing the AJ reports that are used to introduce the debates. Both of them reported that a journalist writes the debate report. M3 specified the journalist as being a part of the debate team, from the news room or the field (from AJ office outside Qatar).

In conclusion, a wealth of information was obtained from the interviewees about the debate preparation process at AJ, with broad agreement from interviewees that topics and sub-themes are set daily by a team, while the questions are formed by the moderator themselves. The questions are designed to be flexible enough to be modified by the moderators during the debate. Reports are prepared and read by AJ staff based on the debate theme and sub-themes.

6.2.4 *Debate guest speakers*

The interviewees were questioned on the guest speakers invited to the debates, in terms of their selection, the availability of all sides of the argument, the choice of real time versus virtual speakers, the degree to which guest speakers are aware of the questions before the programmes commence, the differences between real time and virtual speakers, and whether or not guest speakers know the questions prior to the debate. M1 and M4 were asked about who chooses the guest speakers and based on what criteria. Both interviewees agreed that guest speakers are chosen in accordance with the specific requirements of the debate. M1 explained that these requirements are decided by the debate producer, with the interview producer choosing guest speakers to meet the corresponding interview requirements. She added that the debate producer specifies the interview requirements in the debate-preparation meeting, stating the desired characteristics for the guest speakers, and the interview producer gives a list of the available

speakers from which the actual guests are chosen. She underlined the importance of balance in the debate, meaning that a guest speaker should be chosen from the government and a different guest speaker from the opposition:

> *There is often a balance in the selection of guest speakers. For example if, there is one from the government, we invite one from the opposition. In this way, we ensure a balance in the debate.*
(M1)

M1 added that a Contact List has been created in the system since AJ was launched. The list is an information bank of the guest speakers including names and phone numbers. New names are added to this list daily, whenever AJ staff make contacts or meet people at conferences, or even when speakers are observed on other channels. Interestingly, M4 noted that the absence of a guest speaker from a debate might be due to a number of factors, such as their refusal to participate, but would never be because AJ had chosen not to invite a particular person. He stressed that AJ tries to invite people with different opinions. This particular information by M4 contradicts with the textual analysis of the debates in this study, as the government speakers were absent from most of the debates. Only a small number of government representatives were invited, on multiple occasions, whereas a variety of speakers representing the revolution were invited.

M2, M3, M4 and HO were specifically asked on the availability of parties to represent the two different sides of topics in the debate programmes. All interviewees stressed the importance of being able to present a spectrum of opinions, in both debate programmes and in the news, with M4 adding that any oversight will be corrected in subsequent programmes. For example, if one opinion is presented in a debate without the opposing view, the other opinion will be presented in the next debate. M3 commented that when the guest representing the counter opinion is absent,

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the moderator often takes that side personally. Elaborating on this selection process, HO explained that the general rule for AJ is to approach guest speakers with different ideologies. On those occasions that they cannot reach a guest speaker from the opposite side like *Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Houthis or Bashar,* they bring a third party. On this subject, M2 noted AJ's slogan (the opinion and the other opinion[30]), claiming that all programmes should therefore provide at least two opinions, that all individuals should be given time to speak, and that AJ strives to ensure that all major opinions are present, such as by inviting guest speakers via satellite even when the signal quality is poor.

M3 said that AJ tries to have two or more different points of view in debate programmes and news broadcasts. These different views are represented by the guest speakers, or in the programme reports, and are evident in the questions:

> *So there is always care taken to present the two or more opinions, (if one opinion is not presented by a guest), it will at least be included in the report or in the discussion questions. If a guest speaker is not present, the moderator will try to ask questions from the absent guest speaker's point of view to challenge the present guest, in order to balance the debate.*

(M3)

M3 added that while AJ had been regularly blamed for only presenting one side of a debate, the presence of imbalance was the fault of guest speakers rather than the channel. She cited numerous excuses and tactics used by guest speakers, including turning off their mobile phones at the last minute or being in countries that no longer deal with the channel. Although the interviewees claimed that AJ strives to present all points of view, the textual analysis of this study indicates that AJ excluded the government from the majority of its debates as government speakers were not present in some debates and when present, almost the same speakers presented the government.

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[30] الرأي والرأي الآخر

When M1, HO and M3 were asked about the criteria for the selection of real time guests in comparison to those who participate virtually. They all agreed that the selection depends on guest availability. M1 elaborated that the selection of speakers is a technical and logistic issue:

> *While guest speakers who are in Doha come to AJ, it is difficult to invite those who are in places where armed or unarmed conflicts exist, such as in Syria. There are also countries where AJ does not have an AJ office, like Egypt. In these cases, AJ hosts the guest speakers via satellite, Skype or phone call.*

(M1)

The debates in this study witnessed some virtual speakers, such as the only female guest, Tawakul Karman who spoke virtually. It is assumed that she spoke virtually because she resided at a conflict zone, Yemen, and for cultural reasons that made travelling abroad difficult, as she is female.

M1, M2, M3 and HO were asked of whether or not speakers know about the questions prior to the debates. All interviewees agreed that the guest speakers are only informed of the main points of the debate and so they have no specific knowledge of the questions beforehand. M1 said that the guest speaker does not have the right to see the questions, which was supported by HO and M2, who explained that questions are made and modified instantly during the debate, which means that the moderator is not restricted to specific questions.

To sum up, feedback was elicited from the interviewees on guest speakers in the debates, which uncovered that these participants are drawn from a list of potential candidates that is continually updated. They added that AJ strives to include all sides of an issue in each debate, so as to ensure that no opinion is excluded. However, they noted that the selection of real-time verses virtual speakers is principally dependent on the availability of the speakers, with many being located in conflict zones and therefore unable to present in AJ studios. Besides, they agreed that only

debate themes and sub-themes are given to guest speakers. The flexibility of the questions during the debates also prevents guest speakers from knowing what will be discussed in advance.

6.2.5 *Debate moderators*

The related sub-themes of the debate moderators which were asked to the interviewees were control of debate moderation, adherence to debate questions, and standing points to be won at the debate.

The moderators and HO were asked to outline the debate moderation process such as who watches the moderator during the debates and what kind of instructions the moderator can get. The interviewees all confirmed that the debates are managed by a team in the Control Room who communicate with and issues and give instructions to the moderator through an earpiece. Examples of these messages from the team are explanations, managing speakers to control time, and following up the guest speaker. M2 notes that if the moderator does not pay attention to an important comment by the guest speaker, s/he will be reminded and instructed to ask for elaboration on that comment:

> *maybe you haven't paid attention to a specific point said by the guest. The guest could have deviated from the discussion topic, or a point could need more elaboration, so the discussion topic is enhanced or maybe the guest had said something which I hadn't paid enough attention to*

(M2)

Interestingly, M3 and M4 gave opposing views on the frequency of the instructions: M3 said that communication occurs at all times, whereas M4 stated there are few interventions, especially if the moderator is experienced.

M1 and M3 were asked on their adherence to the debate questions. This included such issues as whether the moderator is empowered to ask follow up questions, is permitted to deviate from the questions, whether each question is rigidly timed, and if it is permissible to cut off speakers.

Both M1 and M3 agreed that the moderator controls the debate questions and can therefore ask follow up questions or stop a speaker from talking, either because of time limit or when they are being aggressive or deviating from the topic. M1 elaborated that the moderator is only given the main points, rather than questions, and that they can therefore draft them in the way they deem most appropriate:

> *The moderator is given the debate topic and sub-topics but not specific questions.*
(M1)

She added that the moderator cannot change the main themes of the debate. Before entering the studio, the moderator and the producer agree on the subtopics. M1 explained that the moderator can interrupt guest speakers because they are running over time, or when they are being aggressive, provocative, or offensive to other guest speakers. M3 gave benefits of interrupting guest speakers such as making use of time which costs a lot and preventing the speakers from making use of the channel in prompting their ideas.

In order to investigate interviewees' ideologies further, M1, M4 and HO were asked about any standing points that they may try to win while moderating programmes. All agreed that a good moderator must be neutral. HO admitted that moderators may show bias, but stated that if this happens, they will be warned:

> *Moderators are human beings so they sometimes violate AJ's basic policies by not sounding neutral. This is unacceptable to us. As we are blamed for the same; we therefore follow it up.*
(HO)

M4 said that nobody is neutral or does not make mistakes, but moderators must try to be unbiased. M4 described a professional moderator as one who is able to leave aside their biases, because the beliefs of the moderator are not important. Underlining the importance of neutrality, M1 agreed that the moderator should not be biased and attempt to retain credibility by refraining

from any ideological, political, ethnic, sectarian, religious, or other affiliations. HO said that unfortunately moderators sometimes become excited and deviate from neutrality or even breach etiquette, but that this is against AJ policy and will result in a formal warning. This was supported by the textual analysis of the debates of this study, which showed that moderators had good moderation skills, including neutrality in the way they controlled the debates.

Each of the interviewees provided feedback on the debate moderators and agreed that they are in contact with the control room and receive instructions during the course of the debate. However, each participant gave different answers on the nature of the instruction, with different perspectives: some reporting that the instructions are detailed and others stating that they are general. All participants reported that moderators are neutral and do not try to win any ideology or side during the debate.

6.2.6   *Discourse of AJ*
The feedback elicited from AJ staff regarding official policies looked at the selection of certain vocabulary, exaggeration of the revolution events by AJ (such as the use of language like 'thugs' and 'ousted president'), the use of nonstandard Arabic in the debates, and the language used with and about women.

First, M2, M3 and HO were asked of AJ's policies on the selection of certain vocabulary, unanimously agreeing that great care is taken in the selection of the vocabulary to be used. HO specified the existence of policies on whether specific words should be chosen, with AJ attempting to use neutral language that has no connotations, wherever possible. This position has been taken because AJ is a news channel, rather than a political party or a country. AJ staff discuss every word and give the specific word or name for a city or organisation. For example, the staff call *Beijing* not *Bekin* and they call the *Islamic State*, not *Daesh*, which was abbreviated

by the Islamic State's enemies, not by the Islamic State itself. M2 stated that he abides by the vocabulary instructed by AJ. For example, the channel uses *martyr*[31] for someone who dies in Palestine, whereas he himself might not use this word when he is outside the channel.

M3 described AJ's selection of vocabulary as being based on international standards, adding that no racist or offensive words should be used.

M2, M3 and M4 were questioned about the accusations that AJ received that it contributed to inciting protests by exaggerating events such as if 100000 people are participating in a march, AJ referred to the figure as a *million people*[32]. The most notable finding here is that the interviewees gave indirect answers with regards to the accusations that AJ incited protesters through linguistically exaggerating events. M2 claimed that anyone has the right to criticise AJ in a professional, non-offensive manner, way and that criticism helps AJ to improve. In contrast, M3 felt that there are many criticisms levelled against AJ from those parties who dislike the change in the Arab people. M3 added that AJ respects both sides and does not try to hide although there are accusations that are not based on any ground:

> *There is one side which disliked AJ and didn't like the way in which these nations protested so they took revenge because they hadn't heard that the Arab person could speak out and demand. On the other hand, there is the other side who likes, encourages, respects and appreciates what AJ has done. Not all accusations are justified.*

(M3)

M4 gave a different perspective to the accusation, commenting that it can be difficult to give a specific answer, because each accusing case would need to be studied in isolation, to determine whether it was true. However, he added that it is the protesters who exaggerate the numbers of people demonstrating, not the news channel, although he conceded that AJ should probably check facts more carefully before reporting any news. When events are exaggerated, then AJ is

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[31] شهيد
[32] مليونية

should therefore not be the only side that is held responsible for the exaggeration. It is obvious from the feedback given by M4 that AJ relied on data from the protesters themselves when determining the number of protesters. This suggests that AJ was in contact with one side of the revolution event and that the government perspective may have been excluded. This finding coincides with the CDA analysis of this study.

M1, M3, M4 and HO were questioned on their views of the use of *thugs*[33] and *the ousted president*[34] by AJ during the Arab revolution. There was universal agreement among the participants on the procedure at the channel, namely that the selection of vocabulary is decided through official meetings. However, their views of these particular terms varied wildly. M1 said AJ calls the President of Egypt the *Egyptian President*, but AJ Mubasher (AJ live channel), whose audience is Egyptian, was saying *the president who came as a result of a coup*[35]. M1 stated that she does not represent AJ Mubasher, as she does not work there and she does not know how they work, so it is difficult to give her opinion.

HO said AJ called Ali Abdullah Saleh *the ousted president,* because a revolution had risen up against him and the people of the country wanted to oust him from his position as a president, meaning that he had been ousted in reality. He also felt that referring to the snipers who attacked the protesters as *thugs* was a fair reflection of reality, because that is what they were called in Yemen and Syria. He said:

> *One of our basic rules is that we don't use names that people don't use for themselves.* (HO)

For this reason, AJ used the terms already being employed by the people involved in that particular event. Nevertheless, the concern here is that AJ uses the vocabulary that is

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[33] بلطجية
[34] الرئيس المخلوع
[35] الرئيس الإنقلابي

representative of one side of the event only and that no attempt was made to ask the other side (government) of what terms people were using during the event. For this reason, it can be argued that the selection of this vocabulary remains biased.

M3 said they call *the ousted president* because he is ousted by the Yemenis, like when a woman ousts her husband, divorces him, according to Islamic Shari. She strictly stated:

Thus, we don't appease anyone.
(M3)
This statement by M3 indicates AJ's strict policy in the selections of its vocabulary.

M3 was the only participant who reported that AJ knew about the reference to Ali Abdullah Saleh as *the ousted president*. This is an interesting finding, as the analysis in this study suggests that AJ focused its guest speakers on the protesters, rather than involving a balanced panel containing adequate numbers of government representatives.

Feedback was elicited from M2, M3, M4 and HO on the use of nonstandard Arabic in the debates. Most interestingly, a range of different answers were elicited from the interviewees regarding the use of nonstandard Arabic. While HO denied that some moderators speak nonstandard Arabic, adding that the moderator would be warned if this happened, M2 and M4 admitted that the use of nonstandard Arabic exists, although they personally dislike it. Specifically, M2 stated that moderators can use any technique to heat up the debate but disagree with them in the matter of using nonstandard Arabic for debate heat-up purpose.

M3 said that sometimes moderators speak in colloquial Arabic for the sake of solidarity, making themselves sound friendlier to the audience, and to communicate in the language that the audience understands. M3 added that she does not oppose the occasional use of dialects, as long as it is infrequent. This is because she believes that debates should be in standard Arabic, not

least because the audience of the channel are used to rational and serious discussions in this form of Arabic. M3 agreed that AJ's policies involve the use of standard Arabic. M3 stated pride in the achievements of AJ in raising the awareness of Arabs, especially with regards to making them speak about their opinions and ask for their rights. She is also proud of AJ because it contributed to making standard Arabic more familiar to the general Arab audience:

> *The use of the Arab language is one of AJ's achievements in the Arab world. We use slightly nonstandard Arabic in order to get closer to the audience as the use of standard Arabic, can make them perceive us as being distant from them.*

(M3)

In contrast, M4 stated that he does not support the use of nonstandard Arabic, especially in news broadcasts and popular debate programmes. The *Opposite Direction* is an exception to this, because it is a talk show, rather than an analytical or political programme. The Al Jazeera Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards states that standard Arabic should be used, however the interviews show that the moderators do not necessarily adhere to the use of standard Arabic.

An additional linguistic aspect of the debates that emerged from this study was the use of *I mean*[36]. When asked, M1 and M2 stated that they thought that *I mean* was just a filler, whereas HO warned moderators from using this expression. M1 explained that she thinks *I mean* functions in the way as ellipses, commenting that some people say *maybe* and some say *I mean* to fill gaps in speech, such as when searching for the right word to use. HO agreed that *I mean* and other colloquial words might slip from moderators, however he stated that the official position is that these filler words are not allowed and so moderators are warned when they use them.

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[36] يعني

M1, M3, M4 and HO were asked about any policies concerning the language used with and about women during the debates. All interviewees agreed that AJ treats women in the same way as men. M1 added that there is a lack in the presence of women guest speakers:

> *Politics is a field dominated by men so political space is wider for men than for women. This is the reality in the Arab societies where male culture is predominates.*

(M1)

She stated that women's participation as guest speakers is less because politics is usually dominated by men and the Arab world's culture is also dominated by men. In addition, AJ tries to look for women as guest speakers, if they are available. When the topic is about or concerning women they will certainly invite women guest speakers. HO stressed that guest speakers are selected on the basis of their importance, not their gender, except when the topic of the debate itself is about women, when women guest speakers will be given priority. M3 stated that the main standard at AJ for choosing an employee or inviting a guest speaker is competence in the discussed field. Meanwhile, M4 agreed that there must not be any difference in dealing with guest speakers, with all being treated equally and with respect, irrespective of their genders. She feels that there is no preferential treatment for women or prejudice against them.

Finally, the participating staff of the channel were asked about the discourse that is used for the debate. All of the participants agreed that AJ has policies on the selection of vocabulary that is included in the quality assurance and code of ethics documents, and that this vocabulary is decided by a management panel, based on what people typically use during the event. The interviewees gave different feedback on AJ's exaggeration of the surrounding events of the Arab revolutions, however, with one moderator admitting that AJ had exaggerated the numbers gathering on squares and describing the coverage as sympathetic. Similarly, although the written

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policies of AJ indicate that only standard Arabic should be used, the participants reported various perceptions of the use of nonstandard Arabic, giving the excuse that nonstandard Arabic varieties can be used in order to *heat up the discussion and to be closer to the audeince*. All of the interviewees approved that the gender treatment at the channel, for both staff and guest speakers, stating that equal treatment means that there is no difference in the way in which language is used with both genders.

6.2.7   *AJ debate transcription*

When directing questions, the following subthemes emerged with regards to the debate transcription: reasons for transcribing the debates, who transcribes the debates, and discrepancies between the actual content of the debates and the transcriptions of each.

The queries concerning the transcription of the debates were directed to M1, HO and DN. All agreed that the reason that AJ transcribes debates is to provide easy access to the content and as a viable alternative when the video is unavailable. In this discussion, HO provided the history of the transcription:

> *Transcription predates the existence of YouTube when there was no chance to watch or read the debate again. Despite the availability of YouTube nowadays, AJ continues to transcribe the debate programmes as a tradition that it aims to continue with. The main aim of the transcription nowadays is for AJ to document its programmes.*

(HO)

M1 added that AJ transcribes the said debates because a big proportion of the audience does not watch programmes that are broadcasted late at night such as *The Revolution Talk*. Therefore, the audience could read the programme later on AJ Net website or on social media. DN linked transcription to research by stating that the online transcription of debates is intended to make the database easily accessible for researchers, as well as to make the debates available for a wider audience, since audio is sometimes unavailable. This statement is true in the context of this study as the debates formed the corpus of this study and significantly assisted the research process.

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A discrepancy was observed in the feedback from M1, HO and DN on who transcribes the debates, however. While M1 said that debates are written down by a group of employees in AJ Net (in Arabic and English), DN and HO both explained that an external company transcribes the debates for AJ. HO added that transcription was done accurately, as per the conditions and policies of AJ and the transcription is checked to ensure that it is complete and accurate. DN stated that there are policies on how the transcription must be carried out and that these are included in their contract with the transcribing company:

> *Transcription is carried out by a company via a contract with AJ and according to AJ's conditions and policies. These conditions are accurate and documented by contracts.*
(DN)

However, when the DN was asked to pass a copy of the policies or contract to the researcher, he refused.

When asked about any discrepancies that may exist between the debate recordings and the written transcription, both M1 and HO were shocked to discover that discrepancies exist and provided excuses to explain this. M1 attributed the differences between the recording and transcription to the use of machines for transcribing the debates, arguing that these machines could not replace humans. M1 argued that there are programmes where speakers use Arabic dialects, like *The Opposite Direction*, meaning that the moderator or guest speaker typically speaks in dialect, which may be particularly difficult to transfer into standard Arabic. DN stressed that AJ does not intentionally modify the transcription and that any difference is a human error, rather than an editorial policy. Nevertheless, this study detected 935 discrepancies between the chosen debates and the transcription provided by AJ: 68 omissions of the filler *I mean*, 230 omissions of immediately repeated words (one after another), and 637 cases of other

discrepancies, which include omissions, substitutions, additions, reordering of the text, and spelling mistakes.

HO was asked for the reasons for AJ videos on YouTube being modified. He attributed the trimming to the need to remove inappropriate words:

> *In his programme, Faisal al Qassem brings two people and uses all kinds of talk live. It is normal that he will throw out words that violate professional, moral, judicial or journalistic standards. So, these words must be removed from the broadcast.*

(HO)

Many of these words are evident in Faisal Al-Qassem's *The Opposite Direction* programme. To support this point, HO added the consequences of the words not being trimmed:

> *The viewers don't have the right to litigate against AJ if the words violate the standard morals. However, if the programme is re-broadcast or uploaded online, the viewer has the right to take AJ to court.*

(HO)

In summary, if the programme is re-broadcast containing inappropriate words, AJ could be taken to court and punished.

