Information theoretic incentives for social interaction
Salge, Christoph and Polani, D.
(2009)
Information theoretic incentives for social interaction.
University of Hertfordshire.
A first step towards social interaction is to observe other agents and their actions. The concept of "Relevant Information" is used to argue, from an information theoretic perspective, why it would be beneficial to observe other agents, and why observing their actions should be relevant to me, even if their actions are not. A simple grid world model illustrates those points, for a simple information gathering task, and shows how to utilise this information to increase an agent's performance.
Item Type | Other |
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Date Deposited | 14 Nov 2024 10:57 |
Last Modified | 14 Nov 2024 10:57 |
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