In conclusion, feedback was obtained from AJ staff regarding the transcribed debates that are available on the website of the channel. Participants reported that AJ transcribes the debates as a tradition, for accessibility and research purposes, although the transcription itself is conducted by an independent company rather than the channel. AJ refused to pass a copy of the contract or procedure to the researcher, and attributed any discrepancies in the records to the use of machines for transcribing the debates. They stressed that AJ does not intentionally alter the transcription, although they conceded that culturally, ethically, and religiously inappropriate words are trimmed from the texts.

6.3   Conclusion

The most significant finding of the interviews is that when asked about the channel's policy and slogan (the opinion and the other opinion), the interviewees replied with examples about *the other opinion*, rather than *the opinion*. In their answers, 'the other' included Bashar al Assad, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hosni Mubarak, Bin Ali and al-Qadhafi. In this way, the interviewees admitted that the Arab presidents are considered Al Jazeera's 'the other'. The interviewees unanimously stated all sides are invited to each debate on their conversation programmes, which conflicts with the main finding of the research, namely that the government was excluded from the debates with protesters outnumbering government speakers in terms of both number and words. Secondly, despite the interviewees' assertions that moderators are followed up and warned if they display bias or speak in nonstandard Arabic, the CDA of this research reveals multiple occurrences of nonstandard Arabic being used by moderators. Not all of these instances serve to stimulate passionate debate, instead sometimes semantically derogating Saleh from the power he had as the president of Yemen during the time of the revolution. Third, the interview findings indicate that AJ supports the Arab revolutions and that the channel promoted principles such as freedom and liberty, thereby contributing to the inciting of protesters to the extent that M4 stated that AJ covered the revolution with 'much sympathy'. In addition, AJ preferred to use similar linguistic terms of the revolution to those used by the protesters at the same time. It also used exaggerated descriptions from the protesters, such as the claim of a 'million' people demonstrating in Egypt, without ensuring the accuracy of the figure.

The next point is that all of the interviewees agree that the moderator drafts the questions and has the power to change them during the debate. No mention was made of editing done to the questions, to ensure that the drafting is neutral and is fair to both sides of the debate. This relates

to the difference in the answers regarding Qatar's influence and control of AJ. While M4 observed that Qatar funds AJ and might therefore have a degree of influence over its strategies and agenda, this theory was dismissed by M3 and evaded by M2 who escaped the question. Although the interviewees denied the relevance that the director's background would have on AJ policies and practices, one interviewee admitted that Qatar policies control AJ and that the decision to appoint a network director from the Qatari royal family serves a political purpose.

This chapter has presented the analysis conducted of the interviews with AJ staff, which were investigated thematically, in order to situate this study within the wider filed of CDA of media and political debates. The following themes were explored: interviewees' experience with AJ, AJ's policies, debate preparation, debate guest speakers, debate moderators, discourse of AJ, and AJ's transcription of debates. Interview responses were discussed based on the various sub-themes of each of these topics, and key findings were highlighted. Finally, a discussion section was presented in which the feedback was discussed and linked to the textual analysis of the debates.

The interviews have demonstrated a limited number of the interviewed staff of AJ but an overall agreement and similarities in the feedback received from the staff. The next chapter will compare the CDA analysis of the debates against the findings of the corpus analysis and interviews. The results will also be compared against the empirical studies examined during the literature review phase of this research, with specific reference to those that address media discourse, political discourse, and the discourse of women.

Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters (4, 5 and 6) presented a comprehensive analysis of the data obtained by the diverse data collection approaches utilised in this study. Chapter four analysed four debates, one from each debate programme, using critical discourse analysis, aspects from the van Leeuwen model and further linguistic components. In chapter five, the CDA was triangulated using computer-assisted corpus analysis that incorporated the entire study corpus of transcriptions from fifteen debates. Finally, chapter six analysed the interviews conducted with AJ staff, which enabled their perceptions to be compared against the debate analysis.

This chapter begins by discussing the conclusions of this study by discussing the major findings of the research. This process involves comparison of the CDA with the corpus analysis, as well as with the analysis of the interviews. This is followed by a brief commentary on the representation of women in the debates, focusing on the use of discourse by Tawakul Karman, the only female debate guest speaker. The results of the study are then compared with the empirical research and recommendations are included in for further research.

7.2 Conclusions

This study investigated the use of discourse in understanding power relationships in the Arab world, with particular emphasis on the ideologies held by Arab media and politics. At the time that this study commenced, the Arab revolutions were some of the leading events in the Arab region. For the purpose of this study, all of the political debates of the 2011-2012 Yemeni revolution staged at AJ were selected. These debates represented Arab media and political discourse, which has not been widely studied. The main data analysis methodology utilised was CDA, which was employed in conjunction with one debate from each debate program. Analysis

was triangulated by computer-based corpus analysis. Finally, the interviews that were conducted with AJ staff enabled the analysis to be compared against the perception of the channel.

The most significant finding of CDA was that AJ excluded the government from its debates. Less government speakers were invited compared to the protesters and so they spoke less.The notions that emerged from the analysis were revolution, the people of Yemen, protesters, Saleh, regime, army, fighting and Gulf Initiative. The findings of the analysis indicated that AJ and the protesters shared similar ideological intentions, sometimes even using the same linguistic aspects. However, the ideological intentions of AJ were shown to bear little similar to those of the government.

Results obtained by the computer analysis correlated with those of the CDA3.2.4w. Firstly, the cared notions that emerged from the CDA are the most frequent content keywords derived from the computer analysis. Additionally, the context in which these words were used was similar. Thirdly, corpus analysis asserted that AJ had excluded the government from its debates, only providing an opportunity for official representatives to produce fewer words of those produced by the protesters. This meant that the government was prevented from being able to linguistically reach its ideological intentions. Both analyses concluded that AJ and protesters shared the same ideological intentions. For instance, they used Saleh with negative connotation, derogated his presidency power, and assigned him negative roles. Even when AJ addressed Saleh as 'president', the context in which this usage occurred was negative. Unlike the other groups, the government expressed solidarity with Saleh, by calling him 'brother' 'the brother president' or 'the brother Ali Abdullah Saleh', an accepted use in Arabic to show closeness and camaraderie.

Another similarity that was found between the ideologies of AJ and the protesters was evident in the use of the word 'Yemen'. Unsurprisingly, the government accorded the name of the country with a patriotic role and good future, whereas speakers from AJ and protesters both gave 'Yemen' a passive role, indicating no censorship of the events in Yemen. Similarly, 'the revolution' was shown to collocate with the social actor 'the youth' among speakers from AJ and the protesters. This suggests that they were granting an ownership of the revolution by 'the youth', implying that they initiated and controlled the revolution and were therefore empowered to make decisions. Both analyses proved that the protesters remained relatively unclear about the Gulf Initiative, in terms of either being fully against it, or even regarding a modified version of the initiative. Overall, the results of the analysis show that AJ was distributing subtle political propaganda order to achieve its aims, primarily the exclusion of the government, which were 'the other' for AJ. Matching results of the CDA and corpus analysis ensures that the CDA was objective and came up with solid conclusions.

However, the interview results did not correlate with the analysis. Overall, AJ staff unanimously expressed the opinion that the channel is neutral, which was justified by claiming that all points of views were included, that the channel does not exclude 'the other', that it makes every effort to abide by its slogan 'the opinion and the other opinion', that there are no underlying political intentions, and that the channel adheres to its strict quality standards and code of conduct. The interviewees added that AJ followed a rigorous system for conducting debates that includes a process that monitors moderators during debates. This conflicts with the linguistic analysis of the debates. The evidence suggests that the channel considered the Arab president to be 'the other' in this context. Accordingly, the government ('the other') was excluded from the debates, enabling the channel to support its ideological intentions, which resembled those carried by the protesters.

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It can be argued that by giving more speaking opportunities to one side than the other, implies hidden propaganda, effectively suggesting that AJ was speaking on behalf of the protesters. This mismatch between the analysis and the interviews entailed controversy in AJ practices and potentially even suggests that AJ holds a degree of responsibility for the exaggeration and progress of the Arab revolutions. If this is the case, then AJ did not follow its slogan or adhere to its stated quality standards.

On the subject of the use of discourse by and with women, the conclusion implied by these findings is that the discourse used by AJ female moderators did not signify any feminine-like language. Their discourse strategies and sociolinguistic functions by the female moderators do not differ from those by their male counterparts. When interviewed, the female moderators of AJ stated that the channel did not make any distinction between a female and male moderator, and that it treats its staff equally.

The discourse produced by Tawakul, the only female guest speaker, indicated that while Tawakul seems to have used hedges to convince the audience of her sensible realistic arguments, there were also observable emotional occurrences of discourse by using more appeals to religion and more idiomatic discourse. Religious terms are an effective way to create emotional resonance with the primarily Arab audience, who hold strong ties to religion as a way of life. These occurrences seem to indicate that the discourse of Tawakul revealed passion about the events of the revolution, as if the overthrow of Saleh was a religious demand. She also made extensive use of exaggerated adjectives and adverbs which were more emotional in tone than those used by her male counterparts. These language choices are inappropriate for political discourse, especially when the language was colloquial and added no ideological power to the meaning. Most significantly, Ali Al-Dhofairi (moderator of the In Depth debate), realised

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Tawakul's emotional use of discourse, as evident when he abruptly stopped her from speaking and admonished her that, 'This is not an emotional subject'. To conclude, Tawakul was the only female guest speaker in the debates, and her emotional use of discourse is implied through her reference to religion and use of idioms.

Although AJ caused a media revolution in the Arab world by diverting from the accepted orthodoxy in the traditional Arab media, it faithfully follows the lead of governments. In effect, AJ showed that they do not accept 'the other', the governments. However, as with the local media, AJ only provides one stance, although in this study the position of bias is that of the protestors. By siding with the protesters, AJ can be said to have moved from its position of supposed neutrality and violated its slogan, 'the opinion and the other opinion'.

7.3   Comparison with empirical research

In the following, this research is compared and contrasted against the empirical studies that are most relevant to the contributions of this study. This comparison is divided into three main areas: media discourse, political discourse and gender.

7.3.1   *Media discourse*

Through study of the discourse of AJ, this study contributes significant findings, as there is a relative paucity of research into the linguistic role of media in shaping political protests and social resistance, especially that of the discourse of AJ. This is despite the fact that AJA is the most popular and influential network in the Arab region and is the main source of news for native Arabic speakers. Another significant contribution of this research is that it utilised an authentic contemporary corpus that has not been previously investigated, namely the Yemeni revolution discourse of AJ. A careful review of literature indicated the absence of empirical CDA research with regards to the discourse of the Yemeni revolution staged at AJ. For instance,

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Fahmy and Al Emad (2011) investigated the differences between AJA and AJE in their news coverage. Although their findings indicated that AJ was ideological in its coverage, the focus of their research was on the differences between the two channels operating in two languages. The study carried out by Barkho (2011) was closer to that of the current research, as it attempted to investigate the ways in which the internal guidelines of AJ sustained its ideologies in the shaping of news narratives. The findings of CDA in the current research support those by Barkho, concluding that AJ was shown to use its organisational power in dissimilating and inculcating its ideology and viewpoints during the Middle East conflict. Interviews with AJ staff here contradict the findings by Barkho and the CDA analysis of this research, as interviewees claimed the channel maintained neutrality in its discourse. This claim contrasted with the outcomes of the linguistic analysis, which suggested that the discourse by the channel is actually ideological. This means that, while Barkho's study used AJ's internal guidelines and this research used AJ's discourse in political debates, both studies yielded similar findings with regards to the ideological strands of the channel.

The findings of this research on the ideological strands of media correlate not only with those carried out in the context of the Arab world but with international media. It coincides with the study, for instance, by Hardman (2008) who found that British newspapers use a series of strategies to evaluate political leaders and their decisions, enabling the media organisations to achieve their ideologies. Another example is the recent study by Hodges (2015), who concludes that media hides assumptions within discourse.

Another significant contribution of this research to the area of media discourse is the use of computer software in analysing Arabic corpus. This approach has not been widely used in empirical studies. For example, in a comprehensive analysis of religious metaphors, El-Sharif

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(2011) did not use computer software for the concordances of the media discourse, claiming that no software was capable of analysing Arabic. However, the current study contends that this is not the case, instead encouraging further research in Arabic media corpus by guiding researchers to the use of AntConc software for wordlists, concordances and collocations. This, by itself, not only encourages but also enhances the research of Arabic corpus, providing accurate and rapid analysis results.

A further contribution of this research is to the linguistic analysis, which was achieved by interviewing those AJ staff members who deal with debates. The majority of CDA studies limit their scope to the linguistic analysis; the current study has provided deeper analysis through comparison of insider perspectives and the discourse used by the channel. Although investigations have been carried out into the ideological strands of media, including those of AJ, complementing the analysis by conducting interviews with the journalists who actually produce the discourse was significant, especially that the results did not correlate. This raises remarks of whether the channel is aware of its ideologies and whether concealing these ideologies is pre-planned with its staff. This is especially noteworthy given that the researcher was not included in the selection of the interviewed staff and that the selection was made by the channel only. It is also interesting to note that all staff gave almost identical answers.

Overall, the results of this study agree with the findings of extant CDA research on media discourse, showing that the discourse of media is often ideological. However, this study bridges the gap in literature through a study of the discourse of AJ on the struggle during the Yemeni revolution. By studying the link between AJ's motto "the opinion and the other opinion" and the discourse used by AJ, this study has contributed to testing whether or not AJ is a controversial channel, as it has been accused of being in the literature. In addition, this study analysed the

Arabic language using van Leeuwen's (2008, 2009) social actor network model. A careful review of literature indicated that no studies have employed this framework in the examination of Arabic discourse, meaning that this study is the first to analyse Arabic using the social actor network CDA model. This study demonstrated the effectiveness of this model in detecting the ideological strands of Arabic language.

7.3.2 *Political discourse*

In addition to its contribution to the examination of Arabic media discourse, this study contributed to the investigation of political discourse related to the Yemeni revolution, which is an area that has been neglected by linguistic research. A careful review of literature found few studies on the political debates of revolution discourse. The political discourse of the Yemeni revolution is contemporary and is continuing until the date of submitting this dissertation, with the political unrest in Yemen deteriorating due to the involvement of many parties, such as Al Qaeda, ISIL, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Saleh's forces, following his resignation from power in 2012.

In addition, the revolution discourse studied in the literature utilised frameworks other than that used for this research. For example, Tileaga (2008) used a critical discursive approach to analyse the political discourses of the Romanian revolution. This study therefore contributes to the literature of revolution discourse by utilising the social actor network CDA framework devised by van Leeuwen (2008, 2009). By using this framework, it was possible to reveal the explicit as well as the implicit ideological intentions of the debate speakers. This has clearly illustrated the extent to which Arab political discourse can be rich in hidden ideological strands. Revealing implicit intentions is especially valuable in discourse of this kind, as politicians tend to conceal information in political forums (Shenhav, 2017).

The closest study to the discourse genre and source of the current research was conducted by Albirini (2011), who studied diglossia in the political debates staged at AJA. Diglossia here denotes the shifts between standard Arabic and dialectical Arabic. In terms of scope of the linguistic tools used by politicians using Arabic discourse, this study is larger and contributes more findings, such as the representation of social actors, repetitions, idioms and dysphemism. Another study on the ideology of political discourse was conducted by Atawneh (2009), who studied the headlines of 428 reports to examine how the discourse of the Israelis and Palestinians mirrors the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. Atawneh concluded that politicians use threats to demonstrate power (ibid). These findings are similar to those of the current study, which concluded that threatening language was made by the protesters against the president and government of Yemen. Similarly, 'threatening' and 'appealing' were two of the sociolinguistic functions of the discourse of AJ and the protesters, which aimed to threaten Saleh and his regime, supporting the findings of similar research (Dunmire, 2005; Johansson, 2006). Besides, the protesters appealed to the international community to be in their side and not support Saleh. This study contributes significant understanding of the use of threatening as a linguistic device, which has not been studied before in Arabic language in the context of the Yemeni revolution.

The findings of this study agree with those of Iiie (2009) in that political forms of address constitute ideologies held by the politicians. In the current study, the way in which Saleh was addressed by AJ was similar to the way used by the protesters, which differed profoundly from the way in which he was referred to by the government representatives. Both AJ and the protesters gave primarily negative reference to Saleh, such as 'the man' and 'the ousted president'. Even on those occasions when AJ provided a neutral reference, such as 'the Yemeni

president Ali Abdullah Saleh', the reference was made in a context that was negative. Overall, the forms of address used by all parties were shown to serve their intended political ideologies.

An important notion that emerged, which was important for all data groups (AJ, protestors, government), was 'the people of Yemen'. This concept is similar to that of 'nation' in the study by Shenhav (2004), as both refer to those individuals ruled by the regime. Findings of this study indicate that all groups, AJ, protesters and government gave 'the Yemeni people' a passivated role which mainly shows them as victims. In addition, the protesters praised, empowered and glorified 'the Yemeni people', in so doing making most of them in their discourse. Victimizing the people of Yemen shows sympathy and care from the side of the political speakers, potentially including the people in the side of the speaking politician.

The ideological function of the political framing 'us' and 'them' was the product of many empirical studies discussed in the literature review of this research. These studies include those of Buckingham (2013), Carvalho (2011), Guillem (2009), Jaworski and Galasinski (2000), Leudar et al. (2004), Mazid (2007), Oddo (2011), Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010), and Tileaga (2008). The overall findings of these studies reveal a positive self-representation while negative other-representation, which correlates with the findings of this research. The differentiation examples from the selected debates clearly illustrated that among the 'other' representation by the government are 'they', 'the members', 'innocent killers gangs' and 'the others', all of which refer to the protesters or opposition. From the other position, the protesters used 'Ali Abdullah Saleh', 'the ousted', 'Ali Abdullah Saleh and his sons', 'dictator', 'the killers', 'the thieves', 'the president', 'president Saleh', 'the ruler', 'Ali Saleh' and 'he' in reference to 'the other', namely Saleh and his family. These references uncover the ideologies held by each of the political parties in the AJ debates.

The results of this study support the use of 'abolition discourse', which means the use of traumatic past as a strategy to convince the audience regarding the topic (Waterton and Wilson, 2009). In this research, the protesters referred to traumatic past events that had occurred in Yemen during Saleh's reign, likely in an attempt to distort his image and to therefore convince others that he should abdicate power. This study therefore contributes an Arabic political context to the literature that demonstrates the use of tragic or unpleasant past events as a linguistic tool utilised by politicians to negatively represent their opponents.

The findings of this research support the empirical literature, such as the study by Badarneh (2010), which discusses the use of religion by AJ and the representatives of the protesters to achieve various sociolinguistic functions, including ideological propaganda. The speakers used Quranic and prophetic hadith as their religious sources in achieving their specific propaganda aims. 'Distorting regime's image', 'threatening Saleh', 'inciting protesters' and 'glorifying the revolution' were among the top ideological functions achieved by referring to religion in this research. Religious quotations are extremely influential among the Arab majority, as they hold strong Islamic beliefs.

However, the results of this study contradict those of Simon-Vandenbergen (2008), who concluded that remarks on the private lives of opponents are generally intended to lower their credibility and ultimately damage their public face. In contrast, the current study noted that opponents did not refer to each other's private lives in the debates, and therefore 'private life' was not a linguistic device used to achieve ideological strands in this research. A justification here is that in the Arab Muslim culture, it is considered extremely sensitive to address details of a person's family life such as his wife or attitude; therefore these were not touched upon in the debates.

This research has supported the findings of previous empirical studies which argue that the ideology concealed by political discourse can be best investigated by CDA triangulated by corpus analysis. Ample evidence has been found to suggest that the vast majority of politicians manipulate and hide propaganda intentions in their discourse. This is supported by the study of Cheng and Yao (2016), who concluded that the dynamics of power distance, including the ideological stance, can best be investigated by a methodological synergy of corpus linguistics and CDA.

7.3.3 _Gender_
This study contributed to the examination of the discourse of women in the Arab world. According to Sadiqi (2003), the Arab Islamic world merely witnesses studies in language and gender. This is typically evident with the CDA studies on gender of Arabic language. An initial and comprehensive review found no literature on the discourse used with or by women during the Yemeni revolutions. In addition to addressing this lack, the current study contributed to findings related to the discourse of AJ female moderators and the discourse of the female guest speaker Tawakul Karman. The study of Tawakul's discourse is particularly significant, as few studies can examine the discourse of female Arab politicians given the extremely limited level female participation in politics in the Arab world. The findings of this study contradicted those of Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013), who showed under-representation of the female gender, unlike this study that suggested no difference in the way in which language was used with women.

However, this study supports the findings of Hess-Luttich (2007), who used CDA to determine that men make more interruptions than women in political talks on television. During the textual analysis of the debate on the _Behind the News_ programme, Yasir (male government guest speaker) interrupted Tawakul (female protesters guest speaker) twice, whereas Tawakul did not

interrupt Yasir at all. Even when talking to Fairouz (the debate moderator), Yasir interrupted Fairouz 26 times, whereas Fairouz only interrupted him 17 times.

Another important finding is the suggestion that Tawakul appealed to the emotions of the audience through the use of religious discourse and idiomatic language. Her discourse was also characterized for being emotional, as she described the themes of glory and triumph rather than focusing on the questions directed to her. Additionally, by interviewing the female staff of AJ, this study illustrates the ways in which the channel perceives female guest speakers, in terms of selection and the use of discourse. Both the interviews and the linguistic analysis suggest that AJ deals with its guest speakers with equality, irrespective of their gender. However, the debates featured a poor level of female participation in terms of guest speakers on the topic of the Arab revolutions. This was exacerbated by the only female taking part showing more emotional discourse than her male counterparts. In addition, a review of AJ's Code of Ethics and, Quality Assurance and Editorial Standards suggested no gender bias in the channel's policies.

7.4 Recommendations for further research

This section provides recommendations for further research. This study has contributed significant findings on the discourse used by media and politicians in the Arab world, specifically within the context of revolutions. The study used the revolution discourse staged live on the AJ channel, which is the most popular and trusted news network in the region. The corresponding ideological intentions of media and politicians were analysed using CDA in an attempt to uncover the interests and power relations in the context, which in turn conceal the ideologies and values underlying discourse.

Analysis was triangulated by corpus analysis and complemented by the perceptions of AJ staff. Discourse of AJA was used because this channel is an authentic source of news and is held to be

representative of media in the Arabic region. However, while AJ is a trusted source of news and events for an extremely broad cross-section of the population, it might be useful for future studies to consider a combined debate corpus of a competing channel. One such option could be Al Arabiya, a Saudi owned news channel, which has been described as "a counter-missile directed at the Qatari news channels" due to its focus on those areas that are not well explored by Al Jazeera, such as the relationship between Qatar and Israel (Fandy, 2007). Optionally, instead of focusing on the content produced by foreign TV channels, future studies could utilise debates aired on local Yemeni television channels, comparing the findings against the programmes of foreign channels like Al Jazeera or even western broadcasters. Bearing in mind the politically deteriorating situation of Yemen after the revolution, which has evolved into widespread war and famine, it would be significantly valuable to study the current discourses. This could provide powerful insights into topics such as how AJ or other channels report the events or how politicians defend their ideological stands.

In addition, future studies could benefit from following multimodality as the CDA framework by considering images of the television debates, as images constitute ideological assumptions and have not been widely addressed in the literature at the time of writing. This may be attributed to the fact that the popularity of the study of images as a discourse type has only recently emerged. For this reason, a relative paucity of research exists on debate photography and imagery, meaning that despite the potentially enormous contribution of image discourse to political debates, the area remains largely unexplored (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012). It has been argued that critical multimodal discourse analysis can effectively draw the political ideologies infused widely in culture (David and van Leeuwen, 2016). Furthermore, the impacts of the use of language, images, layout and organisation may be significant in this area of media and politics,

so would benefit from studies using multimodal analysis. Additionally, time was not considered as a variable due to the inherent limitations of this doctoral dissertation. However, a study of the ways in which the discourse of media channels such as Al Jazeera change over time may offer valuable research avenues. Most importantly, a recent study of the role played by the media in shaping media and political discourse with regards to the 'Syrian Spring' by Ayasrah (2015) warned that wartime translators tend to manipulate the translated message in order to serve their own ideologies. Therefore, it is recommended that a future study be conducted into the ideologies sustained by Arab media organizations based on the translation of discourse, as this could be a valid and important topic for research.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Study Corpus

No	Date (Chronological order)	Program	Debate Title and Subtitles	AJ Moderator	Speakers	Revolution Stage	Video duration in minutes	Number of words
1	22/5/2011	Revolution Talk	Yemen revolution's progress and the gulf initiative 5) The protesters and the failure of the Saudi initiative 6) Yemen and civil war's possibilities 7) Yemen's revolutionists between the peaceful and armed paths 8) Expectations of the next stage	Mohammed Kreshan	7) Jamal al-Milaiki (researcher and a Yemeni activist) 8) Abdulmalik al-Mikhlafi (leader in the joint Congress) 9) Ali al-Maamari (formal spokesperson of the Parliamentary bloc for liberated independent) 10) Abbas al-Masawi (Yemen's extension media in Beirut) 11) Sarhan al-Otaibi (Head of the Saudi Society for Political Sciences) 12) And others	Saleh indicated that he would not accept to sign the agreed terms of the agreement although his spokesperson said he would. The opposition signed but he did not.	28	5,425
2	24/07/2011	Revolution Talk	Yemen between the determination of change and destiny's doubts 1) Filed development in Yemen 2) Al-Qaeda's scarecrow 3) Vow of civil war in Yemen 4) New initiation for solving the Yemen crisis 5) Yemeni councils between two terminologies 6) Talks of transfer of power	Hassan Jamool	1) Mohammed al-Saadi (a leader in the Joint Meeting 2) Abbas al-Masawi (Yemen's extension media in Beirut) 3) Najeeb al-Nafii (a journalist and political analyst)	Clashes between Houthis and Islah opposition party, local tribes and Islamist militants in Zanjibar and other towns controlled by al-Qaeda; and protesters and army defectors.	47:30	5,754
3	19/09/2011	In Depth	Yemen…at the edges of the revolution 6) Massacres continue	Ali al-Dufairi	3) Humood al-Hattar (Former Yemen minister of Endowments)	Forces loyal to Saleh's regime shot dozens of people in Sanaa. This came after Hadi, acting president after Saleh's	23:53 + missing	5,482

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			and uprising rise 7) Gulf initiative and the regime's behaviour 8) Implementation mechanism in a timely manner 9) Revolutionary escalation Friday and army's role 10) Extent of political parties' influence in society's sectors			4) Tawakul Karman (a leader in National Youth Revolution of Yemen)	decree of transferring power to Hadi while Saleh was in Saudi Arabia, was claimed to sign the GCC transitional deal of power in a week time.		
4	25/09/2011	Behind the News	President Saleh's speech after returning to Yemen 1) New in Saleh's last speech 2) Saleh's speech and fuelling the Yemeni crisis 3) Visions behind the lines 4) Saleh's expected departure for treatment	Leila a-Sheikli		1) Tariq al-Shami (Head of media Unit in the National Conference Ruling party) 2) Ali a-Sarari (a leader in the Gathered Congress) 3) Mashari Al-Naeem 4) Ahmed Aayid (a political activist)	Saleh returned to Yemen after being in Saudi Arabia, almost a million protesters protested 'largest number of the revolution'. Saleh gave a speech that he would support the GCC plan.	23:57	2,820
5	3/10/2011	In depth	Consequences of the Yemen's revolution 1) Political block out situation in Yemen 2) Gulf position of Yemen's revolution 3) Post gulf initiative stage 4) Yemen issue with the Security Council 5) Future scenarios of Yemen	Ali al-Dufairi		1) Abdulraqib Mansour (head of Yemen's revolution mass in Egypt) 2) Adil al-Shuraiji (a professor of sociology at Sanaa University)	Same as 24/09/2011	48:41	6,542
6	4/10/2011	The opposite Direction	Is Yemen's political system still valid for power? 1) Electronic armies and Yemen in international reports 2) Arab political systems and media	Faisal al-Qasem		1) Waseem al-Qurashi (spokesman of the organizing committee of Yemen's youth revolution) 2) Yasir al-Yamani (a leader in Yemen's ruling party)	Security forces killed many in residential areas in Sanaa. Saleh and UN criticized by protesters for not failing to negotiate the crisis and therefore negotiation with the regime had stopped.	47:38	7,010

			blackout 3) The system and fighting terrorism 4) The revolution and the family's army					
7	8/10/2011	Behind the News	Last explicit connotations of Yemen's president 5) Tawakul withdraws lights from Saleh 6) Sceneries of the delivery of authority 7) Saleh and the security council's decision 8) Youth and problems of the delivery of power	Fairouz Zayyati	3) Tawakul Karman (a leader in National Youth Revolution) 4) (Yasir al-Yamani (a leader in Yemen's ruling party)	7/10/2011 was the 'Friday of al-Hamdi' to reference a former Yemen president who was killed in 1977. Huge protesters protests took place calling Saleh to leave.	25:06	3,343
8	23/11/2011	Behind the News	Signing the Gulf initiative 1) Youth of the revolution and the continuation of sit-ins 2) Evaluation of the post signing stage 3) The initiative and implementation mechanism 4) Saleh and getting away from some agreement	Leila a-Sheikli	1) Jamal Omar (delegate of secretary General for United Nations) 2) Radwan Masoud (member of the organizing committee of the Youth's revolution) 3) Abdu al-Jundi (Deputy of Yemen's minister of media) 4) Ali AbdRabu al-Qadi (Member of the National Council and member of Representative's Council)	Saleh signed the GCC agreement and gave speech.	25:15	2,743
9	3/12/2011	Behind the News	Security situation in Yemen 1) Bombing of Taizz and regression of safety in Yemen 2) Saleh and receiving more warranties 3) Horizons of transfer of power	Ghada Owais	1) Ali a-Sarari (a leader in the Gathered Congress) 2) Mashari Al-Naeem (Head of International Relations of the GCC Council) 3) Yasir al-Yamani (a leader in Yemen's ruling party)	7 people killed in Taizz.	24:42	2,968
10	13/12/2011	The opposite Direction	Yemen to the first square 5) Army security file 6) Continuation of sit-ins in the Change Square 7) Youth of the	Faisal al-Qasem	3) Jamal al-Milaiki (researcher and a Yemeni activist) 4) Abbas al-Masawi (a Yemeni journalist)	Al-Qaeda fighters escaped prison in Aden and killed military personals near Zanjibar.	47:02	7,064

11	9/01/2012	Behind the news	Debate around giving Saleh and his agents the political immunity 1) The legitimacy of giving Saleh the political immunity 2) Secret behind Saleh's clinging to the immunity 3) Rights of the affected in Yemen	Leila a-Sheikli	1) Mahmoud Rifat (international lawyer and expert in international law) 2) Yasir al-Yamani (a leader in Yemen's ruling party) 3) Hussein al-Suhaili (an activist in the national youth revolution)	Approved law granting immunity to Saleh	25:31	3,105
			revolution and their persistence in Saleh's trial 8) Upcoming struggle for undertaking Yemen's power					
12	21/1/2012	Behind the News	Approval of Saleh's political immunity 1) Fallouts of the complete political immunity to Saleh and his associates 2) Granting the immunity and Yemen's stability plan 3) Saleh and the legal accounting mechanism 4) Future of Yemen after Saleh	Leila a-Sheikli	1) Abdulgalib al-Odaini (spokesperson of the joint opposing parties) 2) Fakhr al-Azab (member of the organizing committee of the Yemen's revolution) 3) Ibrahim al-Sayadi (activist and political researcher)	Immunity law approved	24:09	2,800
13	23/02/2012	Revolution's talk	Challenges of the transitional period in Yemen 1) Development direction in the transitional period 2) Way and plan of fighting corruption 3) Position of the Southern revolution from the political operation	Ghada Owais	1) Saleh Sumai (Yemen's minister of electricity) 2) Khalid al-Ruwaishan (Former minister of Culture) 3) Abdulfaqih al-Faqih (a leader in the mass joint Meeting) 4) Muhsin Muheeb (Assistant secretary in the Southern revolution)	Saleh arrived from abroad in order to inaugurate Hadi who won the presidency elections of Yemen	49:00	5,901

			4) Restructuring of the national army 5) Saleh and the shadow government					
14	06/03/2012	The Opposite Direction	Where is Yemen heading after Ali Abdullah Saleh? 1) Yemen and the post saleh challenges 2) Yemen's remaining under the domination of Saleh's regime 3) Iran's intervention in the Yemeni affair 4) Debate on the presidential referendum 5) Fighting qat(drugs) in Yemen	Faisal al-Qasim	1) Yasir al-Yamani (a leader in Yemen's ruling party) 2) Ali Nasser al-Bakiti (spokesman in the name of the general forum of the revolutionary powers)		47:04	7,037
15	21/05/2012	In depth	Merits of the transitional period in Yemen 1) Extent of al-Qaeda's influence in the political conduct of the military operation 2) Yemen, army's skeleton and security 3) The political maturity in front of Yemen's president 4) Problems of the national dialogue 5) Yemen between the conspiracy of the previous regime and the stability period	Ali al-Dufairi	1) Nasr Taha Mustafa (Former Syndicate of Yemeni journalists) 2) Saeed Ali Obaid (researcher and specialist of Yemen's affair)		48:31	5,901

Appendix 2: Differences between the debates' video recordings and online transcript

No	Date (Chronological order)	Program	Video duration in minutes	Actual from video	AJ transcript	Type of discrepancy
1	22/5/2011	Revolution Talk	28+missing	**هي** هو يقول في الأمس	هو يقول في الأمس	Omission of pronoun/correction
				بأن التوقيع سيكون **في ثلاث** أماكن	بأن التوقيع سيكون **بثلاث** أماكن	Substitution of preposition
				وكل الخطوات التي **طلبتها** طلبها الأمين العام	وكل الخطوات التي طلبها الأمين العام	Omission of verb+sub pronoun/correction
				اختلف فقط وهذا يذكرني **في احد اللذين**	اختلف فقط وهذا يذكرني..	Omission of incomplete object-intensifier
				والذين يقدمون المبادرات **و**أمام كاميرات التلفزة	والذين يقدمون المبادرات أمام كاميرات التلفزة	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				اشرت الي المبادرة الحقيقية **سيد قرشي** هي المبادرة	اشرت الي المبادرة الحقيقية هي المبادرة	Omission of address form and name/semantic derogation
				دون أن **تقع** يقع توقيعها من قبل الرئيس	دون أن يقع توقيعها من قبل الرئيس	Omission of verb/correction
				لأن هذه الازمة في الواقع **هي** تؤثر على استقرار	لأن هذه الازمة في الواقع تؤثر على استقرار	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
				ولأنه اذا أردا المجلس أن يفشل	لأنه اذا أردا المجلس أن يفشل	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				وأحيي **مشاهدين** الجزيرة الأفاضل.	وأحيي **مشاهدي** الجزيرة الأفاضل.	Addition of suffix/correction
				لن نتقاتل مع اخوتنا **في الأمن**	لن نتقاتل مع اخوتنا **بالأمن**	Substitution of preposition
				أو من الأخوة في **المبادرة الخليجية**	أو من الأخوة في **بلاد الخليج**	Substitution of common noun/semantic derogation
				وسنواجه **ما سنواجه** كل طارئ خطأي من قبل المعارضة	وسنواجه كل طارئ خطأي من قبل المعارضة	Omission of stress-intensifier
				هذا من ابرز اسمحلي فقط سيد المساوى	اسمحلي فقط سيد المساوى	Omission of extra information-intensifier
				هذه مسألة **كانت** قدمت لنا مكتوبة	هذه مسألة قدمت لنا مكتوبة	Omission of past perfect indicator-intensifier
				أو فئة مقابل فئة، **او** الموجود انقسام في كل مكان	أو فئة مقابل فئة، الموجود انقسام في كل مكان	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				بأن سبب عدم موافقة المعارضة **على** تعنت النظام	بأن سبب عدم موافقة المعارضة **هو** تعنت النظام	Substitution of preposition by pronoun
				اذن هو السيد وسيم القرشي **وهو** عضو اللجنة التنظيمية	اذن هو السيد وسيم القرشي هو عضو اللجنة التنظيمية	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				لشباب الثورة في صنعاء، **حتى نصحح الصفة ولا نقع بأي لبس ربما يساء فهمه اذن السيد وسيم قرشي هو عضو اللجنة التنظيمية لشباب الثورة في صنعاء،** سيد قرشي أي دور	لشباب الثورة في صنعاء، سيد قرشي أي دور	Omission of an explanatory paragraph/semantic derogation
				أكثر من **منتي شاب** وهم مازالوا يتلقون الرصاص	أكثر من منتشاب وهم مازالوا يتلقون الرصاص	Spelling mistake
				اسمحلي في البداية **أن** وبخمس واربعين ثانية	اسمحلي في البداية وبخمس واربعين ثانية	Omission of indicative pronoun (that)-intensifier
				محاولات للنظام **في شن** حرب على بعض المناطق	محاولات للنظام **بشن** حرب على بعض المناطق	Substitution of preposition
2	24/07/2011	Revolution Talk	47:30	من التدهور الأمني **سارت** الأمور في اليمن	من التدهور الأمني **دارت** الأمور في اليمن	Substitution of verb
				ليحول تحريكه **في اتجاه** تأمين	ليحول تحريكه **باتجاه** تأمين	Substitution of preposition
				يشاركنا أيضا عبر الأقمار **الاصطناعية**	يشاركنا أيضا عبر الأقمار **الصناعية**	Substitution of adjective
				هي انعكاس لخلل أمني **وليس وليس** هو محاولة	هي انعكاس لخلل أمني وهو محاولة	Omission of 'No'/euphemism
				الى مثل هذه الأحداث **وانما** الآن	الى مثل هذه الأحداث انما الآن	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				أن تكون **صراع** بين أجنحة	أن تكون **صراعا** بين أجنحة	Addition of Nunation/correction+ intensifier
				أعلنت انضمامها **للثورة**	أعلنت انضمامها **الى الثورة**	Substitution of preposition
				تتناقض يوما بعد **آخر**	تتناقض يوما بعد **الآخر**	Addition of article-intensifier
				يعني **هو** نظام عبدالله صالح	يعني نظام عبدالله صالح	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
				ان **اربعة** محطات رئيسية	ان **اربع** محطات رئيسية	Omission of feminine noun/correction

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#	Date	Program	Time			Classification
				أللتنزه أن **يلبسها** يريد أن يفتخر بها	أللتنزه أن **يلبس لها** يريد أن يفتخر بها	Spelling mistake
				بالنسبه لبقية المحافظات لا **تستطيع** العسكر ولا القوات	بالنسبه لبقية المحافظات لا **يستطيع** العسكر ولا القوات	Substitution of verb suffix/correction
				نتيجة تواجد **نتيجة** مرجعيات لاهوتية	نتيجة تواجد مرجعيات لاهوتية	Omission of a noun/correction
				مرجعية حتى **أسامة** بن لادن لو قرأت له كتابات	مرجعية حتى **لأسامة** بن لادن لو قرأت له كتابات	Addition of prepositional suffix/intensifier
				حتى الوحيشي **القيادي الجنوبي** حتى تنظيم القاعدة	حتى الوحيشي قيادي جنوبي حتى تنظيم القاعدة	Omission of article/semantic derogation
				ولولا موقفها صدقني لذهب اليمن **في** مليون ستين داهية	ولولا موقفها صدقني لذهب اليمن **الى** مليون ستين داهية	Substitution of preposition
				سأعطيك **مثلا** باكستان ثم اعطيك **مثلا** من فزاعة	سأعطيك **مثلا** باكستان ثم اعطيك **مثلا** من فزاعة	Substitution of conjunction
				سيد المساوى، **نعم** شرحت وجهة نظرك	سيد المساوى، شرحت وجهة نظرك	Omission of noun-intensifier
				بأنها ستنسي الثورة و**ستطمس** الثورة	بأنها ستنسي الثورة و**ستكمش** الثورة	Substitution of verb/euphemism
				من الزحف نحو العاصمة، بالتالي ستبقى الساحات	من الزحف نحو العاصمة، وبالتالي ستبقى الساحات	Addition of conjunction/dysphemism
				أنا أقول أولا **طبعا** أن الأخ المساوى	أنا أقول أولا أن الأخ المساوى	Omission of hedge
				بحاول أن يظهر أنه **ان** لديه معلومات	بحاول أن يظهر أنه لديه معلومات	Omission of indicative pronoun/intensifier
				طيب يبقى السؤال سيد السعيدي	يبقى السؤال سيد السعيدي	Omission of introductory 'oki'
				ولست أدري من هو حميد **يا بن بجدتها**	ولست أدري من هو حميد	Omission of sarcastic metaphor/euphemism
				تصريحه بأنه سيقتحم **سيكتسح** القصر الجمهوري	تصريحه بأنه سيقتحم القصر الجمهوري	Omission of verb/euphemism
				قل اجعلهم يقولون ما **يشاءون**	قل اجعلهم يقولون ما **يشاؤوا**	Substitution of verb ending
				ما هو او ما هي رؤية شباب الثورة للحل	ما هي رؤية شباب الثورة للحل	Omission of sub+conjunction/correction
				أريد أن أنقل مباشرة الى المجلس الانتقالي	**أرد** أن أنقل مباشرة الى المجلس الانتقالي	Spelling mistake
				أو ينسهم نظرتهم لكن هناك أيضا	أو ينسهم نظرتهم ولكن هناك أيضا	Addition of conjunction-intensifier
				من حقهم أن يطرحوا **مبادرتهم**	من حقهم أن يطرحوا **مبادرة**	Omission of possession suffix-intensifier
				سأخذ رأيك **بهذا** الموضوع	سأخذ رأيك **في هذا** الموضوع	Substitution of preposition
				كلمتين للأخ عباس **لانه** أشكره على	كلمتين للأخ عباس **أنه** أشكره على	Omission of prefix(still wrong)
				من القيادة السياسية **الذي** أنت تدافع عنها	من القيادة السياسية **التي** أنت تدافع عنها	Substitution of relative pronoun/euphemism
				ما حظوظ هذه المساعي **في الوصول**	ما حظوظ هذه المساعي **للوصول**	Substitution of pronoun
				الذي أصر عليه الرئيس **واخيرا** بدعم من	الذي أصر عليه الرئيس بدعم من	Omission of conjunctions-intensifier
				لازال هناك فرصة **ولكن** الفرصة هذه تضيع	لازال هناك فرصة **لكن** الفرصة هذه تضيع	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				دخل في متاهات السياسة ولم **ينظر** يعكس بالفعل	دخل في متاهات السياسة ولم يعكس بالفعل	Omission of verb/correction
				لا الشارع واللقاء المشترك هما جزءان	الشارع واللقاء المشترك هما جزءان	Omission of la of negation/mistake
				انه مازال هناك **فرص** حقيقية	انه مازال هناك **فرصا** حقيقية	Addition of nunation/correction
				الى ناطق **باسم** رئيس الحزب	الى ناطق رئيس الحزب	Omission of prepositional phrase-intensifier
				وانه لا مجال **لا** للتفاوض ولا للحوار	وانه لا مجال للتفاوض ولا للحوار	Omission of la of negation-intensifier
				بينما يقول الأخ **لا** سنحاكم سنحاكمك حزبك	بينما يقول الأخ سنحاكمك حزبك	Omission of la of negation-intensifier
				الحاكمون في اليمن **هو** الاسلاميون	الحاكمون في اليمن **هم** الاسلاميون	Substitution of pronoun/correction
				وجاء من اجل ان يلتقي **يجمع** الطرفين	وجاء من اجل ان يلتقي الطرفين	Omission of verb/correction
				هذه المبادرات لم يكتب لها النجاح **طالما**، والرئيس علي	هذه المبادرات لم يكتب لها النجاح، والرئيس علي	Omission of conjunction/correction
				نعم انا مؤمن بان الفعل الثوري	انا مؤمن بان الفعل الثوري	Omission of 'yes'-intensifier
				أو يجد أن المسافة طالت **وأدخل** عليه شيئ من الملل	أو يجد أن المسافة طالت **ودخل** عليه شيئ من الملل	Substitution of passive by active/euphemism
				من الناس يعرفون في اليمن **معايش** الثورة	من الناس يعرفون في اليمن **معاش** الثورة	Spelling mistake
3	19/09/2011	In Depth	23:53 plus missing	اذ يعول عليه في مسألة أو **في** قضية الحسم **الثوري**	اذ يعول عليه في مسألة أو قضية الحسم	Omission of pronoun and adj-intensifier
				تقدر الخسائر بنحو 8 مليارات دولار	تقدر الخسائر **اليمنية** بنحو 8 مليارات دولار	Addition of adj/dysphemism
				اتهم وزير **الداخلية** بسحب ارصدة الوزارة	اتهم وزير **الخارجية** بسحب ارصدة الوزارة	Substitution of adj-mistake
				ويقل دخل **4** نحو 40% من سكانه دولارين	ويقل دخل نحو 40% من سكانه دولارين	Omission of number/correction
				القاضي والوزير ووزير الأوقاف اليمني **الوزير** الأسبق	القاضي ووزير الأوقاف اليمني الأسبق	Omission of noun-intensifier
				استكمل العدد 22 **تقريبا** حسب ما شاهدنا في الاخبار	استكمل العدد 22 حسب ما شاهدنا في الاخبار	Omission of 'approximately'-hedge
				ومسألة تصاعد الاحتجاجات الشعبية في اليمن **اليوم؟**	ومسألة تصاعد الاحتجاجات الشعبية في اليمن؟	Omission of noun-intensifier

#	Date	Program	Time			
				بقايا بلاطجة النظام المخلوع صالح	بقايا بلاطجة النظام المخلوع **علي عبدالله** صالح	Addition of full president name- euphemism
				الشباب اليوم هم **يحسمون معركتهم او** ينتصرون في معركتهم	الشباب اليوم هم ينتصرون في معركتهم	Omission of sentence-euphemism
				والتي تمنحهم المبادرة الخليجية جزء كبير من الضمانات	والتي تمنحهم المبادرة الخليجية **جزءا** كبيرا من الضمانات	Addition of nunation- stronger point
				لكن اشرت **لضووط** دولية	لكن اشرت **الى ضغوط** دولية	Substitution of preposition
				لاحظتم خلال الاسبوع الماضي فان **تصريح** قد صدر	لاحظتم خلال الاسبوع الماضي فان **تصريحا** قد صدر	Addition of nunation-intensifier
				تدعو كافة الأطراف **لخروج** بحل سلمي	تدعو كافة الأطراف **إلى لخروج** بحل سلمي	Substitution of preposition
				مسألة توقيع صالح	مسألة توقيع **علي عبدالله** صالح	Addition of full president name- euphemism
				لكن الآن أريد أن أتوجه **ايضا** الى توكل	لكن الآن أريد أن أتوجه الى توكل	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				لكن **مضطرون** الآن للخوض فيه	لكن **مضطرين** الآن للخوض فيه	Substitution of case ending/correction
				بان هذه ثورة تتحول من ثورة الى ازمة	بان هذه ثورة **وان** تتحول الى ازمة	Addition of conjunction/dysphemism
				في العمق نحتاج **الى مناقشة** بعض	في العمق نحتاج **لمناقشة** بعض	Substitution of preposition
				نحن نراه مخلوعا ولا **يمتلك** أي حق	نحن نراه مخلوعا ولا **يملك** أي حق	Substitution of verb- euphemism
				نتحدث عن **انه** علي عبدالله صالح	نتحدث عن **ان** علي عبدالله صالح	Omission of prefixed pronoun/ correction
				رئيس مطبوخ يراد ان يوضح هكذا **بعد ثلاثة اشهر هنالك** رئيس	رئيس مطبوخ يراد ان يوضح هكذا هناك رئيس	Omission of time phrase-less strong
				ثورتنا هي فعلا **هي** الأنبل والأقوى	ثورتنا هي فعلا الأنبل والأقوى	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
				أن المبادرة الخليجية في ذاتها **هي** مقبولة أم لا؟	أن المبادرة الخليجية في ذاتها مقبولة أم لا؟	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
				على النائب ممارسة صلاحياته **لانه** وفقا للدستور	على النائب ممارسة صلاحياته وفقا للدستور	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
4	25/09/2011	Behind the News	23:57	شكر في هذا السياق السعودية والامارات **اللتين** قال أنهما	شكر في هذا السياق السعودية والامارات **اللتان** قال أنهما	Substitution of relative pronoun/ correction
				وأعمال العنف وتفويته **الفرصة** التي	وأعمال العنف وتفويته **فرصة** التي	Omission of article-intensifier
				التي **كانت** كان يخطط لها المتطرفون	التي **كان** يخطط لها المتطرفون	Substitution of case ending/ correction
				بل انه ذهب **من** أبعد من ذلك	بل انه ذهب أبعد من ذلك	Omission of preposition-intensifier
				لا، أبدا **لا** بالعكس	لا، أبدا بالعكس	Omission of repetition-intensifier
				وهي جميعا **تهم** باطلة	وهي جميعا **التهم** باطلة	Addition of article/spelling mistake
				لنسمع **الناشطين** من الناشطين الشباب	لنسمع من الناشطين الشباب	Omission of object /added word for emphasis
				كل ما قاله **ليس** لا يأتي في سياق	كل ما قاله **هو** لا يأتي في سياق	Substitution of negation tool by pronoun-correction
				ان البعض اعتبره **انه** جاء متأخرا	ان البعض اعتبره جاء متأخرا	Omission of 'that it'/intensifier
				ووجه خطابه **للشباب**	ووجه خطابه **الي** الشباب	Substitution of preposition
				ترافقها الدبابات والأطقم العسكري، **وخطابنا** واضح	ترافقها الدبابات والأطقم العسكري، **خطابنا** واضح	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				عبدربه منصور هادي نائبه **عند** باصداره قرار	عبدربه منصور هادي نائبه باصداره قرار	Omission of preposition-correction
				حول هذه النقطة، **المتطرفو** الإصلاح	حول هذه النقطة، **متطرفو** الإصلاح	Omission of article-correction
				ما عاد علي صالح من أجل **تنفيذه** على الساحة اليمنية	ما عاد علي صالح من أجل **تنفيذا** على الساحة اليمنية	Spelling mistake
				كما جاء في الكلمة التي **او** استهل بها عودته	كما جاء في الكلمة التي استهل بها عودته	Omission of conjunction-correction
				نعم الشكر للامارات العربية المفتوحة	الشكر للامارات العربية المفتوحة	Omission of added word for emphasis-intensifier
				وجه رسالة كيف **تركضون** وتسعون للوصول	وجه رسالة كيف **ترفضون** وتسعون للوصول	Substitution of verb-from run into refuse
				وترافقها **الاطقم** وصواريخ وبوازيق	وترافقها **أطقم** وصواريخ وبوازيق	Omission of article-correction
				هل سيحاكم لأنه **خرج** نجا من محاولة اغتيال	هل سيحاكم لأنه نجا من محاولة اغتيال	Omission of verb-intensifier
				طيب **هو اذا** لم يقل	طيب **اذا هو** لم يقل	Reorder of pronoun, conditional particle/correction
				اذا غادروا السلطة **سيحاسبوا** على الجرائم	اذا غادروا السلطة **سيحاسبون** على الجرائم	Addition of feminine plural pronoun-added emphasis
				نحن **شعب يمني** نعرف ان الدم لا يضيع	نحن **الشعب اليمني** نعرف ان الدم لا يضيع	Addition of article-intensifier
5	3/10/2011	In depth	48:41	في صناعة **العالم** الرخيص (التشكيل)	في صناعة **العالم** الرخيص	Omission of noun/correction
				تنبأ إنه **ممكن** قد يتنحى	تنبأ إنه قد يتنحى	Omission of a hedge/intensifier
				وبدأوا **يتوقعوا** إنه يكون هناك	وبدأوا **يتوقعون** إنه يكون هناك	Substitution of case ending/correction

يعني في كل الجبهات **في** مرة واحدة	يعني في كل الجبهات مرة واحدة	Omission of preposition-intensifier
ما بين **طبعا** النظام الحاكم في اليمن المؤتمر الشعبي وما بين	ما بين النظام الحاكم في اليمن المؤتمر الشعبي وما بين	Omission of hedge/intensifier
وما بين **مكون** أيضا	وما بين أيضا مكون	Reorder of sub + conjunction
المعارضة **الرئيسي**	المعارضة **الرئيسي**	Addition of prefix-intensifier
من اتفاق بين الحكومة **والمعارضة** الى اتفاق	من اتفاق بين الحكومة **والمعارض** الى اتفاق	Omission of feminine marker/spelling error
نحن نعرف تفاصيل أو تلخيص **للنسخ** المتعددة	نحن نعرف تفاصيل أو تلخيص **النسخ** المتعددة	Substitution of suffix/..
كل المرات **كانه** يتعامل معها ايجابيا	كل المرات **كان الرئيس** يتعامل معها ايجابيا	Substitution of subject/euphemism
قال المصدر الرئاسي **بأنه** الرئيس موافق	قال المصدر الرئاسي **بان** الرئيس موافق	Omission of pronoun/correction
ام انه بعد كل هذه التعديلات ووصولنا **الى النسخة** الخامسة	ام ان بعد كل هذه التعديلات ووصولنا **للنسخة** الخامسة	Substitution of preposition
الموقف الخليجي والموقف السعودي **بشكل رئيسي**	الموقف الخليجي والموقف السعودي **الرئيسي**	Substitution of noun by definite article/ euphemism
وهي اشترطت **مثلا** او طرحت قضية	وهي اشترطت او طرحت قضية	Omission of hedge
لم تكن هناك **في في** مبادرة لاخراج الرئيس	لم تكن هناك مبادرة لاخراج الرئيس	Omission of doubled preposition/correction
هي كانت **في** محاولة لاخراج نظام صالح	هي كانت محاولة لاخراج نظام صالح	Omission of preposition
السعودية حريصة **على** ليس على ان يظل	السعودية حريصة ليس على ان يظل	Omission of preposition
يشكل عبئا على السعودية بتصرفاته **ولأن** السعودية قد تتساءل	يشكل عبئا على السعودية بتصرفاته **لأن** السعودية قد تتساءل	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
نقول لأنكم **تتدخلون** وتفرضون رئيسا	نقول لأنكم **تدخلون** وتفرضون رئيسا	Substitution of verb/Euphemism
وليكون هذا شيئ لا تخطئه العين لمدلولاته	وهذا شيئ لا تخطئه العين لمدلولاته	Omission of hedge
ولا **مثلا** تكون هناك اشكالية	ولا تكون هناك اشكالية	Omission of hedge
قامت بسبب **رئيس** هو أن التنظيمات	قامت بسبب **رئيسي** هو أن التنظيمات	Addition of suffix/intensifier
العمل الرسمي عبر الانتخابات **والاحزاب الرسمية** وبالتالي طالبت	العمل الرسمي عبر الانتخابات وبالتالي طالبت	Omission of 2nd particle of the construction/euphemism
أن يكون بهذه الحنكة ويسبق احزاب المعارضة	أن يكون بهذه الحنكة **وان** يسبق احزاب المعارضة	Omission of relative pronoun/euphemism
لكن كما قلت **بأن** المعارضة استطاعت	لكن كما قلت ان المعارضة استطاعت	Omission of pronoun+ relative pronoun/euphemism
لكن الآن أعتقد **انه** اذا طالت مسألة الحوار	لكن الآن أعتقد اذا طالت مسألة الحوار	Omission of relative pronoun+sub/euphemism
هو جمال بن عمر هي الزيارة الخامسة له	جمال بن عمر هي الزيارة الخامسة له	Omission of address form 'he'-intensifier
لا من تساهل **من قبل** من تسهيل من قبل القوات	لا من تساهل من تسهيل من قبل القوات	Omission of time phrase-intensifier
أما القضايا الأخرى **فهي** لازالت حتى الآن	أما القضايا الأخرى **فالولايات المتحدة** لازالت حتى الآن	Substitution of address form/omission of semantic derogation
ولكن علاقة شخصية فيه بحيث **ان** تكون الولايات المتحدة	ولكن علاقة شخصية فيه بحيث تكون الولايات المتحدة	Omission of relative pronoun-intensifier
فبدأ **بنا** التفكير في اليمن	فبدأ التفكير في اليمن	Omission of prepositional phrase-euphemism
حتى جمال بن عمر في **تصريح أخير** له قال	حتى جمال بن عمر في **التصريح الأخير** له قال	Addition of definite article-intensifier
قضية التغيير اليوم هل هي **التغيير** مرتبطة بشخص الرئيس	قضية التغيير اليوم هل هي مرتبطة بشخص الرئيس	Omission of noun/correction
كل هذه الامور نبحثهم مع ضيفي	**كلا الأمرين** نبحثهم مع ضيفي	Substitution of dual by plural-intensifier
أهلا بكم من جديد في العمق **يبحث** سيناريوهات المستقبل	أهلا بكم من جديد في العمق **نبحث** سيناريوهات المستقبل	Substitution of 'it'by'we'-intensifier
هل سيناريو الحرب الأهلية **يلوح** الأفق	هل سيناريو الحرب الأهلية **يلف** الأفق	Substitution of verb/word choice error
الحرس الجمهوري أولاد **صالح** الرئيس علي صالح	الحرس الجمهوري أولاد الرئيس علي صالح	Omission of proper noun-correction
في حلقات **سابعة** سابقة سلسلة الأقارب	في حلقات سابقة سلسلة الأقارب	Omission of adj-correction
وبين قوى **فرقة** أولى مدرسة	وبين قوى **الفرقة** أولى مدرسة	Addition of definite article-intensifier
بالاضافة إلى **لانه** في التفاف شعبي	بالاضافة إلى **انه** في التفاف شعبي	Omission of preposition-correction
أن تشن الفرقة أولى **مدرع** و القبلية	أن تشن الفرقة أولى **مدرعة والقوى** القبلية	Addition of feminine marker+conj+noun-correction
الذي يريد أن يفجر الأوضاع عسكريا هو **الطرف** النظام	الذي يريد أن يفجر الأوضاع عسكريا هو النظام	Omission of noun-correction
يمكن أن يهدم سلطة لكنه لا **يمكن** يبني سلطة	يمكن أن يهدم سلطة لكنه لا يبني سلطة	Omission of hedge
وفي صنعاء **وفي** من الجماهير	وفي صنعاء من الجماهير	Omission of conjunction+preposition-correction
جماعة علي محسن الأحمر **وقوى** طبعا قوى النظام	جماعة علي محسن الأحمر وطبعا قوى النظام	Omission of noun/euphemism
في الرياض لدعم **الاوضاع**	في الرياض لدعم ...	Omission of noun+adj-intensifier
في فبراير 2010 ولذلك **مطلوب** لن يتم التغيير بين ليلة وضحاها	في فبراير 2010 ولذلك لن يتم التغيير بين ليلة وضحاها	Addition of sub pronoun-correction
او نوع من الوكالة او **انه** يكون المسؤول المحلي	او نوع من الوكالة او **ما** يكون المسؤول المحلي	Substitution of case ending/correction

#	Date	Program	Time				Analysis
					لكن دول المنطقة والسعودية دول الخليج	لكن دول المنطقة دول الخليج والسعودية	Omission of relative pronoun-correction
					ولا تعمل كما كانت تعمل مثلا دولة الكويت	ولا تعمل كما كانت دولة الكويت	Omission of noun-error
					مع مصالح الشعب اليمني، ويعطي الشعب اليمني لم يعد	مع مصالح الشعب اليمني، والشعب اليمني لم يعد	Omission of noun-correction
					انا اعتقد ان اليمن مهمة جدا لدول الاقليم	انا اعتقد ان اليمن مهمة لدول الاقليم	Substitution of relative pronoun-error
					ولكن ايضا على هذه الدول ايضا ان تراعي	ولكن ايضا على هذه الدول ان تراعي	Reorder of noun-semantic derogation to Saudi Arabia
					وطبعا النظام كان يراهن	والنظام كان يراهن	Omission of hedge
					الناس كانوا يعتقدون انه مثلا بمجيئ شهر رمضان	الناس كانوا يعتقدون انه بمجيئ شهر رمضان	Omission of verb-correction
					رئيس تكتل الثورة اليمنية في مصر شكرا جزيلا لك	رئيس تكتل الثورة اليمنية في مصر شكرا لك	Omission of intensifier/euphemism
					ان نتوقع ان هذه الثورة ان تستمر وستلد اليمن	ان نتوقع ان هذه الثورة ستستمر وستلد اليمن	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
					دمتم بخير وفي أمان الله	دمتم بخير وبأمان الله	Omission of hedge
6	4/10/2011	The opposite Direction	47:38		أبناء اليمن من أقصاه الى أقصاه	أبناء اليمن من أقصى الى أقصاه	Spelling mistake
					هل انقطع نسل اليمنيات كي لا يبقى	هل قطع نسل اليمنيات كي لا يبقى	Substitution of active by passive voice/euphemism
					ولا تزالوا تشاهدوا الملايين	ولا تزالوا تشهدوا الملايين	Substitution of verb/spelling error
					وسيظلوا متمسكين بالاخ الرئيس	وسيظلون متمسكين بالاخ الرئيس	Substitution of case ending/intensifier
					نعم بالتأكيد،الاخ ياسر اليمني	نعم بالتأكيد، ياسر اليماني	Omission of address form'brother'-semantic derogation
					لكن أكثر من 20 مليون يمني وأنا منهم	هناك أكثر من 20 مليون يمني وأنا منهم	Substitution of hedge by demonstrative pronoun/intensifier
					كل هذه وبالأخير يتحدثون تتحدث عن نجاح	كل هذه وبالأخير تتحدث عن نجاح	Omission of verbal sentence/correction
					بأي شيئ شكل اعتز به	بأي شكل اعتز به	Omission of noun/correction
					يعني تستطيع أن تظهر	أي عين تستطيع أن تظهر	Substitution of filler by subject/intensifier
					وسائل الاعلام لتأتي لتصور	وسائل الاعلام تاتي لتصور	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
					نحن نتكلم عن ذهاب	نتكلم عن ذهاب	Omission of subject pronoun-intensifier
					الشعب اليمني عظيم لا يحتاج	الشعب اليمني العظيم لا يحتاج	Addition of definite article-intensifier
					وفي أمريكا قبل ثلاث ايام يا أخي فيصل	وفي أمريكا يوم الثلاثاء يا أخي فيصل	Substitution of time phrase
					من أجل شخص وعيلته	من أجل شخص وعائلته	Substitution of nonstandard by standard Arabic/intensifier
					أنا اتحدث اليوم باسم أنس	أنا أتحدث باسم أنس	Reorder of nouns- emphasis on time than speaker
					قتل اليوم توفيق الحاج عمره 12 سنة ايضا قتل	اليوم توفيق الحاج عمره 12 سنة ايضا قتل	Omission of verb-intensifier
					وتم استهدافهم بالقناصة	وتم استهدافهم بالقنص	Substitution of part of speech/euphemism
					أنت تعرف كيف تخرط تخرج هذه المظاهرات	أنت تعرف كيف تخرج هذه المظاهرات	Omission of verb-correction
					ضد أي رئيس عربي يساوا 50 مليون	ضد أي رئيس عربي يساوي 50 مليون	Substitution of subject/correction
					أهم من كل ها الملايين	أهم من كل الملايين	Omission of colloquial demonstrative pronoun/euphemism
					اسمح لي الشيئ الآخر	اسمح لي شيئ آخر	Omission of definite articles-intensifier
					يريدوا أن يوصلوا السلطة	يريدون أن يوصلوا السلطة	Substitution of case ending/correction
					الا الى أيادي آمنة	الا الى أياد آمنة	Omission of suffix/correction
					اذا ارادوا الوصول الى السلطة	اذا ارادوا الوصول للسلطة	Substitution of preposition
					تجب على هذا السؤال	تجب عن هذا السؤال	Substitution of preposition
					طول الفترة الماضية تعرف ان علي عبدالله صالح	طول الفترة الماضية تعرف علي عبدالله صالح	Omission of relative pronoun/error
					و نتكلم الان عن حماية الوحدة	والآن نتكلم عن حماية الوحدة	Omission of time phrase-intensifier
					وتعامل معهم هو كمواطنين درجة ثانية	وتعامل معهم كمواطنين درجة ثانية	Omission of subject pronoun- intensifier
					في 18 يوليو في عام 2006	في 18 يوليو في 2006	Omission of noun-semantic derogation for date
					وأنا لن أقاطعك، ان الجميع يعلم هذا الأمر	وأنا لن أقاطعك، الجميع يعلم هذا الأمر	Omission of relative pronoun-intensifier
					وهي تمتلك كل المكونات لان تكون دولة جيدة	وهي تمتلك كل المكونات لتكون دولة جيدة	Substitution of pronoun-intensifier
					هل تستطيع ان تنكر ان الرجل يكافح الارهاب	هل استطيع ان تنكر ان الرجل يكافح الارهاب	Substitution of pronoun-spelling mistake
					فعلا طيب تحصل تحقيقات	فعلا تحصل تحقيقات	Omission of filler/intensifier
					لكن للأسف أن كل الاعلام	لكن للأسف أننا كل الاعلام	Addition of pronoun-error

ليس هناك مشروع بالدول العربية	ليس هناك مشروع في الدول العربية	Substitution of pronoun
قالوا أنها أملاك للتجمع الوطني للإصلاح	قالوا أنها أملاك للتجمع اليمني للإصلاح	Substitution of adj/intensifier
بالدول العربية الأخرى كما يقول البعض	في الدول العربية الأخرى كما يقول البعض	Substitution of preposition
نريد قضاء عادل ونزيه ليس قضاء	نريد قضاء عادل ونزيه ليس قضي ليس قضاء	Omission of negation+No-correction
كان هناك اتفاق في 18 يوليو 2006 على أن	كان هناك اتفاق في 18 يونيو 2006 على أن	Substitution of No(time-month)
قضاء نزيه وعادل، لا مانع.	قضاء نزيه وعادل، فليتقدم لا مانع.	Omission of verbal sentence-intensifier
أبناء الشعب سيمسكون بالأخ الرئيس	أبناء الشعب سيمسكوا بالأخ الرئيس	Substitution of case ending/correction
عن هذا الجيش القاتل كما يقول لك،	عن هذا الجيش القاتل كما يقول لك، ماشي	Omission of colloquial phrase
هي أجهزة أمن العائلة والجيش اليمني هو الجيش العائلي،	هي أجهزة أمن العائلة والجيش اليمني هو جيش العائلة،	Addition of definite article/dysphemism
من حق الرئيس الجديد المنتخب أن يعين القادات	من حق الرئيس الجديد و المنتخب أن يعين القادات	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
في الوقت الذي قرموش ذهب في سوريا الى تركيا	في الوقت الذي قرموش ذهب الى في سوريا الى تركيا	Omission of preposition-correction
بينما المعارضين والمنشقين العسكريين أمامنا في الساحات	بينما معارضيه ومنشقيه العسكريه أمامنا في الساحات	Addition of definite article and omission of pronouns/euphemism
مازالت تصرف حتى هذه اللحظة	مازالت تصرف حتى اللحظة	Addition of demonstrative pronoun/dysphemism
ليس الى عصابات وقطاعين طرق	ليس الى عصابات والى قطاعين طرق	Omission of pronoun/dysphemism
هؤلاء طيب مش عيب عليكم يا رجل مش عيب عليكم مش عيب عليكم	هؤلاء طيب مش عيب عليكن يا رجل مش عيب عليكن مش عيب عليكن	Substitution of colloquial pronoun/euphemism
لا يستطيع أن يقول لحميد الأحمر بأي شيئ	لا يستطيع أن يقول لحميد الأحمر بأي شيئ	Omission of la of negation/euphemism
شباب يريد التغيير في اليمن يريد الإصلاح في اليمن	شباب يريد التغيير في اليمن يريد إصلاح اليمن	Addition of genitive/less intensifier
متى سيبنون اليمن ألا تشاهد ما في ليبيا	متى سيبنون اليمن ألم تشاهد ما في ليبيا	Substitution of question tool tense/dysphemism
حتى تاريخ الثورة هذه تزيد 40 عام	حتى تاتي هذه الثورة هذه تزيد 40 عام	Substitution of verb by N/correction
والاجتماعية والثقافية وكل شيئ وكل ذلك	والاجتماعية والثقافية وكل شيئ وكل ذلك والجغرافية	Omission of conjunction+N/dysphemism
دقيقة المذهبية والمصلحية وكذا	دقيقة المذهبية والمصالحية وكذا	Spelling mistake
وليس النظام اليمني، علي عبدالله صالح	وليس النظام اليمني، ولا علي عبدالله صالح	Omission of la of negation-intensifier
أولا حتى أصحح المعلومة	أولا حتى حتى بس أصحح المعلومة	Omission of repetition and modifier-intensifier
نحن نتحدث عن أن شباب	نحن نتحدث عن شباب	Omission of la of negation-intensifier
أنا تكلمت شوف الفرق بين كلامي وكلامه	أنا تكلمت انا اتعامل شوف الفرق بين كلامي وكلامه	Omission of nominal sentence-intensifier
يعني من تحت الدلفة الى تحت المزراب	يعني من تحت الدلفة لتحت المزراب	Substitution idiom prepositional phrase/mistake
أن نخرج الى الساحات لكي نسقط علي عبدالله صالح	أن نخرج الى الساحات لنسقط علي عبدالله صالح	Addition of conjunction/euphemism
كما تنتقد الأخ الرئيس ان تنتقد حميد الأحمر	كما تنتقد الأخ الرئيس انتقد حميد الأحمر	Substitution of case ending/euphemism
أنه أوصل بلده إلى هذه الحال	أنه أوصل بلده إلى هذا هذه الحال	Omission of pronoun-correction
لماذا لا تسمح لهؤلاء الشباب	طيب لماذا لا تسمح لهؤلاء الشباب	Omission of a filler 'ok'
شباب السماوات المفتوحة الى متى يريد أن يجثم	شباب السماوات المفتوحة طيب الى متى يريد أن يجثم	Omission of a filler 'ok'
اذا كانوا يؤمنون بالديمقراطية	اذا كانوا يؤمنوا بالديمقراطية	Substitution of case ending/correction
من أوصاهم أن يتحدثوا باسم الشعب اليمني	من أوصاهم يتحدثوا باسم الشعب اليمني	Substitution of case ending-correction
ويتحدثون مع أبناء الشعب	ويتحدثوا مع أبناء الشعب	Substitution of case ending-correction
الشعب المني	الشعب اليمني	Spelling mistake
لماذا يهابون الانتخابات	لماذا يهابوا الانتخابات	Substitution of case ending-correction
وكانوا يخافون من هذه	وكانوا يخافون من فقدان هذا هذه	Omission of N+pronoun/euphemism
بالتالي سقطائهم	وبالتالي سقطائهم	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
مسيطرين على الجيش والاعلام والمال وبالتالي	مسيطرين على الجيش والاعلام وعلى المال وبالتالي	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
يجب أن تصحح المعادلة أولا	يجب أن تصحح المعادلة أولا وان يذهب علي عبدالله صالح وابنائه	Omission of sentence/euphemism
علي عبدالله صالح سيظل	علي عبدالله صالح أسمعت؟ ليس، علي عبدالله صالح سيظل	Omission of sentence+not+full proper noun/euphemism
ها هو فيصل القاسم يحييكم مرة أخرى من الدوحة	ها هو فيصل القاسم يحييكم من الدوحة	Addition of 'again'-intensifier

#	Date	Program	Time	النص	النص	Category
7	8/10/2011	Behind the News	25.06	صالح: "لا نريد السلطة ولسنا بحاجة الى السلطة، لكن احنا باجة ان نسلم السلطة الى أيادي آمنة"	....	Omission of speech/euphemism
				والى جانب ملف صالح	الى جانب ملف صالح	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				ولكن كيف ولماذا؟	ولكن متى وكيف؟	Reorder & Substitution of question tool
				قتلوا أبناء الشعب اليمني،	قتلوا الشعب اليمني،	Omission of N/euphemism
				هل هو مستعد على تسليم السلطة	هل هو مستعد لتسليم السلطة	Substitution of pronoun
				ان هذا الرجل غير فاقد الشرعية والمشروعية	ان هذا الرجل فاقد الشرعية والمشروعية	Omission of negation tool/semantic derogation
				لكن ربما، على كل ولكن	على كل ولكن	Omission of hedges
				والآن نحاول نعمل على تشكيل مؤسسات	والآن نعمل على تشكيل مؤسسات	Omission of hedge
				نعم وهنا دعيني ربما أطرح	نعم هنا دعيني ربما أطرح	Omission of conjunction
				بينما في بقية الدول العربية الذي شاهدنا	بينما في بقية الدول العربية التي شاهدنا	Substitution of relative pronoun/correction
				ورفضت الاعتراف بهذا المجلس التي يقوده حميد	ورفضت الاعتراف بهذا المجلس الذي يقوده حميد	Omission of relative pronoun/correction
				هي المستمدة من الدستور من الشعب لكن مستمدة	هي المستمدة من الدستور لكن مستمدة	Omission of prepositional phrase-intensifier
				أو من الاخوان في اللقاء	أو من الاخوة في اللقاء	Substitution of colloquial plural noun/correction
8	23/11/2011	Behind the News	25:15	غير التوقيع على المبادرة التي يعود بعدها رئيسا شرفيا	غير التوقيع على المبادرة ليعود بعدها رئيسا شرفيا	Substitution of relative pronoun by pronoun-..
				فأنتم موجودين حتى لو تخلينا عن السلطة	فأنتم موجودون حتى لو تخلينا عن السلطة	Substitution of case ending-correction
				بيد أن المشهد اليمني تبدوا تعقيداته أكثر بكثير	بيد أن المشهد اليمني يبدوا تعقيداته أكثر بكثير	Substitution of verb suffix/correction
				ثورة يقول المؤمنون بها أنها ماضية الى غايتها	ثورة يقول المؤمنون بها أنه ماضية الى غايتها	Spelling mistake
				ولكن قبل ذلك طبعا سنتحدث إليه بشكل سريع	ولكن قبل ذلك سنتحدث إليه بشكل سريع	Omission of hedge
				اسمحوا لي أن أتحدث لأحد أطراف الأزمة	اسمحوا لي أن أتحدث مع أحد أطراف الأزمة	Substitution of pronoun
				نعم بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم اولا الثورة اليمنية الشبابية	نعم أولا بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم الثورة اليمنية الشبابية	Reader of a signal/ less intensifier
				هذا النظام بكامله وشموليته	هذا النظام بكماله وشموليته	Substitution of noun/intensifier
				فكان لزاما على علينا كشباب للثورة	فكان لزاما علينا كشباب للثورة	Omission of pronoun/correction
				والعشرات من النساء، من هذه هي نتيجة هذا النظام	والعشرات من النساء، هذه هي نتيجة هذا النظام	Omission of pronoun/correction
				واختطف الشباب طيب إذن وجبت محاكمة هذا النظام	واختطف الشباب إذن وجبت محاكمة هذا النظام	Omission of a filler
				أولا أريد أن أؤكد أنه مطالب الشباب	أولا أريد أن أؤكد أن مطالب الشباب	Omission of pronoun/correction
				وأكدت على من خلال مشاوراتي مع جميع الأطراف	وأكدت من خلال مشاوراتي مع جميع الأطراف	Omission of pronoun/correction
				تؤدي الى اعادة تشكيل لجنة عسكرية	تؤدي الى تشكيل لجنة عسكرية	Omission of noun-intensifier
				تقريرا من الأمين العام سيقدمه يوم 28 معناه الأسبوع المقبل	تقريرا من الأمين العام سيقدمه يوم 28 الأسبوع المقبل	Omission on N-intensifier
				الى أي حد يضمن هذه الوفاق بين أطراف اعتادت على الصراع	الى أي حد يضمن الوفاق بين أطراف اعتادت على الصراع	Omission of pronoun/correction
				أنه إذا فيه نية بين الأطراف	أنه إن كان حسن نية بين الأطراف	Substitution of colloquial conditional by a standard-..
				دعم قوي من المجتمع الدولي، وهناك كان هناك تقدم في تطبيق	دعم قوي من المجتمع الدولي، كان هناك تقدم في تطبيق	Omission of conjunction+demonstrative pronoun-intensifier
				لم أحصل على جواب واضح هنا، ولكن أشكرك سيد جمال	لم أحصل على جواب واضح هنا، لكن أشكرك سيد جمال	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				ممثلا في الأخوان الاشقاء في مجلس التعاون الخليجي	ممثلا في الأخوان في مجلس التعاون الخليجي	Omission of adj-intensifier
				فالمعارضة هم أبنائنا ونحن آبائهم	فالمعارضة هم أبناؤنا ونحن آبائهم	Substitution of case ending/correction
				والموقف يتطلب الى جهد كبير	والموقف يتطلب جهدا كبيرا	Omission of pronoun
				سنضطر لنأخذ فاصل قصير	سنضطر لأخذ فاصل قصير	Substitution of verbal sentence by noun
				ولم يقبل كما قلتم بلغة التنحي	ولم يقبل كما قلتم بالتنحي	Omission of noun-intensifier
				تعبيرا عن قناعاته بأن الثوار التداول السلمي للسلطة	تعبيرا عن قناعاته بأن التداول السلمي للسلطة	Omission of noun-correction
				يعرف فيها كل طرف ما هي التزامه	يعرف فيها كل طرف ما هو التزامه	Substitution of pronoun/correction
				تجربته مع المعارضه أكبر من تجربتي وتجربتك	تجربته مع المعارضه أكثر من تجربتي وتجربتك	Substitution of intensifier from size into number
				ولكن قبولنا بها لا بد أن يرافقها آلية تنفيذيه	ولكن قبولنا بها لا بد أن يرافقه الية تنفيذيه	Omission of verb feminine ending/correction
				ما إحنا بصدد معنا هو يتطلب إلى وقت	ما إحنا بصدد يتطلب إلى وقت	Omission of pronoun/euphemism
				أن لا يضيع جهده ما بذله في هذه الفترة	أن لا يضيع جهده وأن ما بذله في هذه الفترة	Omission of conjunction+relative pronoun-intensifier

				المجتمع الدولي **لا يعني معنا** في كل الأطراف الذي ذكرتها	المجتمع الدولي في كل الأطراف الذي ذكرتها	Omission of sentence/euphemism
				أن يشرفوا اشرافا مباشرا لكي يكونوا **معنا** على إطلاع	أن يشرفوا اشرافا مباشرا لكي يكونوا على إطلاع	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				ومن قبل كل فئات **الشعب** اليمني	ومن قبل كل فئات **المجتمع** اليمني	Substitution of noun/intensifier
				لم نعتد بشرعية **الرئيس** علي عبدالله صالح	لم نعتد بشرعية علي عبدالله صالح	Omission of noun(reference)-intensifier
				وبالتالي الأجهزة سوف **ستقوم**	وبالتالي الأجهزة سوف **تقوم**	Substitution of verb tense from future to present/intensifier
				بعملية بتحري كامل	بتحري كامل	Omission of preposition+noun-intensifier
				على العموم **الكل بلا شك** سيتابع	على العموم **بلا شك الكل** سيتابع	Reorder of Hedge/less intensifier
9	3/12/2011	Behind the News	24:42	**نعم** أختي العزيزة هذه الأطراف لا تريد أن تخرج اليمن	أختي العزيزة هذه الأطراف لا تريد أن تخرج اليمن	Omission of filler-intensifier
				والاخوان المسلمين بزعامة **حمود** المدعو حمود المخلافي	والاخوان المسلمين بزعامة المدعو حمود المخلافي	Omission of proper name/correction
				يقتلون الأبرياء **الأطفال** والشيوخ	يقتلون الأبرياء **والأطفال** والشيوخ	Addition of conjunction-intensifier
				من يقصف عم هؤلاء علما أن تعز	من يقصف عم هؤلاء علما **بأن** تعز	Addition of preposition-intensifier
				هل **هنالك** منطق بما تقوله؟	هل **هناك** منطق بما تقوله؟	Substitution of demonstrative pronoun
				وأن تحمي المواطنين و تقتل الأبرياء	وأن تحمي المواطنين **وأن** تقتل الأبرياء	Addition of relative pronoun-intensifier
				لا يريدون باليمن الخير لا يريدون **للشعب الخير**	لا يريدون باليمن الخير لا يريدون	Omission of pronoun+genitive+object-intensifier
				ليس لها يد **في في** فيما يصير في تعز	ليس لها يد في فيما يصير في تعز	Omission of a doubled preposition(filler)/correction
				لن يكون رجل عصابات **اسمحيلي** ...	لن يكون رجل عصابات ...	Omission of verbal sentence-intensifier
				كان من المفترض تشكيلها **من** في خلال 5 أيام	كان من المفترض تشكيلها في خلال 5 أيام	Omission of preposition/correction
				الآليات التي **حددها** الآلية التنفيذية	الآليات التي حددتها الآلية التنفيذية	Omission of a sentence/correction
				هناك **و** مسار	هناك مسار	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				تنفيذ المبادرة	**وتنفيذ** المبادرة	Addition of conjunction-intensifier
				لا ليس مجلس التعاون الخليجي الآن في وارد	ليس مجلس التعاون الخليجي الآن في وارد	Omission la of negation-intensifier/correction
				هم أشقاء **سيكونوا** حريصين معنا	هم أشقاء **سيكونون** حريصين معنا	Substitution of case ending/correction
				توقيت **التوقيت** إشعال هذه الجبهة يطرح سؤال	توقيت إشعال هذه الجبهة يطرح سؤال	Omission of noun/correction
				بين السلطة من جهة **وما** تبقى من هذه السلطة	بين السلطة من جهة **ما** تبقى من هذه السلطة	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
10	13/12/2011	The opposite Direction	47:02	كيف تنظر يعني **86%** وحوالي 87% من المصونتين	كيف تنظر يعني **86.6%** وحوالي 87% من المصونتين	Addition of 0.6% - intensifier
				كان يحاور المعارضة عامين **كاملان** على طريقة الحوار	كان يحاور المعارضة عامين **كاملين** على طريقة الحوار	Substitution of case ending- correction
				بهذه الالفاظ تم **الاستهتار** بالشعب اليمني	بهذه الالفاظ تم **استهتار** بالشعب اليمني	Omission of definite article/euphemism
				النظام الشعب اليمني قادر	الشعب اليمني قادر	Omission of noun/correction
				هو المبادرة الخليجية **ان كان** ان كانت المبادرة الخليجية	هو المبادرة الخليجية ان كانت المبادرة الخليجية	Omission of emphasis noun/ correction
				وبالتالي محطتنا **الى** الان ومنطق اللحظة يحتم	وبالتالي محطتنا الان ومنطق اللحظة يحتم	Omission of filler(doubled pronoun)/correction
				ازداد الفقر **ازداد** ازدادت المعاناة	ازداد الفقر ازدادت المعاناة	Omission of verb-intensifier
				ثورة 1962 انتهت **ايضا** الى المقاصل في اليمن	ثورة 1962 انتهت الى المقاصل في اليمن	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
				ارديك ان تجيب على السؤال، **جيب على السؤال؟**	ارديك ان تجيب على السؤال؟	Omission of a question-intensifier
				ما زالت تابعة من **أخمصها** رأسها الى أخمص قدميها	ما زالت تابعة من رأسها الى أخمص قدميها	Omission of noun/correction
				وستبقى نفس **الشيوخ** الشخوص هذه في كل الثورات	وستبقى نفس الشخوص هذه في كل الثورات	Omission of noun/correction
				لكن هناك كثير من الآليات	هناك الكثير من الآليات	Omission of hedge/intensifier
				لأن الذي يدير اليمن **ليس** ليست مؤسسات	لأن الذي يدير اليمن ليست مؤسسات	Omission of no of negation/euphemism
				ان كنت تعتقد **انه** يجب اجتثاث المؤتمر بملايينه	ان كنت تعتقد **ان** يجب اجتثاث المؤتمر بملايينه	Omission of pronoun
				ما تخسر مليارات **ما تخسر** هؤلاء الطواغيت	ما تخسر مليارات هؤلاء الطواغيت	Omission of sentence-intensifier
				عندك حق تعاملت **مع** ضد الشعوب عندك حق	عندك حق تعاملت ضد الشعوب عندك حق	Omission of conjunction/correction
				هذا النظام فرط بالسيادة الوطنية كما **لا** لم يفرط بها الأمام	هذا النظام فرط بالسيادة الوطنية كما لم يفرط بها الأمام	Omission of la of negation/correction
				الذي ضحى من أجله كل **هذا** هذه الشعوب	الذي ضحى من أجله كل هذه الشعوب	Omission of pronoun/correction
				مطالب شعب كل منه وجرح الآلاف وعشرات الآلاف	مطالب شعب قتل منه وجرح **منه** الآلاف وعشرات الآلاف	Addition of preposition+genitive-intensifier

No.	Date	Program	Time	Arabic (right)	Arabic (left)	Analysis
				وهناك شعب يقظ وهناك **شو هناك** شباب قادر على	وهناك شعب يقظ وهناك شباب متعلم قادر على	Omission of colloquial question-intensifier
				بس أسألك **سؤال**، أليس يعني ألا تعتقد	بس أسألك، أليس يعني ألا تعتقد	Omission of object-intensifier
				أحدثوا توازن قوى وبالتالي **أفشل** مخططات علي عبدالله	أحدثوا توازن قوى وبالتالي **أفشلوا** مخططات علي عبدالله	Substitution of singular by plural subject/intensifier
				اليمنيون **يقول** يقولون أن سجل هذا الرجل	اليمنيون يقولون أن سجل هذا الرجل	Omission of verb/correction
11	9/01/2012	Behind the news	25:31	ووجهت الثورة السلمية	ووجهت الثورة **اليمنية** السلمية	Addition of adj/intensifier
				وانتفت **هاذان** النقطتان	وانتفت **هاتان** النقطتان	Substitution of demonstrative pronoun/correction
				لا نجد قانونا وضعيا **يكون له** حصانه	لا نجد قانونا وضعيا **له يكون** حصانه	Substitution of verb +genitive/error
				الأخ الرئيس ليس بحاجه **الى** الحصانه	الأخ الرئيس ليس بحاجه **لهذه** الحصانه	Substitution of preposition by genitive/intensifier
				طيلة ثلاثة **وثلاثون** عام	طيلة ثلاثة **وثلاثين** عام	Substitution of case ending/correction
				في صيف **1994 و 1993**	في صيف **1993 و 1994**	Reorder of years
				نتحدث بمنطق اليوم **ان** في النهاية المسألة أن ما حدث	نتحدث بمنطق اليوم في النهاية المسألة أن ما حدث	Omission of relative pronoun-intensifier
				يحللوا لانفسهم **ويحرموا** على الاخرين	يحللوا لانفسهم **ويحرمون** على الاخرين	Substitution of case ending/correction
				وتعتبر شريكة **فيها** أيضا في الجرائم	وتعتبر شريكة **هي** أيضا في الجرائم	Substitution of genitive by pronoun
				فان القادة **الفرنسيون** الذين قاموا بالقاء	فان القادة **الفرنسيين** الذين قاموا بالقاء	Substitution of case ending/correction
				بالقاء الاخوة **الجزائريون** في نهر السين	بالقاء الاخوة **الجزائريين** في نهر السين	Substitution of case ending/correction
				لم يلاحقوا قضائيا **وهذا** وهذه عملية ابتزاز	لم يلاحقوا قضائيا وهذه عملية ابتزاز	Omission of conjunction+demonstrative pronoun/correction
				بشروط معينه بأغلب الظن **أنها** ستنطبق	بشروط معينه بأغلب الظن **بأنها** ستنطبق	Omission of preposition/less intensifier
				اختصاص أصيل في اصدار **اذا** مذكرات توقيف	اختصاص أصيل في اصدار مذكرات توقيف	Omission of conditional particle/correction
				ولكن أنا أتكلم على **ال**33 عاما المنصرفة	ولكن أنا أتكلم على 33 عاما المنصرفة	Omission of definite article-intensifier
				اذا ما **تصرف** تصرفت الحكومات المقبلة	اذا ما تصرفت الحكومات المقبلة	Omission of verb/correction
				وفي هذه الحالة **فان** اغلب الظن	وفي هذه الحالة ان اغلب الظن	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				بان من يتحمل المسؤولية **هي** علي عبدالله صالح	بان من يتحمل المسؤولية **هو** علي عبدالله صالح	Substitution of pronoun/correction
				القيادة الكهولة الكاهلة **والطاعنه** في السن	القيادة الكهولة الكاهلة **الطاعنه** في السن	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				هي جرائم مكتملة الاركان **وبسبق** الاصرار والترصد	هي جرائم مكتملة الاركان **بسبق** الاصرار والترصد	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				التي تحدثت عنها والاخ **الرئيس** علي عبدالله صالح	التي تحدثت عنها والاخ علي عبدالله صالح	Omission of reference noun/semantic derogation
				ان اختم مع محمود رفعت **في خصوص** نقطة	ان اختم مع محمود رفعت **بخصوص** نقطة	Substitution of pronoun/correction
				هذا مشروع القانون هذا اذا اجازه البرلمان	مشروع القانون هذا اذا اجازه البرلمان	Omission of demonstrative pronoun-intensifier
				اذا **ما المستقبل** كيف يمكن ان ننظر للمستقبل	اذا كيف يمكن ان ننظر للمستقبل	Omission of question-intensifier
12	21/1/2012	Behind the News	24:09	هذا **أكثر** من هذا	هذا **أفضل** من هذا	Substitution of intensifier from quantity into quality
				Human Rights Watch	**Watch Human Rights**	Reorder of proper noun/spelling mistake
				أهم صلاحياته **الرئاسية**	أهم صلاحياته **الرئيسية**	Substitution of adj
				وقلنا بأننا أننا **احنا** ملتزمون بكافة بنود	وقلنا بأننا أننا ملتزمون بكافة بنود	Omission of colloquial pronoun-intensifier
				كما **أنه** مخالفا لهذه المنظومة	كما **أن** مخالفا لهذه المنظومة	Omission of pronoun/euphemism
				هناك مصالح وطنية شاملة دون الدخول في هذا القانون	هناك مصالح وطنية شاملة **من** دون الدخول في هذا القانون	Addition of pronoun-intensifier
				وكما أننا نرفض مشروع الحصانة	**كما** أننا نرفض مشروع الحصانة	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				لأنه لا يوجد قوة على **وجوه** الأرض	لأنه لا يوجد قوة على الأرض	Omission of noun-intensifier
				فهنالك أمور أو **اتفاق** اتفاقيات	فهنالك أمور أو اتفاقيات	Omission of noun/correction
				التي تخص سيادة الوطن **مثل** مثلا موضوع ترسيم	التي تخص سيادة الوطن مثلا موضوع ترسيم	Omission of conjunction/correction
				تم ضمان **الامر** الأمور السياسية	تم ضمان الأمور السياسية	Omission of noun/correction
				لأنهم **ارنك** ركنوا للمعارضة	لأنهم ركنوا للمعارضة	Omission of meaningless word(slip of tongue)/correction
				لو **كان** الشباب فعلا	لو **كانوا** الشباب فعلا	Addition of masculine plural pronoun/mistake
				الى قادة أو **اقطاب** اللقاء المشترك	الى قادة أو **قادة** اللقاء المشترك	Substitution of noun /less intensifier
				فيما يتعلق **بصلاحية تامة** بالرئيس	فيما يتعلق **بعمل** الرئيس	Substitution of N/omission of intensifier

الأصل (النص)	النص المعدّل	English
تم انتهاكها في المرحلة السابقة وعدم **الانتهاكات** مستقبلا	تم انتهاكها في المرحلة السابقة وعدم **انتهاكات** مستقبلا	Omission of definite article/euphemism
تؤكد بأنه **يتم** تفسير هذا القانون	تؤكد بأنه **لا** تفسير هذا القانون	Substitution of affirmative by negative/semantic derogation
محفوظة في المحاسبة والمساءلة **هوجه الضرر** هذه نقطة	محفوظة في المحاسبة والمساءلة هذه نقطة	Omission of a filler/correction
بأن هذا جهدنا **هذا** هو طريقنا	بأن هذا جهدنا **وهذا** هو طريقنا	Addition of conjunction-intensifier
أن تنتزع **حقوق** من هذه	أن تنتزع **حقوقنا** من هذه	Omission of possessive pronoun/dysphemism
ولكنه عائد **اذا** هل هناك ضمان	ولكنه عائد هل هناك ضمان	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
هنالك مجموعة كبيرة	**هناك** مجموعة كبيرة	Substitution of demonstrative pronoun
والأحزاب التنظيمية الجديدة التي نشأت هذه الأيام	والأحزاب التنظيمية الجديدة التي نشأت **في** هذه الأيام	Addition of preposition-intensifier
التي هي قائمة الآن **وكذلك** نظام علي	التي هي قائمة الآن **كذلك** نظام علي	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
الأنظمة أثبتت فشلها **في في** على مدى عقود	الأنظمة أثبتت فشلها على مدى عقود	Omission of doubled preposition(filler)/correction
جزءا من النظام سابقا **والآن** وبعدها كانت معارضة	جزءا من النظام سابقا وبعدها كانت معارضة	Omission of conjunction+discourse marker/euphemism
وأصبحت جزءا من النظام كما ترين **وفي** حكومة الوفاق	وأصبحت جزءا من النظام كما ترين **في** حكومة الوفاق	Omission of conjunction –intensifier
فهنالك نوع من **ربما** التوافق ربما فيما حدث	فهنالك نوع من التوافق ربما فيما حدث	Omission of hedge/less intensifier
لو شخصنا المشكلة في اليمن **نجد** انها حقيقية	لو شخصنا المشكلة في اليمن **لوجدنا** انها حقيقية	Substitution of case ending/dysphemism
هنالك **عناد** ما بين أسرة	هنالك **العناد** ما بين أسرة	Addition of definite article/dysphemism
الشعب اليمني لو اراد فعلا التجديد عبر تحول سياسي	الشعب اليمني لو اراد فعلا التجديد **والتحول** عبر تحول سياسي	Omission of conjunction+No/less intensifier
الثورة الشعبية اليمنية **التي هي السلمية** ثورة الشعب	الثورة الشعبية اليمنية **السلمية التي** هي ثورة الشعب	Reorder of relative pronoun+pronoun+adj/intensifier
والآن في الواقع **حتى**، وأنتم كنتم يدا بيد	والآن في الواقع، وأنتم كنتم يدا بيد	Omission of conjunction/correction
لم تنجزوا شيئا **لن** تحققوا تغييرا	لم تنجزوا شيئا **لم** تحققوا تغييرا	Substitution of negation from future to past/euphemism
وجميع فئات المجتمع الشعبي اليمني **وبالتالي** الاحزاب السياسيه	وجميع فئات المجتمع الشعبي اليمني **فبالتالي** الاحزاب السياسيه	Substitution of conjunction/less intensifier
وبالتالي **فنحن** مستمرون	وبالتالي **نحن** مستمرون	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
بخطنا الثوري الذي اخترناه **وفي** نهاية المطاف	بخطنا الثوري الذي اخترناه **في** نهاية المطاف	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
فيما يتعلق بالقانون اولا **اريد ان اقول** بانه	فيما يتعلق بالقانون اولا بانه	Omission of sentence-intensifier
وما يمكن **ان** يسفر عنه تشريعات	وما يمكن يسفر عنه تشريعات	Omission of relative pronoun-intensifier
في اطار الحوار الوطني **وبنى** هيكلية جديدة	في اطار الحوار الوطني **وبناء** هيكلية جديدة	Substitution of N/correction
النقطة الثانية فيما يتعلق **باولاد** علي صالح	النقطة الثانية فيما يتعلق **اولاد** علي صالح	Omission of preposition/euphemism
ضمن اطار معاونيه وبالتالي **فانهم** سيكون من الاجراءات	ضمن اطار معاونيه وبالتالي سيكون من الاجراءات	Omission of conjunction+emphasis No+pronoun-intensifier
سيكون هناك القانونيين الذي **يمكن ان**	سيكون هناك القانونيين الذين	Omission of hedge
يحددوا ما يمكن ان يتم اتخاذه	**يحددون** ما يمكن ان يتم اتخاذه	Substitution of case ending/correction
أو لاخراجهم من سجونهم **في حال** الكوارث	أو لاخراجهم من سجونهم **حين** الكوارث	Substitution of conjunction/correction
لذلك هنا يجب ان تكون عداله حقيقية	هنا يجب ان تكون عداله حقيقية	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
في الحركات السياسية والأحزاب حتى **يحول** يحصل التحول السياسي	في الحركات السياسية والأحزاب حتى يحصل التحول السياسي	Omission of verb/correction

#	Date	Title	No.	الأصل (النص)	النص المعدّل	English
13	23/02/2012	Revolution's talk	49.00	مع الشباب الى **مشاكل عدة** أخرى	مع الشباب الى **عدة مشاكل** أخرى	Reoder of N+Ad/correction
				شباب الثورة من جانبهم اعتبروا	شباب الثورة من **جانبهم** اعتبروا	Spelling mistake
				أماني اليمنيين بيمن جديد **نتيجة** استمرار	أماني اليمنيين بيمن جديد **بسبب** استمرار	Substitution of noun
				فضلا عن قضية **الفقر** وما يشابهها	فضلا عن قضية **القفر** وما يشابهها	Spelling mistake
				هي التي تنتظر **من** الرئيس اليمني حملها	هي التي تنتظر الرئيس اليمني حملها	Omission of preposition/euphemism
				ومن تعز عبد**الحافظ** الفقيه (5 مرات)	ومن تعز عبد**الحفيظ** الفقيه (5 مرات)	Substitution of proper noun(name)
				علي عبدالله صالح و البدء في	علي عبدالله صالح **علينا** البدء في	Substitution of conjunction by preposition+genitive/dysphemism
				ومتى ستعود كهرباء	متى ستعود كهرباء	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
				الكهرباء عادت منذ **ثلاث** أيام	الكهرباء عادت منذ **ثلاثة** أيام	Substitution of feminine marker/correction
				من شماله الى جنوبه ومن شرقه الى غربه	من شماله الى جنوبه من شرقه الى غربه	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				لم **نرى** شمولية	لم **نر** شمولية	Substitution of case ending/correction

لكن لاحظنا السيد الوزير	لاحظنا السيد الوزير	Omission of hedge
لاحظنا أن الشوارع ما زالت معتمة	أن الشوارع ما زالت معتمة	Omission of sentence/intensifier
واذا عدت قريبا سترين صنعاء	واذا عدت قريبا ستجدين صنعاء	Substitution of verb/less intensifier
من هذا الحقل الألغام	من هذا حقل الألغام	Omission of definite article/correction
مسائل أخرى مثل المسألة الأمنية	مسائل أخرى مثل المسائل الأمنية	Substitution of singular by plural/dysphemism
التي يمكن أن تحارب هذا الفساد	التي يمكن إن تحارب هذا الفساد	Substitution of pronoun by relative pronoun/error
من الله عزوجل أن يتقبل	من الله أن يتقبل	Omission of adj/semantic derogation
الذي هدم أو الذي كذلك قضى على	الذي هدم أو الذي قضى على	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
غير الاحرار الشرفاء من المؤتمر الشعبي	غير الاحرار الشرفاء في المؤتمر الشعبي	Substitution of pronoun
او اي انحراف لمسار حكومة	او اي انحراف في مسار حكومة	Substitution of preposition
في عام 2006 صوتم للرئيس	في العام 2006 صوتم للرئيس	Addition of definite article/intensifier
اما نحن في هذه المرحلة الحالية فشعبنا في القلوب	اما نحن في هذه المرحلة فشعبنا في القلوب	Omission of adj-intensifier
لم يذهب الى الانتخابات بشكل جدي	لم يذهب للانتخابات بشكل جدي	Substitution of preposition
لكل ألوان الطيف السياسي والثقافي	لكل ألوان الطيف السياسي الثقافي	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
ويعني البلد ككل	يعني البلد ككل	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
لا أظن أن المقاطعة كانت فعالة ولا مؤثرة.	لا أظن أن المقاطعة كانت فعالة يعني ولا مؤثرة.	Addition of filler(I mean)-hedge
قالت هنالك نسبة مشاركة كبيرة	قالت ان هنالك نسبة مشاركة كبيرة	Addition of relative pronoun-intensifier
ومنها قضية الجنوبية	ومنها قضية الجنوب	Substitution of adj by N-/correction
مالا يستطيع أحد أن يتخيل يعني	مالا يستطيع أن يتخيل يعني	Omission of N-intensifier
أنا في رأيي أنها في كفة والأزمة	أنا في رأيي في كفة والأزمة	Omission of relative pronoun+S/error
ستنظم مؤتمر وطني	ستنظم مؤتمرا وطنيا	Addition of critical marks/correction/intensifier
يتكلم بمثل هذه اللهجة ويتأسف	يتكلم بمثل هذه الطريقة ويتأسف	Substitution of N/dysphemism
هو وغيره قالوا	هو وغيره قال	Substitution of subj
من أجل هذه مثل هذه القضايا الكبيرة	من أجل مثل هذه القضايا الكبيرة	Omission of demonstrative pronoun/correction
لكل الآراء وستجدوا أننا	لكل الآراء وستجدون أننا	Substitution of case ending/correction
عبر التاريخ منذ الأزل	عبر التاريخ ومنذ الأزل	Addition of conjunction-intensifier
أن تلبى وأن تحل هذه القضية	أن تلبى وتحل هذه القضية	Omission of relative pronoun-intensifier
وينبغي لحكومة الوفاق مع الأخ الرئيس عبدربه منصور أن يعطوا الأولوية	وينبغي لحكومة الوفاق مع الأخ الرئيس عبدربه منصور أن يعطي الأولوية	Substitution of case ending
أنا بالنسبة للحوثيين طيب أنا أقول	أنا بالنسبة للحوثيين أنا أقول	Omission of filler (ok)
الذي ستقدمه الحكومة للحوثيون	الذي ستقدمه الحكومة للحوثيين	Substitution of case ending-correction
هل مدة السنتين للمرحلة الانتقالية أمام هذه كافية برأيك؟	هل مدة السنتين للمرحلة الانتقالية أمام هذه برأيك؟	Omission of adj/error
أن يجتمع الجميع على مائدة واحدة وحوار ويتفقوا	أن يجتمع الجميع على مائدة واحدة للحوار ويتفقوا	Substitution of conjunction by (preposition+definite article)/intensifier
من قال حتى ان فشلت هذه اللجنة	من قال ان فشلت هذه اللجنة	Omission of hedge
من أكبرها الى أصغرها	من أكبرها لأصغرها	Substitution of preposition
ولكن في نفس الوقت	ولكن بنفس الوقت	Substitution of preposition
حقيقة أن نعم، نعم اللجنة العسكرية	نعم اللجنة العسكرية	Omission of sentence-intensifier
بذلت جهود تشكر	بذلت جهود الحقيقة تشكر	Omission of hedge
أنا قلت لك قبل قليل ويقولها إن كل قيادي	أنا قلت لك قبل قليل وأقول إن كل قيادي	Substitution of sub pronoun+omission of object pronoun-..
لهم مطلب واحد ولا غيره هو شعار الدولة	لهم مطلب واحد ولا غيره شعار الدولة	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
نحن نناضل عشرين سنة	نحن نناضل في عشرين سنة	Addition of preposition-intensifier
وبين قانون الحصانة ما كيف ترد	وبين قانون الحصانة كيف ترد	Omission of relative pronoun
بما تبقى من الوقت ايضا عن مصير	بما تبقى من الوقت عن مصير	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
قانون العدالة هو يأتي عقب مشكلة	قانون العدالة يأتي عقب مشكلة	Omission of pronoun(filler)
اذا سالت دماء للشهداء	اذا سالت دماء الشهداء	Omission of preposition

#	Date	Program	Time			
				يعني **استفزاز استفزاز** استهتار بدماء الشهداء	يعني استهتار بدماء الشهداء	Omission of a doubled noun/euphemism
				مسالة الدماء ومسالة ايضا الفاسدين **زاد** عن حدها	مسالة الدماء ومسالة ايضا الفاسدين **زادت** عن حدها	Substitution of masculine by feminine subject/correction
				وهذا شيئ مهم **للمستقبل**	وهذا شيئ مهم **في المستقبل**	Substitution of pronoun
				لكن هذه **المنطقة** بني مطر والحليمتين ذهبت	لكن هذه **المناطق** بني مطر والحليمتين ذهبت	Substitution of singular by plural Noun/intensifier
				ولا هو الذي أخذ أموال الشعب **هذه عمايل** حتى الجيش	ولا هو الذي أخذ أموال الشعب حتى الجيش	Omission of demonstrative pronoun+colloquial noun-.
				لا أعتقد اطلاقا أن الشعب **هم من** يكسر في الكهرباء	لا أعتقد اطلاقا أن الشعب يكسر في الكهرباء	Omission of prepositional phrase-intensifier
				ما الدور الاقليمي والدولي المطلوب الآن **مع** هذا الترحيب	ما الدور الاقليمي والدولي المطلوب الآن **على** هذا الترحيب	Substitution of preposition
				حديث الثورة **الاستثنائية**	حديث الثورة **الاستثنائي**	Omission of feminine marker
14	06/03/2012	The Opposite Direction	47:04	صوت 12048، **59.1** نعم	صوت 12048، **95.1** نعم	Substitution of 59.1 by 95.1%/intensifier
				حصل فيه الأخ عبدربه منصور على **99.98%**	حصل فيه الأخ عبدربه منصور على **98.99%**	Substitution of 99.98 by 98.99%/semantic derogation
				الذي ظهر جديدا سيبدأ **لهذه** البداية	الذي ظهر جديدا سيبدأ **بهذه** البداية	Substitution of preposition
				شركاء مكملين لهذا الوطن **يكفي ما** عانى الشعب	شركاء مكملين لهذا الوطن **أنه** عانى الشعب	Substitution of verb by relative phrase/euphemism
				للخروج من هذه الأزمة لا أن **نزرع** نضع العقبات	للخروج من هذه الأزمة لا أن **نأتي** نضع العقبات	Substitution of verb/euphemism
				ولتحويل اليمن **عامل** تهديد	ولتحويل اليمن **لعامل** تهديد	Addition of preposition/euphemism
				كما **نرى** رأينا في ليبيا	كما رأينا في ليبيا	Omission of verb/correction
				الذي أغسلت أدمغتهم أن **يعوا** أن الأخ	الذي أغسلت أدمغتهم أن **يقتنعوا** أن الأخ	Substitution of verb/intensifier
				أنا أستغرب أنه يطرح **مثل** هذه الأطروحات!	أنا أستغرب أنه يطرح هذه الأطروحات!	Omission of conjunction/intensifier
				نعم هو يقول **ان** هناك استقرار	نعم هو يقول هناك استقرار	Omission of relative pronoun/intensifier
				الدماء تسيل في كل مكان **وبالنسبة** للشرعية	الدماء تسيل في كل مكان بالنسبة للشرعية	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				وشاهدنا التصريح للسفير الأمريكي **الأخير**الذي قال:	وشاهدنا التصريح الأخير للسفير الأمريكي الذي قال:	Omission of adjective
				لإيران في اليمن تريد **تزرع** اليمن	لإيران في اليمن تريد **زرع** اليمن	Substitution of verb by noun/correction
				أن تحتفظ بهذه الأموال **وان تجعلها** في خزينتها	أن تحتفظ بهذه الأموال في خزينتها	Omission of relative phrase/euphemism
				تعاني في الأصل البلاد **فهل** تستطيع البلاد	تعاني في الأصل البلاد **هل** تستطيع البلاد	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
				ألا يكفي **انه** ما لا يدرك كله لا يترك جله	ألا يكفي ما لا يدرك كله لا يترك جله	Omission of relative pronoun-intensifier
				التي خرج بها عبدالله صالح	التي خرج بها **علي** عبدالله صالح	Addition of reference pronoun(proper name)-intensifier
				مقارنة مع السفاحين **مع مع** الآخرين في البلدان	مقارنة مع السفاحين الآخرين في البلدان	Omission of a doubled preposition/correction
				أخي أنا عم بحكي لك **الآن** عن علي	أخي أنا عم بحكي لك كلام عن علي	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				لكنه ليس احتراما للشعب **وأنما** احتراما لأبنائه	لكنه ليس احتراما للشعب أنما احتراما لأبنائه	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				كل الجمهوريات **دون** أن نحدد	كل الجمهوريات **بلا** أن نحدد	Substitution of noun
				النظام الوحيد **النظام** في الجمهوريات العربية هو نظام الجيش	النظام الوحيد في الجمهوريات العربية هو نظام الجيش	Omission of noun/correction
				الإخوان سواء تنظيم القاعدة	الإخوان سواء **في** تنظيم القاعدة	Addition of preposition-intensifier
				ان هذه القيادات غير **كفوئة** بهذه المناصب	ان هذه القيادات غير **كفوة** بهذه المناصب	Substitution of adj/correction
				نحن عندما نتحدث يجب ان نتحدث عن **المنشقين**	نحن عندما نتحدث يجب ان نتحدث عن **منشقين**	Omission of definite article/euphemism
				التي كان يريد **الانقلابيون** تحويل اليمن	التي كان يريد **الانقلابيين** تحويل اليمن	Substitution of case ending/error
				وبه تستكمل **او تستكمل** الثورة أهدافها	وبه تستكمل الثورة أهدافها	Omission of conjunction+verb-intensifier
				في **ظل** هذا التوازن	في **طل** هذا التوازن	Spelling mistake
				ألا يقول لك الرجل ايران تنفق الملايين لاحباط الثورة	يقول لك الرجل ايران تنفق الملايين لاحباط الثورة	Omission of question tool/dysphemism
				اليمن بحاجة **الى الاستقرار**	اليمن بحاجة **للاستقرار**	Substitution of preposition
				وانه هؤلاء، **انه** هذا الطرف من حقهم	وانه هؤلاء، هذا الطرف من حقهم	Omission of relative phrase-intensifier
				هم من أخرجوا من هذه الأزمة	هم من أخرجوا **اليمن** من هذه الأزمة	Addition of object/intensifier
				أنا أتمنى على الأخ علي، **وهو** شاب من الشباب الواعد	أنا أتمنى على الأخ علي، هو شاب من الشباب الواعد	Omission of conjunction/intensifier
				أمهات **الثكالى** والشهداء	أمهات **الثكلى** والشهداء	Substitution of plural by singular noun/euphemism
				تم الضغط على المواطنين **بمختلف** الوسائل	تم الضغط على المواطنين **بكافة** الوسائل	Substitution of adj/dysphemism
				استخدموا الدقيق، **استخدموا** القمح، استخدموا كل امكانيات الدولة	استخدموا الدقيق، القمح، استخدموا كل امكانيات الدولة	Omission of verb+subject/euphemism

#	Date	Program	Time			Annotation
				هذه النتائج التي يتحدث بها الابن علي	هذه النتائج التي يتحدث الابن علي	Addition of genitive-intensifier
				وشهدت لهذه الانتخابات، وهو اليوم يطعن	وشهدت لهذه الانتخابات، و اليوم يطعن	Omission of pronoun/dysphemism
				طيلة عام يا أستاذ فيصل أن الشعب اليمني	طيلة عام يا أستاذ فيصل أن الشعب اليمني	Omission of a sentence-intensifier
				وهو اليوم يطعن بالاخت توكل	واليوم يطعن بالاخت توكل	Omission of subject pronoun/dysphemism
				وسيعمل جاهدا الأخ الرئيس لخروج من هذه الأزمة	وسيعمل جاهدا الأخ الرئيس للخروج اليمن من هذه الأزمة	Omission of definite article+1st and 2nd particle of the construction-intensifier
				من يمارس المظالم في كتاف وفي دماسي الكثير	من يمارس المظالم على الاخرين في كتاف وفي دماسي الكثير	Omission of genitive/euphemism
				وفي حكومة المؤتمر الوطني	وفي حكومة الوفاق الوطني	Substitution of 2nd particle of the construction
				أنه الدولة كلها، أن الدولة كلها سخرت	أنه الدولة كلها، او أن الدولة كلها سخرت	Omission of conjunction-hedge
				في طور فرعون جديد، آه، أنا أسألك	في طور فرعون جديد، آه، طيب أنا أسألك	Omission of filler(ok)-intensifier
				خاض الانتخابات وهو يستطيع تحريك	خاض الانتخابات وهو لا يستطيع تحريك	Omission of la of negation/euphemism
				ومن ثم لم يخرج للتصويت	ومن ثم فلم يخرج للتصويت	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				وانما بارادة النظام	وانما بارادة اطراف النظام	Omission of 1st particle of the construction
				وأنا أتكلم عن قادة التاريخيين	وأنا أتكلم عن قادة الاخوان التاريخيين	Omission of 2nd particle of the construction/semantic derogation
				نمثل عددا من أحزاب السياسة	نمثل عددا من الأحزاب السياسة	Omission of definite article/correction
				وهم الآن في السلطة من الذي تغير!	وهم الآن في السلطة ما الذي تغير!	Substitution of wh question tool
				بس بدي أسألك سؤال، طب لماذا	بس بدي أسألك سؤال أنا، طب لماذا	Omission of subject pronoun-intensifier
				لماذا تحكمون عليه يعني...	لماذا تحكمون عليه وهو لم يقضي في الحكم يعني...	Omission of sentence/euphemism
				يا أخي اذا كان هذه البداية	يا أخي اذا كانت هذه البداية	Spelling mistake
				من الوصول الى مراكز الاقتراع	من الوصول الى صناديق الاقتراع	Substitution of genitive noun/euphemism
				والأخ علي يتحدث أنه ممثل كذلك للحوثيين	والأخ علي يتحدث أن ممثل كذلك للحوثيين	Addition of subject pronoun-intensifier
				عين محافظين جدد.	عين محافظين له جدد.	Omission of the genitive/euphemism
				والأخ الرئيس عبدربه منصور	والأخ الرئيس منذ الوهلة عبدربه منصور	Omission of prepositional phrase/correction
				وأن يأتوا للمؤتمر الوطني	وأن يأتوا الى المؤتمر الوطني	Substitution of preposition
				أبناء الجنوب ظلموا قهروا	أبناء الجنوب ظلموا وقهروا	Omission of conjunction
				منفردا الى الوحدة وناءوا كل قيادات	منفردا الى الوحدة وباؤوا كل قيادات	Substitution of verb
				ونحن نعرف ان علي عبدالله صالح	ونحن نعرف انه علي عبدالله صالح	Omission of subject pronoun/correction
				لانه يدعي انه من قام في حرب 1994	لانه يدعي انه من قام لحرب 1994	Substitution of preposition/correction
				الجنوب تم أبشع الجرائم	الجنوب تم ممارسة أبشع الجرائم	Omission of noun/mistake
				هل فعلا يا أخي	هل تعلم يا أخي	Substitution of verb by a hedge/dysphemism
				أن نعترف بما اقترفته القيادة	أن نعترف بما اقترفته بما اقترفته القيادة	Omission of repeated genitive-intensifier
				باسم الثورة هذا أخطر من الممارسات	باسم الثورة وهذا أخطر من الممارسات	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				التي كان يمارسها علي عبدالله صالح	التي كان يمارسها نظام علي عبدالله صالح	Omission of 1st particle of the construction(subject)-/euphemism
				أسألك سؤال في نهاية الموضوع	أسألك سؤال بنهاية الموضوع	Omission of noun/correction
				على القادة اليمنين	على قادة اليمنين	Omission from video/euphemism
				كيف تتوقع لبلد لبلد أن ينهض وهو سكران 24 ساعة بربك؟	كيف تتوقع لبلد لبلد أن ينهض وهو سكران 24 ساعة بربك؟	
				(مقتطع في اليوتيوب)	(مقتطع في اليوتيوب)	
				علي عبدالله صالح اليوم سلم السلطة	علي عبدالله صالح ما يزال اليوم سلم السلطة	Omission of verb/correction
15	21/05/2012	In depth	48:31	وبقي أبناءه أيضا	وبقي أبناؤه أيضا	Spelling mistake
				ويثير هذه مجتمعا ثورة اليمنين السلمية	ويثير هذه مجتمعا كل المخاوف ثورة اليمنين السلمية	Omission of determiner+N/euphemism
				مواجهة تأخرت كثير	مواجهة تأخرت كثيرا	Spelling mistake
				بعض القوى المعارضة اتهمت الرئيس	بعض قوى المعارضة اتهمت الرئيس	Addition of the definite article-intensifier
				وتجعل لها أولويه إنه عشان توفر	وتجعل لها أولويه لأنه عشان توفر	Omission of preposition
				ربما تكون هذه الحالة غير مسبوقة	ربما يكون هذه الحالة غير مسبوقة	Substitution of prefix/correction
				لكن هل هناك عناصر غير طبيعية	لكن هل مسألة هناك عناصر غير طبيعية	Omission of noun/correction

هو لا شك **أنه** أعنقد أنه أخذ	هو لا شك أعنقد أنه أخذ	Omission of relative pronoun/correction
نتهم به النظام السابق هو **غضه** البصر	نتهم به النظام السابق **هو غض** البصر	Omission of pronoun/euphemism
هي نفسها تنسق، **مع** التنسيق اذا كان هناك	هي نفسها تنسق، التنسيق اذا كان هناك	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
عيد الوحدة إنه **اذا** فيما لو تخلى	عيد الوحدة إنه فيما لو تخلى	Omission of conditional particle-hedge
عبدربه هادي واضح **فمن هو** وحقيقة هي بحاجة	عبدربه هادي واضح وحقيقة هي بحاجة	Omission of conjunction+genitive/correction
أريد أن أسأل الأستاذ **نصر** الآن	أريد أن أسأل الأستاذ **ناصر** الآن	Substitution of proper name/spelling mistake
في قيادة الجيش بدأ تقدم **الجاد** فيه الحرب	في قيادة الجيش بدأ تقدم **الجد** فيه الحرب	Substitution of noun/correction
وهي تحصد، وتستولي على المزيد	وهي تحصد، تستولي على المزيد	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
عهد علي عبدالله صالح **الي**	عهد علي عبدالله صالح **الذي**	Substitution of colloquial by standard relative pronoun-intensifier
كانت الطائرات الأمريكية	**كان** الطائرات الأمريكية	Omission of feminine marker/mistake
هم الذين **رعوها** هذا عهد كان الأمريكيون	هم الذين **يرعوها** هذا عهد كان الأمريكيون	Substitution of past by present verb tense/intensifier
نريد أن الواقع أن الأمريكيين لديهم	الواقع أن الأمريكيين لديهم	Omission of verb+conditional particle/correction
الأمريكيون هم الأكثر **الحجة** والأكثر شماعة	الأمريكيون هم الأكثر **حجة** والأكثر شماعة	Omission of definite article/spelling mistake
ليست فقط للشعوب بل **حتى** والقاعدة نفسها	ليست فقط للشعوب بل والقاعدة نفسها	Omission of hedge
من العام 1994 كل **مشتروا** الجيش والتحديث	من العام 1994 كل **مشتريات** الجيش والتحديث	Addition of a letter/correction
وليس **لبقية** لقوات الجيش	وليس لقوات الجيش	Addition of genitive/euphemism
أكثر من موضة صدامية **وبني** تضخم على حساب	أكثر من موضة صدامية وتضخم على حساب	Omission of noun/correction
أعتقد **أن** رئيس جهاز الأمن	أعتقد رئيس جهاز الأمن	Omission of relative pronoun-intensifier
يعني أنا **طبعا** لا أتحدث عن الشخصيات	يعني أنا لا أتحدث عن الشخصيات	Omission of filler/euphemism
سيطرة كبيرة في **قضية** ملف الأمن	سيطرة كبيرة في ملف الأمن	Omission of N/euphemism
لا أعتقد **أن ازاحته صعبة**.	لا أعتقد.	Omission of sentence/euphemism
هم قالوا هم أنفسهم ابن **أخو** الرئيس أنفسهم	هم قالوا هم أنفسهم ابن **أخ** الرئيس أنفسهم	Substitution of case ending
وهذا متروك **لتقديرات** الرئيس	وهذا متروك **لتغييرات** الرئيس	Substitution of noun/semantic derogation
وتم تعيين **بدلا** عنه لواء من اللواء	وتم تعيين عنه لواء من اللواء	Omission of conjunction/correction
الاكثر استعصاء الجيش واجهزة الامن؟	الاكثر استعصاء الجيش **ولا** اجهزة الامن؟	Addition of la of negation/error
في الأوراق ولا **في** مسجلة	في الأوراق ولا مسجلة	Omission of preposition-intensifier
ولكن **هذا** هذه المرحلة الأولى	ولكن هذه المرحلة الأولى	Omission of demonstrative pronoun/correction
المرحلة الثانية **الآن هي**	المرحلة الثانية **هي الآن**	Reorder of time phrase+pronoun
الآن **هي** المتعلقة بالجانب الفني	الآن المتعلقة بالجانب الفني	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
لأخراج أولا كل معسكرات **القوات** المسلحة	لأخراج أولا كل معسكرات **قوات** المسلحة	Omission of definite article/spelling mistake
بالضبط بالتالي وهو في خطابه	وبالتالي وهو في خطابه	Substitution of preposition+intensifier by conjunction/ ..
المهم **الي** ألقاه قبل أسبوعين	المهم **الذي** ألقاه قبل أسبوعين	Substitution of colloquial by standard relative pronoun-intensifier
اذا تحدثت عن نوايا الرئيس	تحدثت عن نوايا الرئيس	Omission of conditional particle-intensifier
من الاستحقاقات السياسية الأخرى	**على** الاستحقاقات السياسية الأخرى	Substitution of pronoun
نبحث اليوم استحقاقات الانتقال	**سنبحث** اليوم استحقاقات الانتقال	Substitution of present by future tense/less intensifier
تنامي ايضا نشاط **تنظيم** القاعدة	تنامي ايضا نشاط القاعدة	Omission of 1st particle of construction/euphemism
طبعا اللواء علي محسن الأحمر	اللواء علي محسن الأحمر	Omission of intensifier
هو الأمران **اللذان** اللذين نصا عليهما المبادرة	هو الأمران اللذين نصا عليهما المبادرة	Omission of demonstrative pronoun/correction
اعادة **الهيكلة** الجيش والحوار	اعادة **هيكلة** الجيش والحوار	Omission of definite article/correction
الانفصال **التي** البعض ينادي فيها	الانفصال **الذي** البعض ينادي فيها	Substitution of relative pronoun/correction
لكن هل لديه القدرة الكافيه	هل لديه القدرة الكافيه	Omission of but-hedge
لا .. اعتقد انه تغيير كبير	اعتقد انه تغيير كبير	Omission of la of negation-intensifier
في **ملف** الرئيسي على الأقل	في **الملف** الرئيسي على الأقل	Addition of definite article/correction
لكن في تقديري **انه** بعد الموقف الدولي	لكن في تقديري بعد الموقف الدولي	Omission of relative phrase-intensifier
جلسة مجلس الأمن **الوطني** الدولي بعد القرار	جلسة مجلس الأمن الدولي بعد القرار	Omission of adj-intensifier

				الأصل	التعديل	التصنيف
				أستاذ سعيد	**طيب أسأل** أستاذ سعيد	Omission of filler+verb/semantic derogation
				الحوار الوطني نوه بدأ	الحوار الوطني **هو** نوه بدأ	Omission of pronoun-intensifier
				ترتيب الانفصال العودة ل **1994**.	ترتيب الانفصال العودة ل **94**	Substitution of 94 by 1994/intensifier
				ولقي له **يعني بعض** المروبين	ولقي له **بعض يعني** المروبين	Reorder of subject+filler/correction
				من الحراك أنا أعتقد **أن** هذا الجزء	من الحراك أنا أعتقد **أنه** هذا الجزء	Omission of relative pronoun/correction
				وأنا قرأتها **بصراحة** من أكثر من مصدر	وأنا قرأتها **طبعا** من أكثر من مصدر	Substitution of intensifier/euphemism
				الايرانيون **يعني** يبحون عن موطئ	الايرانيون يبحون عن موطئ	Addition of filler/euphemism
				والمتغيرات اللي **يمكن** تحدث	والمتغيرات اللي **ممكن** تحدث	Substitution of hedge by verb/euphemism
				في عقد المؤتمرات في **استقطاب** ..	في عقد المؤتمرات في **استقطابات** ..	Substitution of plural by singular N/less intensive
				وقانون أعتقد **انه** كل الأموال	وقانون أعتقد **ان** كل الأموال	Addition of pronoun/error
				مثلا للسعودية تأثير كبير	للسعودية تأثير كبير	Addition of conjunction
				لها اليوم هذا الفارق بين أهداف	لها اليوم هذا **هو** الفارق بين أهداف	Omission of pronoun/euphemism
				أنا لا أريد أن أقول انه **هذا** يعني ..	أنا لا أريد أن أقول انه يعني ..	Omission of demonstrative pronoun
				الآن هم لا شك يشكلوا دولة	الآن هم لا شك **انهم** يشكلوا دولة	Omission of demonstrative phrase- intensifier
				مضبوط ولدينا دولة للحوثيين	مضبوط ولدينا دولة للحوثيين	Omission of conjunction/euphemism
				ولدينا قاعدة ولدينا ايضا منطقة	ولدينا **دولة** قاعدة ولدينا ايضا منطقة	Omission of 1st particle of the construction/euphemism
				الحراك أحيانا **تيار** يضع اشتراطات	الحراك أحيانا **في جانبي** يضع اشتراطات	Substitution of the genitive by noun-intensifier
				أحزاب المعارضة التي اليوم	أحزاب المعارضة التي **تشاركت** اليوم	
				بدعم اقليمي ودولي الى آخره	بدعم اقليمي ودولي **والى** آخره	Omission of conjunction-intensifier
				في تقديري **سيظلون** قوة جاهزة	في تقديري **سيظلوا** قوة جاهزة	Substitution of case ending/correction
				التي تحكم اليوم **ورئيس** الوزراء	التي تحكم اليوم رئيس الوزراء	Addition of conjunction-intensifier
				وأعتقد بأنها ليست صعبة	و**أنا** أعتقد بأنها ليست صعبة	Omission of subject pronoun/euphemism
				مجموعة ليست على الشكل السابق	مجموعة ليست على **الشاكل** الشكل السابق	Omission of noun/correction
				باسم النظام السابق يعني بعض الخطابات	باسم النظام السابق **لا زال** يعني بعض الخطابات	Omission of conjunction/correction
				وكأن النظام لم تكن هناك ثورة	وكأن النظام **او** لم تكن هناك ثورة	Omission of conjunction/dysphemism
				هذا معلومات **ولا** تحليل يعني؟	هذا معلومات لا تحليل يعني؟	Addition of conjunction/mistake
				وان كان هناك اتفاقات بينه وبين الرئيس	وان كان **خاصة** هناك اتفاقات بينه وبين الرئيس	Omission of intensifier
				ثورة جديدة **يؤمنون** بها	ثورة جديدة **يؤمنوا** بها	Substitution of case ending/correction
				أنا أعتقد لا يشكل أحمد علي	أنا أعتقد **انه** لا يشكل أحمد علي	Omission of relative pronoun-intensifier
				ويتجهون إلى العمل المدني	**ويتجهوا** إلى العمل المدني	Substitution of case ending/correction
				وكأن النظام لم تكن هناك ثورة	وكأن النظام **أو** لم تكن هناك ثورة	Omission of conjunction
				لأنه تورطوا في مواجهات مع شباب الثورة	**لأنهم** تورطوا في مواجهات مع شباب الثورة	Substitution of subject/error
				ربما يعني أنا أقول انما أنا لا أريدهم	ربما يعني أنا أقول انما أنا **لا** لا أريدهم	Omission of la of negation/correction
				أو يفتح أمامهم **مجال** للعمل السياسي	أو يفتح أمامهم **المجال** للعمل السياسي	Omission of definite article-intensifier
				عهد علي عبدالله صالح وعهد.	عهد علي عبدالله صالح وعهد **أسرته**.	Omission of 2nd particle of the construction/error
				صفحة البرنامج **الرئيسية** على موقع الجزيرة	صفحة البرنامج **الرسمية** على موقع الجزيرة	Substitution of adj/correction
				في العمق **صفحات** البرنامج على موقع	في العمق **وصفحة** البرنامج على موقع	Substitution of singular by plural/intensifier

Appendix 3: Translation certificate

Date: Thursday 4th February, 2016

To Whom It May Concern

This is to certify that we have conducted a detailed review of 'the translation in the documents 'macro-analysis' and 'Interviews' done by Ms. Tamadher Al Sabaei of the research titled "Critical discourse analysis of the 2011 Yemen revolution".

We hereby confirm the translation is correct and match to the source text.

Yours Sincerely,

For/ Tarjamah Legal Translation

T.O.: 32 / 2014

ABSOLUTE PRECISION

إتقان تام

Appendix 4: AJ Approval Letter

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قـــــنـــــاة الجـــزيـــرة
ALJAZEERA CHANNEL

Ethics Committee
University of Hertfordshire
London, UK

16/09/2014

SUB: APPROVAL OF DATA COLLECTION FROM AL JAZEERA CHANNEL

We received Ms. Raiya Sulaiman Salim Al Kharusi's request to collect data from Al Jazeera Channel in Doha, Qatar for her research in the form of interviews for her PhD project entitled 'A Critical Discourse Analysis of TV Political Debates of the 2011 Yemen Movement: the Ideological Balance of Broadcasts'.

We agree and welcome Ms. Al Kharusi's visit to the offices of our channel in Doha, Qatar to collect her data by interviewing channel staff. Details on the interviews such as visit date, Al Jazeera staff members to be interviewed and content of questions are to be decided by Ms. Al Kharusi. We will make sure that Ms. Al Kharusi's visit to the channel will be a pleasant and fruitful one.

We thank you for your interest in the channel's activities and wish Ms. Al Kharusi all the best.

Ahmed Al Hooti
Chief Bureau
Al Jazeera office
Muscat, Oman

Appendix 5: Hertfordshire ethics approval

University of Hertfordshire **UH**

UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE
SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES

ETHICS APPROVAL NOTIFICATION

TO   Raiya Sulaiman Salim Al Kharusi

CC   Dr Tim Parke

FROM   Ms Caroline Large, Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities ECDA Vice-chairman

DATE   19/1/15

Protocol number: **HUM/PG/UH/00723**

Title of study: A Critical Discourse Analysis of TV Political Debates of the 2011 Yemen Movement: the Ideological Balance of Broadcasts

Your application for ethical approval has been accepted and approved by the ECDA for your school.

This approval is valid:

From: 5/4/15

To: 7/4/15

Please note:

Approval applies specifically to the research study/methodology and timings as detailed in your Form EC1. Should you amend any aspect of your research, or wish to apply for an extension to your study, you will need your supervisor's approval and must complete and submit form EC2. In cases where the amendments to the original study are deemed to be substantial, a new Form EC1 may need to be completed prior to the study being undertaken.

Should adverse circumstances arise during this study such as physical reaction/harm, mental/emotional harm, intrusion of privacy or breach of confidentiality this must be reported to the approving Committee immediately. Failure to report adverse circumstance/s would be considered misconduct.

Ensure you quote the UH protocol number and the name of the approving Committee on all paperwork, including recruitment advertisements/online requests, for this study.

Students must include this Approval Notification with their submission.

Appendix 6: Interview questions

1. For how long have you been working with Al Jazeera? Where did you work before?

متى انضممت للعمل بقناة الجزيرة؟ أين كنت تعمل سابقا؟

2. What is a critical incident you have encountered while working with the debates?

حدثني عن الموقف الحاسم الذي صادفك خلال العمل مع القناة وتحديدا فيما يخص الحوارات/المناظرات؟

General / عام

3. Are there any channel policies in terms of how program procedures take place? If yes, what are they?

هل توجد أي سياسات للقناة فيما يخص ادارة البرامج من تحضير وتنفيذ وبث الخ؟

4. Do you train the channel's policies in your training programs?

هل تقومون خلال برامج التدريب بتدريس سياسات القناة؟

5. On what basis does the channel use new terms such as بلاطجةand الرئيس المخلوع? Does Al Jazeera consider the language it uses the formal standard contemporary Arabic?

على اي أساس يتم اختيار مصطلحات جديدة (مثال: بلاطجة أو رئيس مخلوع)؟ وهل تعتبر الجزيرة اللغة التي تستخدمها هي اللغة العربية الفصحى المعاصرة؟

Topic and question selection / الموضوع واختيار الأسئلة

6. How are topics selected and by who?

كيف يتم اختيار مواضيع الحلقات ومن يختارها؟

7. Who drafts the questions? When?

من يقوم بصياغة أسئلة الحلقات؟ متى؟

8. Who drafts the report which introduces the debates?

من يكتب التقارير التي يتم بثها في بداية كل حلقة؟

Speakers / المتحدثون

9. How are the speakers selected (who chooses and on what bases)?

من يختار المتحدثين؟ وعلى أي أساس؟

10. Is there any difference in the selection of real time vs. virtual speakers?

على أي أساس يتم اختيار المتحدثين ليتواجدوا بالأستوديو أو يتحدثوا افتراضيا (عن طريق Skype) مثلا؟

11. Do speakers know about the questions prior to the debates?

هل يعرف المتحدثون عن الأسئلة قبل موعد الحوار؟

Moderator / المذيع

12. On what bases are the moderators selected? Why are there no Qataris?

على أي أساس يتم اختيار المذيعين للعمل بالقناة وتحديدا للبرامج الحوارية؟ لماذا لا يتواجد مذيعين قطريين؟

13. Who watches the moderator? Does s/he have an earpiece? What instructions can the moderator get?

من يقوم بمتابعة المذيع أثناء الحوار؟ هل تكون المتابعة عبر سماعة الأذن؟ ما هي التعليمات التي يحصل عليها المذيع؟

14. Can the moderator ask follow up questions? Can s/he deviate from the questions? Are questions rigidly timed? Can the moderator cut off speakers? If yes, according to what: topic such as a taboo, time or speaking tone?

هل بإمكان المذيع تغيير الأسئلة؟ هل بإمكانه إضافة أسئلة للمتابعه ؟ هل يتم توقيت الأسئلة بصرامة؟ هل بإمكان المذيع ايقاف المتحدث، وعلى أي أساس يقوم بإيقافه كحساسية الكلام أو الوقت أو نبرة صوت المتحدث؟

15. Are there any policies concerning the language used with and about women?

هل توجد سياسات بخصوص اللغة المستخدمه مع وعن المرأة في البرامج الحوارية؟

16. Why do some moderators sometimes use nonstandard Arabic?

لماذا يستخدم بعض المذيعين لغة عربية عامية أحيانا؟

17. Do moderators have certain standing points which they try to win while moderating programs?

هل توجد لدى المذيعين آراء/وجهات نظر يحاولون الفوز بها خلال الحوار؟

18. Why do some moderators use 'I mean'?

لماذا يستخدم بعض المذيعين كلمة (يعني)؟

Transcription / (تفريغ الحوارات كتابة بموقع الجزيرة الالكتروني)

19. Why does Al Jazeera transcribe debates?

لماذا تقوم الجزيرة بتفريغ الحوارات/المناظرات؟

20. Who, when and how are the debates transcribed after being staged? 3

من ومتى وكيف يتم تفريغ الحوارات/المناظرات؟

21. Who checks whether the transcript is accurate and complete?

من يقوم بالتأكد من أن التفريغ صحيح ومكتمل؟

22. Who decides on which debates are transcribed? And how are they transcribed?

من يقوم باختيار الحلقات التي يتم تفريغها؟

23. Although the Yemeni revolution started in January 2011, no written corpus is available for the debates which took place in Al Jazeera channel between March and August 2011 in two debate programs (The Opposite Direction and In Depth) and between January 2011 to April 2011 in one debate program (Behind the News). Why?

ما سبب عدم تواجد بعض حلقات البرامج مفرغة على الانترنت؟

24. What are the reasons of any discrepancies between the debate recordings and the written transcription?

ما سبب وجود اختلاف بين التفريغ والفيديو؟

25. Are there any factors, policies or people who influence the transcription?

هل توجد أي سياسات أو عوامل تؤثر على التفريغ؟

26. Why does Al Jazeera sometimes cuts parts of videos on YouTube?

لماذا تقوم الجزيرة باقتطاع اجزا من الفيديو؟ علما بأن المقطع يكون مكتوبا بالتفريغ؟

Appendix 7: CONSENT FORM

I, the undersigned *[please give your name here, in BLOCK CAPITALS]*

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

of *[please give contact details here, sufficient to enable the investigator to get in touch with you, such as a postal or email address]*

…..…………………………………………………………………………………………………

hereby freely agree to take part in the study entitled *[***A Critical Discourse Analysis of TV Political Debates of the 2011 Yemen Revolution: the Ideological Balance of Broadcasts****]*

………………………………………………………………………………………………

1 I confirm that I have been given a Participant Information Sheet (a copy of which is attached to this form) giving particulars of the study, including its aim(s), methods and design, the names and contact details of key people and, as appropriate, the risks and potential benefits, and any plans for follow-up studies that might involve further approaches to participants. I have been given details of my involvement in the study. I have been told that in the event of any significant change to the aim(s) or design of the study I will be informed, and asked to renew my consent to participate in it.

2 I have been assured that I may withdraw from the study at any time without disadvantage or having to give a reason.

3 I have been given information about the risks of my suffering harm or adverse effects. I have been told about the aftercare and support that will be offered to me in the event of

this happening, and I have been assured that all such aftercare or support would be provided at no cost to myself.

4 I have been told how information relating to me (data obtained in the course of the study, and data provided by me about myself) will be handled: how it will be kept secure, who will have access to it, and how it will or may be used.

5 I have been informed that my name will not be mentioned in the audio recording and will therefore not appear in the study.

Signature of participant …………………….Date ………………………….

Signature of (principal) investigator……………… Date…………………

Name of (principal) investigator

MS. RAIYA SULAIMAN SALIM AL KHARUSI

Appendix 8: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Title of study

A Critical Discourse Analysis of TV Political Debates of the 2011 Yemen Revolution: the Ideological Balance of Broadcasts

Introduction

You are being invited to take part in a study. Before you decide whether to do so, it is important that you understand the research that is being done and what your involvement will include. Please take the time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Do not hesitate to ask us anything that is not clear or for any further information you would like to help you make your decision. Please do take your time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

What is the purpose of this study?

This study aims at uncovering how language can be used to formulate and circulate hegemonic political ideology in the TV political debates of the 2011 Yemen revolution-how ideology is used as a tool of hegemony.

Do I have to take part?

It is completely up to you whether or not you decide to take part in this study. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. Agreeing to join the study does not mean that you have to complete it. You are free to withdraw at any stage without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part at all, will not affect any treatment/care that you may receive (should this be relevant).

How long will my part in the study take?

If you decide to take part in this study, you will be involved in it for *no more than one hour.*

What will happen to me if I take part?

You will receive an invitation to attend an interview. You may ask for the questions to be disclosed to you in advance, and you will be free to discuss and comment on them.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?

By taking part in this study, you share information about your program production in terms of selecting topics, formulating questions and recording.

How will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

The personal data which will be obtained are your occupation and number of years of experience with Al Jazeera channel. Unless you accept that your occupation and years of experience are added, they will be omitted from the study's data. Your name will not be collected.

What will happen to the data collected within this study?

Interviews will be recorded, transcribed and compared with the analysis of data. Recording and transcription of the interviews will not be accessed to anybody unless with the consent of the interviewer. All data will be stored on encrypted files, and kept on a personal computer which is password protected.

Who has reviewed this study?

This study has been reviewed by the ECDA for Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities: protocol number to be assigned on approval.

Who can I contact if I have any questions?

If you would like further information or would like to discuss any details personally, please get in touch with me, in writing, by phone or by email:

Ms. Raiya Al Kharusi

Email: raya@aou.edu.om

Phone: +968 99214977

Although we hope it is not the case, if you have any complaints or concerns about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the course of this study, please write to the University's Secretary and Registrar at *Secretary/Registrar.s.c.grant@herts.ac.uk*

Thank you very much for reading this information and giving consideration to taking part in this study.

Appendix 9: 'Us' and 'Them'

Table 63 Differentiation: AJ

The opposition (his opponents/ his rivals/ the opposition)	Saleh (the Yemeni president/ Saleh/ Ali Abdullah Saleh/ the man/ the president)
The competitors (his competitors)	Saleh (-)
The people (the Yemeni people)	Saleh (Ali Abdullah Saleh)
The army (the army)	The regime (the government)
The opposition (his opponents)	The regime (the regime)
The revolution (the revolution's youth)	The opposition (the opposition and the ruling party)
The tribes	The opposition (the youth)

Table 64 Differentiation: government

The opposition (the killers, the criminals and gangs, the gangs, the extremists)	Saleh (the president, Ali Abdullah Saleh)
Tawakul (Tawakul Karman)	Saleh (the president Ali Abdullah Saleh)
The opposition (the opposition, these, the members)	The people (the Yemeni people, the people, the people, the Yemeni people)
Tawakul (Tawakul Karman)	The people (the Yemeni people, some youth, these youth, the innocent youth, the innocent)
The opposition (they, the members, gangs that kill the innocent, the others)	The regime (we, we in the ruling party)
Tawakul (Tawakul)	Yasir (I)

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Table 65 Differentiation: protesters

Saleh (the ousted president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, he, family, who kills him, a president who runs the country while being abroad, ousted, war criminal, president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the ruler, the criminal, a person)	The people (his great people, the Yemeni people, the people, his people, the Yemenis, their people)
Saleh (Ali Abdullah Saleh, the ousted, Ali Abdullah Saleh and his sons, dictator, the killers, the thieves, the president, president Saleh, the ruler, Ali Saleh, he)	The opposition (we, the national youth revolution, we, the revolution's youth, we, the protesters, the youth, the revolution's youth forces, the opposition, the squares, the youth)
Saleh (the dictators, Ali Abdullah Saleh)	The revolution (the revolutions, the national youth revolution)
Saleh (Ali Abdullah Saleh)	The army (the army)
Saleh (Ali Abdullah Saleh, the entourage and the family, Saleh)	America (America, the brothers in the European Union and the United States of America)
The people in the eyes of Saleh (terrorists)	The people in the eyes of the world (the people of peace, the people of safety, the people of love)
The regime (Yasir al Yamani and other than brother Yasir al Yamani like defenders of the family regime), they, the regime, the gang,	The opposition (The national youth revolution, the opposition, the youth lines, the youth, a revolution government, the Yemeni youth, the

conspiracy government and termination government, the remnants of the thugs of the ousted regime, the gang, the thugs, regime)	protesters and the opposition, the revolution youth)
The regime (the regime)	The revolution (the Yemeni revolution)
The regime (they, Ali Abdullah Saleh's thugs, the regime)	The people (the people, their people, the Yemeni people)
The regime (they)	The world (the world)
The Gulf (who came up with the initiative)	The opposition (our youth)
The Gulf (who came up with the initiative, some forces)	The people (our people, the Yemeni people)
The regime (this regime)	The Gulf (the brothers in the Gulf)

Table 66 Generalized social actors: AJ

Connotation	Social actors
Negative	The regime, the dictator, treacherous government, treacherous regime, the ruling clique, Ali Abdullah Saleh's group, the sheikhs, his sheikhs, the elderly, his competitors, the regime officials, Al Ahmer (Ahmer, Bait Al Ahmer), the rulers (Arab rulers, the Americans, the Arab rulers and the tyrants)
Victim	The wounded people, his civilians, Yemen's people, the protestors, the people's sectors, the Yemenis
Faithful	Opposition parties, the protesters' leaders, the sheikhs of Hashid tribes, military leaders, ambassadors

Strong	The Yemeni people, the people, the unarmed people, the protesters, the revolutionary Yemeni, the protesters, the opposition

Table 67 Generalized social actors: government

Connotation	Social actors
Negative	The opposition, the killers, the criminals, the gangs, the extremists, the parties, these few members
Victim	The Yemeni people, the Yemeni people, the innocent, these youth, the innocent youth, the revolutionary Yemeni people, the safe people
Faithful	National leaders, military leaders, leaders from the people, the ruling party
Strong	The people, the millions

Table 68 Generalized social actors: protesters

Sociolinguistic function	Social actors
Negative	His regime, the regime, the killers, chief country leaders, the remnants of this regime, and those who work with them, this regime's figures, the dictators, Saleh's family, the entourage, the national security, Saleh's family, the oppressors, the tyrants, who kills them(people), the regime's thugs, the ones who misused the power, patronage networks, the killers and the corrupts, al Qaida
Victim	The people of Yemen and those who work with them, the martyrs
Faithful	his great people, the people of peace, the people of safety, the people

	of love, the Yemeni people, great people, the protesters, the tribe, the society, the martyrs, the wounded, the tribes, the Houthis, all the forces, (the army, our army, our forces, the armed forces, our brothers in the army)
Strong	The youth, the opposition, the revolution's youth, the youth and the opposition, the people, the heroes, the national youth revolution forces, the protesters, the holy fighters, the Yemenis